[84] The Greek name τύραννος cannot be properly rendered tyrant; for many of the τύραννοι by no means deserved to be so called, nor is it consistent with the use of language to speak of a mild and well-intentioned tyrant. The word despot is the nearest approach which we can make to it, since it is understood to imply that a man has got more power than he ought to have, while it does not exclude a beneficent use of such power by some individuals. It is, however, very inadequate to express the full strength of Grecian feeling which the original word called forth.

[85] The Phæakian king Alkinous (Odyss. vii. 55-65): there are twelve other Phæakian Βασιλῆες, he is himself the thirteenth (viii. 391).

The chief men in the Iliad, and the suitors of Penelopê in the Odyssey, are called usually and indiscriminately both Βασιλῆες and Ἄνακτες; the latter word, however, designates them as men of property and masters of slaves, (analogous to the subsequent word δεσπότης, which word does not occur in Homer, though δέσποινα is found in the Odyssey,) while the former word marks them as persons of conspicuous station in the tribe (see Odyss. i. 393-401; xiv. 63). A chief could only be Βασιλεὺς of freemen; but he might be Ἄναξ either of freemen or of slaves.

Agamemnôn and Menelaus belong to the most kingly race (γένος βασιλεύτερον: compare Tyrtæus, Fragm. ix. v. 8, p. 9, ed. Schneidewin) of the Pelopids, to whom the sceptre originally made for Zeus has been given by Hermês (Iliad, ii. 101; ix. 160; x. 239); compare Odyss. xv. 539. The race of Dardanus are the favorite offspring of Zeus, βασιλεύτατον among the Trojans (Iliad, xx. 304). These races are the parallels of the kingly prosapiæ called Amali, Asdingi, Gungingi, and Lithingi, among the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards (Jornandes, De Rebus Geticis, c. 14-22; Paul Warnefrid, Gest. Langob. c. 14-21); and the ἀρχικὸν γένος among the Chaonian Epirots (Thucyd. ii. 80).

[86] Odyss. i. 392; xi. 184; xiii. 14; xix. 109.—

Iliad, ix. 154-297 (when Agamemnôn is promising seven townships to Achilles, as a means of appeasing his wrath):—

See Iliad, xii. 312; and the reproaches of Thersitês (ii. 226)—βασιλῆας δωροφάγους (Hesiod, Opp. Di. 38-264).

The Roman kings had a large τέμενος assigned to them,—“agri, arva, et arbusta et pascui læti atque uberes” (Cicero, De Republ. v. 2): the German kings received presents: “Mos est civitatibus (observes Tacitus, respecting the Germans whom he describes, M. G. 15) ultro ac viritim conferre principibus, vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit.”

The revenue of the Persian kings before Darius consisted only of what were called δῶρα, or presents (Herod. iii. 89): Darius first introduced both the name of tribute and the determinate assessment. King Polydektês, in Seriphos, invites his friends to a festival, the condition of which is that each guest shall contribute to an ἔρανος for his benefit (Pherekydês, Fragm. 26, ed. Didot); a case to which the Thracian banquet prepared by Seuthês affords an exact parallel (Xenophôn, Anab. vii. 3, 16-32: compare Thucyd. ii. 97, and Welcker, Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 381). Such Aids, or Benevolences, even if originally voluntary, became in the end compulsory. In the European monarchies of the Middle Ages, what were called free gifts were more ancient than public taxes: “The feudal Aids (observes Mr. Hallam) are the beginning of taxation, of which they for a long time answered the purpose.” (Middle Ages, ch. ii. part i. p. 189.) So about the Aides in the old French Monarchy, “La Cour des Aides avoit été instituée, et sa jurisdiction s’étoit formée, lorsque le domaine des Rois suffisoit à toutes les dépenses de l’Etat, les droits d’Aides étoient alors des supplémens peu considérables et toujours temporaires. Depuis, le domaine des Rois avoit été anéanti: les Aides, au contraire, étoient devenues permanentes et formoient presque la totalité des ressources du trésor.” (Histoire de la Fronde, par M. de St. Aulaire, ch. iii. p. 124.)

[87] Ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, is the description which Thucydidês gives of these heroic governments (i. 13).

