XIX.—Report on the Algerine Prisoners.

December 28, 1790.

The Secretary of State, having had under consideration the situation of the citizens of the United States in captivity at Algiers, makes the following report thereupon to the President of the United States:

When the House of Representatives, at their late session, were pleased to refer to the Secretary of State, the petition of our citizens in captivity at Algiers, there still existed some expectation that certain measures, which had been employed to effect their redemption, the success of which depended on their secrecy, might prove effectual. Information received during the recess of Congress has so far weakened those expectations, as to make it now a duty to lay before the President of the United States, a full statement of what has been attempted for the relief of these our suffering citizens, as well before, as since he came into office, that he may be enabled to decide what further is to be done.

On the 25th of July, 1785, the schooner Maria, Captain Stevens, belonging to a Mr. Foster, of Boston, was taken off Cape St. Vincents, by an Algerine corsair; and, five days afterwards, the ship Dauphin, Captain O'Brien, belonging to Messieurs Irvins of Philadelphia, was taken by another Algerine, about fifty leagues westward of Lisbon. These vessels, with their cargoes and crews, twenty-one persons in number, were carried into Algiers.

Congress had some time before commissioned ministers plenipotentiary for entering into treaties of amity and commerce with the Barbary Powers, and to send to them proper agents for preparing such treaties. An agent was accordingly appointed for Algiers, and his instructions prepared, when the Ministers Plenipotentiary received information of these captures. Though the ransom of captives was not among the objects expressed in their commissions, because at their dates the case did not exist, yet they thought it their duty to undertake that ransom, fearing that the captives might be sold and dispersed through the interior and distant countries of Africa, if the previous orders of Congress should be waited for. They therefore added a supplementary instruction to the agent to negotiate their ransom. But, while acting thus without authority, they thought themselves bound to offer a price so moderate as not to be disapproved. They therefore restrained him to two hundred dollars a man; which was something less than had been just before paid for about three hundred French captives, by the Mathurins, a religious order of France, instituted in ancient times for the redemption of Christian captives from the infidel Powers. On the arrival of the agent at Algiers, the dey demanded fifty-nine thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars for the twenty-one captives, and could be brought to abate but little from that demand. The agent, therefore, returned in 1786, without having effected either peace or ransom.

In the beginning of the next year, 1787, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris procured an interview with the general of the religious order of Mathurins, before mentioned, to engage him to lend his agency, at the expense of the United States, for the redemption of their captive citizens. He proffered at once all the services he could render, with the liberality and the zeal which distinguish his character. He observed, that he had agents on the spot, constantly employed in seeking out and redeeming the captives of their own country; that these should act for us, as for themselves; that nothing could be accepted for their agency; and that he would only expect that the price of redemption should be ready on our part, so as to cover the engagement into which he should enter. He added, that, by the time all expenses were paid, their last redemption had amounted to near two thousand five hundred livres a man, and that he could by no means flatter us that they could redeem our captives as cheap as their own. The pirates would take advantage of its being out of their ordinary line. Still he was in hopes they would not be much higher.

The proposition was then submitted to Congress, that is to say, in February, 1787, and on the 19th of September, in the same year, their Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris received their orders to embrace the offers of the Mathurins. This he immediately notified to the general, observing, however, that he did not desire him to enter into any engagements till a sufficient sum to cover them should be actually deposited in Paris. The general wished that the whole might be kept rigorously secret, as, should the barbarians suspect him to be acting for the United States, they would demand such sums as he could never agree to give, even with our consent, because it would injure his future purchases from them. He said he had information from his agent at Algiers, that our captives received so liberal a daily allowance as to evince that it came from a public source. He recommended that this should be discontinued; engaging that he would have an allowance administered to them, much short indeed of what they had hitherto received, but such as was given to his own countrymen, quite sufficient for physical necessities, and more likely to prepare the opinion, that as they were subsisted by his charity, they were to be redeemed by it also. These ideas, suggested to him by the danger of raising his market, were approved by the Minister Plenipotentiary; because, this being the first instance of a redemption by the United States, it would form a precedent, because a high price given by us might induce these pirates to abandon all other nations in pursuit of Americans; whereas, the contrary would take place, could our price of redemption be fixed at the lowest point.

To destroy, therefore, every expectation of a redemption by the United States, the bills of the Spanish consul at Algiers, who had made the kind advances before spoken of for the sustenance of our captives, were not answered. On the contrary, a hint was given that these advances had better be discontinued, as it was not known that they would be reimbursed. It was necessary even to go further, and to suffer the captives themselves and their friends to believe for awhile, that no attention was paid to them, no notice taken of their letters. They are still under this impression. It would have been unsafe to trust them with a secret, the disclosure of which might forever prevent their redemption, by raising the demands of the captors to sums which a due regard for our seamen, still in freedom, would forbid us to give. This was the most trying of all circumstances, and drew from them the most afflicting reproaches.

