The following year Emperor Hien Feng died, leaving a son as heir, whose age was only five years. Four of Prince Kung’s elder brothers were already dead, and the fifth had lost his position in Emperor Tankwang’s household by being adopted into the family of another emperor. There was thus no one to claim precedence of him as the first prince of blood royal, during the minority of Tung-chi, the new emperor. A conspiracy had, however, been formed against him, with which he found it necessary to grapple immediately. The late emperor had left the administration of affairs practically in the hands of a council of eight, of whom Prince I was at the head. This council had decided upon a plan of action for seizing the reins of power. They proposed to obtain possession of the emperor’s person, to put the empress-regents out of the way, and to kill Prince Kung and his two surviving brothers. Prince Kung, however, was not to be found napping. Having received news of the plot, he at once took measures to prevent its successful accomplishment, by carrying off the young emperor to Peking. The conspirators were then arrested and brought to trial. The Princes I and Chin, being of the blood royal, were permitted to take the “happy dispatch.” The rest of the conspirators were either beheaded or banished. Thus did Prince Kung save from destruction the reigning dynasty of China.

For his great services he was at once proclaimed “Regent Prince,” and in conjunction with the two empress-regents assumed the government of China. He immediately adopted a vigorous policy in dealing with the Tai-Ping rebels, which was crowned with success. After Colonel Gordon’s capture of Suchow, at the head of his ever victorious army, Prince Kung bestowed upon him a medal and ten thousand taels, which were refused. Prince Kung also successfully put down the Mohammedan rising in Yun-nan and Kan-pu, and opened up diplomatic intercourse with European powers. Prince Kung’s determination not to accept the gunboats purchased in 1861 nearly led to serious results, and cost England $5,000,000. This crucial period was followed by another in 1870 when the Tien-tsin massacre occurred. In all these events Prince Kung showed that he possessed the gifts of a great statesman. When Emperor Tung-chi died childless in 1875, the choice of a successor to the dragon throne lay between Tsai-ching, the son of Prince Kung, and Tsai-tien, the son of Prince Chun, his younger brother. As the election of the former would have compelled the retirement of Prince Kung from active participation in the government of China, and as a continuance of his services was a matter of absolute necessity for his country, Tsai-ching was passed over in favor of Tsai-tien, a child of only four years of age, who adopted the name of Kwang-Su, or illustrious successor. Prince Kung, however, continued to act as regent of the country. The present emperor assumed the reigns of power in 1887, and subsequently he dismissed with disgrace the man whom he was afterwards pleased to honor, and who had rendered to China and the reigning dynasty such services as ought never to be forgotten.

When the Chinese fled from Ping-Yang towards Wi-ju they left behind them nearly a million dollars in treasure, thirty-six guns, two thousand tents, one thousand three hundred horses, and a considerable quantity of rice and other stores. Hard pressed by the pursuing Japanese, they abandoned their remaining four guns at An-ju, a town some seventy-five miles north of Ping-Yang. Thirty miles farther on, at Chong-ju, an important provincial town, they made a temporary halt, having received orders to hold the place pending the arrival of large reinforcements from the north. But the pursuit was too hot, and Chong-ju was evacuated without fighting. The next stand attempted to be made was at Ngan, where the troops were reinforced by orders from Shin-King, the province in which Mukden is situated. For a few days it was prophesied that the decisive battle of the war would be fought there, but the Chinese again abandoned their position and fell back upon Kaichan.

The Japanese army, while pushing forward towards Manchooria, showed the greatest consideration in their dealings with the Coreans, and any attempt at robbery or outrage on the part of the soldiery was most severely punished. The private soldiers were under the strictest orders to pay cash for everything that they obtained from the natives, and pains were taken to see that they should carry out their instructions. The result was that the Coreans began to appreciate that the Japanese were better friends to them than were the Chinese. The latter had been very severe in their exactions of supplies from the populace, and even though the Corean sympathies had been with the Chinese, the common people objected to the expense of quartering the army without recompense.

On the 4th of October the main portion of the advance Japanese column reached Yong-chon, a little to the south of Wi-ju, after the difficult march from Ping-Yang, retarded by an extensive commissariat department and many guns. No sign of the enemy was reported at this place. Four days later, scouts reported that a small Chinese force still occupied Wi-ju, and a detachment of Japanese infantry and cavalry was thrown forward, supported by light artillery, to dislodge them. The Chinese offered but a slight resistance and fled precipitately before the smart attack, finally succeeding in getting across the Yalu. The larger body of Chinese troops had withdrawn across the river before this time, so that the forces remaining in Corea numbered not more than two thousand. Their loss in killed and wounded probably did not exceed one hundred. Wi-ju was occupied by the Japanese on the same day, and on the day after they began a reconnoissance which revealed the fact that the Chinese were still in force in the northern bank of the river. Eight intrenched batteries were discovered, and the enemy were rapidly throwing up fresh earthworks and building new batteries. Obviously the next fight was to be expected at this place, and if the Chinese held their grounds it would be a sanguinary one.