The language of Aristotle (Polit. iii. 10, 1) is much the same: Ἡ βασιλεία—ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους—αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἦν ἑκόντων μὲν, ἐπί τισι δ᾽ ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς δ᾽ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος.

It can hardly be said correctly, however, that the king’s authority was defined: nothing can well be more indefinite.

Agamemnôn enjoyed or assumed the power of putting to death a disobedient soldier (Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 2). The words which Aristotle read in the speech of Agamemnôn in the Iliad—Πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος—are not in our present copies: the Alexandrine critics effaced many traces of the old manners.

[88] Striking phrases on this head are put into the mouth of Sarpêdôn (Iliad, xii. 310-322).

Kings are named and commissioned by Zeus,—Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες (Hesiod, Theogon. 96; Callimach. Hymn. ad Jov. 79): κρατέρω θεράποντε Διὸς is a sort of paraphrase for the kingly dignity in the case of Pelias and Nêleus (Odyss. xi. 255; compare Iliad, ii. 204).

[89] Odysseus builds his own bed and bedchamber, and his own raft (Odyss. xxiii. 188; v. 246-255): he boasts of being an excellent mower and ploughman (xviii. 365-375): for his astonishing proficiency in the athletic contests, see viii. 180-230. Paris took a share in building his own house (Iliad, vi. 314).

[90] Odyss. xi. 496; xxiv. 136-248.

[91] See this prominent meaning of the words ἀγαθὸς, ἐσθλὸς, κακὸς, etc. copiously illustrated in Welcker’s excellent Prolegomena to Theognis, sect. 9-16. Camerarius, in his notes on that poet (v. 19,), had already conceived clearly the sense in which these words are used. Iliad, xv. 323. Οἶα τε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσι παραδρώωσι χέρηες. Compare Hesiod, Opp. Di. 216, and the line in Athenæus, v. p. 178, Αὐτόματοι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν.

“Moralis illarum vocum vis, et civilis—quarum hæc a lexicographis et commentatoribus plurimis fere neglecta est—probe discernendæ erunt. Quod quo facilius fieret, nescio an ubi posterior intellectus valet, majusculâ scribendum fuisset Ἀγαθοὶ et Κακοὶ.”

If this advice of Welcker could have been followed, much misconception would have been obviated. The reference of these words to power and not to worth, is their primitive import in the Greek language, descending from the Iliad downward, and determining the habitual designation of parties during the period of active political dispute. The ethical meaning of the word hardly appears until the discussions raised by Socrates, and prosecuted by his disciples; but the primitive import still continued to maintain concurrent footing.

I shall have occasion to touch more largely on this subject, when I come to expound the Grecian political parties. At present, it is enough to remark that the epithets of good men, best men, habitually applied afterwards to the aristocratical parties, descend from the rudest period of Grecian society.

[92] Aristot. Polit. i. 1, 7.

[93] Καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας διαφέροντας κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις (Polit. iii. 10, 7); also the same treatise, v. 8, 5, and v. 8, 22. Οὐ γίνονται δ᾽ ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν, etc.

Aristotle handles monarchy far less copiously than either oligarchy or democracy: the tenth and eleventh chapters of his third book, in which he discusses it, are nevertheless very interesting to peruse.

In the conception of Plato, also, the kingly government, if it is to work well, implies a breed superior to humanity to hold the sceptre (Legg. iv. 6. p. 713).

The Athenian dramatic poets (especially Euripidês) often put into the mouths of their heroic characters popular sentiments adapted to the democratical atmosphere of Athens—very different from what we find in Homer.

[94] Βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων ἷζε γερόντων (Iliad, ii. 53): compare x. 195-415. Ἴλου, παλαιοῦ δημογέροντος (xi. 371).

[95] Iliad, xviii. 313.—

Also, xii. 213, where Polydamas says to Hectôr,—

[96] Iliad, ix. 95-101.

[97] Iliad, vii. 126, Πηλεὺς—Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ᾽ ἀγορήτης.

[98] Considerable stress seems to be laid on the necessity that the people in the agora should sit down (Iliad, ii. 96): a standing agora is a symptom of tumult or terror (Iliad, xviii, 246); an evening agora, to which men come elevated by wine, is also the forerunner of mischief (Odyss. iii. 138).

Such evidences of regular formalities observed in the agora are not without interest.

