IX.—Opinion respecting the expenses and salaries of foreign Ministers.

July 17, 1790.

The bill on the intercourse with foreign nations restrains the President from allowing to Ministers Plenipotentiary, or to Congress, more than $9,000, and $4,500 for their "personal services, and other expenses." This definition of the objects for which the allowance is provided appearing vague, the Secretary of State thought it his duty to confer with the gentlemen heretofore employed as ministers in Europe, to obtain from them, in aid of his own information, an enumeration of the expenses incident to these offices, and their opinion which of them would be included within the fixed salary, and which would be entitled to be charged separately. He, therefore, asked a conference with the Vice-President, who was acquainted with the residences of London and the Hague, and the Chief Justice, who was acquainted with that of Madrid, which took place yesterday.

The Vice-President, Chief Justice, and Secretary of State, concurred in the opinion that the salaries named by the act are much below those of the same grade at the courts of Europe, and less than the public good requires they should be. Consequently, that the expenses not included within the definition of the law, should be allowed as an additional charge.

1. Couriers, Gazettes, Translating necessary papers, Printing necessary papers, Aids to poor Americans.—All three agreed that these ought to be allowed as additional charges, not included within the meaning of the phrase, "his personal services, and other expenses."

2. Postage, Stationary, Court-fees.—One of the gentlemen being of opinion that the phrase "personal services, and other expenses," was meant to comprehend all the ordinary expenses of the office, considered this second class of expenses as ordinary, and therefore included in the fixed salary. The first class before mentioned, he had viewed as extraordinary. The other two gentlemen were of opinion this second class was also out of the definition, and might be allowed in addition to the salary. One of them, particularly, considered the phrase as meaning "personal services and personal expenses," that is, expenses for his personal accommodation, comforts, and maintenance. This second class of expenses is not within that description.

3. Ceremonies; such as diplomatic and public dinners, galas, and illuminations. One gentleman only was of opinion these might be allowed.

The expenses of the first class may probably amount to about fifty dollars a year. Those of the second, to about four or five hundred dollars. Those of the third are so different at different courts, and so indefinite in all of them, that no general estimate can be proposed.

The Secretary of State thought it his duty to lay this information before the President, supposing it might be satisfactory to himself, as well as to the diplomatic gentlemen, to leave nothing uncertain as to their allowances; and because, too, a previous determination is in some degree necessary to the forming an estimate which may not exceed the whole sum appropriated.

The Secretary of State has also consulted on the subject of the Morocco consulship, with Mr. Barclay, who furnished him with the note, of which a copy accompanies this. Considering all circumstances, Mr. Barclay is of opinion, we had better have only a consul there, and that he should be the one now residing at Morocco, because, as secretary to the Emperor, he sees him every day, and possesses his ear. He is of opinion six hundred dollars a year might suffice for him, and that it should be proposed to him not as a salary, but as a sum in gross intended to cover his expenses, and to save the trouble of keeping accounts. That this consul should be authorized to appoint agents in the seaports, who would be sufficiently paid by the consignments of vessels. He thinks the consul at Morocco would most conveniently receive his allowance through the channel of our Chargé at Madrid, on whom, also, this consulate had better be made dependent for instructions, information, and correspondence, because of the daily intercourse between Morocco and Cadiz.

The Secretary of State, on a view of Mr. Barclay's note, very much doubts the sufficiency of the sum of six hundred dollars; he supposes a little money there may save a great deal; but he is unable to propose any specific augmentation till a view of the whole diplomatic establishments and its expenses, may furnish better grounds for it.

X.—Opinion in regard to the continuance of the monopoly of the commerce of the Creek nation, enjoyed by Col. McGillivray:

July 29th, 1790.

Colonel McGillivray, with a company of British merchants, having hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of the commerce of the Creek nation, with a right of importing their goods duty free, and considering these privileges as the principal sources of his power over that nation, is unwilling to enter into treaty with us, unless they can be continued to him. And the question is how this may be done consistently with our laws, and so as to avoid just complaints from those of our citizens who would wish to participate of the trade?