It was a twelvemonth afterwards before the money could be deposited in Paris, and the negotiation be actually put into train. In the meantime the general had received information from Algiers of a very considerable change of prices there. Within the last two or three years the Spaniards, the Neapolitans, and the Russians, had redeemed at exorbitant sums. Slaves were become scarce, and would hardly be sold at any price. Still he entered on the business with an assurance of doing the best in his power; and he was authorized to offer as far as three thousand livres, or five hundred and fifty-five dollars a man. He wrote immediately to consult a confidential agent at Marseilles, on the best mode of carrying this business into effect; from whom he received the answer No. 2, hereto annexed.

Nothing further was known of his progress or prospects, when the House of Representatives were pleased, at their last session, to refer the petition of our captives at Algiers to the Secretary of State. The preceding narrative shows that no report could have then been made without risking the object, of which some hopes were still entertained. Later advices, however, from the chargé des affaires of the United States, at Paris, informs us, that these measures, though not yet desperate, are not to be counted on. Besides the exorbitance of price, before feared, the late transfer of the lands and revenues of the clergy in France to the public, by withdrawing the means, seems to have suspended the proceedings of the Mathurins in the purposes of their institution.

It is time, therefore, to look about for something more promising, without relinquishing, in the meanwhile, the chance of success through them. Endeavors to collect information, which have been continued a considerable time, as to the ransoms which would probably be demanded from us, and those actually paid by other nations, enable the Secretary of State to lay before the President the following short view, collected from original papers now in his possession, or from information delivered to him personally. Passing over the ransoms of the Mathurins, which are kept far below the common level by special circumstances:

In 1786, the dey of Algiers demanded from our agent $59,496 for twenty-one captives, which was $2,833 a man. The agent flattered himself they could be ransomed for $1,200 apiece. His secretary informed us, at the same time, that Spain had paid $1,600.

In 1787, the Russians redeemed at $1,546 a man.

In 1788, a well-informed inhabitant of Algiers assured the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that no nation had redeemed, since the Spanish treaty, at less than from £250 to £300 sterling, the medium of which is $1,237. Captain O'Brien, at the same date, thinks we must pay $1,800, and mentions a Savoy captain, just redeemed at $4,074.

In 1789, Mr. Logie, the English consul at Algiers, informed a person who wished to ransom one of our common sailors, that he would cost from £450 to £500 sterling, the mean of which is $2,137. In December of the same year, Captain O'Brien thinks our men will now cost $2,290 each, though a Jew merchant believes he could get them for $2,264.

In 1790, July 9th, a Mr. Simpson, of Gibraltar, who, at some particular request, had taken pains to find for what sum our captives could be redeemed, finds that the fourteen will cost $34,79,228, which is $2,485 a man. At the same date, one of them, a Scotch boy, a common mariner, was actually redeemed at 8,000 livres, equal to $1,481, which is within nineteen dollars of the price Simpson states for common men; and the chargé des affaires of the United States at Paris is informed that the whole may be redeemed at that rate, adding fifty per cent. on the captains, which would bring it to $1,571 a man.

It is found then that the prices are 1,200, 1,237, 1,481, 1,546, 1,571, 1,600, 1,800, 2,137, 2,264, 2,485, 2,833, and 2,920 dollars a man, not noticing that of $4,074, because it was for a captain.

In 1786, there were 2,200 captives in Algiers, which, in 1789, had been reduced by death or ransom to 655. Of ours six have died, and one has been ransomed by his friends.

From these facts and opinions, some conjecture may be formed of the terms on which the liberty of our citizens may be obtained.

But should it be thought better to repress force by force, another expedient for their liberation may perhaps offer. Captures made on the enemy may perhaps put us into possession of some of their mariners, and exchange be substituted for ransom. It is not indeed a fixed usage with them to exchange prisoners. It is rather their custom to refuse it. However, such exchanges are sometimes effected, by allowing them more or less of advantage. They have sometimes accepted of two Moors for a Christian, at others they have refused five or six for one. Perhaps Turkish captives may be objects of greater partiality with them, as their government is entirely in the hands of Turks, who are treated in every instance as a superior order of beings. Exchange, too, will be more practicable in our case, as our captives have not been sold to private individuals, but are retained in the hands of the Government.

The liberation of our citizens has an intimate connection with the liberation of our commerce in the Mediterranean, now under the consideration of Congress. The distresses of both proceed from the same cause, and the measures which shall be adopted for the relief of the one, may, very probably, involve the relief of the other.

XX.—The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Representatives, the representation from the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the subjects of the cod and whale fisheries, together with the several papers accompanying it, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report:

February 1, 1791.

The representation sets forth that, before the late war, about four thousand seamen, and about twenty-four thousand tons of shipping, were annually employed from that State, in the whale fishery, the produce whereof was about three hundred and fifty thousand pounds lawful money a year.

