[649] Suchet in his memoirs conceals the fact that the fort was already abandoned when his troops entered (ii. p. 72). But the evidence of Contreras, Schepeler, and other Spanish authorities is clear and unanimous.
[650] The first was a big affair, 3,000 men under Sarsfield taking part in it, but oddly enough it is not mentioned by Suchet or Belmas.
[651] It seems to have arrived about June 20, in time for the storm on the 21st.
[652] See his memoirs, p. 273, and Arteche, x. 274.
[653] See especially Schepeler (i. 438). Arteche (x. 317) grants that he had not the iron resolution of Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, but thinks that he did his honest best, and this I think can hardly be denied. His own narrative is simple and modest, but does not conceal the fact that he was from the first downhearted, and feared the worst. Napier (iii. 240) calls him vacillating and deceitful. There is some foundation for the former charge (see p. 513 below), but the latter seems unjustifiable. The only evidence brought to justify the accusation can be explained away (see Codrington’s letters in the appendix to Napier, vol. iii).
[654] Toreno (ii. p. 544) makes out that the fault was with Contreras, and Napier, who used far more violent language, says that he ‘acted a shameful part.... The assault was momentarily expected, yet he ordered Sarsfield to embark immediately, averring that he had Campoverde’s peremptory commands. Sarsfield remonstrated vainly, saying that the troops would be left to an inefficient subordinate, but was compelled to embark, and Velasco, coming a few hours later, found only the dead bodies of his garrison. Contreras then assured Codrington and the Junta that Sarsfield had gone without orders, and betrayed his post!’ There is much misrepresentation in this: (1) Contreras had Campoverde’s command to send him Sarsfield without delay. (2) He passed the order on to Sarsfield, but did not know that the latter had gone off, without waiting a moment, after sending him a note to say that Don José Carlos, the senior colonel in the lower city, was incompetent to take command. Naturally Contreras thought that Sarsfield would have waited to see Velasco and hand over the troops to him. (3) Therefore Contreras was correct in saying to the Junta that Sarsfield departed ‘sin conocimiento mío,’ though he had sent him a passport to leave the town. See Arteche, ix. 288-9.
[655] The troops were the 2/47th, a detachment of the 3/95th, and some light companies lent by the governor of Gibraltar, 1,147 in all, counting the gunners. See Graham’s dispatches to Lord Liverpool and to Colonel Skerret of June 14th, 1811.
[656] That this represents pretty accurately what happened is, I think, clear from the comparison of Codrington’s very full letter to General Graham (see his Life, i. 225), Skerret’s report to Graham and the Regency (printed in Arteche, ix. pp. 544-5), and Contreras’s own narrative of the siege. This version, as it will be seen, differs from that of Napier, who is much harder on Skerret than he deserves—though the colonel was an unlucky officer and distrusted by his subordinates (see e. g. Sir Harry Smith’s autobiography, i. pp. 118-19).
[657] The critical phrase of Graham’s instructions to Skerret was: ‘You will before landing your detachment state to the governor that you must have at all times free and open communication with his Majesty’s ships of war: and in the event of the place being under the necessity of surrendering, that you are at liberty to withdraw the troops on board the said ships previous to the capitulation.’ The orders are dated June 14.
[658] Codrington, looking on from his ship, says that the storm succeeded ‘almost immediately,’ and that ‘from the rapidity with which they [the French] entered, I fear they met with but little opposition.’ (Life, i. 227.) This is borne out by Contreras’s narrative.
[659] For details of this sally see Codrington’s letter of July 29 in his Life, i. p. 228.
[660] Those who like to sup on horrors may read the original document in Arteche’s Appendix X to his tenth volume, pp. 546-8.
[663] e. g. see Schepeler, i. 343, and Arteche, x. 314.
[664] Interesting details of his perilous escape, in company with a French royalist officer, Bouvet de Lozier, and of his final arrival in England, may be found in his Narrative, written in 1813.