Marshal Yamagata still maintained his base at Ping-Yang, as being more convenient for securing his supplies by sea, while General Nodzu remained in advance with the forces. The Japanese line of communication was now complete throughout Corea, a sufficient number of troops being scattered through the peninsula at Fusan, Asan, Chemulpo, Seoul, Gensan, and Ping-Yang to guard against any hostilities on the part of the natives, and to make reinforcement by land safe. The government of Wi-ju was placed in the hands of a Japanese officer acting as special commissioner. The field telegraph was established in working order within two days after the capture of the place, and a regular courier service to the rear was inaugurated at once.

At the same time two or three detached revolts were in progress, the most important one being that of the Togakuto rebels in the province of Kiung-sang. These rebels were still in arms and in the mountain fastnesses it was hard to get near them. They had with them fifty Chinese soldiers who escaped when the Chinese were defeated at Asan and then joined the rebels. Those who had taken up arms against the corrupt Corean officials in the Province of Chung-chong had been dispersed, however, and the more formidable ones were now being gradually hemmed in.

When the middle of October came, the two armies were still facing each other on the banks of the Yalu. The Chinese had not yet fired a shot but kept at work night and day improving the natural advantages of their position. On the Japanese side there was no desire unduly to hurry the fighting, Marshal Yamagata choosing to wait for his heavier artillery and supplies before attacking. Spies kept him admirably informed as to the movements of the enemy, their defenses, and their artillery. They estimated the total strength of the Chinese massed along the north bank of the Yalu as between twenty-five and thirty thousand.

While the two armies are thus facing one another across the Yalu River, the Chinese having been driven from their last foothold in Corea, let us turn to the condition of affairs in the capitals of the two nations. The enemies of Li Hung Chang in Peking were busy in their efforts to cast disgrace upon him. Sheng, the taotai or chief magistrate of Tien-tsin, fell into disgrace and it was immediately alleged that he was a nephew of Li Hung Chang’s and that the latter was probably a sharer in the results of his dishonesty. Just before the war broke out Sheng was commissioned to purchase arms and ammunition for the imperial troops, to be distributed to them as they arrived from the interior on the way to Corea. Rifles and cartridges were duly purchased, and nearly all were served out to the troops. As soon as they were put to the test of actual service they were found to be almost worthless, and strong complaints were sent to Peking and Tien-tsin. Li Hung Chang himself conducted an inquiry, and learned therefrom that Sheng bought from German agents three hundred thousand rifles of obsolete pattern, part of the discarded weapons, in fact, of more than one European army. The contract price of these rifles as between Sheng and the German sellers was two taels each, but the price charged by Sheng to the imperial treasury was nine taels each. The cartridges were of very inferior quality and of various pattern, and Sheng made a large profit on them also. After Sheng’s guilt was proven upon him by the viceroy, he retired to his palace and for a time was seen no more in public. It was stated semi-officially that he applied for and was granted leave of absence on the ground of ill health. But a few days later it was reported that he was again enjoying the authority of his office, having been sustained against Li’s wishes by some of the viceroy’s enemies. Li’s enemies became bolder and bolder. Placards denouncing him as the cause of China’s troubles were posted on the walls of Tien-tsin and children in the streets sang doggerel songs ridiculing and insulting the great viceroy.

The foreigners resident in Peking and Tien-tsin became very restless under the impending invasion of China by the Japanese. Assaults on foreigners in Peking and its environs, which have been of constant occurrence during the last ten years, increased in frequency and gravity. Several English and American families withdrew to Shanghai because of the prevalence of street rowdyism. Tien-tsin was full of troops from the interior, but nearly all of them were the merest rabble, wretchedly clad, mutinous through lack of pay and insufficient rations, and useless for real war because of their antiquated weapons. Their continued presence in Tien-tsin was a distinct danger alike to Chinese and Europeans. An imperial edict published in Peking assumed full responsibility for the protection of foreign residents, denounced rowdyism, and ordered the punishment of certain culprits who had assaulted travelers. It assured the strangers the protection of their persons and their property, and was especially favorable to missionaries. The whole tone of the edict was considered highly satisfactory, and yet the government had failed to punish those who were responsible for the assaults and had taken no cognizance of the murder of a missionary, except to permit the governor of the province where the crime was committed to retain his high position.