Our citizens, at this time, are not permitted to trade in that nation. The nation has a right to give us their peace, and to withhold their commerce, to place it under whatever monopolies or regulations they please. If they insist that only Colonel McGillivray and his company shall be permitted to trade among them, we have no right to say the contrary. We shall even gain some advantage in substituting citizens of the United States instead of British subjects, as associates of Colonel McGillivray, and excluding both British and Spaniards from the country.

Suppose, then, it be expressly stipulated by treaty, that no person be permitted to trade in the Creek country, without a license from the President, that but a fixed number shall be permitted to trade there at all, and that the goods imported for and sent to the Creek nation, shall be duty free. It may further be either expressed that the person licensed shall be approved by the leader or leaders of the nation, or without this, it may be understood between the President and McGillivray that the stipulated number of licenses shall be sent to him blank, to fill up. A treaty made by the President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, is a law of the land, and a law of superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but cannot itself be repealed by future ones.[24] The treaty, then, will legally control the duty acts, and the acts for licensing traders, in this particular instance. When a citizen applies for a license, who is not of McGillivray's partnership, he will be told that but a given number could be licensed by the treaty, and that the number is full. It seems that in this way no law will be violated, and no just cause of complaint will be given; on the contrary, the treaty will have bettered our situation, though not in the full degree which might have been wished.

XI.—Opinion respecting our foreign debt.

August 26, 1790.

On consideration of the letter of our banker, of January 25th, 1790, the Secretary of the Treasury's answer to it, and the draught of powers and instructions to him, I am of opinion, as I always have been, that the purchase of our debt to France by private speculators, would have been an operation extremely injurious to our credit; and that the consequence foreseen by our banker, that the purchasers would have been obliged, in order to make good their payments, to deluge the markets of Amsterdam with American paper of all sorts, and to sell it at any price, was a probable one. And the more so, as we know that the particular individuals who were engaged in that speculation, possess no means of their own adequate to the payments they would have had to make. While we must not doubt that these motives, together with a proper regard for the credit of the United States, had real and full weight with our bankers, towards inducing them to counterwork these private speculations; yet, to ascribe their industry in this business wholly to these motives, might lead to a too great and dangerous confidence in them. It was obviously their interest to defeat all such speculations, because they tended to take out of their hands, or at least to divide with them, the profits of the great operation of transferring the French debt to Amsterdam, an object of first rate magnitude to them, and on the undivided enjoyments of which they might count, if private speculators could be baffled. It has been a contest of dexterity and cunning, in which our champions have obtained the victory. The manœuvre of opening a loan of three millions of florins, has, on the whole, been useful to the United States, and though unauthorized, I think should be confirmed. The measure proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury, of sending a superintendent of their future operations, will effectually prevent their doing the like again, and the funding laws leave no danger that such an expedient might at any future time be useful to us.

The report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the draught of instructions, present this plan to view: First, to borrow on the best terms we can, not exceeding those limited by the law, such a sum as may answer all demands of principal or interest of the foreign debts, due, or to become due before the end of 1791. [This I think he supposes will be about three and a half millions of dollars.] Second, to consider two of the three millions of florins already borrowed by our bankers as, so far, an execution of this operation; consequently, that there will remain but about two and a half millions of dollars to be borrowed on the old terms. Third, to borrow no more as yet, towards completing the transfer of the French debt to Amsterdam, unless we can do it on more advantageous terms. Fourth, to consider the third millions of florins already borrowed by our bankers, as, so far, an execution of the powers given the President to borrow two millions of dollars, by the act of the 12th of August. The whole of this appears to me to be wise. If the third million be employed in buying up our foreign paper, on the exchange of Amsterdam, by creating a demand for that species of paper, it will excite a cupidity in the monied men to obtain more of it by new loans, and consequently enable us to borrow more and on lower terms. The saving of interest, too, on the sum so to be bought, may be applied in buying up more principal, and thereby keep this salutary operation going.