[665] For the wording of the votes see the précis of the council of war in the Appendix to Arteche, vol. x. pp. 550-2. Caro, San Juan, Velasco, and Carrasquedo voted for embarkation: Sarsfield, Santa Cruz, and Campoverde for holding on in Catalonia. Miranda would not vote, ‘not considering himself as belonging to the Catalan army,’ but was in favour of the evacuation. Eroles was absent.
[666] Letter of Codrington, in his Life, i. p. 235.
[667] Codrington says that he only embarked 2,400 men out of the 4,000 who had come to Catalonia. The cavalry had gone another way, and 600 or 800 men had deserted, some to join the somatenes, others to find their way home to Valencia as best they could.
[668] Apparently while the army was at Agramunt near Cervera, about July 4th. See Codrington’s correspondence in his Life, i. 236, and in Napier’s Appendix to vol. iii. p. 398. For testimonials to the honourable and patriotic conduct of Eroles throughout the campaign, see Codrington’s letters, passim.
[669] One of Ultonia, two of Antequera, 1st and 2nd of the Voluntarios de Valencia.
[670] See Vacani, v. p. 313. It will be remembered that when Masséna was in a similar position at Genoa in 1800, be refused to dismiss his Austrian prisoners, and allowed many hundreds of them to die of starvation. Martinez was more merciful.
[671] ‘Hasta los insectos más inmundos’ as Martinez wrote to the Catalan Junta.
[672] They both became officers in the Catalan army, and survived for many years after the war; the elder died, a retired brigadier-general, in the year 1850. See Arteche, x. 480. Vacani and Napier err in saying that he was hanged with Marquez, who was his cousin.
[673] Correspondance, vol. xxii, no. 18,066.
[674] An interesting study of the reorganization of the Catalan army in August-September 1811 is given in Estalella’s El Batallon de Hostalrich (Madrid, 1909), an account of the fortunes of Manso’s new Cazadores de Cataluña in 1811-14.
[675] These divisions were those of Maucune, Sarrut, and Ferey.
[676] Clausel’s division in the province of Avila, Brennier at Plasencia.
[677] For an interesting account of the experiences of an officer sent to scrape together drafts and convalescents despite of the petty governors, see the diary of Sprünglin, pp. 484-5. He had special difficulties with Thiébault, the Governor of Salamanca.
[678] Correspondence from Berthier printed in Marmont’s Autobiography, iv. p. 122.
[679] See Joseph to Marmont in the correspondence of the latter, iv. pp. 150-6.
[681] Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 58.
[682] Intercepted dispatch from Marmont to Berthier of August 5th, printed in Supplementary Wellington Dispatches, xiii. p. 690.
[683] Mémoires, iv. p. 55.
[684] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, vii. p. 115.
[685] D’Urban in his diary often harps upon this project.
[686] ‘We should meet in Andalusia the whole force which lately obliged us to raise the siege of Badajoz, with the addition to it of the force which was left before Cadiz.... An attempt to relieve Cadiz would certainly not succeed.’ Dispatches, vii. p. 118.
[687] From the same letter to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, vii. 118.
[688] See the all-important dispatch of July 18, in which these three points are set forth. Dispatches, vii. 118.
[689] Dispatches, vii. 184: ‘I should imagine that the reports have some foundation.’ August 9th.
[690] Dispatches, vii. p. 194. August 14th.
[691] By August 21st he has heard that the 5th Léger and other new regiments from the interior of France are over the Pyrenees. Dispatches, vii. p. 215.
[692] Dispatches, vii. 119, July 18th.
[693] It is contained in the ‘Memorandum for Colonels Frampton and Fletcher’ of 19th July, dated the day after the dispatch to Lord Liverpool which sets forth the whole project.
[694] Bredin’s and Glubb’s, which had long been lying at Lisbon without horses, and had taken no part in the field operations of 1810 and 1811. Holcombe’s battery was soon afterwards substituted for Glubb’s. See Dickson’s Diary (ed. Leslie) for months of August-October 1811.
[695] Wellington saw this clearly enough; he writes to Lord Liverpool on August 27: ‘If we cannot maintain this blockade, the enemy must bring 50,000 men to raise it, and then they can undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to watch Rodrigo, and we shall so far save the cause. Meanwhile if they offer me a favourable opportunity of bringing any of them to action, I shall take it.’ Dispatches, viii. p. 232.