A rebellion broke out in the district of Jeho, in the province of Chihli early in October, consequent on the rumored invasion of the Japanese. The imperial summer residence was in this city. Another Chinese rebellion broke out in the province of Hoopih about one hundred miles from Hankow. The local authorities attempted to quell the first rising but failed. Some of their soldiers were killed and others joined the rebels. Two mandarins lost their lives. In consequence of the urgent demands of the imperial authorities the province had been quite denuded of troops and there was practically no means at the command of the authorities to keep them in check. The Europeans at Hankow were seriously alarmed and many of them withdrew to Shanghai.

The emperor of China, early in October, began to take the initiative, attempting to infuse new energy into the national defense. It was indeed reported that he had disguised himself, and in person visited Tien-tsin, accompanied only by a few trusted servants, in order to see for himself what was going on, and particularly to learn the truth as to the alleged incapacity of Li Hung Chang to carry on the arrangements for the war. It was not, however, the emperor who made the journey in disguise, but his former tutor and trusted adviser Weng Toung Ho, the President of the Board of Revenue, or Finance Department. He also went to Port Arthur, Wei-hai-wei, and other places, and thoroughly informed himself of the state of affairs, civil, naval, and military. On returning to Peking he made an exhaustive report to the emperor, upon which the latter immediately began to take more interest in public affairs. He declined to sign documents until they had been previously read and explained to him, and called for special reports from the naval and military commanders. His next act was to summon to Peking the viceroys and governors of provinces, to receive from them accounts of the steps taken to comply with the demands of the imperial government, and to obtain from them their views as to the state of affairs. It was believed however by foreigners most able to judge that throughout all these actions the dowager empress of China was the active power in control. It was also believed that she was really a friend to Li Hung Chang, and that he would not suffer ultimate destruction unless she turned against him.

Another important action taken by the emperor was to confer the highest grade of the Order of the Double Dragon upon Captain Von Hannecken for his services at the naval battle of the Yalu River and to place him under practically sole control of the naval forces of China.

Constantine von Hannecken, the German officer who was put in supreme control of what was left of the Chinese navy, had already seen a great deal of service in the war with Japan before his promotion to that post. He was on board the Kow-shing when she was overhauled and sunk by the Japanese cruiser Naniwa-Kan, with a loss of more than a thousand Chinese soldiers. Von Hannecken was left struggling in the water when the Kow-shing sank, but had the rare good fortune to be picked up by a boat. Still more recently he was high in command of the Chinese fleet at the disastrous battle of the Yalu River. He was slightly wounded but was soon ready for action again. This brave man was born in Wiesbaden, Germany, in 1854, and was a son of the late Lieutenant-General von Hannecken. He served the usual term in the German army, and in 1879 went to China, where he was soon high in favor with Li Hung Chang. He mastered the Chinese language in a single year. His technical military knowledge, amiability, and tact, gained for him the position of personal adjutant to Li Hung Chang, with a large salary. He devoted much of his time to the construction of bridges and forts, and the fortifications at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei were built under his personal direction. He was rapidly promoted to the highest military places within the gift of Li Hung Chang and the government, and received buttons, feathers, and jackets galore.

About a year before the outbreak of the war, having grown rich in the service of the dragon throne, he resigned from the Chinese army and returned to his home in Germany. After a stay of a few months he sailed again for China with the intention of settling his affairs there and retiring to Germany. The war with Japan changed this plan, and he promptly reëntered the service of China.

Admiral Ting and Captain Von Hannecken visited Wei-hai-wei to examine its defenses, and satisfied themselves that the harbor was practically impregnable from the sea. Japanese war vessels continually patrolled all parts of the Gulf of Pechili, and were frequently seen from Port Arthur, Chefoo and Wei-hai-wei. The Japanese fleet was also sighted several times ten miles off Shan-hai-kwan, less than two hundred miles from Peking.

The main body of the Chinese army was now entrenched in a strong position protected by a line of rectangular forts newly constructed across the northeast border of the province of Chihli. The Manchoos were held in reserve nearer Tien-tsin than Peking. Sung Kwei, the emperor’s father-in-law, was in command of five thousand picked Manchoo soldiers at Shan-hai-kwan, which was a city of great strategic importance, the starting point of a great highroad to Peking from the coast.

