Having explained what is intended by the principles of common sense, the next attempt will be to apply certain of these principles to gain a system of natural religion; meaning by this term that religion which may be gained from the works of the Creator independently of any revealed Word.
In all systems of religion the first article relates to the existence and character of the Deity to be worshiped and obeyed. The first principle of common sense to guide us in this inquiry is this:
In the widest sense of the word, cause signifies something as an antecedent, without which a given change will not occur, and with which it will occur. This is the leading idea in every use of this word.
Then there are two classes of causes; the first are necessary or producing causes, and the second occasional causes.
A producing cause is an antecedent which produces a given change.
Occasional causes are those circumstances which are indispensable to the action of producing causes.
[pg 045]Thus, fire applied to powder is the producing cause of an explosion, while the placing of the two together is the occasional cause of it.
The idea of a producing cause is one which probably is gained when we first discover that our own will moves our own limbs and other things around us. When we will to move a thing, and find the intended change follows our volition to move it, then we can not help believing that our own mind produced this change. At the same time we gain the idea of power to produce this change, and the belief also that the thing changed had no power to refrain from the change.
Our only mode of defining the idea of a producing cause, of power and of want of power, is to refer to occasions when, by willing, we cause changes, and thus become conscious of the existence and nature of these ideas by experience.
So also we have no mode of defining our sensations but by stating the occasions in which we are conscious of them. For instance, whiteness is the sensation we have when we look at snow, and blackness is the sensation we have when we look at charcoal.
The same idea of causation and power in ourselves which we have when we make changes by our will, we always connect with any thing which by experiment and testimony we find, in given circumstances, to be an invariable antecedent of a given change. Our minds are so made, that whenever we find an invariable antecedent of a given change, we can not help believing that this antecedent produced the change, just as we believe our own will produces changes in our bodies and in things around us. And if any person [pg 046] were to talk and act as if lie did not believe this, be would be regarded as having “lost his reason.”
Moreover, whenever men, by frequent experiments, find that a given change is invariably preceded by a certain antecedent, they can not help believing that the antecedent has power to produce this change, and that the thing changed has no power to do otherwise. This idea of power and want of power always exists whenever men find an invariable antecedent to some change. It is by finding what are thus invariably connected as antecedents and consequents that men learn what are causes, and what are effects, and what are the powers of things around us.
Here, then, we have these as principles of common sense believed by all men, viz.:
1. Every change (in matter or mind) has a producing cause as an antecedent.
2. Every invariable antecedent of an invariable sequent is a producing cause, and the thing changed has no power to refrain from that change.
3. A producing cause, in appropriate circumstances, has power to make a given change.
Now every man, however unlearned, can judge for himself whether these principles of common sense exist in his own mind, as here set forth. For example, let any person take a magnet and discover, day after day, that when it is placed near a piece of iron it draws it to itself; let him find also, by testimony from others, that this is invariable and fails in not a single instance, and the inevitable result is a belief that the magnet is the cause of the moving of the iron, just as the mind is the cause of the movement of our bodies. So also there is a belief that the magnet, in given circumstances, [pg 047] has power to move the iron, as our will has power to move our body. So also there is a belief that the piece of iron, in the given circumstances, has no power to refrain from being thus attracted.
We see, then, that it is a universal fact, that when there is a change of any thing, or any new mode of existence, every sane man believes there is some producing cause of this change. Even the youngest child exhibits this principle as a part of its mental organization. And should a person be found who was destitute of a belief in this truth, so that he should talk and act as if things came into existence and were changing places and forms without any causes, he would be called insane, or a man who had “lost his reason.”
Our minds being endowed with this principle, we find the world around us to be a succession of changes which we trace back to preceding causes, until we come to the grand question, “Who, or what first started this vast system of successive changes?” Only two replies are conceivable. The first is that of the Atheist, who, contradicting his own common sense, maintains that, in some past period, all this vast system of organization and changes began to exist without any cause. The other reply is, that there is a great, eternal, self-existent First Cause, who himself never began to be, and who is the author of all finite existences. This being, the Creator of the heavens and the earth, we call God.