I would only take the liberty of suggesting the insertion of some such clause as the following, into the instructions: "The agents to be employed shall never open a loan for more than one million of dollars at a time, nor open a new loan till the preceding one has been filled, and expressly approved by the President of the United States." A new man, alighting on the exchange of Amsterdam, with powers to borrow twelve millions of dollars, will be immediately beset with bankers and brokers, who will pour into his ear, from the most unsuspected quarters, such informations and suspicions as may lead him exactly into their snares. So wonderfully dexterous are they in wrapping up and complicating their propositions, they will make it evident, even to a clear-headed man, (not in the habit of this business,) that two and two make five. The agent, therefore, should be guarded, even against himself, by putting it out of his power to extend the effect of any erroneous calculation beyond one million of dollars. Were he able, under a delusive calculation, to commit such a sum as twelve millions of dollars, what would be said of the government? Our bankers told me themselves that they would not choose, in the conduct of this great loan, to open for more than two or three millions of florins at a time, and certainly never for more than five. By contracting for only one million of dollars at a time, the agent will have frequent occasions of trying to better the terms. I dare say that this caution, though not expressed in the instructions, is intended by the Secretary of the Treasury to be carried into their execution. But, perhaps, it will be desirable for the President, that his sense of it also should be expressed in writing.

XII.—Opinion upon the question what the answer of the President should be in case Lord Dorchester should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi.

Opinion on the questions stated in the President's note of August 27th, 1790.

August 28, 1790.

I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the dangers which will attend our government, if Louisiana and the Floridas be added to the British empire, that, in my opinion, we ought to make ourselves parties in the general war expected to take place, should this be the only means of preventing the calamity.

But I think we should defer this step as long as possible; because war is full of chances, which may relieve us from the necessity of interfering; and if necessary, still the later we interfere, the better we shall be prepared.

It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture of a place, than to retake it. Should it be so in the case in question, the difference between the two operations of preventing and retaking, will not be so costly as two, three, or four years more of war.

So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and entering into the war as late, as possible.

If this be the best course, it decides, in a good degree, what should be our conduct, if the British ask leave to march troops through our territory, or march them without leave.

It is well enough agreed, in the laws of nations, that for a neutral power to give or refuse permission to the troops of either belligerent party to pass through their territory, is no breach of neutrality, provided the same refusal or permission be extended to the other party.

If we give leave of passage then to the British troops, Spain will have no just cause of complaint against us, provided we extend the same leave to her when demanded.

If we refuse, (as indeed we have a right to do,) and the troops should pass notwithstanding, of which there can be little doubt, we shall stand committed. For either we must enter immediately into the war, or pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the world; and one insult pocketed soon produces another.

There is indeed a middle course, which I should be inclined to prefer; that is, to avoid giving any answer. They will proceed notwithstanding, but to do this under our silence, will admit of palliation, and produce apologies, from military necessity; and will leave us free to pass it over without dishonor, or to make it a handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have use for it as such. But, if we are obliged to give an answer, I think the occasion not such as should induce us to hazard that answer which might commit us to the war at so early a stage of it; and therefore that the passage should be permitted.

If they should pass without having asked leave, I should be for expressing our dissatisfaction to the British court, and keeping alive an altercation on the subject, till events should decide whether it is most expedient to accept their apologies, or profit of the aggression as a cause of war.

XIII.—Opinion on the question whether it will be expedient to notify to Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing by Governor St. Clair.

August 29, 1790.

On considering more fully the question whether it will be expedient to notify to Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing by Governor St. Clair, I still think it will not be expedient. For, if the notification be early, he will get the Indians out of the way, and defeat our object. If it be so late as not to leave him time to withdraw them before our stroke be struck, it will then be so late also as not to leave him time to withdraw any secret aids he may have sent them. And the notification will betray to him that he may go on without fear in his expedition against the Spaniards, and for which he may yet have sufficient time after our expedition is over. On the other hand, if he should suspect our preparations are to prevent his passing our territory, these suspicions may induce him to decline his expedition, as, even should he think he could either force or steal a passage, he would not divide his troops, leaving (as he would suppose) an enemy between them able to take those he should leave, and cut off the return of those he should carry. These suspicions, too, would mislead both him and the Indians, and so enable us to take the latter more completely by surprise, and prevent him from sending secret aid to those whom he would not suppose the objects of the enterprise; thus effecting a double purpose of preventing his enterprise, and securing our own. Might it not even be expedient, with a view to deter his enterprise, to instruct Governor St. Clair either to continue his pursuit of the Indians till the season be too far advanced for Lord Dorchester to move; or, on disbanding his militia, to give them general orders (which might reach the ears of Lord Dorchester) to be ready to assemble at a moment's warning, though no such assembly be really intended?

