If the question were asked, “What is the greatest constructive work that has yet been undertaken by man?” there would, without question, be a great many different replies. There can, however, be only one reply as to the most costly. Perhaps, also, there can be but one answer as to the most disastrous to human life. The Panama canal would almost certainly secure pre-eminence in these attributes. It might or might not rank equally high as a work of engineering genius and possible public utility.

There has probably never been a project that has so challenged the admiration and the approval of the world as that of finding a waterway between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, at or near to the narrow neck of land that separates Limon from the Gulf of Panama in Central America. This enterprise has a long and a very eventful history. Many explorers, geographers, statesmen, engineers, and economists have either written on the merits and demerits of the undertaking, or have otherwise become associated with it. Some of the more notable episodes in the records of the isthmus may therefore be referred to, before proceeding to describe the various projects now either in progress or in contemplation, for opening it up for the purposes of trade, commerce, and navigation.

One of the earliest direct references to the importance of a waterway between the two oceans is that made by Cortez in his letters to Charles V. The great conqueror, however, does not seem to have contemplated the construction of such a waterway. He diligently searched for a natural waterway or strait between the two oceans, and declared that to be “the one thing above all others in the world I am most desirous of meeting with,” on account of its immense utility. Some sixty or seventy years later, there was a project put forward by the Spaniards for uniting the two oceans by a waterway, but it does not appear to have been carried any length. The Spaniards, indeed, were hardly the people to achieve such a distinction. Unlike the ancient Romans, the Italians, and the Chinese, their skill was not very marked in hydraulics. They were, besides, much too superstitious to venture on interference with what many of them believed to be an ordinance having all the fixity of a law of nature.[165]

The American Isthmus next claims attention as associated with the ill-starred fortunes of William Paterson and the Darien scheme.[166]

The earliest, and in some respects the best, information yet available, relative to the topography of the country adjacent to the Panama Canal, is that furnished by Dampier,[167] who spent some time on the isthmus and noted all its chief physical characteristics. Dampier’s observations, however, were chiefly made in and about the Gulf of St. Michael, which he describes as lying “nearly thirty leagues from Panama, towards the south-east,” and as “a place where a great many rivers, having finished their course, are swallowed up in the sea.” Dampier found the isthmus very low and swampy, “the rivers being so oosy that the stinking mud infects the air.”

Lionel Wafer[168] has also made an early and valuable report on the character of the country bordering on the route of the present Panama Canal, describing it “as almost everywhere of an unequal surface, distinguished with hills and valleys of great variety for height, depth, and extent.” He described the river Chagre, or Chagres, as one which “rises from some hills near the South Sea, and runs along in an oblique north-westerly course till it finds itself a passage into the North Sea, though the chain of hills, if I mistake not, is extended much further to the west, even to the Lake of Nicaragua.”

De Ulloas[169] and some friends in 1735 made an ascent of the river Chagres on their journey from Cruces to Panama. This voyage is interesting as being one of the first that is recorded over the river that has since played so prominent a part in the history of the canalisation of the isthmus. They found the banks of the Chagres impassable, for the most part, from the density of the vegetation and the velocity of the current. The vessels that were then more or less accustomed to navigate the Chagres were described by De Ulloas as chatas and bongos—the first carrying 600 or 700 quintals, and the latter 400 or 500. The river was found to be so full of shallows that even vessels of this small size had to be lightened every now and again until they had passed over them.

No one has taken a greater interest in the subject of a ship canal than Humboldt, who regarded Kelley’s Atrato route with approval, and who, replying to the objections brought against the proposal in his time, declared that “there is nothing more likely to obstruct the extension of commerce and the freedom of international relations than to create a distaste for farther investigation by discouraging, as some are too positive in doing, all hope of an oceanic channel.”[170]