The next principle of common sense is that by which we gain a knowledge of the natural attributes of the Creator. It is this:
Design or contrivance to secure a given end, is proof [pg 048] of an intelligent designer, and the nature of a design proves the intention and character of its author.
The mind, as has been shown, is so formed that it can not believe that any existence can commence without some antecedent cause. The existence of unorganized matter, however, would be no proof that the cause was an intelligent mind.
But when any existence is discovered where there is an adjustment of parts, all conducing to accomplish some determinate end, no person can examine and understand its nature and adaptations without the accompanying belief that the cause of that contrivance was a mind endowed with the capacity of adjusting means to accomplish an end, and thus an intelligent mind.
Nor is it possible, when the object which any design is fitted to accomplish is clearly discovered, to doubt the intention of the designer. We can not help believing that it was the intention of the contriver to accomplish the end for which his contrivance is fitted.
As an example to illustrate the existence of these principles, even in the simplest minds, if a savage should find in the desert a gold watch, nothing could lead him to believe that it sprang into existence there without any cause. If he should open it and perceive the nice adjustment of the wheels and all its beautiful indications of contrivance, he could not believe that the mind of an animal, or that any but an intelligent mind constructed its machinery. If he should have all its movements explained to him, and learn how exactly all were fitted to mark the passage of time, it would be equally impossible to convince him that the contriver did not design it for such a purpose.
Very early childhood gives evidence of the existence [pg 049] of these principles. An interesting instance of this is recorded by a celebrated philosopher, who, to test the existence of these principles in the mind of his child, planted a bed with seeds arranged in the form of the letters which spelled the child's name. When the green symbols had sprung from the ground and were discovered by the delighted child, the father in vain endeavored to force his belief that the letters came without a cause and without a design. “No, father. Somebody planted them; somebody intended to have them come up and spell my name!” And thus infancy itself maintains the principles which are our guide to the Great Source of all finite existences.
Another principle of common sense lends us still further aid in arriving at the natural attributes of the Creator. It is this:
All the business of life rests on a belief of this truth. Our confidence that the sun will rise, the seasons return, the ocean and rivers flow, the mountains remain; and in thousands of other things that regulate our plans and conduct, all depends on this implanted belief that things will continue according to our past experience till there is evidence of a change. A man who acted as if he disbelieved this principle would be regarded as having “lost his reason.”
When, therefore, we have gained the idea that the Creator is an intelligent mind, we necessarily believe that his mind is such as we have ever known in past experience, that is, a mind like our own, endowed with reason, intellect, susceptibilities and will. We can not conceive of any other kind of mind, because we [pg 050] have never had any experience or knowledge of any other kind.
The only respect in which we can conceive of the Creator as differing from our own minds is in the extent of those natural faculties which are exhibited in his works.
Thus by the use of the principles of common sense we have gained the positions that there is a Being who is the Author of all finite existences, whose mind is like our own in natural faculties, while in the extent of these faculties, as exhibited in his works, he is far beyond our conceptions.
In the preceding chapter we have applied the principles of common sense to gain evidence of the existence of a Creator, or Great First Cause, whose natural attributes we can discover only by the nature of our own minds.
This being so, our next step in seeking after God is to examine the construction or nature of our own minds.
The only way to discover the nature of a thing is to examine what are its qualities, how it acts, and how it is acted upon. This also is the same as studying the philosophy of things. For when learned men set forth any branch of philosophy, they only teach the qualities of certain things, how they act, and how they are acted upon.
[pg 051]Whoever, therefore, gives attention to the nature of mind so as to discover its qualities, how it acts, and how it is acted upon, is studying the philosophy of mind, or mental philosophy.
The nature of mind, the philosophy of mind, and mental philosophy are terms all expressing the same thing.
Now, the only possible way in which any person can discover the nature of another mind is by a knowledge of his own. We first learn by experience the qualities of our own mind, how it acts and how it is acted upon, and then, by a process of reasoning, we learn that there are other minds around us, and that they have similar qualities.
The study of mental philosophy, then, is directing attention to the nature of our own mind, and thus discovering the nature of other minds.