Always taking care neither to say nor do, against their passage, what might directly commit either our peace or honor.

XIV.—Opinion on proceedings to be had under the Residence act.

November 29, 1790.

A territory not exceeding ten miles square (or, I presume, one hundred square miles in any form) to be located by metes and bounds.

Three commissioners to be appointed. I suppose them not entitled to any salary.

[If they live near the place they may, in some instances, be influenced by self interest, and partialities; but they will push the work with zeal. If they are from a distance, and northwardly, they will be more impartial, but may affect delays.]

The commissioners to purchase or accept "such quantity of land on the east side of the river as the President shall deem proper for the United States," viz., for the federal Capitol, the offices, the President's house and gardens, the town house, market house, public walks and hospital. For the President's house, offices and gardens, I should think two squares should be consolidated. For the Capitol and offices, one square. For the market, one square. For the public walks, nine squares consolidated.

The expression "such quantity of land as the President shall deem proper for the United States," is vague. It may therefore be extended to the acceptance or purchase of land enough for the town; and I have no doubt it is the wish, and perhaps expectation. In that case, it will be to be laid out in lots and streets. I should propose these to be at right angles, as in Philadelphia, and that no street be narrower than one hundred feet, with foot ways of fifteen feet. Where a street is long and level, it might be one hundred and twenty feet wide. I should prefer squares of at least two hundred yards every way, which will be about eight acres each.

The commissioners should have some taste in architecture, because they may have to decide between different plans.

They will, however, be subject to the President's direction in every point.

When the President shall have made up his mind as to the spot for the town, would there be any impropriety in his saying to the neighboring land holders, "I will fix the town here if you will join and purchase and give the lands." They may well afford it by the increase of value it will give to their own circumjacent lands.

The lots to be sold out in breadths of fifty feet; their depths to extend to the diagonal of the square.

I doubt much whether the obligation to build the houses at a given distance from the street, contributes to its beauty. It produces a disgusting monotony; all persons make this complaint against Philadelphia. The contrary practice varies the appearance, and is much more convenient to the inhabitants.

In Paris it is forbidden to build a house beyond a given height; and it is admitted to be a good restriction. It keeps down the price of ground, keeps the houses low and convenient, and the streets light and airy. Fires are much more manageable where houses are low.

XV.—Report by the Secretary of State to the President of the United States on the Report of the Secretary of the Government north-west of the Ohio.

December 14, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under his consideration the report made by the Secretary of the Government north-west of the Ohio, of his proceedings for carrying into effect the resolution of Congress of August 29th, 1788, respecting the lands of the inhabitants of Port Vincennes, makes the following report thereon to the President of the United States:

The resolution of Congress of August 29th, 1788, had confirmed in their possessions and titles the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers at that post, who, in or before the year 1783, had settled there, and had professed themselves citizens of the United States or any of them, and had made a donation to every head of a family, of the same description of four hundred acres of land, part of a square to be laid off adjoining the improvements at the post.

The Secretary of the north-western government, in the absence of the Governor, has carried this resolution into effect, as to all the claims to which he thought it could be clearly applied: there remain, however, the following description of cases, on which he asks further instructions:

1. Certain cases within the letter of the resolution, but rendered doubtful by the condition annexed, to the grants of lands in the Illinois country. The cases of these claimants, fifteen in number, are specially stated in the papers hereto annexed, number 2, and the lands are laid off for them but remain ungranted till further orders.