[696] Mr. Fortescue sends me the subjoined note on Spencer from a suppressed letter of Wellington to Pole at Apsley House, not to be found in any of the editions of the Dispatches. ‘The person who is now here as second in command is very unfit for his situation. He is a good executive officer, but has no mind, and is incapable of forming any opinions of his own. He is the centre of all the vulgar and foolish opinions of the day. Thus you are aware that, from former experiences, I cannot depend upon him for a moment, for anything. He gives his opinion upon every subject, changes it with the wind, and if any misfortune occurs, or the act recommended by him is disapproved of, there is no effort to be looked for from him.’ This verdict does not much differ, save in strength of expression, from the opinion of minor contemporaries, such as Tomkinson and Stepney, e. g. ‘Sir Brent Spencer, a zealous gallant officer, had no great military genius. He was anxious and fidgety when there was nothing to do, but once under fire looked like a philosopher solving a problem—perfectly cool and self-possessed.’ (Stepney’s Leaves from a Diary of an Officer of the Guards, p. 80.) See also in Stepney for notes as to Spencer’s resentment at his supersession by Graham. This has value, as the diarist was a favourite of the general, who had offered to make him his aide-de-camp.
[697] 11th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars K.G.L.
[698] 3rd Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons. Properly belonging to Erskine’s cavalry division in the Alemtejo, but borrowed.
[699] 1st Royals and 12th Light Dragoons.
[700] 14th and 16th Light Dragoons.
[702] Marmont to Berthier, Correspondance, p. 165, in the 4th vol. p. 163 of his Mémoires.
[703] See all the August correspondence of 1811 in his Mémoires, iv. pp. 143-62.
[704] On August 26th according to his narrative, iv. p. 61.
[705] Ibid., p. 60.
[706] Graham’s diary in his Life, by Delavoye, p. 577.
[707] Ibid., August 29th.
[708] Ibid., September 2nd, p. 582.
[709] Wellington to Graham, September 16, Dispatches, viii. 284.
[710] To Beresford, Dispatches, viii. p. 97.
[711] This is mentioned in his letters to Henry Wellesley of August 22 and to Craufurd of August 28.
[712] To Henry Wellesley on August 28; cf. to Lord Liverpool of same date.
[713] To Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, viii. 256.
[714] Some typical regimental figures of September 15, 1811, may serve as illustrations. The 68th (only just landed) had 233 sick to 412 effective, the 51st (landed in April) 246 sick to 251 effective. The 77th landed on July 5th with 859 of all ranks, but had only 680 effective on August 5, and 560 on September 15. The 40th had, on September 15, 791 effective and 513 sick. The total sick on the last-named day were, ‘present’ 1,720, ‘hospitals’ 12,517, or 14,237 in all.
[715] Brigades of Pack and MacMahon, with the other five brigades incorporated in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th Divisions, and two weak cavalry brigades under Madden. See tables in Appendix XX.
[716] Thiébault (Mémoires, iv. p. 510) gives the total at 48,000 infantry and nearly 4,000 cavalry. I imagine the real total to have been a little larger, about 58,000 in all. By the returns of the summer of 1811 the two guard-infantry divisions had 15,000 men, Serras’s (Thiébault’s) 4,000 men, Souham’s nearly 8,000.
[717] Wellington to Charles Stuart, from Fuente Guinaldo, September 23rd. Dispatches, viii. p. 299.
[718] According to Marmont (Mémoires, iv. p. 63) only one division, Thiébault’s, actually entered the town.
[719] This reason for his great reconnaissances of September 25th is the only one given by Marmont (Mémoires, iv. p. 63).
[720] This was the first time on which the British cavalry fought lancers (at Albuera it was only infantry which were charged by the Poles). Tomkinson of the 14th reports (Diary, p. 115): ‘They looked well and formidable till they were broken and closed with by our men, and then their lances were an encumbrance.... Many caught in the appointments of other men, and pulled them to the ground.’