That, previous to the same period, the cod fishery of that State employed four thousand men, and twenty-eight thousand tons of shipping, and produced about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year.

That these branches of business, annihilated during the war, have been, in some degree, recovered since; but that they labor under many and heavy embarrassments, which, if not removed, or lessened, will render the fisheries every year less extensive and important.

That these embarrassments are, heavy duties on their produce abroad, and bounties on that of their competitors; and duties at home on several articles, particularly used in the fisheries.

And it asks that the duties be taken off; that bounties be given to the fishermen; and the national influence be used abroad, for obtaining better markets for their produce.

The cod and whale fisheries, carried on by different persons, from different ports, in different vessels, in different seas, and seeking different markets, agree in one circumstance, in being as unprofitable to the adventurer, as important to the public. A succinct view of their rise, progress, and present state, with different nations, may enable us to note the circumstances which have attended their prosperity, and their decline; to judge of the embarrassments which are said to oppress ours; to see whether they depend on our own will, and may, therefore, be remedied immediately by ourselves, or, whether depending on the will of others, they are without the reach of remedy from us, either directly or indirectly.

Their history being as unconnected as their practice, they shall be separately considered.

Within twenty years after the supposed discovery of Newfoundland, by the Cabots, we find that the abundance of fish on its banks, had already drawn the attention of the people of Europe. For, as early as 1517, or 1519, we are told of fifty ships being seen there at one time. The first adventurers in that fishery were the Biscayans, of Spain, the Basques and Bas-Bretons, of France, all united anciently in language, and still in habits, and in extreme poverty. The last circumstance enabled them long to retain a considerable share of the fishery. In 1577, the French had one hundred and fifty vessels there; the Spaniards had still one hundred, and the Portuguese fifty, when the English had only fifteen. The Spaniards and Portuguese seem at length to have retired silently, the French and English claiming the fishery exclusively, as an appurtenance to their adjacent colonies, and the profits being too small for nations surcharged with the precious metals proceeding from their mines.

Without materials to trace the intermediate progress, we only know that, so late as 1744, the French employed there five hundred and sixty-four ships, and twenty-seven thousand five hundred seamen, and took one million two hundred and forty-six thousand quintals of fish, which was three times the extent to which England and her colonies together, carried this fishery at that time.

The English, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, had employed, generally, about one hundred and fifty vessels in the Newfoundland fishery. About 1670 we find them reduced to eighty, and one hundred, the inhabitants of New England beginning now to supplant them. A little before this, the British Parliament perceiving that their citizens were unable to subsist on the scanty profits which sufficed for their poorer competitors, endeavored to give them some advantage by prohibiting the importation of foreign fish; and, at the close of the century, they formed some regulations for their government and protection, and remitted to them some duties. A successful war enabled them, in 1713, to force from the French a cession of the Island of Newfoundland; under these encouragements, the English and American fisheries began to thrive. In 1731 we find the English take two hundred thousand quintals of fish, and the Americans two hundred and thirty thousand, besides the refuse fish, not fit for European markets. They continue to gain ground, and the French to lose it, insomuch that, about 1755, they are said to have been on a par; and, in 1768, the French have only two hundred and fifty-nine vessels, of twenty-four thousand four hundred and twenty tons, nine thousand seven hundred and twenty-two seamen, taking two hundred thousand quintals, while America alone, for some three or four years before that, and so on, to the commencement of the late war, employed six hundred and sixty-five vessels, of twenty-five thousand six hundred and fifty tons, and four thousand four hundred and five seamen, and took from three hundred and fifty thousand to upwards of four hundred thousand quintals of fish, and England a still greater quantity, five hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals, as is said.

Spain had formally relinquished her pretensions to a participation in these fisheries, at the close of the preceding war; and, at the end of this, the adjacent continent and islands being divided between the United States, the English and French, (for the last retained two small islands merely for this object,) the right of fishing was appropriated to them also.

France, sensible of the necessity of balancing the power of England on the water, and, therefore, of improving every resource for raising seamen, and seeing that her fishermen could not maintain their competition without some public patronage, adopted the experiment of bounties on her own fish, and duties on that of foreign nations brought into her markets. But, notwithstanding this, her fisheries dwindle, from a change taken place, insensibly, in the character of her navigation, which, from being the most economical, is now become the most expensive. In 1786, she is said to have employed but seven thousand men in this fishery, and to have taken four hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals; and, in 1787, but six thousand men, and one hundred and twenty-eight thousand quintals. She seems not yet sensible that the unthriftiness of her fisheries proceeds from the want of economy, and not the want of markets; and that the encouragement of our fishery abridges that of a rival nation, whose power on the ocean has long threatened the loss of all balance on that element.

The plan of the English Government, since the peace, has been to prohibit all foreign fish in their markets, and they have given from eighteen to fifty thousand pounds sterling on every fishing vessel complying with certain conditions. This policy is said to have been so far successful, as to have raised the number of seamen employed in that business, in 1786, to fourteen thousand, and the quantity of fish taken, to 732,000 quintals.