2. Certain persons who, by removals from one part of the territory to another, are not of the letter of the resolutions, but within its equity, as they conceive.

3. Certain heads of families, who became such soon after the year 1783, who petition for a participation of the donation, and urge extraordinary militia service to which they are exposed.

4. One hundred and fifty acres of land within the village granted under the former government of that country, to the Piankeshaw Indians, and on their removal sold by them in parcels to individual inhabitants, who in some instances have highly improved them both before and since the year 1783.

5. Lands granted both before and after 1783, by authority from the commandant of the post, who, according to the usage under the French and British governments, thinking himself authorized to grant lands, delegated that authority to a court of civil and criminal jurisdiction, whose grants before 1783, amount to twenty-six thousand acres, and between that and 1787, (when the practice was stopped,) to twenty-two thousand acres. They are generally in parcels from four hundred acres down to the size of house lots; and some of them under considerable improvement. Some of the tenants urge that they were induced by the court itself to come and settle these lands under assurance of their authority to grant them, and that a loss of the lands and improvements will involve them in ruin. Besides these small grants, there are some much larger, sometimes of many leagues square, which a sense of their impropriety has prevented the grantees from bringing forward. Many pretended grants, too, of this class are believed to be forgeries, and are, therefore, to be guarded against.

6. Two thousand four hundred acres of good land, and three thousand acres of sunken land, held under the French, British, and American governments, as commons for the use of the inhabitants of the village generally, and for thirty years past kept under inclosure for these purposes.

The legislature alone being competent to authorize the grant of lands in cases as yet unprovided for by the laws. The Secretary of State is of opinion that the report of the Secretary of the north-western government, with the papers therein referred to, should be laid before Congress for their determination. Authentic copies of them are herewith enclosed to the President of the United States.

XVI.—Opinion on certain proceedings of the Executive in the North-western Territory.

December 14, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under his consideration, the journal of the proceedings of the Executive in the North-western Territory, thinks it his duty to extract therefrom, for the notice of the President of the United States, the articles of April 25th, June 6th, 28th, and 29th. Some of which are hereto annexed.

Conceiving that the regulations, purported in these articles, are beyond the competence of the executive of the said government, that they amount, in fact, to laws, and as such, could only flow from its regular legislature. That it is the duty of the general government to guard its subordinate members from the encroachments of each other, even when they are made through error or inadvertence, and to cover its citizens from the exercise of powers not authorized by the law. The Secretary of State is of opinion that the said articles be laid before the Attorney General for consideration, and if he finds them to be against law, that his opinion be communicated to the Governor of the North-western Territory, for his future conduct.

[The following are the extracts alluded to above.]

XVII.—Report on certain letters from the President to Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and from Mr. Morris to the President, relative to our difficulties with England—1790.

December 15, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under consideration the two letters of October 13th, 1789, from the President of the United States, to Mr. Gouverneur Morris; and those of Mr. Morris to the President, of January 22d, April 7th, 13th, May 1st, 29th, July 3d, August 16th, and September 18th, referred to him by the President, makes the following report thereon:

The President's letter of January 22d, authorized Mr. Morris to enter into conference with the British ministers in order to discover their sentiments on the following subjects:

1. Their retention of the western posts contrary to the treaty of peace.

2. Indemnification for the negroes carried off against the stipulations of the same treaty.

3. A treaty for the regulation of the commerce between the two countries.

4. The exchange of a minister.

The letters of Mr. Morris before mentioned, state the communications, oral and written, which have passed between him and the ministers; and from these the Secretary of State draws the following inferences:

1. That the British court is decided not to surrender the posts in any event; and that they will urge as a pretext that though our courts of justice are now open to British subjects, they were so long shut after the peace as to have defeated irremedially the recovery of debts in many cases. They suggest, indeed, the idea of an indemnification on our part. But probably were we disposed to admit their right to indemnification, they would take care to set it so high as to insure a disagreement.