[99] Iliad, ii. 100.—

Nitzsch (ad Odyss. ii. 14) controverts this restriction of individual manifestation to the chiefs: the view of O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, b. iii. c. 3) appears to me more correct: such was also the opinion of Aristotle—φησὶ τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι ὁ μὲν δῆμος μόνου τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι κύριος ἦν, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες καὶ τοῦ πρᾶξαι (Schol. Iliad, ix. 17): compare the same statement in his Nikomachean Ethics, iii. 5.

[100] See Iliad, ix. 635; Odyss. xi. 419.

[101] Odyss. ii. 25-40.

[102] Odyss. ii. 43, 77, 145.—

[103] A similar character is given of the public assemblies of the early Franks and Lombards (Pfeffel, Histoire du Droit Public en Allemagne, t. i. p. 18; Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, t. i. c. 2, p. 71).

Dionysius of Halikarnassus (ii. 12) pays rather too high a compliment to the moderation of the Grecian heroic kings.

The kings at Rome, like the Grecian heroic kings, began with an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος: the words of Pomponius (De Origine Juris, i. 2,) would be perhaps more exactly applicable to the latter than to the former: “Initio civitatis nostræ Populus sine certâ lege, sine jure certo, primum agere instituit: omniaque manu a Regibus gubernabantur.” Tacitus says (Ann. iii. 26), “Nobis Romulus, ut libitum, imperitaverat: dein Numa religionibus et divino jure populum devinxit, repertaque quædam a Tullo et Anco: sed præcipuus Servius Tullius sanctor legum fuit, quis etiam Reges obtemperarent.” The appointment of a Dictator under the Republic was a reproduction, for a short and definite interval, of this old unbounded authority (Cicero, De Repub. ii. 32; Zonaras, Ann. vii. 13; Dionys. Hal. v. 75).

See Rubino, Untersuchungen über Römische Verfassung und Geschichte, Cassel, 1839, buch i. abschnitt 2, pp. 112-132; and Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i. sect. 18, pp. 81-91.

[104] Iliad, ii. 204. Agamemnôn promises to make over to Achilles seven well-peopled cities, with a body of wealthy inhabitants (Iliad, ix. 153); and Menelaus, if he could have induced Odysseus to quit Ithaka, and settle near him in Argos, would have depopulated one of his neighboring towns in order to make room for him (Odyss. iv. 176).

Manso (Sparta, i. 1, p. 34) and Nitzsch (ad Odyss. iv. 171) are inclined to exclude these passages as spurious,—a proceeding, in my opinion, inadmissible, without more direct grounds than they are able to produce.

[105] Iliad, ii. 74. Πρῶτα δ᾽ ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι, etc.

[106] Iliad, ii. 188-196.—

[107] Iliad, ii. 213-277.

[108] Iliad, ii. 284-340. Nor does Thersitês, in his criminatory speech against Agamemnôn, touch in any way upon this anomalous point, though, in the circumstances under which his speech is made, it would seem to be of all others the most natural,—and the sharpest thrust against the commander-in-chief.

[109] See this illustrated in the language of Theseus, Eurip. Supplic. 349-352.

[110] Xenophôn, Memorab. i. 2, 9.

[111] Aristot. Polit. vii. 6, 1; Hippocrat. De Aëre, Loc. et Aq. v. 85-86; Herodot. vii. 135.

[112] The σκῆπτρον, θέμιστες, or θέμις, and ἀγορὴ, go together, under the presiding superintendence of the gods. The goddess Themis both convokes and dismisses the agora (see Iliad, xi. 806; Odyss. ii. 67; Iliad, xx. 4).

The θέμιστες, commandments and sanctions, belong properly to Zeus (Odyss. xvi. 403); from him they are given in charge to earthly kings along with the sceptre (Iliad, i. 238; ii. 206).

The commentators on Homer recognized θέμις, rather too strictly, as ἀγορᾶς καὶ βουλῆς λέξιν (see Eustath. ad Odyss. xvi. 403).

The presents and the λιπαραὶ θέμιστες (Iliad, ix. 156).

[113] Hesiod, Theogon. 85; the single person judging seems to be mentioned (Odyss. xii. 439).