A survey was made of the isthmus in 1827 by Captain Lloyd and Captain Falmark, the former an officer of engineers in the Colombian service, and the latter a Swedish gentleman acting in that capacity for the time being. Beginning at Panama, they followed the old line of road from that city to Porto Bello, a distance of 22¾ miles, where they found the surface of the water in the river to be 152½ feet above high-water mark at Panama. At Cruces they found a fall in the river of 114½ feet, leaving only about 38 feet as the height above the Pacific. It was found that at Panama there was a rise and fall of the tide in the Pacific of 27·4 feet, being 13·5 feet above the high-water mark of the Atlantic at Chagres. These and other observations led them to conclude[171] that “in every twelve hours, commencing with high tides, the level of the Pacific is first several feet higher than that of the Atlantic; it becomes then of the same height, and at low tide it is several feet lower; again, as the tide rises, the two seas are of one height, and, finally, at high tide the Pacific is again the same number of feet above the Atlantic as at first.”[172]

In 1840 Mr. Wheelwright was commissioned by the directors of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company to examine the capabilities of the river Chagres, and the best means of communication with the South Sea. He made a lengthy report on the subject, in the course of which he confirmed many of Captain Lloyd’s observations, giving the depth of high water on the bar of the Chagres at 15 feet. In 1843, again, M. Napoleon Garella received from M. Guizot, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, an order to make a survey of the isthmus, and he proposed a summit-canal of more than three miles long, the level being reached by thirty-six locks and three large aqueducts.[173]

In 1853, Mr. Squier explored that section of the mountain chain which crosses the American isthmus to which Berghaus has given the name of the Honduras-Nicaraguan group. This range commences at the Col de Guajoca and extends to the valley of the Rio San Juan. Running at first close to the shore of the Pacific, it gradually approaches the centre of the isthmus. The eastern slope, broken by mountain offshoots and watered by rivers of the first order, terminates on the north-east in the point Gracias a Dios. The western slope forms a long, low, and, comparatively speaking, level valley, crossed by an irregular and independent series of volcanic peaks. This accessory line of volcanoes, which presents the most distinctive feature of the physical geography of Central America, is nowhere so distinct from the main line of rocky axis as in the Honduras-Nicaraguan district. Mr. Squier proposed to commence a railway at Puerto Caballos, in the Bay of Honduras, and proceed due south to Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific, a distance of some 160 miles. The harbours on this route are said to be very superior to those on the Tehuantepec route. The summit-level, however, is 2308 feet above the level of the sea. At such a height a canal would be practically impossible, and the project was never carried any further than a survey.

Among the many alternative routes suggested for a canal across the American isthmus, one that has found some favour in the United States was that viâ the isthmus of Tehuantepec. This locality has been repeatedly surveyed. Cortez had his attention called to it in the sixteenth century. Don Augustus Cramer went over at least part of the route in 1744. Again, in 1842-3, it was surveyed by Señor Moro, as will be found in a book called ‘Survey of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, executed in the years 1842 and 1843, under the superintendence of a scientific commission appointed by the projector, Don José de Garay. London, 1844.’ In 1852 it was surveyed by Mr. J. J. Williams, on behalf of the Tehuantepec Railroad Company of New Orleans. The project was to ascend, from the Atlantic coast, the river Coatzacoalcos to its junction with the Malalengo, from which spot a canal was to be carried to the summit-level on the Mesa de Tarifa, through a series of locks, rising 525 feet in all, and descending 656 feet into the lagoons on the shores east of Tehuantepec. The canal would have a length of about 50 miles, and would require 19 additional miles of trench to convey water. The length of this line was stated by Mr. Kelly, of New York,[174] at “about 210 miles,” and by M. Voisin, a director of the Suez Canal,[175] at 240 kilometres, or about 149 miles.

M. Moro estimated that 150 locks would be required on this route, and twelve days would be required for vessels to pass through the canal. The coast of Tehuantepec is, moreover, subject to fearful hurricanes and to subterranean movements of volcanic origin, while, finally, the supply of water at so high a level was believed to be doubtful.[176]

At the first session of the Congress of Geographical Science, held at Antwerp in 1871, the question of constructing a canal across the American isthmus was presented for consideration. General Hame, of the United States, was present, and took part in the congress. He described the proposals of the two French explorers, MM. de Gogorza and de Lacharme, who proposed to cut the Isthmus of Darien between the navigable channels of the Tuyra, the Atrato, and the Caquiri. The congress recommended the project of these gentlemen to the attention of the great maritime Powers, and of the scientific societies throughout the world. There the matter rested for a time.