2. That as to indemnification for the negroes, their measures for concealing them were in the first instance so efficacious, as to reduce our demand for them, so far as we can support it by direct proof, to be very small indeed. Its smallness seems to have kept it out of discussion. Were other difficulties removed, they would probably make none of this article.

3. That they equivocate on every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and authorize in their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions which have been drawn from those they had had from time to time with Mr. Adams, and those through Mayor Beckwith; to wit, that they do not mean to submit their present advantages in commerce to the risk which might attend a discussion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not fail to be demanded. Unless, indeed, we would agree to make it a treaty of alliance as well as commerce, so as to undermine our obligations with France. This method of stripping that rival nation of its alliances, they tried successfully with Holland, endeavored at it with Spain, and have plainly and repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably relax some of the rigors they exercise against our commerce.

4. That as to a minister, their Secretary for foreign affairs is disposed to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his cabinet, so as to render the issue uncertain.

From the whole of which, the Secretary of State is of opinion that Mr. Morris' letters remove any doubts which might have been entertained as to the intentions and dispositions of the British cabinet.

That it would be dishonorable to the United States, useless and even injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty of commerce, or for the exchange of a minister; and that these subjects should now remain dormant, till they shall be brought forward earnestly by them.

That the demands of the posts, and of indemnification for the negroes, should not be again made till we are in readiness to do ourselves the justice which may be refused.

That Mr. Morris should be informed that he has fulfilled the object of his agency to the satisfaction of the President, inasmuch as he has enabled him to judge of the real views of the British cabinet, and that it is his pleasure that the matters committed to him be left in the situation in which the letter shall find them.

That a proper compensation be given to Mr. Morris for his services herein, which having been begun on the 22d of January, and ended the 18th of September, comprehend a space of near eight months; that the allowance to an agent may be properly fixed anywhere between the half and the whole of what is allowed to a Chargé d'affaires; which, according to the establishment of the United States at the time of this appointment, was at the rate of $3,000 a year; consequently, that such a sum of between one and two thousand dollars be allowed him as the President shall deem proper, on a view of the interference which this agency may have had with Mr. Morris' private pursuits in Europe.

XVIII.—Report relative to the Mediterranean trade.

December 28, 1790.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Representatives so much of the speech of the President of the United States to both Houses of Congress, as relates to the trade of the United States in the Mediterranean, with instructions to report thereupon to the House, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report:

The loss of the records of the custom houses in several of the States, which took place about the commencement and during the course of the late war, has deprived us of official information, as to the extent of our commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean sea. According to the best which may be obtained from other sources meriting respect, it may be concluded that about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports; that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into that sea; that that commerce loaded outwards from eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve hundred seamen. It was abandoned early in the war. And after the peace which ensued, it was obvious to our merchants, that their adventures into that sea would be exposed to the depredations of the piratical States on the coast of Barbary. Congress, too, was very early attentive to this danger, and by a commission of the 12th of May, 1784, authorized certain persons, named ministers plenipotentiary for that purpose, to conclude treaties of peace and amity with the Barbary powers. And it being afterwards found more expedient that the negotiations should be carried on at the residences of those powers. Congress, by a farther commission, bearing date the 11th of March, 1785, empowered the same ministers plenipotentiary to appoint agents to repair to the said powers at their proper residences, and there to negotiate such treaties. The whole expenses were limited to eighty thousand dollars. Agents were accordingly sent to Morocco and Algiers.

Before the appointment of the one to Morocco, it was known that a cruiser of that State had taken a vessel of the United States; and that the emperor, on the friendly interposition of the court of Madrid had liberated the crew, and made restitution of the vessel and cargo, as far as their condition admitted. This was a happy presage of the liberal treaty he afterwards concluded with our agent, still under the friendly mediation of Spain, and at an expense of between nine and ten thousand dollars only. On his death, which has taken place not long since, it becomes necessary, according to their usage, to obtain immediately a recognition of the treaty by his successor, and consequently, to make provision for the expenses which may attend it. The amount of the former furnishes one ground of estimate; but the character and dispositions of the successor, which are unknown here, may influence it materially. The friendship of this power is important, because our Atlantic as well as Mediterranean trade is open to his annoyance, and because we carry on a useful commerce with his nation.