It deserves to be noticed that, in Sparta, the senate decided accusations of homicide (Aristot. Polit. iii. 1, 7): in historical Athens, the senate of Areiopagus originally did the same, and retained, even when its powers were much abridged, the trial of accusations of intentional homicide and wounding.

Respecting the judicial functions of the early Roman kings, Dionys. Hal. A. R. x. 1. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐφ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔταττον τοῖς δεομένοις τὰς δίκας, καὶ τὸ δικαιωθὲν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων, τοῦτο νόμος ἦν (compare iv. 25; and Cicero, Republic. v. 2; Rubino, Untersuchungen, i. 2, p. 122).

[114] Iliad, xviii. 504.—

Several of the old northern Sagas represent the old men, assembled for the purpose of judging, as sitting on great stones in a circle, called the Urtheilsring, or Gerichtsring (Leitfaden der Nördischen Alterthümer, p. 31, Copenhag. 1837).

[115] Homer, Iliad, xviii. 497-510.

[116] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 37.

[117] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 27-33.

[118] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 250-263; Homer, Iliad, xvi. 387.

[119] Tittmann (Darstellung der Griechischen Staatsverfassungen, book ii. p. 63) gives too lofty an idea, in my judgment, of the condition and functions of the Homeric agora.

[120] Iliad, i. 520-527; iv. 14-56; especially the agora of the gods (xx. 16).

[121] Odyss. ix. 114.—

These lines illustrate the meaning of θέμις.

[122] See this point set forth in the prolix discourse of Aristeides, Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς (Or. xlv. vol. ii. p. 99): Ἡσίοδος ... ταὐτὰ ἀντικρὺς Ὁμήρῳ λέγων ... ὅτι τε ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύνεδρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, etc.

[123] Pêleus, king of the Myrmidons, is called (Iliad, vii. 126) Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ᾽ ἀγορητὴς—Diomedes, ἀγορῇ δέ τ᾽ ἀμείνω (iv. 400)—Nestôr, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητὴς—Sarpêdôn, Λυκίων βουληφόρε (v. 633); and Idomeneus, Κρητῶν βουληφόρε (xiii. 219).

Hesiod (Theogon. 80-96) illustrates still more amply the idéal of the king governing by persuasion and inspired by the Muses.

[124] See the striking picture in Thucydidês (ii. 65). Xenophôn, in the Cyropædia, puts into the mouth of his hero the Homeric comparison between the good king and the good shepherd, implying as it does immense superiority of organization, morality, and intelligence (Cyropæd. viii. p. 450, Hutchinson).

Volney observes, respecting the emirs of the Druses in Syria: “Everything depends on circumstances: if the governor be a man of ability, he is absolute;—if weak, he is a cipher. This proceeds from the want of fixed laws; a want common to all Asia.” (Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 66.) Such was pretty much the condition of the king in primitive Greece.

[125] Nevertheless, the question put by Leotychides to the deposed Spartan king Demaratus,—ὅκοιόν τι εἴη τὸ ἄρχειν μετὰ τὸ βασιλεύειν (Herodot. vi. 65), and the poignant insult which those words conveyed, afford one among many other evidences of the lofty estimate current in Sparta respecting the regal dignity, of which Aristotle, in the Politica, seems hardly to take sufficient account.

[126] O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, book iii. i. 3) affirms that the fundamental features of the royalty were maintained in the Dorian states, and obliterated only in the Ionian and democratical. In this point, he has been followed by various other authors (see Helbig, Die Sittlich. Zustände des Heldenalters, p. 73), but his position appears to me substantially incorrect, even as regards Sparta; and strikingly incorrect, in regard to the other Dorian states.

[127] Cæsar, Bell. Gallic. vi. 12.

[128] Seneca, Epist. xc.; Tacitus. Annal. iii. 26. “Vetustissimi mortalium (says the latter), nullâ adhuc malâ libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine pœnâ aut coërcitione, agebant: neque præmiis opus erat, cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. At postquam exui æqualitas, et pro modestiâ et pudore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenêre dominationes, multosque apud populos æternum mansere,” etc. Compare Strabo, vii. p. 301.

These are the same fancies so eloquently set forth by Rousseau, in the last century. A far more sagacious criticism pervades the preface of Thucydidês.