At the second congress of the same body, held at Paris in 1875, the question of the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Darien was again considered. M. de Lesseps, who was present on that occasion, declared that all the authors of the various projects brought forward for piercing the isthmus up to that time had made a grave mistake in committing themselves to a canal with locks and sweet water. He urged that, in order to meet the wants of commerce, all maritime canals should be carried between the two oceans at the same level, in the same way as the Suez Canal had been. Again a resolution was adopted, urging on the various governments concerned that the utmost facilities should be given for the construction of a ship canal in this part of the world. The congress went a step further. In order to inquire into the subject of the possibility of constructing such a canal, and the conditions necessary for its accomplishment, a committee was appointed under the presidency of Admiral Noury, and including among its members MM. Daubrée, Levasseur, and Delesse, members of the Institute of France. A syndicate was at the same time formed for the purpose of exploring Central America, with a view to the adoption of the most suitable route.

The results of the exploration thus undertaken were made known in due time, and in 1879 an international congress was held at Paris under the Presidency of M. de Lesseps, to consider proposals for an interoceanic canal, when it was affirmed (1) that the construction of an interoceanic canal, at sea level throughout, so desirable in the interests of commerce and of navigation, was possible; and (2) that such a canal should be constructed between the Gulf of Limon and the Bay of Panama.[177] These resolutions were adopted by no less than seventy-eight votes against eight, there being, however, twelve who abstained from voting.

Five different projects were submitted for the consideration of the conference. It is, however, a remarkable fact that none of them, except the Panama Canal Scheme, proposed to provide for a canal without a tunnel and without locks. As the Panama scheme was that recommended by M. de Lesseps, the conference requested him to undertake the direction of the work. The veteran replied that his best friends had endeavoured to persuade him that after the accomplishment of his great work at Suez he should seek repose; but, he added, “if a general who has won a first battle is asked to engage in a second, he cannot refuse.” Directly afterwards M. de Lesseps received from Victor Hugo a letter approving his course, and adding, “Astonish the universe by great doings which are not of wars. Is it necessary to conquer the world? No; it is yours. It belongs to civilisation; it awaits it. Go; do it; proceed.” The press of Paris were jubilant over the new enterprise, declaring that France was continuing its great mission. In the Chamber of Deputies Mgr. Freppel declared that with the piercing of the Isthmus of Panama, a complete change will be effected in the relations of the entire world.

Thus encouraged on every side, M. de Lesseps sought the means for his second great enterprise. He did not find it difficult to raise a considerable sum. He pointed out to his countrymen that on the 250,000,000 of francs that they had contributed towards the actual expenditure incurred on the works of the Suez Canal, they had benefited to the extent of 1,220,000,000 of francs. The congress had made it appear that the Panama Canal would cost twice that of the Suez, but then it was expected to produce three times as good a result.

M. de Lesseps consented to occupy the position he did on the express condition that all the complex problems connected with the undertaking were fully and satisfactorily resolved by commissions of experts. Five such commissions were appointed—of statistics, of economics, of navigation, of construction or technique, and of ways and means. The Technical Commission having considered the various proposals submitted, drew up the following summary of their several merits.

The cost of the maintenance and working of each of the several schemes was estimated at the same sum—130 million of francs, or 5 per cent. of the anticipated receipts. No doubt appears to have been entertained that the enterprise would prove highly remunerative. M. Voisin Bey, Inspector-General of Ways and Bridges, calculated that the company would be able to obtain an average of 15 francs on at least four million tons of shipping expected to make use of the canal; and the Statistical Commission committed themselves to the view that the two canals of Suez and Panama would present the following comparison:—

On the faith of these and similar statements, many of them, as we now know, largely illusory, the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique de Panama was founded in 1879 with a capital of 600 millions of francs, or about one half the sum estimated as necessary, but with authority to increase or reduce the capital as might be deemed desirable.