The Algerines had also taken two vessels of the United States, with twenty-one persons on board, whom they retained as slaves. On the arrival of the agent sent to that regency, the dey refused utterly to treat of peace on any terms, and demanded 59,496 dollars for the ransom of our captives. This mission therefore proved ineffectual.

While these negotiations were on foot at Morocco and Algiers, an ambassador from Tripoli arrived in London. The ministers plenipotentiary of the United States met him in person. He demanded for the peace of that State, thirty thousand guineas; and undertook to engage that of Tunis for a like sum. These demands were beyond the limits of Congress, and of reason, and nothing was done. Nor was it of importance, as, Algiers remaining hostile, the peace of Tunis and Tripoli was of no value, and when that of the former should be obtained, theirs would soon follow.

Our navigation, then, into the Mediterranean, has not been resumed at all since the peace. The sole obstacle has been the unprovoked war of Algiers; and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects. Its effects may, perhaps, be palliated by insuring our ships and cargoes destined for that sea, and by forming a convention with the regency, for the ransom of our seamen, according to a fixed tariff. That tariff will, probably, be high, and the rate of insurance so settled, in the long run, as to pay for the vessels and cargoes captured, and something more. What proportion will be captured nothing but experience can determine. Our commerce differs from that of most of the nations with whom the predatory States are in habits of war. Theirs is spread all over the face of the Mediterranean, and therefore must be sought for all over its face. Ours must all enter at a strait only five leagues wide; so that their cruisers, taking a safe and commanding position near the strait's mouth, may very effectually inspect whatever enters it. So safe a station, with a certainty of receiving for their prisoners a good and stated price, may tempt their cupidity to seek our vessels particularly. Nor is it certain that our seamen could be induced to engage in that navigation, though with the security of Algerine faith that they would be liberated on the payment of a fixed sum. The temporary deprivation of liberty, perhaps chains, the danger of the pest, the perils of the engagement preceding their surrender, and possible delays of the ransom, might turn elsewhere the choice of men, to whom all the rest of the world is open. In every case, these would be embarrassments which would enter into the merchants' estimate, and endanger the preference of foreign bottoms not exposed to them. And upon the whole, this expedient does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce in that sea.

A second plan might be to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting their interest more than their honor. If, conforming to their example, we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what a peace may cost. This being merely a matter of conjecture, we can only compare together such opinions as have been obtained, and from them form one for ourselves.

Mr. Wolf, a respectable Irishman, who had resided very long at Algiers, thought a peace might be obtained from that regency, and the redemption of our captives included, for sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling.[25] His character and opinion both merited respect. Yet his estimate being the lowest of all who have hazarded an opinion on this subject, one is apt to fear his judgment might have been biassed by the hope he entertained that the United States would charge him with this negotiation.

Captain O'Brien, one of our captives, who had been in Algiers four years and a half at the date of his last letter, a very sensible man, and to whom we are indebted for very minute information, supposes that peace alone, might be bought for that sum, that is to say, for three hundred and twenty-two thousand dollars.

The Tripoline ambassador, before mentioned, thought that peace could be made with the three smaller powers for ninety thousand pounds sterling, to which were to be added the expenses of the mission and other incidental expenses. But he could not answer for Algiers; they would demand more. The ministers plenipotentiary, who conferred with him, had judged that as much must be paid to Algiers as to the other three powers together; and consequently, that according to this measure, the peace of Algiers would cost from an hundred to an hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling; or from four hundred and sixty to five hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars.

The latter sum seemed to meet the ideas of the Count de Vergennes, who, from a very long residence at Constantinople, was a good judge of what related to the porte, or its dependencies.