[129] Seuthês, in the Anabasis of Xenophôn (vii. 2, 33), describes how, when an orphan youth, he formerly supplicated Mêdokos, the Thracian king, to grant him a troop of followers, in order that he might recover his lost dominions, ἐκαθεζόμην ἐνδίφριος αὐτῷ ἱκέτης δοῦναί μοι ἄνδρας.

Thucydidês gives an interesting description of the arrival of the exile Themistoklês, then warmly pursued by the Greeks on suspicion of treason, at the house of Admêtus, king of the Epirotic Molossians. The wife of Admêtus herself instructed the fugitive how to supplicate her husband in form: the child of Admêtus was placed in his arms, and he was directed to sit down in this guise close by the consecrated hearth, which was of the nature of an altar. While so seated, he addressed his urgent entreaties to Admêtus for protection: the latter raised him up from the ground and promised what was asked. “That (says the historian) was the most powerful form of supplication.” Admêtus,—ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἱκέτευμα ἦν τοῦτο (Thuc. i. 136). So Têlephus, in the lost drama of Æschylus called Μυσοὶ, takes up the child Orestês. See Bothe’s Fragm. 44; Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 305.

In the Odyssey, both Nausikaa and the goddess Athênê instruct Odysseus in the proper form of supplicating Alkinous: he first throws himself down at the feet of queen Arêtê, embracing her knees and addressing to her his prayer, and then, without waiting for a reply, sits down among the ashes on the hearth,—ὣς εἰπὼν, κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάρῃ ἐν κονίῃσι,—Alkinous is dining with a large company: for some time both he and the guests are silent: at length the ancient Echenêus remonstrates with him on his tardiness in raising the stranger up from the ashes. At his exhortation, the Phæakian king takes Odysseus by the hand, and, raising him up, places him on a chair beside him: he then directs the heralds to mix a bowl of wine, and to serve it to every one round, in order that all may make libations to Zeus Hiketêsios. This ceremony clothes the stranger with the full rights and character of a suppliant (Odyss. vi. 310; vii. 75, 141, 166): κατὰ νόμους ἀφικτόρων, Æschyl. Supplic. 242.

That the form counted for a great deal, we see evidently marked: but of course supplication is often addressed, and successfully addressed, in circumstances where this form cannot be gone through.

It is difficult to accept the doctrine of Eustathius (ad Odyss. xvi. 424), that ἱκέτης is a vox media (like ξεῖνος), applied as well to the ἱκετάδοχος as to the ἱκέτης, properly so called: but the word ἀλλήλοισιν, in the passage just cited, does seem to justify his observation: yet there is no direct authority for such use of the word in Homer.

The address of Theoclymenos, on first preferring his supplication to Telemachus, is characteristic of the practice (Odyss. xv. 260); compare also Iliad, xvi. 574, and Hesiod. Scut. Hercul. 12-85.

The idea of the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης run very much together. I can hardly persuade myself that the reading ἱκέτευσε (Odyss. xi. 520) is truly Homeric: implying as it does the idea of a pitiable sufferer, it is altogether out of place when predicated of the proud and impetuous Neoptolemus: we should rather have expected ἐκέλευσε. (See Odyss. x. 15.)

The constraining efficacy of special formalities of supplication, among the Scythians, is powerfully set forth in the Toxaris of Lucian: the suppliant sits upon an ox-hide, with his hands confined behind him (Lucian, Toxaris c. 48, vol. iii. p. 69, Tauchn.)—the μεγίστη ἱκετηρία among that people.

[130] Iliad, xxiii. 142.

[131] Odyss. xiv. 389.—

[132] Nägelsbach (Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. s. 23) gives a just and well-sustained view of the Homeric ethics: “Es ist der charakteristische Standpunkt der Homerischen Ethik, dass die Sphären des Rechts, der Sittlichkeit, und Religiosität, bey dem Dichter, durchaus noch nicht auseinander fallen, so dass der Mensch z. B. δίκαιος seyn konnte ohne θεουδὴς zu seyn—sondern in unentwickelter Einheit beysammen sind.”

[133] Νόμοι, laws, is not an Homeric word; νόμος, law, in the singular, occurs twice in the Hesiodic Works and Days (276, 388).