At the outset of the undertaking, M. de Lesseps, following the example that he had set with the Suez Canal, and in order to mark the international character of the enterprise, offered to American capitalists the opportunity of providing one half of the amount required, and announced that whether the Americans subscribed towards the enterprise or not it would be begun with the 300 millions of francs which it was proposed to raise in Europe. Subscriptions towards this moiety were invited in Europe in December 1880, and 102,230 subscribers offered more than double the amount asked for, or 1,266,609 shares in all, of which 994,508 shares were subscribed in France alone. The financial outlook of the enterprise being thus encouraging, M. de Lesseps lost no time in proceeding to Panama, in order that he might study for himself, on the spot, the character of the work he had undertaken to perform. He was accompanied by an engineering commission of eight well-known experts, including MM. Dircks, the chief engineer of the waterways of Holland, Danzats, chief resident engineer at Suez, two Colombian engineers, and others. The opinion unanimously arrived at by this commission was that the canal could be completed for 843 millions of francs, or about 34 millions sterling,[178] in about eight years.

Meanwhile a grand superior consultative commission, which had been convened at Paris, for the purpose of inquiring into the technical details of the scheme, and determining a programme for their execution, recommended that no time should be lost, and thereupon MM. Couvreux and Hersent, well-known contractors, were entrusted with the execution of the work to the extent of 500 millions of francs (20,000,000l.), for which sum they declared that the canal could be constructed. The work of levelling and dredging was prosecuted with vigour. There was, however, a vast amount of preliminary work to be done. Twenty-three different workshops and docks had to be provided along the line of the canal, with workmen’s dwellings, hospitals, and other requisite equipments. The Culebra, a mountain in the middle of the isthmus, was selected for the erection of several considerable installations adapted to the study of the problems to be solved. Through this mountain the canal had to be cut to a depth of over 100 metres. It was calculated that the organisation of the works, the providing of the necessary materials of construction, the acquisition of the ground along the line of route, and the commencement of operations generally, represented something like one-third of the total work to be done. The Colombian Government, through whose territory the canal was to be constructed, did all they could to advance the project, offering to the company 500,000 hectares of land, with the minerals underlying the same, in such localities as the company might select. This concession was deemed at the time to be equal to about one-third of the cost of the canal.

The first important step towards the prosecution of the Panama Canal works was the selection of a site for landing the necessary plant. The space in front of the town of Colon, at the north-eastern extremity of the Bay of Limon, was occupied by wharves devoted to the existing trade brought by steamers to the Panama Railway, and, therefore, another spot had to be found. The village of Gatun was first chosen, being on the river Chagres, and close to the railway and the proposed line of the canal. It was supposed that this site would be healthier than the low island of Manzanillo, on which Colon is situated, and the river Chagres afforded communication with the sea, having a minimum depth of 13 feet over its bar, which might be increased by dredging. Owing, however, to the want of proper shelter, fever attacked the workmen at Gatun; and, finally, the creek separating Manzanillo island from the mainland was selected as a harbour for the works.

The outlet of the canal was to be situated in this creek; and in order to protect the mouth of the canal and provide a good harbour for the works an embankment was formed on the south-west corner of Manzanillo island, and was carried about 650 feet into the Bay of Limon to afford shelter, being protected along its exposed portion by rubble stone. This embankment contains 458,000 cubic yards of earthwork, obtained by the aid of excavators from some hillocks about three-quarters of a mile distant, adjoining the railway; it covers an area of about 74 acres, which was formerly partly marsh land, and partly covered by the sea. The projecting mole was estimated to shelter nearly 3000 lineal feet of wharfage.[179] The position of the works will be understood from the annexed drawing.