General Sung, formerly commander of Port Arthur, was appointed to be Generalissimo of the Pei-Yang army corps in manchooria and Chief Commander of the Manchoo levies, with the exception of the Kirin division, which remained under the command of the Tartar general. The Chinese headquarters were established at Chiu-lien-tcheng. Generals Yeh and Wei were degraded by imperial edict.

On the 15th of October the newly-elected Japanese Diet met for a short preliminary session at Hiroshima, where the mikado had established his headquarters. The election of officers was immediately proceeded with, Mr. Kusumoto being chosen president, and Mr. Shimada vice-president. The formal opening of the Parliament took place two days later. The mikado in his speech announced that he had decided to convene an extraordinary session, and had given direction to his ministers to submit for the deliberation of the Diet a bill providing for increased expenditure for the army and navy, which was an important matter. His Majesty declared that he was greatly pained that China should have forgotten her duties in regard to the maintenance of peace in the east in conjunction with Japan, she having brought about the present state of affairs. “However,” proceeded the emperor, “as hostilities have begun we shall not stop until we have obtained our utmost objects.” In conclusion, His Majesty expressed the hope that all subjects of the empire would co-operate with the government, in order to promote the restoration of peace by means of the great triumph of the Japanese arms.

The president of the two chambers of the Diet presented an address in reply to the speech from the throne, thanking the mikado for advancing the imperial standard and for personally assuming the direction of the war. The victories which had been secured by the Japanese arms by land and sea were the natural result. The address in conclusion said: “His Majesty rightly considers China the enemy of civilization. We will comply with the imperial desire to destroy the barbarous obstinacy of that power.”

In the House of Peers, on October 19, Count Ito, the premier, made an elaborate speech in support of the government measures for meeting the expenses of the war, and defended Japan against the charge of having precipitated the hostilities. He narrated in detail the circumstances which had led up to the war, and read the correspondence which had passed between the mikado’s government and the authorities at Peking, before the rupture of diplomatic relations. The premier’s statement made a great impression, and intensified the keenly patriotic feeling manifested by the members of the Diet, not a dissenting voice being raised against the ministerial bills. The following day the war budget of 150,000,000 yen passed both houses unanimously. This was the most important part of the proceedings of Parliament. The two houses fully demonstrated that they desired to hold up the hands of the government, and grant everything which might be asked to insure the success of the Japanese arms.

Simultaneously with the opening of Parliament an important diplomatic move was made by the Japanese. Now that Japan was practically in undisputed possession of Corea, the moment was considered opportune for the carrying out of those thorough reforms in the internal government of the country, to which Japanese statesmen looked forward as the best guarantee against foreign influence in the future. In order to strengthen the hands of Mr. Otori, the Japanese minister at Seoul, the emperor selected Count Inouye, minister of the interior, to proceed to the Corean capital to act as special adviser to Mr. Otori.

The Japanese Parliament had occasion to welcome an important Corean messenger. The second son of the peninsular monarch left Chemulpo on the day the session began, as a special envoy to the mikado, returning the visit made to the king by the Marquis Sainonji. The young prince and his embassy, consisting of eight leading nobles, were received by the mikado and his principal ministers, being welcomed most cordially.

Just prior to the opening of the session, the British government addressed a circular note to the ministers of the great powers, suggesting intervention in the affairs of the east. The Chinese were in readiness to make terms of peace, conscious of the enormous sacrifices and risks which would have to be incurred before she could bring her immense reserves of strength into action, and being devoid of military ambition. The British cabinet council which decided upon this letter met on October 4, and three days later it was generally known, in spite of government denials, that the action had been taken. The reception of it was not cordial. In reply to the proposals put forward by England, the German government formally intimated that it was not prepared to join in any measures for circumscribing the political results of the conflict between China and Japan. The French government shared the same view, and the United States was earnest in the same expression. Russia, too, decided to avoid interference in connection with other nations, preferring to retain the opportunity of individual interference. On the part of Russia, the military commanders in the Amoor province were ordered to hold troops in readiness, in view of the fact that the situation in China might make intervention necessary. There seems to be good ground for believing true the rumor, oft repeated after the battle of the Yalu, that China had made to Japan overtures for peace, on the basis of an acknowledgment of Corea’s independence, and payment of an indemnity for the losses and expenses of the war. The proposal was rejected by Japan as inadequate. Altogether it seemed that the initiative taken by the British foreign office was premature to say the least.