[721] That of Lamotte (1st and 3rd Hussars, 15th and 22nd Chasseurs) and that of Fournier (7th, 13th, 20th Chasseurs).
[722] Graham’s diary, in his Life by Delavoye, p. 577.
[723] Wallace of the 88th was commanding the brigade vice Mackinnon, on sick leave in England.
[724] ‘Comme la position des Anglais était très dominante, je ne pouvais juger quelles forces ils avaient en arrière: il était possible que ses premières troupes fussent soutenues par d’autres. Ne voulant pas risquer un engagement sérieux, en les faisant attaquer par la seule division d’infanterie qui fût à portée [Thiébault], je pris le parti de n’employer à l’attaque que de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie. Si l’ennemi était en force, elle en serait quitte pour se retirer.’ (Mémoires, iv. p. 64.)
[725] Not counting the 21st Portuguese, which came up later, and was not engaged in the actual combat.
[726] The best account of this fine skirmish, carefully constructed from original authorities, is in Schwertfeger’s History of the German Legion, i. 337-9.
[727] Arentschildt’s gunners did not suffer so much as might have been expected, and Wellington was inaccurate when, in his dispatch, he says that they were cut down at their guns. The Portuguese returns show that they lost only one man killed and four wounded.
[728] They only made up 1,000 bayonets between them, and the 77th, only 450 strong, would have made a very small square by itself.
[729] Memoirs of Grattan of the 88th, pp. 116-17.
[730] 1st Hussars K.G.L. 5 killed, 2 officers and 32 men wounded, 5 men missing; 11th Light Dragoons 8 killed, 2 officers and 14 men wounded.
[731] According to Martinien’s invaluable lists, the 25th Dragoons lost 3 officers, the 22nd Chasseurs 4, the 6th and 15th Dragoons 2 each, the 8th and 10th Dragoons 1 each.
[732] Marmont, in his Mémoires, iv. p. 65, says that he sent for Thiébault’s division when Montbrun was checked, but ‘l’ordre, envoyé lentement, fut exécuté plus lentement encore,’ and Thiébault only appeared at nightfall. The general himself gives the explanation (Mémoires, iv): the French right (i. e. the wing towards Carpio) seeming to be menaced, ‘they sent me off to a point where no enemy was to be found.’
[733] Graham to Cathcart, in his Life by Delavoye, p. 598.
[734] Graham’s diary, ibid., August 26.
[735] For notes on this point see the life of Craufurd by his grandson, Rev. Alex. Craufurd, pp. 184-5. Wellington was vexed that the Light Division had not done the night march, and, according to Larpent’s Journal (p. 85) observed to Craufurd, with some asperity, ‘I am glad to see you safe.’ The answer was, ‘Oh! I was in no danger, I assure you.’ ‘But I was, from your conduct,’ answered Wellington. Upon which Craufurd observed, ‘He’s d——d crusty to-day.’
[736] The account of the march of the Light Division on this day is quite satisfactory. I have Sir John Bell’s note that the idea that Craufurd thought for a moment of retreating by the Pass of Perales, because he feared being intercepted at Robleda, is ‘nonsense.’
[737] Marmont (Mémoires, iv. p. 65) is very sure that he could have ‘isolated, turned, and enveloped’ Craufurd, and have destroyed him. But it is hard to see that he could really have done more than drive him on to an eccentric line of retreat.
[738] Thiébault, Mémoires, iv. p. 66.
[739] Marmont, Mémoires, iv. pp. 513-14.
[740] Thiébault, in his elaborate account of the skirmish (Mémoires, iv. pp. 522-5), says that he did not lose Aldea da Ponte, but I prefer to take Wellington’s definite statement that he did, supported by those of Vere (the Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the 4th Division) and Lord Londonderry—both eye-witnesses.
[741] Thirty killed and 120 wounded. Martinien’s lists show 7 casualties among officers of Thiébault’s regiments (3 in the 34th Léger, 3 in the regiment of Neuchâtel, 1 in the 4th of the Vistula). This at the average rate of 20 or 22 officers per man seems just right. By a tiresome misprint Thiébault speaks of himself as commanding the 31st Léger in many places. It was really the 34th. The 31st was in the Army of Portugal, not in that of the North.
