“About four o’clock most of the officers and men posted on the quarter-deck being killed and wounded, the largest ship making up to us with diligence, being still within a cable’s length of us, often giving us a broadside, there being now no hopes of Capt. Kirby coming to our assistance, we endeavoured to run ashore: and though we drew four feet more of water than the pirate, it pleased God that he struck on a higher ground than happily we fell in with: so was disappointed a second time from boarding us. Here we had a more violent engagement than before: all my officers and most of my men behaved with unexpected courage: and, as we had a considerable advantage by having a broadside to his bow, we did him great damage: so, that had Captain Kirby come in then, I believe we should have taken both the vessels, for we had one of them sure: but the other pirate (who was still firing at us) seeing the Greenwich did not offer to assist us, supplied his consort with three boats full of fresh men. About five in the evening the Greenwich stood clear away to sea, leaving us struggling hard for life, in the very jaws of death: which the other pirate that was afloat seeing, got a warp out, and was hauling under our stern.

“By this time many of my men being killed and wounded, and no hopes left us of escaping being all murdered by enraged barbarous conquerors, I ordered all that could to get into the long-boat, under the cover of the smoke of our guns: so that, with what some did in boats, and others by swimming, most of us that were able got ashore by seven o’clock. When the pirates came aboard, they cut three of our wounded men to pieces. I with some of my people made what haste I could to King’s town, twenty-five miles from us, where I arrived next day, almost dead with the fatigue and loss of blood, having been sorely wounded in the head by a musket-ball.

“At this town I heard that the pirates had offered ten thousand dollars to the country people to bring me in, which many of them would have accepted, only they knew the king and all his chief people were in my interest. Meantime I caused a report to be circulated that I was dead of my wounds, which much abated their fury. About ten days after, being pretty well recovered, and hoping the malice of our enemy was near over, I began to consider the dismal condition we were reduced to: being in a place where we had no hopes of getting a passage home, all of us in a manner naked, not having had time to bring with us either a shirt or a pair of shoes, except what we had on. Having obtained leave to go on board the pirates with a promise of safety, several of the chief of them knew me, and some of them had sailed with me, which I found to be of great advantage; because, notwithstanding their promise, some of them would have cut me to pieces, and all that would not enter with them, had it not been for their chief captain, Edward England, and some others whom I knew. They talked of burning one of their ships, which we had so entirely disabled as to be no farther useful to them, and to fit the Cassandra in her room. But in the end I managed the affair so well, that they made me a present of the said shattered ship, which was Dutch built, and called the Fancy: her burden was about three hundred tons. I procured also a hundred and twenty-nine bales of the Company’s cloth, though they would not give me a rag of my own clothes.

“They sailed on the 3rd of September: and I, with the jury masts, and such old sails as they left me, made a shift to do the like on the 8th, together with forty-three of my ship’s crew, including two passengers and twelve soldiers: having no more than five tuns of water aboard. After a passage of forty-eight days, I arrived here on the 26th of October, almost naked and starved, having been reduced to a pint of water a day, and almost in despair of ever seeing land, by reason of the calms we met with between the coast of Arabia and Malabar.

“We had in all thirteen men killed and twenty-four wounded: and we were told that we destroyed about ninety or a hundred of the pirates. When they left us, there were about three hundred whites and eight blacks in both ships. I am persuaded had our consort of the Greenwich done his duty, we had destroyed both of them, and got two hundred thousand pounds for our owners and selves: whereas the loss of the Cassandra may justly be imputed to his deserting us. I have delivered all the bales that were given me into the company’s warehouse, for which the governor and council have ordered me a reward. Our governor, Mr Boon, who is extremely kind and civil to me, had ordered me home with the packet: but Captain Harvey who had a prior promise, being come in with the fleet, goes in my room. The governor had promised me a country voyage to help to make up my losses, and would have me stay and accompany him to England next year.”

This Captain England was a notorious sea-pirate and had made many a capture of an innocent merchant ship, and now commanded the Victory, which as the Peterborough he had previously captured. He used Madagascar as his base for attacking East Indiamen, though he had sailed into most of the seas of the world on the look-out for his victims. It was only after remaining a short time at Madagascar that they had proceed to Juanna and fallen in with the two English East Indiamen and one Ostender. Captain Mackra was certainly lucky to have got off with his life and also with even a crippled ship to reach India. But England, villain that he was, respected Mackra as a brave seaman, and with difficulty succeeded in restraining the pirate crew from exhausting their fury upon the East Indiaman captain. In fact this generosity towards Mackra was eventually the undoing of England, for the crew considered the treatment had not been in accordance with the severe traditions of pirates, and England was deprived of his command.

Captains of the East Indiamen had to be masters of resource no less than able tacticians and shipmasters. In the month of January 1797 the French Rear-Admiral Sercey was splendidly outwitted by the captain of one of the East India Company’s merchant ships. It happened on this wise. Admiral Sercey was commanding a squadron of six frigates and was returning to the Isle of France. When he was off the east end of Java he descried what appeared to be a considerable force, and before the day had ended counted himself very fortunate to have escaped them. That, indeed, was how it appeared to him. But looked at from the opposite point of view we have to consider half-a-dozen homeward-bound East Indiamen all richly laden, and not one of them a warship. The commodore of this merchant squadron was Captain Charles Lennox, whose ship was the Woodford. On the morning of the day mentioned he was alarmed to see Admiral Sercey’s frigate squadron and feared for the safety of the Indiamen under his own charge. Here was a dilemma indeed. These six merchantmen were not the equal of the six frigates in a fight: therefore an engagement must be avoided. But, on the other hand, if the merchantmen attempted to crowd on all sail and run away this would be an admission of inferior strength and the Frenchman would be bound to attack at once.