The mikado, in his address to Parliament, made no allusion to the proposals for peace, but seemed rather to look on the prosecution of the war to the end as the sole means of insuring lasting tranquility. With England’s effort for European intervention in mind, Parliament adopted a resolution that, “No foreign interference will be suffered to obstruct the great object of the national policy, to secure a guarantee of permanent peace in the orient.” A renewed offer of mediation in the interest of peace was made to China and Japan in the name of some of the European powers, after the adjournment of Parliament. China declared her willingness to conclude an armistice or a peace on any reasonable terms; Japan refused to consider the proposal until it should be made directly at Hiroshima “From a quarter formally accredited and empowered to offer it.”

The movements of troops, both Japanese and Chinese, were now multiplying to such an extent, that except for one familiar with the geography of eastern Asia, they were very confusing. Almost every day it was reported that some Japanese force had made a landing on the Chinese coast, rumor after rumor of this sort being circulated and denied. Chinese troops massed in the vicinities already named, their numbers constantly increasing. An army of five thousand Japanese was taken by transports along the east coast of Corea to Possiet harbor, near the boundary of Siberia, and five thousand Russian troops were posted on the other side, facing them, to guard the Siberian frontier. Corea was being steadily cleared of Chinese stragglers, deserters from the late army and others, who if allowed to be at large might develop into bandits or spies. The restlessness of the natives in the province of Chulla was difficult to restrain, and a combined force of Japanese and Corean troops was despatched to the district to quell the outbreak. Rumors of land battles in the north of Corea, on the lower Yalu, were circulated every day, but for a time were foundationless. Towards the end of October, troops began to pour into Tien-tsin in large numbers daily, and were disposed for the defense of the capital. Most of the new arrivals were infantry, the bulk of the cavalry being sent to the Manchoorian provinces to the northeast.

SURRENDER OF CHINESE GENERAL AND STAFF.

The fleets of the two nations were now again in fighting condition, although the loss of many vessels suffered by the Chinese at the Yalu had left them in strength far inferior to the Japanese. The Chinese fleet was concentrated at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, where it was believed to be safe from attack or favorably situated for offensive operations. The Japanese squadron under Admiral Ito was concentrated at Ping-Yang. On October 18 the last of the transports carrying the second Japanese army steamed out of the harbor of Ujina on their way to Hiroshima, where they were held in readiness for active operations.

The extraordinary session of the Japanese diet at Hiroshima was closed October 22, all the bills submitted by the government having passed unanimously. Before separating, the Diet voted a memorial urgently requesting the officers of the government to execute the desires of the Mikado, in order that Japan might achieve a complete victory over the Chinese, whereby peace would be restored in the east and the glory of the Japanese nation increased. A resolution was passed unanimously, placing upon record the thanks of the nation to the army and navy, for the gallantry and patriotism displayed by all ranks, and for the splendid success which had attended the Japanese arms.

On October 24 Count Yamagata, commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in Corea, threw a small force across the Yalu, thus invading Chinese territory. In order to understand the subsequent operations, a brief topographical explanation is here necessary. At a little distance below Wi-ju, the Yalu, flowing west, receives a tributary, the Ai, coming from the northeast. Chiu-lien lies in the western, or obtuse-angled corner formed by the junction of the two rivers, some distance back from their banks. Within the eastern, or acute-angled corner the land rises to an eminence called Hu-shan. A traveler by the main road from Wi-ju to Chiu-lien, having crossed the Yalu, must pass on the left or to the west of Hu-shan, which overlooks the highway, and thus reaching the Ai must cross it also to Chiu-lien. The Chinese had intrenched Hu-shan, and posted there a force estimated by the Japanese at three thousand five hundred, but subsequently alleged by prisoners to have aggregated seven or eight thousand.

The plan pursued by Field-Marshal Count Yamagata was to occupy a long stretch of the Yalu River, so that his point of passage would remain to the last uncertain, and any flanking movement on the east by the cavalry, of which the enemy possessed a large force, was rendered impossible. Having rested his troops and completed his arrangement for a final advance, he threw a battalion across the river under Colonel Sato, at Shai-ken-chau, a place ten miles up stream from Wi-ju. The passage was made by wading and was unopposed. The detachment was composed entirely of riflemen, no cavalrycavalry or artillery accompanying them. A Chinese earthwork had been thrown up at this point to oppose a landing, but a slight deviation enabled the detachment to cross without interference. An attack was immediately opened on the Chinese position, which was garrisoned only by a few artillerymen and infantry. They fled after the first two or three rounds had been fired, and the Japanese captured the works with a rush. A regiment of Manchoorian cavalry arrived as the little garrison fled, and covered their retreat. The Chinese made for the batteries constructed lower down the river, the infantry throwing away their arms in their flight. The Chinese loss was about twenty killed and wounded, while on the Japanese side not a man was hit. The Japanese force now moved down the river and captured the Chinese fortifications at the Suckochi ferry, where they passed the night. The Japanese engineers had pontoons in readiness for passage across the river.