* * * * * * * *

The fisheries of the United States, annihilated during the war; their vessels, utensils, and fishermen destroyed; their markets in the Mediterranean and British America lost, and their produce dutied in those of France; their competitors enabled by bounties to meet and undersell them at the few markets remaining open, without any public aid, and, indeed, paying aids to the public;—such were the hopeless auspices under which this important business was to be resumed. Yet it was resumed, and, aided by the mere force of natural advantages, they employed, during the years 1786, 1787, 1788, and 1789, on an average, five hundred and thirty-nine vessels, of nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five tons, three thousand two hundred and eighty-seven seamen, and took two hundred and fifty thousand six hundred and fifty quintals of fish. * * * And an official paper * * shows that, in the last of those years, our exportation amounted to three hundred and seventy-five thousand and twenty quintals, and thirty thousand four hundred and sixty-one barrels; deduction made of three thousand seven hundred and one quintals, and six thousand three hundred and forty-three barrels of foreign fish, received and re-exported. * * Still, however, the calculations * * which accompany the representation, show that the profits of the sales in the years 1787 and 1788, were too small to afford a living to the fishermen, and on those of 1789, there was such a loss as to withdraw thirty-three vessels, of the town of Marblehead alone, from the further pursuit of this business; and the apprehension is, that, without some public aid, those still remaining will continue to withdraw, and this whole commerce be engrossed by a single nation.

This rapid view of the cod fishery enables us to discern under what policy it has nourished or declined in the hands of other nations, and to mark the fact, that it is too poor a business to be left to itself, even with the nation most advantageously situated.

It will now be proper to count the advantages which aid, and the disadvantages which oppose us, in this conflict.

Our advantages are—

1. The neighborhood of the great fisheries, which permits our fishermen to bring home their fish to be salted by their wives and children.

2. The shore fisheries, so near at hand, as to enable the vessels to run into port in a storm, and so lessen the risk, for which distant nations must pay insurance.

3. The winter fisheries, which, like household manufactures employ portions of time, which would otherwise be useless.

4. The smallness of the vessels, which the shortness of the voyage enables us to employ, and which, consequently, require but a small capital.

5. The cheapness of our vessels, which do not cost above the half of the Baltic fir vessels, computing price and duration.

6. Their excellence as sea boats, which decreases the risk and quickens the return.

7. The superiority of our mariners in skill, activity, enterprise, sobriety, and order.

8. The cheapness of provisions.

9. The cheapness of casks, which, of itself, is said to be equal to an extra profit of fifteen per cent.

These advantages are of such force, that, while experience has proved that no other nation can make a mercantile profit on the Newfoundland fishery, nor can support it without national aid, we can make a living profit, if vent for our fish can be procured.

Of the disadvantages opposed to us, those which depend on ourselves, are—

Tonnage and naval duties on the vessels employed in the fishery.

Impost duties on salt.

On tea, rum, sugar, molasses, hooks, lines, and leads, duck, cordage, and cables, iron, hemp, and twine, used in the fishery; coarse woollens, worn by the fishermen, and the poll tax levied by the State on their persons. The statement No. 6, shows the amount of these, exclusive of the State tax and drawback on the fish exported, to be $5 25 per man, or $57 75 per vessel of sixty-five tons. When a business is so nearly in equilibrio that one can hardly discern whether the profit be sufficient to continue it or not, smaller sums than these suffice to turn the scale against it. To these disadvantages, add ineffectual duties on the importation of foreign fish. In justification of these last, it is urged that the foreign fish received, is in exchange for the produce of agriculture. To which it may be answered, that the thing given, is more merchantable than that received in exchange, and agriculture has too many markets to be allowed to take away those of the fisheries. It will rest, therefore, with the wisdom of the Legislature to decide, whether prohibition should not be opposed to prohibition, and high duty to high duty, on the fish of other nations; whether any, and which, of the naval and other duties may be remitted, or an equivalent given to the fisherman, in the form of a drawback, or bounty; and whether the loss of markets abroad, may not, in some degree, be compensated, by creating markets at home; to which might contribute the constituting fish a part of the military ration, in stations not too distant from navigation, a part of the necessary sea stores of vessels, and the encouraging private individuals to let the fishermen share with the cultivator, in furnishing the supplies of the table. A habit introduced from motives of patriotism, would soon be followed from motives of taste; and who will undertake to fix the limits to this demand, if it can be once excited, with a nation which doubles, and will continue to double, at very short periods?

Of the disadvantages which depend on others, are—

1. The loss of the Mediterranean markets.

2. Exclusions from the markets of some of our neighbors.

3. High duties in those of others; and,

4. Bounties to the individuals in competition with us.

The consideration of these will find its place more aptly, after a review of the condition of our whale fishery shall have led us to the same point. To this branch of the subject, therefore, we will now proceed.