Up to February 1883 the work undertaken at the canal had been almost entirely preliminary. In that month M. de Lesseps, acting upon recommendations contained in a report made by M. Dingler, chief engineer of roads and bridges, proposed to the shareholders of the company that the definite programme of the work to be done should embrace a canal of a depth of nine metres below sea level, and a width of 22 metres throughout its course; the construction of large ports at Colon and at Panama; a great basin, five kilometres in extent, near Tavernilla, about the centre of the canal, in order to allow vessels to pass each other; a great dam at Gamboa, for the regulation of the course of the Chagres river; and a tidal port at Panama, in order to ensure access to and from the Pacific at all hours. In submitting this programme, M. de Lesseps calculated that the excavation necessary to the completion of such a canal would be about 110 millions of cubic metres, and that the work of regulating the Chagres river would be equal to a further 10 millions of cubic metres. This work, M. de Lesseps estimated, could be completed in 1888—the excavations of land in three years, and the dredging operations in two, so that “the canal could, with mathematical certainty, be opened on the 1st January 1888.” In confirmation of this calculation, he appealed to the experience at Suez, where, with a total of 75 millions of cubic metres of excavation, 50 millions were done during the two last years of the work.

The state of affairs at the canal in the autumn of 1884 is described by the American Admiral Cooper, who reported that although comparatively little had been done in the actual work of excavation, in relation to the vast work to be accomplished, yet all the preliminary plans had been prepared, the soundings had been made, the line of route had been cleared of its tropical vegetation, large supplies of materials of all kinds were at command, dwellings and barracks for the employés had been erected in elevated and salubrious localities, hospitals had been established, and every arrangement requisite for meeting possible eventualities had been carried out so completely that he was confirmed in the belief that the canal would be finished in due time, although he doubted its completion in 1888. At this time no less than twenty different contractors, of eight different nationalities, were engaged upon the work of construction. These contractors had undertaken collectively to raise 62,691,000 cubic metres of excavation for a sum total of 219,295,000 francs (8,772,000l. sterling), being at the rate of rather less than 3s. per cubic metre. As the total quantity of excavation required was estimated at 120 millions of cubic metres, the opinion was held that the mere work of clearing the course of the canal could be accomplished for about 440 millions of francs, or rather less than 18 millions sterling.

Up to the end of 1884, the Canal Company had received a total sum of 471¼ millions of francs (about 19,000,000l.), and had expended 368¼ millions of francs[180] (about 14¾ millions sterling), leaving only about 4¼ millions sterling in hand. Even at this date it was confidently stated by M. de Lesseps and his colleagues, that the canal could still be constructed for the sum of 1070 millions of francs, or about 43 millions sterling. In other words, it was held that for 25 millions sterling additional, the work could be completed as originally planned.

The work proceeded, with occasional interruptions, due either to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient capable labour, to the delay in delivering the necessary dredging and other appliances, and to other causes. The result of an appeal made through the ‘Bulletin du Canal Interocéanique’[181] in the latter part of 1884, was to place a further capital of 136½ millions of francs (about 5½ millions sterling) at the disposal of the company.[182] With this and the balance remaining of the previous issues, the company were enabled to carry on the work until 1886, when they had to make a further appeal for assistance. This time they made a larger demand than they had done on the last occasion, and they succeeded in raising a sum of 206½ millions of francs (8¼ millions sterling), making the total amount subscribed to the end of 1886 not less than 886 millions of francs, or about 35½ millions sterling. The company was by this time getting into deep water. The public did not take to the bonds offered so readily as they had formerly done, and the deep distrust that was beginning to be felt in the success of the enterprise was shown by the very low price at which the shares had to be offered.[183]