During the night of the 24th, the Japanese pontoon men threw a bridge across the Yalu at the ferry, and at dawn the main body of the army, having passed over unopposed, commenced an attack against Hu-shan, Colonel Sato’s brigade coming into action simultaneously from the other side. The battle began at 6:30 A.M., and lasted until a few minutes past 10. At first the Chinese held their ground with tolerable firmness, but presently, finding their position swept by rifle and artillery fire from a hill on their right flank, of which possession had been taken by a brigade under Major-General Osako, they broke and fled across the Ai to Chiu-lien. The reserves, however, did not join the rout. Posted advantageously, they preserved their formation and maintained a resolute fire, until thrown into confusion by a flanking movement, which placed a large force under Major-General Tachimi to the rear of their left. Then they too gave way, and retreated in confusion across the Ai, so hotly pursued that they had to abandon ten pieces of artillery. The Japanese had lost twenty killed and eighty-three wounded; the Chinese two hundred and fifty killed and a somewhat large number of wounded. Two divisions of the army then crossed the Ai and encamped on the east of Chiu-lien, the brigades of Major-General Tachimi and Colonel Sato posting themselves on the same side of the Ai, but further north, so as to menace the same road from Chiu-lien northward to Feng-hwang. Field Marshal Yamagata and Lieutenant-General Nodzu took up their quarters in a farmer’s house to the northeast of Hu-shan. Thus with all the advantages of elevated ground, a position fortified at leisure, and a force ample for defensive purposes, the feebleness and faulty strategy of the Chinese converted into a mere skirmish what ought to have been a sanguinary battle.

The following morning, October, 26, before dawn, a general advance was commenced against Chiu-lien. It was supposed that the enemy would make an obstinate stand there, since after Feng-hwang the fortified town of Chiu-lien ranks as a position of eminent importance in the defense of southwestern Manchooria. Moreover, throughout the night a cannonade had been kept up from the town against the Japanese camp, and though the invading columns were posted so that the enemy’s missiles passed harmlessly over them, this resolute service of guns seemed to promise stout fighting on the following day. But in truth the artillery was employed merely in the vain hope of intimidating the assailants, or in order to cover the flight of the garrison. The Japanese encountered no resistance whatever. At eight o’clock in the morning they entered Chiu-lien. The enemy had decamped in the direction of Feng-hwang before dawn, leaving behind him almost everything, twenty-two guns, three hundred tents, large stores of ammunition and quantities of grain and forage.

The series of defeats following the crossing of the Yulu River by the Japanese seemed to complete the Chinese demoralization in that vicinity. The defeated forces probably numbered more than twenty thousand men, the victorious army was considerably inferior in numbers, the batteries were well built, and the position was a strong one. The continuous loss of artillery, and throwing away of muskets and rifles wherever the Chinese made retreat, was gradually depleting the stores of arms possessed by the forces in Manchooria, leaving them unable to fight even if they had desired to. A little fighting evidently went a long way with them. Did they carry away their artillery and stores, these precipitate retreats might possess some strategical character, but they simply saved their own lives, leaving all their material of war behind them. The troops at Chiu-lien were not ill-disciplined or badly armed from a Chinese point of view. Coming from Port Arthur, from Taku, and from Lu-tai, they ranked among the best soldiers China could put into the field. If such men proved themselves so conspicuously invertebrate, it was to be questioned whether or not the addition to their number of a few thousand Tartars would make them stand more stiffly in a subsequent conflict. It seemed even to the friends of China that her capacity for resisting the invasion of Manchooria in the face of well-organized and resolute attack, was simply contemptible.

The second invasion of Chinese territory was made by the second Japanese army corps, twenty-two thousand strong, under the command of General Count Oyama. These forces sailed in transports from Hiroshima, and on October 24 commenced landing in a little cove northeast of Talien-wan Bay and protected by the Elliot islands from the open sea. Talien-wan Bay was avoided because the Chinese were known to have made some preparations to resist a landing there. The peninsula which juts out southwestward between the Gulf of Liao-Tung and Corea Bay is known variously as the Liao-Tung peninsula and the Kwang Tung peninsula. Every yard of it was familiar to the Japanese military staff, and had been included in their system of minute cartography, so that whatever point they selected was well chosen. Up to the last moment it had been supposed by the general public that Port Adams, on the west of the peninsula, would be the port of debarkation, but as that would have involved the passing of a great flotilla of transports into Pechili Gulf, it was considered too hazardous an operation. The last of the flotilla of fifty transports left Hiroshima October 18, and the fleet having assembled at Shimonoseki, steamed westward on the morning of the 19th. A distance of eight hundred miles had to be traversed, and in this case as in all previous operations everything worked with smoothness and success. On the evening of the 23rd the great flotilla reached its destination, and on the following morning the landing was commenced.