The whale fishery was first brought into notice of the southern nations of Europe, in the fifteenth century, by the same Biscayans and Basques who led the way to the fishery of Newfoundland. They began it on their own coasts, but soon found that the principal residence of the whale was in the Northern seas, into which, therefore, they pursued him. In 1578 they employed twenty-five ships in that business. The Dutch and Hamburghers took it up after this, and about the middle of the seventeenth century the former employed about two hundred ships, and the latter about three hundred and fifty.

The English endeavored also to participate of it. In 1672, they offered to their own fishermen a bounty of six shillings a ton, on the oil they should bring home, and instituted, at different times, different exclusive companies, all of which failed of success. They raised their bounty, in 1733, to twenty shillings a ton, on the admeasurement of the vessel. In 1740, to thirty shillings, with a privilege to the fishermen against being impressed. The Basque fishery, supported by poverty alone, had maintained but a feeble existence, before competitors aided by the bounties of their nation, and was, in fine, annihilated by the war of 1745, at the close of which the English bounty was raised to forty shillings. From this epoch, their whale fishery went on between the limits of twenty-eight and sixty-seven vessels, till the commencement of the last war.

The Dutch, in the meantime, had declined gradually to about one hundred and thirty ships, and have, since that, fallen down to less than half that number. So that their fishery, notwithstanding a bounty of thirty florins a man, as well as that of Hamburg, is now nearly out of competition.

In 1715, the Americans began their whale fishery. They were led to it at first by the whales which presented themselves on their coasts. They attacked them there in small vessels of forty tons. As the whale, being infested, retired from the coast, they followed him farther and farther into the ocean, still enlarging their vessels with their adventures, to sixty, one hundred, and two hundred tons. Having extended their pursuit to the Western Islands, they fell in, accidentally, with the spermaceti whale, of a different species from that of Greenland, which alone had hitherto been known in commerce: more fierce and active, and whose oil and head matter was found to be more valuable, as it might be used in the interior of houses without offending the smell. The distinction now first arose between the Northern and Southern fisheries: the object of the former being the Greenland whale, which frequents the Northern coasts and seas of Europe and America; that of the latter being the spermaceti whale, which was found in the Southern seas, from the Western Islands and coast of Africa, to that of Brazil, and still on to the Falkland Islands. Here, again, within soundings, on the coast of Brazil, they found a third species of whale, which they called the black or Brazil whale, smaller than the Greenland, yielding a still less valuable oil, fit only for summer use, as it becomes opaque at 50 degrees of Fahrenheit's termometer, while that of the spermaceti whale is limpid to 41, and of the Greenland whale to 36, of the same thermometer. It is only worth taking, therefore, when it falls in the way of the fishermen, but not worth seeking, except when they have failed of success against the spermaceti whale, in which case, this kind, easily found and taken, serves to moderate their loss.

In 1771 the Americans had one hundred and eighty-three vessels, of thirteen thousand eight hundred and twenty tons, in the Northern fishery, and one hundred and twenty-one vessels, of fourteen thousand and twenty tons, in the Southern, navigated by four thousand and fifty-nine men. At the beginning of the late war, they had one hundred and seventy-seven vessels in the Northern, and one hundred and thirty-two in the Southern fishery. At that period, our fishery being suspended, the English seized the opportunity of pushing theirs. They gave additional bounties of £500, £400, £300, £200, £100 sterling, annually, to the five ships which should take the greatest quantities of oil. The effect of which was such, as, by the year 1786, to double the quantity of common oil necessary for their own consumption. Finding, on a review of the subject, at that time, that their bounties had cost the Government £13 10s. sterling a man, annually, or sixty per cent. on the cargoes, a part of which went consequently to ease the purchases of this article made by foreign nations, they reduced the northern bounty from forty to thirty shillings the ton of admeasurement.

They had, some little time before, turned their attention to the Southern fishery, and given very great bounties in it, and had invited the fishermen of the United States to conduct their enterprises. Under their guidance, and with such encouragement, this fishery, which had only begun with them in 1784 or 1785, was rising into value. In 1788 they increased their bounties, and the temptations to our fishermen, under the general description of foreigners who had been employed in the whale fishery, to pass over with their families and vessels to the British dominions, either in America or Europe, but preferably to the latter. The effect of these measures had been prepared, by our whale oils becoming subject, in their market, to the foreign duty of £18 5s. sterling the ton, which, being more than equal to the price of the common oil, operated as a prohibition on that, and gave to their spermaceti oil a preference over ours to that amount.

* * * * * * * *

The fishermen of the United States, left without resource, by the loss of their market, began to think of accepting the British invitation, and of removing, some to Nova Scotia, preferring smaller advantages in the neighborhood of their ancient country and friends, others to Great Britain, postponing country and friends to high premiums.