A person whose name is not free to be mentioned here, a native of the continent of Europe, who had long lived, and still lives at Algiers, with whom the minister plenipotentiary of the United States, at Paris, had many and long conversations, and found his information full, clear, and consistent, was of opinion the peace of Algiers could not be bought by the United States for less than one million of dollars. And when that is paid, all is not done. On the death of a dey, (and the present one is between seventy and eighty years of age,) respectable presents must be made to the successor, that he may recognize the treaty and very often he takes the liberty of altering it. When a consul is sent or changed, new presents must be made. If these events leave a considerable interval, occasion must be made of renewing presents. And with all this they must see that we are in condition to chastise an infraction of the treaty; consequently some marine force must be exhibited in their harbor from time to time.

The late peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars. Having received the money, they take the vessels of that nation on the most groundless pretexts; counting, that the same force which bound Spain to so hard a treaty, may break it with impunity.

Their treaty with France, which had expired, was about two years ago renewed for fifty years. The sum given at the time of renewal is not known. But presents are to be repeated every ten years, and a tribute of one hundred thousand dollars to be annually paid. Yet perceiving that France, embarrassed at home with her domestic affairs, was less capable of acting abroad, they took six vessels of that nation in the course of the last year, and retain the captives, forty-four in number, in slavery.

It is the opinion of Captain O'Brien, that those nations are best treated who pay a smaller sum in the beginning, and an annual tribute afterwards. In this way he informs us that the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians pay to Algiers, from twenty-four to thirty thousand dollars a year, each; the two first in naval stores, the two last chiefly in money. It is supposed, that the peace of the Barbary States costs Great Britain about sixty thousand guineas, or two hundred and eighty thousand dollars a year. But it must be noted that these facts cannot be authentically advanced; as from a principle of self-condemnation, the governments keep them from the public eye as much as possible.

Nor must we omit finally to recollect, that the Algerines, attentive to reserve always a sufficient aliment for their piracies, will never extend their peace beyond certain limits, and consequently, that we may find ourselves in the case of those nations to whom they refuse peace at any price.

The third expedient is to repel force by force. Several statements are hereto annexed of the naval force of Algiers, taken in 1785, 1786, 1787, 1788, and 1789, differing in small degrees, but concurring in the main. From these it results that they have usually had about nine chebecs, from ten to thirty-six guns, and four galleys, which have been reduced by losses to six chebecs and four galleys. They have a forty-gun frigate on the stocks, and expect two cruisers from the grand seignior. The character of their vessels is, that they are sharp built and swift, but so light as not to stand the broadside of a good frigate. Their guns are of different calibres, unskilfully pointed and worked. The vessels illy manœuvred, but crowded with men, one third Turks, the rest Moors, of determined bravery, and resting their sole hopes on boarding. But two of these vessels belong to the government, the rest being private property. If they come out of the harbor together, they separate immediately in quest of prey; and it is said they were never known to act together in any instance. Nor do they come out at all, when they know there are vessels cruising for them. They perform three cruises a year, between the middle of April and November, when they unrig and lay up for the winter. When not confined within the straits, they rove northwardly to the channel, and westwardly to the westward islands.

They are at peace at present, with France, Spain, England, Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark; and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, Genoa, and Malta.

Should the United States propose to vindicate their commerce by arms, they would, perhaps, think it prudent to possess a force equal to the whole of that which may be opposed to them. What that equal force would be, will belong to another department to say.

At the same time it might never be necessary to draw out the whole at once, nor perhaps any proportion of it, but for a small part of the year; as it is reasonable to presume that a concert of operation might be arranged among the powers at war with the Barbary States, so as that, each performing a tour of given duration, and in given order, a constant cruise during the eight temperate months of every year, may be kept up before the harbor of Algiers, till the object of such operations be completely obtained. Portugal has singly, for several years past, kept up such a cruise before the straits of Gibraltar, and by that means has confined the Algerines closely within. But two of their vessels have been out of the straits in the last five years. Should Portugal effect a peace with them, as has been apprehended for some time, the Atlantic will immediately become the principal scene of their piracies; their peace with Spain having reduced the profits of their Mediterranean cruises below the expenses of equipment.

Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called forth, and how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms of the constitution, the co-operation of other powers. If tribute or ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount; and with the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to take arrangements for employing it to the best advantage.