So with much ingenuity Lennox devised a piece of bluff. In order to deceive Sercey, the English commodore hoisted the blue flag of the French Rear-Admiral Rainier at the mizen, and made all the other five ships to hoist pennants and ensigns to correspond, for it must be remembered that in appearance a French frigate and one of the Company’s East Indiamen were very similar at a distance. In addition he had the audacity to detach two of his ships and send them on to reconnoitre the French squadron. These approached the French reconnoitring frigate Cybèle, and the latter’s captain, having had a good look at the enemy, made the signal at her mast-head, “The enemy is superior in force to the French,” and crowding on sail rejoined Sercey’s squadron. The French admiral therefore caused his ships to make sail and escape, though when one of his vessels—the Forte—had the misfortune to carry away her maintopmast he was more than surprised to notice that the English did not continue their chase. But inasmuch as the captain of the Cybèle had assured him that the enemy’s force consisted of two line-of-battle ships and four frigates he felt that he was justified in retreating and declining fight. So it came about that the six East Indiamen were able to congratulate themselves on escaping, and the French rear-admiral was no less pleased to have avoided an engagement. But you may judge of the latter’s anger and chagrin four weeks later when, on arriving at the Isle of France, he learned that Admiral Rainier had not been near the straits (where the East Indiamen were sighted), and that therefore six rich merchant ships which ought to have been captured had been allowed literally to slip through his fingers.

From time immemorial the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Persia had been the happy hunting-ground of pirates, and the mouth of the Red Sea, from its strategical position, was another favourite resort. There is on record an incident belonging to the year 1696, when the pirates attacked a Bombay ship commanded by an Englishman named Sawbridge, whose cargo consisted of Arab horses for Surat. The pirates were able to seize the ship, whereupon Sawbridge began to expostulate with them as to their manner of life. On this they ordered him to be silent, but as he continued to speak they took a sail-needle and twine and sewed his lips together, keeping him like this for several hours with his hands tied behind him. They then at length unloosed both his hands and his lips and took him on board their own ship, and having successfully plundered Sawbridge’s vessel they set it on fire, burning both her and the horses. Sawbridge was set ashore at Aden, together with his people, but it is not surprising to learn that he soon died.

Now the pirate in this case was not an Oriental, but that notorious blackguard Captain Avery, who certainly knew better. The pirates, however, of whom we are now to speak as enemies of the East Indiamen ships were those Easterns who dwelt on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf and were known by the name of Joassamees. They were seamen by nature and occupation, trading with their vessels to Bussorah, Bushire, Muscat and India. Finding that to plunder the big merchant ships which now came to the Persian Gulf was a profitable concern, they applied themselves with great assiduity to that task, and became even more ambitious. About the year 1797 one of the East India Company’s warships was lying at anchor in the inner roads of Bushire (on the Persian side of the Gulf). Her name was the Viper and she carried ten guns. Anchored in the harbour were some Joassamee dhows, but as they had always respected or feared the British flag no hostile measures had been taken against them by British ships. The commanders of these dhows had applied to the Persian agent of the East India Company for a supply of gunpowder and cannon shot, and as the agent had no suspicion of their intentions he furnished them with an order to the commanding officer on board for the quantity required.

The captain of the Viper was ashore at the time in the agent’s house, but as the order was produced to the officer on board the powder and shot were delivered and the dhows subsequently made sail. At this moment the crew of the Viper were below at breakfast, when suddenly they were alarmed by a cannonade from two of the dhows directed at the Viper. The Joassamees attempted to board, but the English officers leaping on deck sent the crew to quarters, cut the Viper’s cable and got sail upon her so that she might have the advantage of manœuvring. A regular engagement now followed between the Viper and four dhows, all being armed with guns and full of men. The commanding officer of the Viper was wounded, but after tying round a handkerchief still kept the deck, till he fell with a ball entering his forehead. The command then devolved on a midshipman, who continued the fight with great bravery, and the result was that the dhows were beaten off and chased out to sea.

Reverting now to the Company’s purely mercantile ships it is well to see how they were armed to withstand the attacks of their enemies. On another page the reader will find the lines of one of the finest East Indiamen of the early nineteenth century. This was one of the Company’s ships which carried freight and passengers between England and India and was not one of their cruisers belonging to the Bombay Marine. We may take this vessel as typical of the biggest and most formidable type of their ships at the time of which we are speaking. She measured 165 feet 6½ inches long. Her length of keel (measured for tonnage) was 134 feet. Her extreme breadth was 42 feet, and the depth of her hold 17 feet, her burthen working out at 1257 tons. Such a ship was armed with twenty-six 18-pounders on her middle deck and ten 18-pounders on her upper deck, with two more guns in the after ports as stern-chasers. One of the greatest authorities on shipbuilding and naval architecture of that time, who himself was a Fellow of the Royal Society, went so far as to state that the biggest East Indiamen were not safe owing to their bad design below water, adding that whenever these vessels got ashore in bad weather they usually broke their floors and then filled with water—so weakly constructed were they below.