The Government of France could not be inattentive to these proceedings. They saw the danger of letting four or five thousand seamen, of the best in the world, be transferred to the marine strength of another nation, and carry over with them an art, which they possessed almost exclusively. To give time for a counterplan, the Marquis de Lafayette, the valuable friend and citizen of this, as well as that country, wrote to a gentleman in Boston, to dissuade the fishermen from accepting the British proposals, and to assure them that their friends in France would endeavor to do something for them. A vessel was then arrived from Halifax at Nantucket, to take off those who had proposed to remove. Two families had gone abroad, and others were going. In this moment, the letter arriving, suspended their designs. Not another went abroad, and the vessel returned to Halifax with only the two families.

The plan adopted by the French ministry, very different from that of the first mover, was to give a counter invitation to the Nantucket men to remove and settle in Dunkirk, offering them a bounty of fifty livres (between nine and ten dollars) a ton on the admeasurement of the vessels they should equip for the whale fishery, with some other advantages. Nine families only, of thirty-three persons, accepted the invitation. This was in 1785. In 1786, the ministry were led to see that their invitation would produce but little effect, and that the true means of preventing the emigration of our fishermen to the British dominions would be to enable them still to follow their calling from their native country, by giving them a new market for their oils, instead of the old one they had lost. The duties were, therefore, abated on American whale oil immediately, and a further abatement promised by the letter No. 8, and, in December, 1787, the arrêt No. 9 was passed.

The rival fishermen immediately endeavored to turn this measure to their own advantage, by pouring their whale oils into the markets of France, where they were enabled, by the great premiums received from their Government, perhaps, too, by extraordinary indemnifications, to undersell both the French and American fishermen. To repel this measure, France shut her ports to all foreign fish oils whatever, by the arrêt No. 10. The British whale fishery fell, in consequence, the ensuing year from two hundred and twenty-two to one hundred and seventy-eight ships. But this general exclusion has palsied our fishery also. On the 7th of December, 1788, therefore, by the arrêt No. 11, the ports of France still remaining shut to all other nations, were again opened to the produce of the whale fisheries of the United States, continuing, however, their endeavors to recover a share in this fishery themselves, by the aid of our fishermen. In 1784, 1785, 1786, they had had four ships. In 1787, three. In 1788, seventeen in the two fisheries of four thousand five hundred tons. These cost them in bounty 225,000 livres, which divided on one thousand five hundred and fifty tons of oil, the quantity they took, amounted to 145 livres (near twenty-seven dollars) the ton, and, on about one hundred natives on board the seventeen ships, (for there were one hundred and fifty Americans engaged by the voyage) came to 2,225 livres, or about 416⅔ dollars a man.

We have had, during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789, on an average, ninety-one vessels, of five thousand eight hundred and twenty tons, in the northern, and thirty-one of four thousand three hundred and ninety tons in the southern fishery. * * * * *

These details will enable Congress to see with what a competition we have to struggle for the continuance of this fishery, not to say its increase. Against prohibitory duties in one country, and bounties to the adventurers in both of those which are contending with each other for the same object, ours have no auxiliaries, but poverty and rigorous economy. The business, unaided, is a wretched one. The Dutch have peculiar advantages for the northern fishery, as being within six or eight days' sail of the grounds, as navigating with more economy than any other nation in Europe, their seamen content with lower wages, and their merchants with lower profit. Yet the memorial No. 13, from a committee of the whale merchants to the States General of Holland, in the year 1775, states that fourteen millions of guilders, equal to five million six hundred thousand dollars, has been lost in that fishery in forty-seven years, being about one hundred and twenty thousand dollars a year. The States General, thereupon, gave a bounty of thirty guilders a man to the fishermen. A person immediately acquainted with the British whale fishery, and whose information merits confidence, has given assurance that the ships employed in their northern fishery, in 1788, sunk £800 each, on an average, more than the amount of the produce and bounties. An English ship of three hundred tons and forty-two seamen, in this fishery, generally brings home, after a four months' voyage, twenty-five tons of oil, worth £437 10s. sterling; but the wages of the officers and seamen will be £400; there remain but £37 10s., not worth taking into account, towards the outfit and merchants' profit. These, then, must be paid by the Government; and it is on this idea that the British bounty is calculated.

Our vessels for the northern fishery average sixty-four tons, and cost, when built, fitted out, and victualled for the first voyage, about three thousand dollars. They have taken, on an average, the three last years, according to the statement No. 12, eighteen tons of oil, worth, at our market, nine hundred dollars, which are to pay all expenses, and subsist the fishermen and merchant. Our vessels for the southern fishery average one hundred and forty tons, and cost, when built, fitted out, and victualled, for their first voyage, about six thousand five hundred dollars. They have taken on an average, the three last years, according to the same statement, thirty-two tons of oil each, worth at our market three thousand two hundred dollars, which are, in like manner, to pay all expenses, and subsist the owners and navigators. These expenses are great, as the voyages are generally of twelve months' duration. No hope can arise of their condition being bettered by an augmentation of the price of oil. This is kept down by the competition of the vegetable oils, which answer the same purposes, not quite so well, but well enough to become preferable, were the price to be raised, and so well, indeed, as to be more generally used than the fish oils for lighting houses and cities.