It differs from all other studies in this respect, that all men have the materials of the knowledge sought in their own minds, and are required simply to direct attention to their own mental states and acts.
This being so, the common people are as fully qualified to settle all questions in regard to the nature or philosophy of their own minds as the most learned and profound metaphysicians or theologians can be. All that is requisite to success is, that they direct their attention to the subject by suitable methods.
It will be found, on examination, that the common people have secured a written system of mental philosophy as real as has ever yet been furnished by any metaphysician or theologian, while it is free from the great defects which render many works on mental science unpractical and repulsive.
[pg 052]This—the people's system of mental philosophy—it will be the object of what follows to set forth.
In attempting it, we shall find that mankind, in the uses of every-day life, have arranged the various acts and states of mind into classes and subdivisions, and have given names to these classes, and to the specific acts or states included in these classes. These classifications and terms are recorded by lexicographers in their dictionaries.
All words have that meaning which is attached to them by the people who use them. The business of the lexicographer is, not to settle what meaning ought to belong to words, but rather to state the meaning which men actually attach to them in writing and speaking.
In setting forth the people's system of natural philosophy as contained in lexicographies, we find that almost every word is used to express several meanings, similar in some respects and diverse in others. In consequence of this, we only can attempt thus much for mental science, as for many other subjects, viz., to describe the thing intended, and then to select the word most frequently used to express this idea, as set forth in our dictionaries.
This, then, is the course pursued in the following pages. A description is set forth of a given act or state of mind, sufficient to identify it from all others, and then the word is selected from dictionaries of our language which has most frequently been used by the common people in expressing the idea intended. Thus every person who cares enough about the matter to read and think, can decide as well as the most celebrated metaphysician, whether the description given is [pg 053] true to his own experience, and also whether, according to lexicographers, the word selected is frequently used by man to express this idea.
The writer, in her first attempts to investigate the philosophy of mind, examined the works of Stewart, Reid, Locke, Edwards, Brown, Coleridge, Cousin, Jouffroy, Coombe, Spurtzheim and several others. More recently some attention has been given to the writings of Sir William Hamilton, Hickok and others. The result has been the conviction, that most of these works contain the people's system, more or less disguised with diverse modes of classification and new technics, which tend to render the whole subject misty and perplexing. And still more unfortunately, some of them attempt the discussion of questions which are unpractical and often unintelligible.
As an example, certain metaphysicians have attempted to prove that there is nothing existing but mind, and that all which we believe to be realities without ourselves are not so, but merely ideas in the mind.
Other metaphysicians have attempted to meet their arguments, and to prove that the world around us is a reality.
Both attempts have ended in books which seem to have no sort of practical influence either way. Men can not help believing that there is an outer world, and that the men and things that affect our senses are realities, and such arguments neither lessen nor increase this belief.
Meantime, the books written to prove or disprove this truth are incomprehensible to most common minds, at least the writer of this work has in vain essayed to [pg 054] understand them, or to find any person who could communicate any clear ideas of their contents.
We have seen, in the preceding chapters, that our only mode of gaining a knowledge of the natural attributes of God, is by the study of the nature of mind. We have seen also that the only way to discover the nature of mind is to examine what are its qualities, and how it acts and is acted upon in our own experience.
When we discover what our minds actually do, we find out what they have power to do. The faculties of mind are its powers of acting as they are exhibited in our own experience.
The following presents a brief outline of the powers and faculties of mind as they have been classified and named by the people.
Ideas is the word most frequently used to include all the operations and states of mind.
Our ideas are often referred to as divided into two classes, viz., ideas gained by the senses, and ideas that pass through the mind without the aid of the senses.
The power to gain ideas by the five senses is called sensation or perception.
[pg 055]The power to have ideas without the use of the senses is called conception.
Per is the Latin word for by, and con is the word for without. So we have perceptions by the senses, and conceptions without the senses.
Imagination or fancy, is the power to make new combinations of our conceptions.
Memory is the power of recalling past ideas, and of recognizing them as having existed before.
Judgment is the power of comparing ideas, and noticing their relations to each other.
Abstraction is the power of noticing certain parts or certain qualities of things, while other parts or qualities are unnoticed.