Meanwhile the prospects and progress of the company had been seriously hampered by several exceptional sources of trouble. Political strife on the isthmus disturbed the progress of the works, and led to a large migration of the workmen employed. An act of incendiarism at Colon destroyed a number of the principal buildings erected for the purposes of the canal, and led immediately to the transfer of the headquarters of the company from Colon to a new town created by them, and called by the name of Christopher Columbus. At Culebra, again, where the great work of cleaving a mountain was being proceeded with, there were several unfortunate incidents which caused the employés to desert the place almost in a body. These events were the origin of some sinister rumours most unfavourable to the company. It was stated in the United States that the political troubles had been expressly “got up” by the personnel on the canal, with a view to giving France a pretext for seizing the Isthmus of Panama. In Europe, on the other hand, it was reported, and largely believed, that the United States proposed to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the disturbance at Colon to seize the State of Colombia, through which the canal is carried. It is no doubt true that the United States at that time intervened, with a view to the re-establishment of order on the isthmus, but in despatching Admiral Jouett with an expedition for that purpose, they distinctly declared that their only object was to protect the lives and property of American citizens, and that they would religiously fulfil their engagements to maintain the neutrality and freedom of transit between Colon and Panama.

Another difficulty with which M. de Lesseps and his colleagues have had to contend from the beginning has been the unhealthy character of the climate. In this respect Panama has always had a most unenviable notoriety. The danger was therefore not unknown. Dampier, nearly 200 years ago, spoke of the “malignity of the waters draining off the land, through thick woods, and savannas of low grass and swampy grounds;” and Wafer reported about the same time that “the country all about here is woody, low, and very unhealthy, the rivers being so oozy that the stinking mud infects the air.” Walton, again, expressly declared that the unhealthiness of the isthmus was one of the greatest obstacles to the opening of a canal between the two oceans. “Disease,” he said, “is a barrier against settling on the isthmus to improve it,” and he found that “persons who have withstood every other climate there became languid.” Humboldt appears to have made the climate of Panama a special subject of inquiry, and reports that “for fifty years back the vomito (black vomit of the yellow fever) has never appeared on any point of the coast of the South Sea, with the exception of the town of Panama.” This is explained by the fact that “the tide, when it falls, leaves exposed for a great way into the bay a large extent of ground covered with Fucus ulvæ and Medusæ, the air is infected by the decomposition of so many organic substances, and miasmata, of very little influence on the organs of the natives, have a powerful effect on Europeans.”

Accounts of the extraordinary mortality at the works of the canal have from time to time been circulated in Europe, which read like the description of a pestilence, or of a devastating war. To Europeans especially the climate has been highly fatal. M. de Lesseps and his friends have tried, not unnaturally, to reassure the public, both European and American, on this score. Even he, however, has been compelled to admit a serious mortality. In his report on the progress of the works in 1885, he stated that during the previous twelve months more than 1100 deaths had occurred, of which some 320 were Europeans.[184] In some of the rainy months the mortality was frightful. In October and November it rose to nearly fifty per week. The Canal Executive declared that this large number was swollen considerably by the mortality of sailors arriving at Panama, but, however this may be, the climate is without doubt one of the most malarious and deadly to European constitutions that exists in the world.

These things being so, two results not unnaturally follow—the first, that it was difficult to get the highest class of labour to undertake the work; and the second, that the rate of wages paid, and the cost of the work generally, were exceptionally high. During the years 1884-85-86, the personnel on the canal ranged between 12,000 and 25,000; and although M. de Lesseps announced in 1885 that the Company had undertaken to provide barrack accommodation for 30,000, it is doubtful whether that number was ever employed on the works at any one time. We have already seen that the first contracts made with a number of different contractors provided for the cost of excavation being brought under 3s. per cubic metre. Señor Armero, however, in a report made on the progress of the work in the latter part of 1887, stated that every cubic foot had cost at least 2 dollars, or 8s. 4d. for excavation, being nearly three times the amount at which M. de Lesseps stated the first contracts to have been placed, for something like one-half of the entire work.