With respect to the armament of these ships, James, the famous naval historian, in commenting on that incident in which Commodore Dance beat off the French Admiral Linois (already related in another chapter), says that each of the Indiamen under Dance carried from thirty to thirty-six guns apiece, but the strongest of them was not a match for the smallest 36-gun French frigate, and some of these East Indiamen would have found it difficult to avoid yielding to the 22-gun corvette. Speaking of these East Indiamen, he says: “Some of the ships carried upon the main deck 26 medium 18-pounders, or ‘carronades,’ weighing about 28 cwt. and of very little use: guns of this description, indeed, have long since been exploded. Ten 18-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck made up the 36 guns. Others of the ships, and those among the largest, mounted long 12 and 6 pounders. No one of the crews, we believe, exceeded 140 men, and that number included Chinese, Lascars, etc. Moreover in fitting the ships, so much more attention had been paid to stowage than to the means of attack and defence, that one and sometimes two butts of water were lashed between the guns, and the decks in general greatly lumbered.”

The fact was that the old East Indiamen had to go about their work under very trying conditions. They could not be built of more than a certain tonnage for the reason that shipbuilders were not equal to the task. Within their limited size of about 140 feet on the keel a very great deal had to be got in. First and most important of all, the ship must be able to carry a large amount of cargo. Without this she would not be of service to the East India Company. Secondly, she carried passengers and a large crew. This meant that the designer’s ingenuity was further taxed to find accommodation for all. Then, although she had to be strong enough to carry all her armament, yet she had to make as fast a passage as she could with safety and caution. In short, like all other ships she was a compromise, but the real difficulty was to combine space, speed and fighting strength without one item ousting the other. To-day the designer of our merchant ships has a difficult problem; but he has not to consider so much how his ship would fare in an engagement, but how he can get out of her the greatest speed combined with the maximum amount of room for passengers and cargo. He has to work on all sorts of data obtained from actual experience of years and experiments made in tanks with wax models. But the designers and builders of the old East Indiamen were tied down to the frigate type and bound by convention. There was very little science in shipbuilding, and practically all that they could do was to modify very slightly the models which had been in vogue for so many generations. If they had been in possession of greater theoretical knowledge, if they could have been allowed to eliminate all thought of the ship being a fighting unit, we should have seen, no doubt, the clipper era appearing some years before it actually did. It is easy enough to find fault with the old East Indiamen for their clumsiness, but it is much more just to remember the conditions which were handicapping the designers and builders of those times.

CHAPTER XXI

THE “WARREN HASTINGS” AND THE “PIÉMONTAISE”

One of the most gallant duels which was ever fought between a merchant ship and a man-of-war is that which occurred in the year 1805: and though eventually the former was at last captured, yet the engagement none the less remains to her credit, since the fight lasted for four hours and the enemy was compelled to haul off several times during the action. The incident, in fact, affords an excellent example of the readiness for hostilities which was so marked a feature of the old East Indiamen. James has happily preserved to posterity a full account of this, although in some instances he has not always done full credit to the gallantry and determination of these merchant ships. And I shall make no apology for availing myself of his detailed story.

The Warren Hastings was a vessel of 1200 tons, was armed with 44 guns, and her crew consisted of 196 men and boys. She was therefore in size, in armament and crew a distinctly formidable ship, her commander being Captain Thomas Larkins. On the 17th of February 1805 she left Portsmouth bound for China. This was one of the most historic years in the whole history of the sea, and a few months later the Battle of Trafalgar brought matters to a crisis. It was obvious that in consequence of the eventful times no ship, not even an East Indiaman, could dare to begin a voyage unless special precautions had been taken to render her as fully equipped against a French frigate as both money and the ship’s own limitations would permit.

In the case of so valuable a ship as the Warren Hastings extraordinary precautions had been taken to make her as powerful as possible. Her forty-four guns were composed as follows. She carried on her main or lower deck twenty-six medium 18-pounders, fourteen carronades (18-pounders) on her upper deck, and four carronades (12-pounders) on her poop. The medium gun was six feet in length, and weighed about 26¾ cwt. It will be seen that this was a smaller weapon than that used in the Royal Navy, for the common 18-pounder of the latter measured nine feet long, and weighed 42 cwt. The East Indiaman’s medium 18-pounder when run out did not reach out more than a foot from the ship’s side. The 18-pounder carronade was five feet long, and weighed about 15½ cwt. The 12-pounder was 3¼ feet long and weighed about 8½ cwt. The Warren Hastings’ carronades were mounted, says James, “upon a carriage resembling Gover’s in every particular but the only essential one, the having of rollers adapted to a groove in the slide. The consequence of this silly evasion of an ingenious man’s patent was, that the whole of the ship’s quarter-deck and poop guns became utterly useless, after only a few rounds had been fired from them. The first discovery of any imperfection in the new carriage occurred at exercise: but a plentiful supply of blacklead upon the upper surface of the slide lessened the friction, and, with the aid of an additional hand, enabled the gun to be run out. On account, however, of the rain, and the salt water in washing the deck, the application of blacklead was obliged to be repeated every time of exercise.”

The Warren Hastings, after leaving Portsmouth on the day mentioned, made a safe and uneventful passage to China and duly began her return journey. But this time she was armed not quite so strongly. Four of her main-deck ports had been caulked up so as to afford additional space for a storeroom, and the four guns had been put away in the hold. Nor had she so good a crew, for forty Chinamen had decided to remain at Canton, and there was the usual impressment from the British navy, a warship relieving the Warren Hastings of eighteen English seamen: and you can be sure they were some of the best men in the ship. In addition to the four guns already mentioned, four of the 18-pounder carronades were also transferred to the hold. The net result was that when she put to sea for her homeward voyage she mounted 36 guns only and carried a crew of 138 men and boys.