The employment of the words δίκη, δίκαι, θέμις, θέμιστες, in Homer, is curious as illustrating the early moral associations, but would require far more space than can be given to it in a note; we see that the sense of each of these words was essentially fluctuating. Themis, in Homer, is sometimes decidedly a person, who exercises the important function of opening and closing the agora, both of gods and men (Iliad, xx. 4: Odyss. ii. 68), and who, besides that, acts and speaks (Iliad, xiv. 87-93): always the associate and companion of Zeus, the highest god. In Hesiod, (Theog. 901,) she is the wife of Zeus: in Æschylus, (Prometh. 209,) she is the same as Γαῖα: even in Plato, (Legg. xi. p. 936,) witnesses swear (to want of knowledge of matters under inquest) by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis. Themis as a person is probably the oldest sense of the word: then we have the plural θέμιστες (connected with the verb τίθεμι, like θεσμὸς and τεθμὸς), which are (not persons, but) special appurtenances or emanations of the supreme god, or of a king acting under him, analogous to and joined with the sceptre. The sceptre, and the θέμιστες or the δίκαι constantly go together (Iliad, ii. 209; ix. 99): Zeus or the king is a judge, not a lawmaker; he issues decrees or special orders to settle particular disputes, or to restrain particular men; and, agreeable to the concrete forms of ancient language, the decrees are treated as if they were a collection of ready-made substantive things, actually in his possession, like the sceptre, and prepared for being delivered out when the proper occasion arose: δικασπόλοι, οἵτε θέμιστας Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται (Il. i. 238), compared with the two passages last cited: Ἄφρονα τοῦτον ἀνέντας, ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα (Il. v. 761), Ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (Odyss. ix. 215). The plural number δίκαι is more commonly used in Homer than the singular: δίκη is rarely used to denote Justice, an an abstract conception; it more often denotes a special claim of right on the part of some given man (Il. xviii. 508). It sometimes also denotes, simply, established custom, or the known lot,—δμώων δίκη, γερόντων, θείων βασιλήων, θεῶν (see Damm’s Lexicon, ad voc.) θέμις is used in the same manner.

See, upon this matter, Platner, De Notione Juris ap. Homerum, p. 81, and O. Müller, Prolegg. Mythol. p. 121.

[134] Οὐδὲ τοκεῦσι Θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε (Il. iv. 477): θρέπτρα or θρεπτήρια (compare Il. ix. 454; Odyss. ii. 134; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 186).

[135] Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 11. The ἔδνα, or present given by the suitor to the father, as an inducement to grant his daughter in marriage, are spoken of as very valuable,—ἀπερείσια ἔδνα (Il. xi. 244; xvi. 178; xxii. 472): to grant a daughter without ἔδνα was a high compliment to the intended son-in-law (Il. ix. 141: compare xiii. 366). Among the ancient Germans of Tacitus, the husband gave presents, not to his wife’s father, but to herself (Tacit. Germ. c. 18): the customs of the early Jews were in this respect completely Homeric; see the case of Shechem and Dinah (Genesis, xxxiv. 12) and others, etc.; also Mr. Catlin’s Letters on the North American Indians, vol. i. Lett. 26, p. 213.

The Greek ἔδνα correspond exactly to the mundium of the Lombard and Alemannic laws, which is thus explained by Mr. Price (Notes on the Laws of King Ethelbert, in the Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, translated and published by Mr. Thorpe, vol. i. p. 20): “The Longobardic law is the most copious of all the barbaric codes in its provisions respecting marriage, and particularly so on the subject of the Mund. From that law it appears that the Mundium was a sum paid over to the family of the bride, for transferring the tutelage which they possessed over her to the family of the husband: ‘Si quis pro muliere liberâ aut puellâ mundium dederit et ei tradita fuerit ad uxorem,’ etc. (ed. Rotharis, c. 183.) In the same sense in which the term occurs in these dooms, it is also to be met with in the Alemannic law: it was also common in Denmark and in Sweden, where the bride was called a mund-bought or a mund-given woman.”

According to the 77th Law of King Ethelbert (p. 23), this mund was often paid in cattle: the Saxon daughters were πάρθενοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι (Iliad, xviii. 593).

[136] Odyss. i. 430: Iliad, ix. 450: see also Terpstra, Antiquitas Homerica, capp. 17 and 18.