With calculations so entirely falsified by results, the Panama Canal Company found it necessary in 1887 to procure fresh capital. They thereupon offered half a million shares, of the nominal value of 500 million francs at 440 francs on 1000 francs, and succeeded in raising a further sum of about 114 million francs, making the total amount of cash received to that date rather over 1001 million francs, or, in other words, within 200 millions of the total amount for which the canal was to have been completed. How far the canal still was from completion at this time we may learn from the report made to the Colombian Government in November 1887 by Señor Armero, who says that the total amount excavated up to August of that year was about 34 millions of cubic metres, out of a total of 161 millions; that the upper and easier part of the work had been accomplished, and that greater difficulties would be encountered in working as the tide-level was approached; that the cost of controlling the water of the Chagres alone would amount to 471 million francs, or, roughly, one-third of the whole estimated cost of the enterprise; that the sum still required to complete the canal would be 3012½ millions of francs, or 120 millions sterling, being nearly three times as much as the whole original estimated cost; and that the amount to be paid on capital loaned during the next six or seven years would add perhaps 40 millions sterling to this amount.

This unfavourable report had naturally a depressing effect upon the scheme when it was made public. And yet the reporter was not entirely unfavourable to the enterprise. On the contrary, he prefaced his report by the following remarks:—

“As up to date the sum expended is 818,023,900 francs, it is evident that the cost per metre of work has been exorbitant. Were we to base our calculations on these figures, the total cost of the canal would become fabulous, and it would probably never be finished. But this is not the way to calculate. We have to look at the costly preliminary works, the purchase of the railroad, the immense amounts of materials which had to be collected, and the purchase and erection of buildings, all of which were expenses which had to be met in order that a work should progress which is perhaps the most important and colossal of modern or any times. Thus the expense of work per metre has diminished as the work has progressed, and only when it shall have been completed shall we be able to determine the cost of all the excavations.”

About the close of 1887, the canal was in extremis. The funds in hand had sunk to a low point, and there appeared to be but little prospect of raising more. M. de Lesseps, however, again proved himself equal to the occasion. Instead of abandoning himself to despair, as the vast difficulties, past, present, and to come, would have warranted, he announced to his fellow-countrymen in a letter to the Premier that he would proceed with the work piecemeal, providing in the meantime a sufficient passage through the canal for the 7½ million tons of annual traffic then anticipated,[185] and looking forward to the completion of the canal, as originally designed, by means of small levies on the annual profits, as in the case of the Suez Canal. The Consultative Commission had, he added, declared the practicability both of constructing on the central mass an upper cutting which would allow of the continuance of the level works by dredging, and of opening the maritime transport between the two oceans as soon as these plans were completed. M. de Lesseps went on to say:—

“This approval leaves for extraction only 40,000,000 cubic metres, 10,000,000 being hard soil, and 30,000,000 dredgable soil. The carrying out of these reduced extractions being materially ensured, we entrusted the task of submitting to us a contract for the execution of the works to M. Eiffel, whose reputation has been established by engineering skill equally exact and bold, and by his great metallurgic works; imposing on him the obligation of applying exclusively to French industry for the supply of materials, and for all other co-operation.

“This morning (November 15) M. Eiffel has engaged to execute these works at his own risk within the period and on the conditions desired by the company. It now rests with the Government of the Republic, inasmuch as French law obliges me to apply to it, to insure definitively the execution of our programme, by authorising the Universal Inter-oceanic Company to issue lottery obligations.”

On the 1st of January, 1888, the amount of money at the disposal of the company was stated by M. de Lesseps to be 110 millions of francs (4½ millions sterling), and it was calculated that 300 million francs (12,000,000l.) would be required by the end of the year. M. de Lesseps, in asking permission to raise this sum by a lottery, placed at the disposal of the French Government all the contracts and documents in the hands of the company, “whereby the execution of the programme drawn up is guaranteed.”