It was on the 21st of June at 7.30 in the morning that, while this ship was foaming along under a smart press of canvas before a strong breeze, she descried a strange ship under treble-reefed topsails and courses. This turned out to be the French frigate Piémontaise of 40 guns, commanded by Captain Jacques Epron. This ship was armed rather differently from the rest of French frigates which were so famous at this period, and as we are about to watch the contest between her and the Indiaman it will be well to notice these details. The Piémontaise had the usual twenty-eight long 18-pounders on her main-deck. On her quarter-deck and forecastle she mounted ten iron and two brass 36-pounder carronades, two long French 8-pounders, and four long English 9-pounders, these having belonged to the British frigate Jason, which had been compelled to throw them overboard when she grounded off Pointe de la Trenche at the capture of the Seine in 1798.

In addition to her forty-six carriage guns, the Frenchmen also carried swivel guns and musketoons in her tops and along her gunwales. On each fore and main yard-arm there was fixed a tripod to contain a shell weighing a quarter of a ton, the idea being that when in combat she got alongside another ship, the shell was to have its fuse lighted by a man lying out on the yard. It would then be thrown from the tripod, fall on the enemy’s deck, pass through to the deck below, and then exploding would cause wholesale destruction. Meanwhile, the French crew would rush on board, profiting by this confusion, and the capture of the Frenchman’s enemy would be an easier matter. The French crew would also be armed each with a dagger in the buttonholes of his jacket in addition to the boarding-pike which he would hold in his hand. These tactics were, even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a curious survival of the mediæval methods of fighting. Gunnery was not the chief reliance, but was looked upon merely as a means for quelling the enemy so that she might be boarded and a hand-to-hand fight begun. It seems strange in this twentieth century, when a battleship would open fire at six miles and be pretty sure to keep a good distance from its opponent, that the older fashion should have survived so long. If the French frigates of yesterday were the German light cruisers of to-day, and the old East Indiamen were the crack ships of the Cunard Line of the P. & O., the latter could, if desired, be attacked and sunk without the vessels ever getting within several miles of each other, let alone any thought of boarding, unless the German was determined to spare human life, keep within the limits of international law and take the merchant ship captive. Thus have the conditions changed in the course of time.

But to return to the incident before us. An hour and a half after sighting the Frenchman, the Warren Hastings noticed that the frigate was shaking out her reefs from her topsails and was approaching the English ship, the latter still keeping on her course. At half-past nine that morning the frigate was fast gaining on the Indiaman, and nevertheless set her topgallant-sails as well as her fore and maintopmast stuns’ls. Her next act was to hoist an English blue ensign and pennant. However, the skipper of the Warren Hastings was far too experienced in the ways of the sea to be taken in by this piece of bluff, and still kept his ship on her way. He replied to the signals by hoisting his English colours and making the private signal, of which we have spoken elsewhere in this volume. The Frenchman, however, made no reply to this private signal, so it was pretty certain that there was treachery.

On came the frigate, tearing through the water with the smart breeze, doing good work all the time. Meanwhile, the East Indiaman’s commander was seeing that everything was in readiness for obvious impending trouble. At eleven o’clock he shortened sail, hauled up a point and cleared his ship for action. One hour later the frigate also took in her “fancy” canvas—her stuns’ls and her staysails, but also her mainsail too. And having approached to within one mile hauled down her English colours and sent up her French flag. She had intentionally chosen the leeward position, because of the high wind, and opened fire at the Indiaman’s port quarter within musket-shot distance—that is to say, about four hundred yards away; and so soon as the Indiaman could bring her guns to bear this fire was returned. This firing went on for about a quarter of an hour, when the frigate bore away, let her sails fill, and went on ahead. The only damage that had been done to the Indiaman was to carry away part of the rigging.

After the frigate had got about a mile and a half ahead the latter tacked, passed close to leeward of the Warren Hastings again, and once more a smart fire was exchanged. This time several of the Warren Hastings’ crew were killed and wounded, and in addition the whole of the port fore shrouds, the foretopsail tie, her chief running gear, her stays and her ensign were cut away and her foremast seriously injured. The ensign, however, was quickly rehoisted at the maintopgallant-masthead. Quickly the Indiaman repaired her damage, but then the frigate having put about astern of the Indiaman began the action a third time, though this did little more damage than crippling the merchant ship’s foremast altogether. Owing to this fact and the heavy sea and high wind the Warren Hastings could carry sail only on her main and mizen masts. The result was that the Frenchman could run round her even more easily than before.

This time she went ahead again, tacked, and was about to make a further onslaught when the Warren Hastings opened a hot fire. The Frenchman replied, but it was seen that the Englishman was being injured still more and more. She was now injured not merely at her foremast, but at her main too. Her standing and running rigging had also been considerably damaged, two quarter-deck guns were disabled, five men had been killed and others were wounded. However, in this crippled state she had to sustain a fifth attack. For the frigate, coming on the Indiaman’s port quarter, poured in a heavy and destructive fire which smashed the driver-boom to splinters, and soon the mizen-mast went. And as it fell it succeeded in disabling every effective gun on the upper deck. Troubles seldom come singly, and in addition to these misfortunes the lower deck was on fire from the shot which had entered the counter, and as the nail of the tiller rope on the barrel of the steering wheel had drawn, the rudder became useless.

The surgeon was in the act of amputating and dressing the wounded when a shot entered and destroyed the whole of his instruments. Altogether it was a bad business, and the poor, crippled Indiaman, after having done her best to fight against a superior foe, was reluctantly compelled to lower her colours just before five o’clock that evening. She had been rendered almost a mere hulk, she had lost her purser and six men all killed. Thirteen more, including her chief, third and sixth officers and her surgeon’s mate had been wounded, whereas the Frenchman out of her enormous crew of 385 men and boys had lost only seven men killed and five badly wounded. Her hull was practically undamaged and her rigging and sails were only partially injured. But this, of course, was natural enough, for the frigate’s weight of broadside was 533 lb. as against the Indiaman’s 312 lb. The Indiaman carried only 138 men and boys, as against the Frenchman’s 385.