The American whale fishery is principally followed by the inhabitants of the island of Nantucket—a sand bar of about fifteen miles long, and three broad, capable of maintaining, by its agriculture, about twenty families; but it employed in these fisheries, before the war, between five or six thousand men and boys; and, in the only harbor it possesses, it had one hundred and forty vessels, one hundred and thirty-two of which were of the larger kind, as being employed in the southern fishery. In agriculture, then, they have no resource; and, if that of their fishery cannot be pursued from their own habitations, it is natural they should seek others from which it can be followed, and preferably those where they will find a sameness of language, religion, laws, habits, and kindred. A foreign emissary has lately been among them, for the purpose of renewing the invitations to a change of situation. But, attached to their native country, they prefer continuing in it, if their continuance there can be made supportable.

This brings us to the question, what relief does the condition of this fishery require?

1. A remission of duties on the articles used for their calling.

2. A retaliating duty on foreign oils, coming to seek a competition with them in or from our ports.

3. Free markets abroad.

1. The remission of duties will stand on nearly the same ground with that to the cod fishermen.

2. The only nation whose oil is brought hither for competition with our own, makes ours pay a duty of about eighty-two dollars the ton, in their ports. Theirs is brought here, too, to be reshipped fraudulently, under our flag, into ports where it could not be received under theirs, and ought not to be covered by ours, if we mean to preserve our own admission into them.

The 3d and principal object is to find markets for the vent of oil.

Portugal, England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Russia, the Hanse towns, supply themselves and something more. Spain and Italy receive supplies from England, and need the less, as their skies are clearer. France is the only country which can take our surplus, and they take principally of the common oil; as the habit is but commencing with them of ascribing a just value to spermaceti whale. Some of this, however, finds its vent there. There was, indeed, a particular interest perpetually soliciting the exclusion of our oils from their markets. The late government there saw well that what we should lose thereby would be gained by others, not by themselves. And we are to hope that the present government, as wise and friendly, will also view us, not as rivals, but as co-operators against a common rival. Friendly arrangements with them, and accommodation to mutual interest, rendered easier by friendly dispositions existing on both sides, may long secure to us this important resource for our seamen. Nor is it the interest of the fisherman alone, which calls for the cultivation of friendly arrangements with that nation; besides five-eights of our whale oil, and two-thirds of our salted fish, they take from us one-fourth of our tobacco, three-fourths of our live stock * * * * * a considerable and growing portion of our rice, great supplies, occasionally, of other grain; in 1789, which, indeed, was extraordinary, four millions of bushels of wheat, and upwards of a million of bushels of rye and barley * * * * * and nearly the whole carried in our own vessels. * * * * * They are a free market now, and will, in time, be a valuable one for ships and ship timber, potash, and peltry.

England is the market for the greatest part of our spermaceti oil. They impose on all our oils a duty of eighteen pounds five shillings sterling the ton, which, as to the common kind, is a prohibition, as has been before observed, and, as to the spermaceti, gives a preference of theirs over ours to that amount, so as to leave, in the end, but a scanty benefit to the fishermen; and, not long since, by a change of construction, without any change of law, it was made to exclude our oils from their ports, when carried in our vessels. On some change of circumstance, it was construed back again to the reception of our oils, on paying always, however, the same duty of eighteen pounds five shillings. This serves to show that the tenure by which we hold the admission of this commodity in their markets, is as precarious as it is hard. Nor can it be announced that there is any disposition on their part to arrange this or any other commercial matter, to mutual convenience. The ex parte regulations which they have begun for mounting their navigation on the ruins of ours, can only be opposed by counter regulations on our part. And the loss of seamen, the natural consequence of lost and obstructed markets for our fish and oil, calls, in the first place, for serious and timely attention. It will be too late when the seaman shall have changed his vocation, or gone over to another interest. If we cannot recover and secure for him these important branches of employment, it behooves us to replace them by others equivalent. We have three nurseries for forming seamen:

1. Our coasting trade, already on a safe footing.

2. Our fisheries, which, in spite of natural advantages, give just cause of anxiety.

3. Our carrying trade, our only resource of indemnification for what we lose in the other. The produce of the United States, which is carried to foreign markets, is extremely bulky. That part of it which is now in the hands of foreigners, and which we may resume into our own, without touching the rights of those nations who have met us in fair arrangements by treaty, or the interests of those who, by their voluntary regulations, have paid so just and liberal a respect to our interests, as being measured back to them again, places both parties on as good ground, perhaps, as treaties could place them—the proportion, I say, of our carrying trade, which may be resumed without affecting either of these descriptions of nations, will find constant employment for ten thousand seamen, be worth two millions of dollars, annually, will go on augmenting with the population of the United States, secure to us a full indemnification for the seamen we lose, and be taken wholly from those who force us to this act of self protection in navigation.