During the first half of 1888, several discussions of a more or less stormy character took place in the French Parliament on the proposal to authorise on behalf of the Panama Canal Company an issue of lottery bonds. In the result M. de Lesseps got his own way, the Senate sanctioning a loan with 4 per cent. interest, and a deposit of rentes as a guarantee. Subscriptions were opened on the 23rd of June. The French people, backed by the most influential newspapers in the country, looked favourably on the lottery. There were a large number of prizes to be drawn, the chief being one of half a million francs (20,000l.), and there were to be six drawings a year. At the outset, with inducements that appealed so strongly to the French imagination, the loan seemed likely to be covered several times over. All at once, however, the flow of subscriptions stopped. It was then ascertained that the opponents of the canal had set afloat some sinister rumours with the object of frustrating the lottery scheme. One of these was the rumour that Lesseps was dead. The veteran projector, however, was never more entirely alive. Threatened with failure, he made almost heroic efforts to avert it. He arranged for attending and speaking at meetings in all the principal towns of France, beginning at Paris. The labours now undertaken by the octogenarian canal-builder are thus referred to by the Times correspondent at Paris:—

“I do not know what will be the fate of the millions of lottery bonds which still remain to be placed, but what is certain is that two men never gave themselves to a more laborious work of propagandism than M. de Lesseps and M. Charles de Lesseps, his son, have undertaken. If ever the Panama Canal is finished, if it ever yields the results promised—as to which I can make no assertion—it would not be too much to raise statues to these men, who have spared themselves no toil, but have made almost superhuman efforts to bring the work to a successful close. For a month M. de Lesseps and his son have been visiting the industrial and commercial centres, delivering addresses, taking part in banquets, organising committees, and endeavouring to create a national movement favourable to the realisation of this gigantic scheme. In all places where they have been speaking they have had crowded audiences, which have eagerly listened to them, and have shown sympathy with their efforts to make the completion of the Panama Canal a national question. Frenchmen feel that success in this work must avert a rebuff for the constructor of the Suez Canal, who will continue to be styled ‘Le Grand Français’ so long as the Panama Canal Scheme has not collapsed.”

On the 14th December, 1888, the Panama Canal Company suspended payment. Announcement was made in Paris that in consequence of the subscription not having extended to 400,000 obligations, the payment of all coupons and drawn bonds would be temporarily suspended. The intimation caused a severe shock in Paris, although it was not entirely unexpected. The French Cabinet deemed the matter one of such importance that they held a meeting to consider what should be done. It was decided to propose a suspension for three months only. This was proposed for a double reason—to gain time, and to prevent speculation on the Bourse. It was stated by M. Peytral, the Minister of Finance, that the Government wished to enable the old company, without going through the process of bankruptcy, to hand over the canal to a new concern.

There have been few warmer discussions, even in the French Chamber, than that which followed the proposal to interpose to this extent on behalf of the canal company. It was argued by the opponents of the Government that the canal should not be treated exceptionally; that the bankruptcy law should be allowed its ordinary course; that the Government had kept secret the report of its own engineer on the condition of the company when it was known to be in danger; that the Army Bill should not be delayed for the sake of a private company; and that if the company did come to grief, nearly a million bondholders would be ruined and a milliard of money would be lost.

On the 15th December the Chamber of Deputies, acting upon the Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Bill, resolved by 256 votes against 81 to throw out the Bill. This decision created intense excitement, not only in Paris, but throughout France—aye, and throughout Europe. The shareholders in the company, 870,000 in number, were threatened with disaster, many of them with ruin. The newspapers contained reports of the condition of panic that prevailed in the capital, which recalled the similar episodes of the South Sea Bubble and Law’s Mississippi Scheme. The canal company’s offices in Paris were besieged by eager and demonstrative crowds. They did not, however, vent their anger and disappointment on M. de Lesseps. It was the Government that was condemned. Lesseps was still the favourite of the people. “Vive Lesseps” and “Vive Boulanger” were the cries of the hour. There were not a few who regarded the occasion as one that justified the country in getting rid of so pusillanimous a Chamber. The opportunity of the Boulangists appeared to be at hand.[186] The greatest but one of European Powers seemed likely to be drawn into the vortex of revolution by the obscure problem of the cost of constructing a waterway in a territory over which it had no control, at thousands of leagues from its shores. The mutability of human affairs had surely never a more striking illustration!

According to a statement which appeared in the Standard of the 17th December, 1888, a Figaro reporter called on M. de Lesseps, and was received by him in a drawing-room, where seven of his younger children were having a romp with their mother. The following is a description of the scene that took place:—