But it is necessary also to bear in mind that a warship exists solely for the purpose of being an efficient fighting unit. This frigate had to think of nothing else. Whenever she cruised about, her intention was to find some opportunity of inflicting injury on an English ship. The Indiaman, on the other hand, had to consider primarily how best she could carry the greatest amount of cargo, how she could get this to port in the quickest manner: and then only in a secondary sense had she to contemplate being an able fighter. Necessarily, therefore, the frigate was always better armed and more ready for war. It so happened that the Warren Hastings was still further handicapped by the fact that she could make very little use of her upper deck and poop batteries after the second or third round of shot. Owing to lack of men she could man only eight out of her eleven guns on her lower deck, while the frigate was in no way impeded.

“Under these circumstances,” says James, “the defence made by the Warren Hastings, protracted as it was to four hours and a half, displayed a highly commendable zeal and perseverance on the part of Captain Larkins, his officers, and ship’s company, but with all their gallant efforts, the latter could never have succeeded in capturing—although, had the ship’s guns been in an effective state, they might, in beating off—an antagonist so well armed, manned, and appointed as the Piémontaise.”

But we have not yet concluded. The Warren Hastings being dismasted, and a heavy sea running, the ship was allowed to fall off. And as the French frigate was lying close to leeward, under three topsails, with the mizen one aback and the main one on the shake, this warship had to bear up to avoid collision with the Indiaman. The former filled her maintopsail, but as there was none left at the helm she luffed up into the wind and fouled the Warren Hastings on the latter’s port bow. You can readily imagine that with such a sea running there followed a series of sickening thuds as these two heavy ships banged against each other’s sides. But the situation was now suitable for boarding tactics, and the Frenchmen, led by the first lieutenant, poured aboard the merchant ship. But they came not as conquerors, but as assassins, with uplifted daggers and threatening the lives of all.

One of these villains dragged the English captain about the ship, accusing him of an attempt to run the frigate down in order to cripple her masts. The first lieutenant also stabbed the captain on the right side. It was a brutal affray, which cannot be said to redound to the credit of any naval officer. Captain Larkins, brave man though he was, soon fainted through loss of blood, and was then ordered on board the frigate. It should be added that the first lieutenant and many of his men were highly intoxicated at the time and so cannot be held fully responsible for their base treatment of their victims. The second officer, the surgeon and the boatswain’s mate were also stabbed, and a midshipman was pierced in seven different places by the first lieutenant. The ship was afterwards pillaged by this drunken gang, but after such excesses had been allowed to have their way the French captain did his best to make the survivors comfortable. The Piémontaise then steered for the Isle of France, taking her fine prize in tow, one of the handsomest vessels which the Honourable East India Company ever possessed. Captor and captive arrived at the Isle of France on the 4th of July, and a strange sight these two must have made as they proceeded. The reader may have marvelled that the Piémontaise had been able to overhaul the Warren Hastings so quickly and to manœuvre so easily when she kept returning to make one attack after another. But these French frigates were splendid craft and wonderfully fast, for although the East Indiamen were built on frigate lines more or less, yet they were modified to allow of a large cargo being carried, and this of course could be done only by sacrificing speed possibility. Some idea of the pace which these French frigates could reach may be gathered from the statement that the Piémontaise, in a moderate breeze, carrying three single-reefed topsails, foresail and mizen staysail, was able to tow her prize, a deeply laden ship of bigger tonnage than herself, having very small jury-sail set, at the rate of seven and a half knots an hour.

This fight and capture show the kind of adventure that was always imminent during a great portion of the East Indiaman period. It is almost difficult for us who travel with safety and punctuality in modern steamship liners to realise the uncertainty, the danger and anxieties with which the old merchant ships to the East proceeded on their way. There was not a species of disaster peculiar to maritime travel that was not ready to bring the career of such fine ships to a speedy end. Every conceivable kind of enemy seemed to be lying in wait for these craft: and the wonder really is, not that they were so often lost, but that they got to port. Knowing, as we do, something of the characters of the commanders who took these East Indiamen over the ocean, we need not be altogether surprised that their sagacity, their determination, leadership, seamanship and ability as navigators and tacticians when tested did so much for the honour of their service and for the safety of the ships and cargoes which the Company entrusted to their care. They were men of whom the Company and the country had every right to be proud.

CHAPTER XXII

PIRATES AND FRENCH FRIGATES

Another pirate who was a thorn in the flesh to the East Indiamen was a man named Jean Lafitte, who was born at St Malo. This man was no stranger to the Eastern seas. He had been appointed mate of a French East Indiaman which was bound from Europe to Madras. But on the way out the ship encountered bad weather off the Cape of Good Hope, by which she was so damaged that the captain determined to call at Mauritius: and a quarrel having sprung up between Lafitte and the captain, the former decided to quit the ship at the island. Now there were several privateers or pirates fitting out at this island, and before long Lafitte became captain of one of these vessels.