Hence, too, would follow, that their Newfoundland ships, not receiving provisions from us in their bottoms, nor permitted (by a law of their own) to receive in ours, must draw their subsistence from Europe, which would increase that part of their expenses in the proportion of four to seven, and so far operate as a duty towards restoring the level between them and us. The tables No. 2 and 12, will show the quantity of tonnage, and, consequently, the mass of seamen whose interests are in distress; and No. 17, the materials for indemnification.

If regulations exactly the counterpart of those established against us, would be ineffectual, from a difference of circumstances, other regulations equivalent can give no reasonable ground of complaint to any nation. Admitting their right of keeping their markets to themselves, ours cannot be denied of keeping our carrying trade to ourselves. And if there be anything unfriendly in this, it was in the first example.

The loss of seamen, unnoticed, would be followed by other losses in a long train. If we have no seamen, our ships will be useless, consequently our ship timber, iron, and hemp; our ship building will be at an end, ship carpenters go over to other nations, our young men have no call to the sea, our produce, carried in foreign bottoms, be saddled with war-freight and insurance in times of war; and the history of the last hundred years shows, that the nation which is our carrier has three years of war for every four years of peace. (No. 18.) We lose, during the same periods, the carriage for belligerent powers, which the neutrality of our flag would render an incalculable source of profit; we lose at this moment the carriage of our own produce to the annual amount of two millions of dollars, which, in the possible progress of the encroachment, may extend to five or six millions, the worth of the whole, with an increase in the proportion of the increase of our numbers. It is easier, as well as better, to stop this train at its entrance, than when it shall have ruined or banished whole classes of useful and industrious citizens.

It will doubtless be thought expedient that the resumption suggested should take effect so gradually, as not to endanger the loss of produce for the want of transportation; but that, in order to create transportation, the whole plan should be developed, and made known at once, that the individuals who may be disposed to lay themselves out for the carrying business, may make their calculations on a full view of all circumstances.

On the whole, the historical view we have taken of these fisheries, proves they are so poor in themselves, as to come to nothing with distant nations, who do not support them from their treasury. We have seen that the advantages of our position place our fisheries on a ground somewhat higher, such as to relieve our treasury from giving them support; but not to permit it to draw support from them, nor to dispense the government from the obligation of effectuating free markets for them; that, for the great proportion of our salted fish, for our common oil, and a part of our spermaceti oil, markets may perhaps be preserved, by friendly arrangements towards those nations whose arrangements are friendly to us, and the residue be compensated by giving to the seamen thrown out of business the certainty of employment in another branch, of which we have the sole disposal.

XXI.—Opinion against the constitutionality of a National Bank.

February 15, 1791.

The bill for establishing a National Bank undertakes among other things:—

1. To form the subscribers into a corporation.

2. To enable them in their corporate capacities to receive grants of land; and so far is against the laws of Mortmain.[26]

3. To make alien subscribers capable of holding lands; and so far is against the laws of alienage.

4. To transmit these lands, on the death of a proprietor, to a certain line of successors; and so far changes the course of Descents.

5. To put the lands out of the reach of forfeiture or escheat; and so far is against the laws of Forfeiture and Escheat.

6. To transmit personal chattels to successors in a certain line; and so far is against the laws of Distribution.

7. To give them the sole and exclusive right of banking under the national authority; and so far is against the laws of Monopoly.

8. To communicate to them a power to make laws paramount to the laws of the States; for so they must be construed, to protect the institution from the control of the State legislatures; and so, probably, they will be construed.

I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people." [XIIth amendment.] To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.

The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States, by the Constitution.

1. They are not among the powers specially enumerated: for these are: 1st. A power to lay taxes for the purpose of paying the debts of the United States; but no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid. Were it a bill to raise money, its origination in the Senate would condemn it by the Constitution.

2d. "To borrow money." But this bill neither borrows money nor ensures the borrowing it. The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any other money holders, to lend or not to lend their money to the public. The operation proposed in the bill, first, to lend them two millions, and then to borrow them back again, cannot change the nature of the latter act, which will still be a payment, and not a loan, call it by what name you please.

3. To "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States, and with the Indian tribes." To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who erects a bank, creates a subject of commerce in its bills; so does he who makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines; yet neither of these persons regulates commerce thereby. To make a thing which may be bought and sold, is not to prescribe regulations for buying and selling. Besides, if this was an exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending as much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For the power given to Congress by the Constitution does not extend to the internal regulation of the commerce of a State, (that is to say of the commerce between citizen and citizen,) which remain exclusively with its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say, its commerce with another State, or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. Accordingly the bill does not propose the measure as a regulation of trade, but as "productive of considerable advantages to trade." Still less are these powers covered by any other of the special enumerations.

II. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the two following:—

1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, that is to say, "to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare." For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.