There was no resistance. The Pei-yang squadron did not show. Had there been any ordinary exercise of vigilance on the part of Admiral Ting’s war ships they must have sighted the Japanese flotilla in ample time to strike at it. That they would have effected nothing in the face of the convoying squadron may be taken for granted, but if the prospect of failure deterred them from making any effort to protect their own headquarters, China’s only dockyard and really important naval station in the north, they certainly deserved the indifference with which the Japanese treated them. From the time of the naval battle of September 17, the Pei-yang squadron played no part in the war. Many attempts were made to prove that it had not been vitally hurt in the encounter, and that a few days would suffice to put it in a thorough state of repair. But whether repaired or not it disappeared from the scene, and the Japanese cruisers thenceforth roamed at will along the Chinese coasts.

With the move towards the investment of Port Arthur, and the crossing of the Yalu, the war entered upon a new phase. In selecting Port Arthur as an objective point, the Japanese were well advised. By such an attack a dockyard of the first importance was threatened, and full advantage of naval superiority could be taken. The Kwang Tung peninsula, or “Regent’s Sword,” was peculiarly inaccessible by land, while a power in command of the sea could land men at pleasure at several points within a short distance of Port Arthur, and with a small force only could isolate it from the mainland.

Two days after the landing of troops on the peninsula, the collection of a third army at Hiroshima commenced. This force was to number twenty-four thousand, and be under the command of Lieutenant-General Viscount Takashima. At the same time another revolt of some little magnitude arose in the south of Corea, and two thousand rebels attacked the quarters of the Japanese commissary at Anpo. The malcontents were afterwards dispersed by a military force though not without difficulty.

We have now reached the end of October. The first Japanese army is safely installed on the north bank of the Yalu River in Manchoorian territory, threatening the road to Mukden, Niuchwang and the intervening cities. The second army is safe on shore on the Kwang Tung peninsula, threatening China’s proudest naval station. The next month will see the fall of Port Arthur and the practical destruction of all Chinese hopes of ultimate success.

Characteristics of the two Nations in War—China’s Ignorance of the Coasts of Corea—Japan’s Knowledge of Chinese Topography and Climate—Patriotism in the Two Countries—Bad Judgment of China in Methods of Conducting the War—The Governmental Weather-Vane and its Revolutions—No Commander-in-Chief for the Chinese Army—Official Corruption in Civil as Well as Military Officials—The Battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu River—Handling the Forces of the Enemies.

At this period in the war, occurs a lull which makes it possible and wise to take a glance at the whole course of affairs during the hostilities, since the declaration three months earlier. The war has advanced far enough to prove the mettle of both combatants, and to furnish data for judging of the probable issue of the struggle, at least from a purely military point of view. At the beginning of November, prophets were quite well equipped with material for predictions that were surely not to be disappointed, and it is from the aspect at this date that the present chapter takes its view. On the one side there is little but praise to be offered. The Japanese have proved themselves assiduous students of all modern armaments, and have in many points bettered their European instruction. They have made good their claim to be the rising power of the Orient.

Of the Chinese a diametrically opposite account must be given. From a military standpoint nothing favorable can be said of them, and the only palliation of their failure is that they were wholly unprepared for an unexpected aggression. The course of the war has brought out in strong relief what has not always been clearly recognized, the essential differences between the two belligerent nations. A stronger contrast is scarcely imaginable than that between China and Japan, though they are so near and have been nursed on a common literature. With passionate effort the Japanese have ransacked the western world for its treasures of knowledge, and have vigorously applied what they have learned. The Chinese, on the other hand, have set their faces against the science of other nations, and with an unhappy mixture of apathy and contempt have rejected the teaching which has pressed upon them. In the same spirit they have spurned the knowledge of their own country and of their own forces, while the Japanese have been for years making a minute study of both, and possess maps and details which the Chinese themselves have not and do not care for. The Chinese have carried on a large trade with the Yalu river, but the government knew nothing of the coast. Captain Calder of Port Arthur made a holiday expedition to the Manchoo-Corean coast, found the country beautiful, and recommended the naval authorities to let the cadets go and improve themselves by surveying it. Nothing was done, the sole reason being that the incidental expenses of the ships would be increased by being at sea, and the captains would not save so much of their monthly allowance. Now the only survey the Chinese admiral possesses even of the scene of the late naval battle, is the outline made by Captain Calder himself. The Japanese navy has complete charts both of the Corean and the Chinese coasts. In the summer of 1893 a small expedition of Japanese disguised as Chinese, in a native boat surveyed the islands and coasts of the Gulf of Pechili, spending eight days in the immediate neighborhood of Port Arthur. The topography and physiography of North China have been their study for years.