For a time he cruised about the seas robbing whatsoever ships he could, but was eventually chased by an English frigate as far north as the Equator: and from there he later on came south and proceeded to the Bay of Bengal to obtain provisions. His ship was of 200 tons, with only two guns and twenty-six men. This should be noted, because it shows how much inferior as a fighting unit she was to any Indiaman. Nevertheless whilst off the Bengal coast he fell in with the East Indiaman Pagoda, which was armed with twenty-six 12-pounders and had a crew of a hundred and fifty men. With this disparity in strength it was obvious that Lafitte could only hope for victory by employing artifice. So he manœuvred as if he were a pilot for the Ganges ready at his station cruising about. The Pagoda came along and was quite taken in by this trickery, and, to cut the story short, when it was all too late to get out of the trap, the East Indiaman found Lafitte’s ship alongside, and the pirate, together with his men, suddenly leapt on board the merchant ship, overcame every opposition and very speedily captured the ship. And it was this same pirate who at a later date became skipper of that notorious Confiance of which we have had need to speak in this volume.

We pass over the intervening period until we come to the year 1807, when we find Lafitte during the month of October still on the prowl. Off the Sand Heads he fell in with the East Indiaman Queen, a vessel of about 800 tons, a crew of nearly four hundred, and carrying forty guns. She was such a fine ship that this Frenchman determined to become her owner. Compared with the pirate the Queen, with her tall masts and high freeboard, her guns and crew, seemed absurdly superior to the smaller vessel. But Lafitte was as plucky as he was adventurous, and this apparent inequality only added zest to his plans. As the two ships were getting nearer and nearer, he exhorted his men with that wild, almost fanatical enthusiasm which was usually an electrifying force to a band of desperadoes, and then having manœuvred his ship with no little cleverness, brought her alongside the Indiaman. Just as he did this the English vessel greeted him with a broadside, but the Frenchman was expecting this, and ordered his men to lie flat on the deck. And when the first fire had been made, the pirates all got up again, and from the yards and tops hurled down bombs and grenades into the Indiaman’s forecastle.

These tactics entirely surprised the Queen’s captain, and great havoc was wrought. Lafitte realising the amount of consternation which had now been caused sent aboard the Queen forty of his men with pistols in their hands and daggers between their teeth, and as soon as their feet touched the Indiaman’s deck they drove the terrified and astonished crowd into the steerage, where the latter endeavoured to defend themselves as best they could. Lafitte now reinforced his forty men with another division, and himself went as their leader, and the result was that the Queen’s captain was killed and the rest of the survivors were swept into one terror-stricken crowd. He then caused a gun to be loaded with grape and pointed to the place where the crowd were gathered, and threatened to blow them into eternity. Upon this the English determined that further opposition was useless, and surrendered. Lafitte therefore ceased his bloody slaughter, and became possessor of the ship. The incident, when the news reached India, caused a deep sensation, and the name of this scoundrel was spoken of with horror. But as East Indiamen now began to traverse the Indian Ocean only under powerful convoys, Lafitte found his opportunities very few and rare, so he betook himself to other waters, to end his days with a violent death.

We come now to the year 1810. About this time the French frigates were very actively on the qui vive for our East Indiamen and other merchant ships, and the neighbourhood of Madagascar and Mauritius was popular for setting forth to lie in wait for the victims. When any prisoners were brought in here from the Company’s ships they were made to form part of the crews of these French frigates. And if any British soldiers were also found on board they were likewise destined to become part of the frigates’ complement. Some were made so to do only by vehement threats if they declined: while some others were base enough to desert the English flag.

On the 3rd of July of the year just mentioned, just as the day was dawning, the French frigates, Bellone and Minerve, and the corvette Victor, having stood leisurely up the Mozambique Channel, were about thirty-six miles off the island of Mayotta, when they were sighted by three outward-bound East Indiamen, who were steering to the north before a fresh breeze from the south-south-east. The frigates were about nine miles off to the north-north-east, close-hauled on the port tack. A signal was made by the senior officer or commodore of the British ships half-an-hour later, and the three Indiamen hauled their wind on the port tack under double-reefed topsails, courses, jib and spanker. The names of these vessels were the Ceylon (commodore’s flagship), Windham and Astell, the commodore being Captain Henry Meriton. At half-past seven the Ceylon made the private signal, as was customary. This was in accordance with the secret code provided by the Admiralty: and if the strange ships had been British naval frigates or fellow East Indiamen they would have answered in accordance with the code. Failure to reply would have indicated that they were hostile.

Inasmuch as there was no reply in this case the East Indiamen’s commodore ordered his ships to clear for action. There could be no sort of doubt now, and every minute was valuable, for the enemy was passing on the opposite tack. At half-past nine the Astell was carrying rather more sail than she could do with and made a signal to that effect: the Ceylon and Windham therefore shortened sail to keep her company. Captain Meriton now telegraphed to his two consorts the following message: “As we cannot get away, I think we had better go under easy sail and bring them to action before dark.” It was the only thing to be done: otherwise the Astell might have been lost. The Windham, however, replied thus: “If we make all sail and get into smooth water under the land we can engage to more advantage.” But half-an-hour later, as the force of the wind had increased, it became necessary for the East Indiamen to heave-to and take in a third reef in their topsails. But even under this shortened canvas the ships were making heavy weather of it. As a fact, they heeled over so much that the high sea that was running made it quite impossible for the lower-deck ports on the lee side to be kept open.

James, with his characteristic love of detail, has given full particulars of this incident, and we can well watch with him what followed. At 11.30 A.M. the Minerve tacked in the wake of the Indiamen and at about six miles away. Soon afterwards the Bellone and the Victor also went about. When Captain Meriton had watched these tactics and observed the Minerve coming up at a great rate astern he made the following signal: “Form line abreast, to bear on ships together, Ceylon in the centre.” So the Windham, Ceylon and Astell formed a close line in the order named and awaited the oncoming of the enemy, and the Victor and Minerve were approaching rapidly on the starboard quarter, which was also the weather side.