Association is the power of recalling past ideas according to certain modes, called laws of association.
The above powers are usually classed together, and called the intellectual powers, or the intellect.
The powers of feeling various kinds of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, enjoyment and discomfort, are called the susceptibilities, the emotions and the feelings.
When any thing is found to be the cause of pleasurable feelings, there follows a desire to secure it, and it is called good. When any thing causes pain, a desire follows to avoid it, and it is called evil.
These desires to secure good and avoid evil are called motives (or movers), because they move the mind to action in order to secure the good desired or to escape the evil feared. The objects that cause such desires are also called motives.
[pg 056]For example, gold is called the motive that led a man to murder, and the desire of gold is also called the motive of that act.4
Desires are measured as strong or weak by our own consciousness. When we desire two incompatible things and must choose one or the other, before the act of choice we are conscious that one creates a desire which is stronger than the other.
The only mode of deciding which desire is strongest, is by our own consciousness.
The power of choosing, or willing, is called the will. It is also called the power of volition.
When several desires coexist, some of which must necessarily be denied in order to gratify others, we ordinarily choose that object which excites the strongest desire, as measured by our consciousness.
But it is often the case that we feel the strongest desire for that which is not best for us. Thus, when sick we have tempting fruit and nauseous medicine before us, with power to choose either. Our intellect decides that the medicine is best for us, but our strongest desire is for the fruit.
In such a case we have power to choose either that which excites the strongest desire or that which the intellect decides to be best, even when it does not excite the strongest desire.
This power is the chief feature of a rational mind in distinction from an irrational mind.
And the belief that we have this power is to be [pg 057] placed as one of the principles of common sense, because all men talk and act as if they believe they possess this power. And if any person were to talk and act as if he did not believe that he had power to choose in either of these two ways, he would be regarded as having lost his reason.
Of the thoughts which continually pass through the mind, we find that some are attended with a feeling of the real existence of the objects of our thoughts, and others are not so attended. For example, we may think of a man with a certain form carrying a dagger and going to commit murder, and with this, a feeling that no such thing is really existing. Again, we may have this same idea attended with the conviction that it is a reality.
This feeling of the reality of the objects of our thoughts is called belief, or faith.
Our minds are so made, that we necessarily believe not only that things are really existing at the present time, but that things will occur that are not now in existence. For example, we believe the sun will rise to-morrow morning in another place nearer toward the north or south than it did the present morning. We believe the tide will rise higher or lower on a coming day than it did the present day. And thus multitudes of events are believed to be in the future.
Those things which really do or will exist, in distinction from those we may think of but which do not and will not exist, are called truths, or realities.
All our comfort and happiness depend on our believing the truth, meaning by truth the reality of things. [pg 058] To believe that things exist when they do not, or that things are not existing when they are, involves certain pain, disappointment and mistake.
Our great safeguard from this is that part of our mental organization called reason, or common sense. This, as has been shown, consists in the necessary belief of certain truths by all men.
The test by which these truths are identified and distinguished from all other knowledge, is the fact that usually all men talk and act as if they believed them, and that when they fail to do so, they are regarded as having “lost their reason.”
The truths thus necessarily believed are the foundation of the process called reasoning, which is a mode of establishing other truths by the aid of those already believed.
These principles of reason or common sense are often called by other names, such as intuitions, intuitive truths, first principles, etc.
Thus all the powers of mind are arranged in the four general classes, viz., the intellect, the susceptibilities, the will, and reason or common sense.
In regard to the power of mind called reason, what is claimed here is, not that either the common people or metaphysicians have usually thus clearly set forth what is here so described and named; but that all men, learned and unlearned, allow that there are truths which are necessarily believed by all mankind; that these are the foundation of all reasoning, and that they often are called reason. So when any one is found to lack a belief in certain of these intuitive truths, he is said to have “lost his reason.” And when any act or assertion is seen to contradict any [pg 059] of these truths, it is said to be “contrary to reason.”
Therefore it is proper to put the belief in these implanted truths as a distinct power of the mind, and to call it “the reason.” And as the belief of these truths is common to all men, it is also proper to call it common sense.