A Japanese physician even devoted a whole year to the climate and pathology. With his headquarters in Tien-tsin, where he plied the foreign doctors incessantly with queries, this Japanese investigator thoroughly explored the province of Chihli, and probably knows more of the climatic conditions of North China than any other living man. He pretended he had the intention of practicing among the Chinese, as possibly he may in the not distant future. The Chinese have started exotic medical schools, but they have not overcome the elementary difficulty about dissection, and the enterprise is but half hearted. As for employing competent men to gather knowledge, the whole idea is foreign to the Chinese official mind, and they only accept ungraciously as a gift the results of the explorations of enthusiasts for science. It is not, therefore, the accident of being a little earlier in the field, or quicker in movement to seize the benefit of an opportunity, that gives the Japanese such crushing advantages over the Chinese, but rather a deep-seated, congenital love of improvement on one side and hatred of it on the other.

Another essential difference between the people is their exhibition of patriotism. The Japanese are saturated with it, while the Chinese have none. The instinct of loyalty is there, and it can be called out by any man, native or foreign, who is worthy of it, but in the sense of nationality the Chinese have no capacity for enthusiasm, and the people as a whole are indifferent as to who rules them, so long as they are left to cultivate their gardens. For want of a patriotic focus, what would elsewhere be treachery is in China a commonplace of official practices; every man to the limit of his small ability selling his country for his private benefit, and no one able to cast a stone at his neighbor. In Japan it would be impossible to get a man to betray his fatherland; in China where is the man who would not? From the same root springs the incredible difference between the peoples in their treatment of soldiers and sailors. In the one country they are made heroes of, the people at home send delicacies to the troops abroad, honor the dead, and nurse the wounded. In the other the men are treated worse than dogs, robbed of their small pay, deserted, discarded, or grossly neglected by their leaders whenever they can be dispensed with and their monthly pay saved. Attachment between men and officers in China is a rare, though not an unknown thing, for the Chinese are, after all, human at heart, if one can but penetrate the pile of hereditary corruption which has covered up the divine spark.

The foregoing are but examples which might be multiplied indefinitely, of the antitheses of Chinese and Japanese character and mode of action. If to all this is added the fact that the Japanese are a people who delight in war, while the Chinese abominate it, no further search is needed for explanation of the actual result. It is simply ignorance overcome by science, indifference by energy.

The Chinese have conducted the campaign in the manner those best acquainted with them would have predicted, doing on most occasions the utterly wrong thing, or stumbling on the right thing at the wrong time in the wrong way. But the most pessimistic prophet could hardly have predicted the utter inaptitude of the Chinese military movements. It is not only that they have failed to learn the modern art of war, but that they have forgotten the old methods. It was thought that Chinese troops, though deficient in enterprise, might at least make a respectable defense. They were advised never to risk a pitched battle, but to retreat slowly, giving trouble to the enemy by night attacks on his baggage, and compelling him to use up an army corps to keep open his line of communication. They failed in every point, and allowed themselves to be chased and caught like sheep, losing stores, guns, and munitions. When all else failed, it was said that winter would come to their assistance, as the Japanese could never stand the cold, while the Chinese and Manchoos were inured to it. But when the cold came it was found that it was not the Japanese but the Chinese who suffered, having abandoned their warm clothing in precipitate flight. Their heart was never in the business, and nothing therefore could go right with the Chinese conduct of the war.

While the war was incubating, China had to make up her mind how she was to meet the aggression of the Japanese in Corea. Candid friends, who knew well that her inchoate forces could never be a match for any organized army whatsoever, commended strictly defensive strategy. She was caught in the false position—in a military sense, though it was politically correct—of having a small force isolated in southern Corea, while the Japanese were occupying the capital in strength. The fighting value of the respective fleets was as yet an unknown quantity, but on the Japanese side there was confidence in their own superiority, and on the part of the Chinese a tacit acquiescence in that estimate. Under such circumstances an over-sea campaign was an absurdity for China, and the commonest prudence dictated that the small garrison at Asan be withdrawn before the outbreak of war.