Presently the Minerve arrived abreast of the British centre, the Victor being ahead. Up went French colours, a shot was fired at the Windham and then a whole broadside was fired into the Ceylon, which was so close astern of her consort as almost to touch her. The Astell, however, was a long way to leeward and astern of the Ceylon. When the corvette opened fire the action became general between the Minerve and Victor of the one side and the Windham, Ceylon and Astell on the other. But inasmuch as the Ceylon, by reason of her situation, was just abeam of the frigate, this Indiaman received a pretty hot time. After a little while the corvette found the fire of the British too warm, so bore up and passed to leeward of the Astell, and the captain of the latter becoming wounded severely, the chief mate had to take command. It is quite certain that an officer of a modern steamship liner is a much abler navigator than those who served in the old East Indiamen. But it is unquestionable that even if he were a Royal Naval Reserve officer, and had served for a year in his Majesty’s fleet, he would not be such a master of tactics as his forefathers who served in the “John” Company. I have not the slightest doubt in asserting that if a European war broke out to-morrow every officer in the British mercantile marine would render an excellent account of himself for resource and bravery. Recent disasters and rescues in mid-ocean have shown that the fine old British stuff still goes to the making of our sailors. But if their ships were attacked by cruisers the merchantman would have no opportunity for displaying fighting tactics, since there is to-day a far greater difference between the fighting qualities of a liner and a navy’s cruiser than there existed between an armed East Indiaman and a French frigate. And this even if we include the recently built Aquitania of the Cunard line, which happens to be the most heavily armed British liner which ever put to sea.

In these sea-fights, then, between the Indiamen and their foreign enemies we have a condition that is not comparable with anything to-day. It belongs to the past absolutely, and therefore the difference between the captains of yesterday and to-day is also different, and that not merely owing to the fact that one commanded a ship propelled by sails, whereas his successor handles a steamship. We cannot help admiring the many-sided ability of the East Indiamen captains. Taking them by and large, with all their defects in respect of smuggling and other delinquencies which need not be enlarged upon, they were extraordinarily successful in most complicated circumstances. It is characteristic of any kind of seaman, in whatever service he is enrolled, that he is adaptable, but could you find a greater strain imposed on any man than that which had to be borne by the commanders of the vessels whose history we are considering? As exponents of the art of pure seamanship they were never beaten, unless by their immediate successors, who made such wonderful passages during the clipper-ship era. And certainly as tacticians and fighting men they had few superiors even in the Royal Navy of that time. I feel that it is only just to emphasise these points, for with the transition from one period of the ship to another the ability of our mercantile officers has changed not in degree but in kind: and very shortly the last link—in the person of a steamship captain who formerly commanded a sailing ship—connecting the ships of yesterday with to-day will have been broken for ever. No one can fail to admire the consummate cleverness with which a modern mercantile captain brings a gigantic liner through a narrow, twisting channel in a strong tideway and berths his ship so quietly as not to break the proverbial eggshell. No one can help being struck with the scientific and practical ability by which perfect land-falls are made and punctual voyages are carried through even in thick weather. The captains of the Indiamen of yesterday were never called upon to bear the kind of responsibility which attaches to a man who has a 40,000-ton ship and 5000 lives under his care. But at the same time our modern commanders in the merchant service have never yet been called upon to think out battle tactics and manœuvre so as to fight a superior enemy without losing one’s ship or cargo.

This was always the anxiety which an East Indiaman’s skipper had to think of. Was he justified in remaining to fight: or was his chief duty to run away? His command was not primarily a fighting ship, but a means of trade. And even if he got his ship safe in port would he incur the displeasure of the Honourable East India Company’s directors? His job was too valuable to be thrown away by an error of judgment. It would be a fine feather in his cap if he could follow the example of Commodore Dance, and he was sure to be well rewarded by his Company. To deal a smashing blow at the nation’s enemy would ensure fame for this captain to the end of his days and after. But—if he should forget that his first duty was to get the valuable cargo home he might find himself a broken man and not a hero.

Such, then, was the position of Captain Meriton in the incident we are discussing. He had to take in the situation at a glance and form a quick but not hasty judgment, and then act accordingly, flinging out his signals and disposing his squadron. At four o’clock the Minerve went ahead and then bore down as if intending to get alongside the Windham. Now this was a mode of attack which the Indiamen in the present instance had reason to fear least of all, for they chanced to have plenty of soldiery on board. The Windham therefore made sail so as to strike the French frigate on the port side at the quarter, whilst the Ceylon and Astell closed on their consort so as to assist in this manœuvre. However, the Windham had been greatly damaged in regard to her sails and rigging, so did not possess enough way to act as she had hoped. The result was that the Minerve was able to cross her bows only a few yards away. All this time the three Indiamen had kept up an incessant and well-aimed musketry fire from their troops on board.

Just as the Minerve got out of gun-shot—that is to say, about a mile away—the Astell passed astern of the Windham and became the headmost and weathermost ship. The Windham was now the sternmost and leewardmost vessel of the three, and the Minerve, true to the best tradition of tactics employed by Nelson and other great admirals, endeavoured to cut the Windham off from the other two: but the best laid schemes of clever tacticians sometimes do not fructify: for the Minerve now lost her main and mizen topmasts, and there came a lull in the contest, though not for long. It was now six in the evening, and the Bellone, followed by the Victor, began a most destructive fire on the Windham. Taking up her position presently a little farther on, the Bellone began to attack the commodore’s ship, whilst with her foremost guns she attacked the Astell. The Victor was some distance away, and so her fire at the Windham was not so effective. Captain Meriton now endeavoured to close with the French frigate in order that he might be able to give full opportunity to the troops’ musketry, but had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the neck from grape-shot. The command therefore fell to the chief mate, Mr T. W. Oldham. But the latter, being himself wounded not many seconds later, was obliged to yield the command to the second mate, Mr T. Fenning. By seven o’clock the poor Ceylon, which had endured much, was in a sorry plight. Her two principal officers had been wounded, her masts, rigging and sails were all damaged badly, all the guns on her upper deck had been disabled and five on the lower deck. Her hull, too, had been so badly holed that she was leaking to such an extent that she made three feet an hour. In addition, many of her people had been killed and wounded.