[742] Note the curious misprint in the first line of p. 307 of Wellington Dispatches, vol. viii, of Light Dragoons for Light Division. Unless the misprint is noticed, the reader will ask why Wellington has omitted Craufurd in describing his order of battle. Napier, I know not why, has altogether neglected to explain the distribution of the British army, in the short paragraph of vol. iii. p. 342 which describes this day’s operations.
[743] Graham to Cathcart, October 1, in Delavoye’s Life of Lord Lynedoch, p. 598.
[744] Thiébault’s feelings were much hurt at the skirmish being called a ‘scuffle.’ ‘Il se permit de dire que mon combat de la veille était une échauffourée. Je ne rappelle le mot que pour peindre l’arrogance d’un de ces hommes à qui leur titre de Maréchal défendait d’admettre aucun mérite en dehors d’eux-mêmes’ (Mémoires, iv. 528).
[745] Graham to Cathcart, in Delavoye’s Life of Lord Lynedoch, p. 599.
[746] There were changes in detail in November, for which see Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 21.
[747] For all this see Dickson’s Diary, edited by Major Leslie, R.A., pp. 478-501. The order to start the first section of the siege-train for Almeida was only given on November 14. (Dickson, p. 505.)
[748] Afterwards replaced by one brigade of Dumoustier’s division of the Imperial Guard.
[750] It may be found in Belmas, Appendix to vol. i. pp. 585-8. Marmont, for reasons not hard to divine, does not print it among the many documents containing his correspondence with the Emperor which appear in the Appendix to his Book XV. (Mémoires, vol. iv.)
[752] The destruction of these stores is mentioned in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 68.
[753] This may be found printed in Belmas, vol. i. Appendix, pp. 588-90.
[754] Printed in Appendix to Marmont’s Mémoires, vol. iv. pp. 257-8.
[755] The sick have grown from 18,000 to 20,000 since the day before, which is the date of a less important dispatch, in which Marmont had been warned to set aside 6,000 men only for the Valencian expedition, because Wellington is absolutely unable to strike a blow.
[756] To be exact, Wellington’s Return of November 22, the day after Napoleon dictated this dispatch, was:—
British. Present, 38,311; Detached, 3,917; sick (present and absent), 16,000.
Portuguese. Present, 24,391; Detached, 2,087; sick (present and absent), 6,000.
[757] Memorandum, dated 28th December, 1811, at Freneda. (Dispatches, viii. pp. 518-19.)
[758] Note in Correspondence, Appendix of vol. iv of Mémoires, p. 259.
[760] Martinien’s invaluable lists show only three officers wounded in the 16th.
[761] For Hill’s force at this time see Appendix XXIII. He had 5,800 British infantry, 7,400 Portuguese infantry, 1,800 British cavalry (including Le Marchant’s brigade at Castello Branco), 650 Portuguese cavalry, and about 600 artillery, &c., about 16,000 in all. Drouet had the 9th Corps, now about 14,000 strong (it had been recruited by the return to the ranks of the convalescents of the 4,000 Albuera wounded), and six regiments of cavalry from the Army of the South, bringing up his force to much the same figure.
[763] Wellington to Hill, August 8th. (Dispatches, viii. pp. 180-2.)
[764] See for the recall the dispatch of October 4. (Dispatches, viii. p. 321.)
[765] For copious details see the Life of Morillo, by Don Antonio Villa, pp. 47-55 (Madrid, 1910).
[766] At the breaking up of the 9th Corps in June, Claparéde took over Gazan’s old division in the 5th Corps, and Conroux that of Ruffin in the 1st Corps. But the 9th Corps battalions were not all redistributed into their regiments till Conroux came back from Soult’s campaign against the Murcians in August.
[767] See Wellington to Hill, October 4 and October 10. (Dispatches, viii. pp. 321, and 332-3.)
[768] Wellington to Hill, from Freneda, October 16. (Dispatches, viii. pp. 333-4.)