She therefore came out of the firing-line and passed astern of the Bellone, which was engaging the Windham all the time. And then there appears to have been some misunderstanding. The Windham hailed the Astell time after time, asking her to join in making an attempt to board the Bellone: but the Astell put out her lights, crowded on sail, and went off, receiving a heavy parting fire from the frigate. As for the Ceylon, there was nothing left for her to do but to haul down her colours, and she then had the humiliation of being taken possession of by a prize crew sent off in a boat from the Minerve. As the Ceylon passed the Windham, the former hailed the latter that she had struck. The Windham was therefore now left alone: and since she, too, was considerably damaged as to her masts and rigging, so that it was impossible to set sail, she doggedly continued the action, so that the Astell might be able to make good her escape. Nine of the Windham’s guns had been put out of action, many of her crew had been killed or wounded, so finally she too had to haul down her colours, and was taken possession of by the Bellone. Meanwhile the Victor had gone in pursuit of the Astell, but the latter was able to get right away owing to the extreme darkness of the night and the length of time which had been taken in securing the two prizes.

The result of this fight, which had lasted almost from dawn till after dark, was melancholy: but the Indiamen had fought very gallantly, and it is not always that success comes to those who seem assuredly most to deserve it. Each of these merchant ships was of 800 tons, and their armament was quite unequal to that of the French frigates, which had no cargo to carry and could mount more numerous guns. There were about two hundred and fifty troops on board each of these Indiamen, in addition to a hundred lascars, but there were only about twelve or a score of British seamen. So in respect of numbers the merchant ships were quite inferior to the trained men-of-war’s-men of the French. The Ceylon lost four seamen, one lascar and two soldiers killed. Her captain, chief mate, seven of her seamen, one lascar, one lieutenant-colonel and ten soldiers had been wounded—a pretty heavy toll to pay. The Windham had a seaman, three soldiers and two lascars killed: and seven soldiers, two lascars and three of her officers and half-a-dozen others wounded. The Astell had four seamen and the same number of soldiers killed: whilst her captain, her fifth mate, nine seamen, a lascar, five cadets and twenty soldiers were all wounded.

Everyone in these Indiamen had fought splendidly against heavy odds. The commodore had fulfilled his part as well as the difficulty of the situation allowed him. Soldier and sailor alike had done their level best. How did the East India Company eventually consider this forlorn fight? It may be said at once that, in spite of the result, the directors showed their appreciation of their servants by presenting each of these three captains with the sum of £500, whilst the rest of the officers and men were also handsomely rewarded. The captain of the Astell received a pension of £460 a year from the East India Company, whilst the officers and crew were presented with the sum of £2000 between them. It is said that one of the Astell’s seamen, a man named Andrew Peters, nailed the pennant to the maintopmast-head and was killed as he was on his way down: and the Astell’s colours were shot away no fewer than three times.

To show their appreciation of the Astell’s fine defence the Admiralty granted the ship’s company protection from impressment for three years. But even all this exhibition of approbation must have been unable to wipe out from officers and men the miserable recollection of having been compelled to yield to the nation’s deadly enemy.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE LAST OF THE OLD EAST INDIAMEN

It must not be thought that even after that momentous change of 1834, when the “free traders,” as they were called, began to send their ships to India, the Company were freer of anxiety. It has already been shown that they were being badly defeated in the new competition. But this was not all. In the year 1816 the owners of thirty-four ships which had been engaged by the Company under the Act of 1799 for six voyages on a settled peace freight now complained that these rates were inadequate to meet the increased charge of outfit and repairs. For since the Treaty of Paris the cost and equipment of ships had gone up, and to an extent that could not have been expected. The long duration of the war, and the extraordinary price of articles of a ship’s inventory continued long after the cessation of hostilities: and therefore it was but natural that an improved rate should be granted for the remainder of the voyages.

And with the much larger number of men required for the bigger ships it was frequently found when lying in an Indian port that with “dead, run, or discharged” men a vessel had not the required number of crew in her that she ought to have. So now these East Indiamen were allowed to sail with less than their full complement. Great Britain had won her fights chiefly on the sea, yet for all that she was not abundantly blessed with seamen.

And then came the final change, which had really been foreshadowed by that event of 1814. True the East India Company had been bereft of their Indian monopoly, but China had been reserved to them. However, in 1832 the subject had to be faced again in Parliament. The mind of the public was distinctly adverse to the Company and its monopoly: too long it had been permitted to enjoy these privileges and keep back the stream of trade. Discontent increased both in vehemence and volume, and so at length the Company were powerless to hold on to their China monopoly. Private shipowners desired to trade with all parts of the Orient, and this desire had to be met. From the year 1833, then, the East India Company lost their exclusive trading privilege. And inasmuch as the free traders had done so much, and were determined to do more, it were useless for the Company to continue in commerce at all. Instead they became entirely a political body and permitted British subjects to settle in India. Actually the Company’s commercial charter came to an end in April 1834, and thereafter it proceeded to close its business as soon as possible.