Polygamy appears to be ascribed to Priam, but to no one else (Iliad, xxi. 88).

[137] Odyss. xiv. 202-215: compare Iliad, xi. 102. The primitive German law of succession divided the paternal inheritance among the sons of a deceased father, under the implied obligation to maintain and portion out their sisters (Eichhorn, Deutsches Privat-Recht. sect. 330).

[138] Iliad, ii. 362.—

These three epithets include the three different classes of personal sympathy and obligation: 1. The Phratry, in which a man is connected with father, mother, brothers, cousins, brothers-in-law, clansmen, etc.; 2. The θέμιστες, whereby he is connected with his fellow-men who visit the same agora; 3. His Hestia, or Hearth, whereby he becomes accessible to the ξεῖνος and the ἱκέτης:—

[139] It must be mentioned, however, that when a chief received a stranger and made presents to him, he reimbursed to himself the value of the presents by collections among the people (Odyss. xiii. 14; xix. 197): ἀργαλέον γὰρ ἕνα προικὸς χαρίσασθαι, says Alkinous.

[140] Odyss. i. 123; iii. 70, etc.

[141] Odyss. xvii. 383.—

which breathes the plain-spoken shrewdness of the Hesiodic Works and Days, v. 355.

[142] See the illustrative case of Lykaon, in vain craving mercy from Achilles. (Iliad, xxi. 64-97. Ἀντί τοι εἶμ᾽ ἱκέταο, etc.)

Menelaus is about to spare the life of the Trojan Adrastus, who clasps his knees and craves mercy, offering a large ransom,—when Agamemnôn repels the idea of quarter, and kills Adrastus with his own hand: his speech to Menelaus displays the extreme of violent enmity, yet the poet says,—

Adrastus is not called an ἱκέτης, nor is the expression used in respect to Dolon (Il. x. 456), nor in the equally striking case of Odysseus (Odyss. xiv. 279), when begging for his life.

[143] Odyss. ix. 112-275.

[144] Tacit. German. c. 21. “Quemeunque mortalium arcere tecto, nefas habetur: pro fortunâ quisque apparatis epulis excipit: cum defecêre qui modo hospes fuerat, monstratur hospitii et comes, proximam domum non invitati adeunt: nec interest—pari humanitate accipiuntur. Notum ignotumque, quantum ad jus hospitii, nemo discernit.” Compare Cæsar, B. G. vi. 22.

See about the Druses and Arabians, Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 76, Engl. Transl.; Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, Copenh. 1772, pp. 46-49.

Pomponius Mela describes the ancient Germans in language not inapplicable to the Homeric Greeks: “Jus in viribus habent, adeo ut ne latrocinii quidem pudeat: tantum hospitibus boni, mitesque supplicibus.” (iii. 3.)

“The hospitality of the Indians is well known. It extends even to strangers who take refuge among them. They count it a most sacred duty, from which no one is exempted. Whoever refuses relief to any one, commits a grievous offence, and not only makes himself detested and abhorred by all, but liable to revenge from the offended person. In their conduct towards their enemies they are cruel and inexorable, and, when enraged, bent upon nothing but murder and bloodshed. They are, however, remarkable for concealing their passions, and waiting for a convenient opportunity of gratifying them. But then their fury knows no bounds. If they cannot satisfy their resentment, they will even call upon their friends and posterity to do it. The longest space of time cannot cool their wrath, nor the most distant place of refuge afford security to their enemy.” (Loskiel, History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the North American Indians, Part I. ch. 2, p. 15.)

“Charlevoix observes, (says Dr. Ferguson, Essay on Civil Society, Part II. § 2, p. 145,) that the nations among whom he travelled in North America never mentioned acts of generosity or kindness under the notion of duty. They acted from affection, as they acted from appetite, without regard to its consequences. When they had done a kindness, they had gratified a desire: the business was finished, and it passed from the memory. The spirit with which they give or receive presents is the same as that which Tacitus remarks among the ancient Germans: ‘Gaudent muneribus, sed nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.’ Such gifts are of little consequence, except when employed as the seal of a bargain or a treaty.”

Respecting the Morlacchi (Illyrian Sclavonians), the Abbé Fortis says (Travels in Dalmatia, pp. 55-58):—

“The hospitality of the Morlachs is equally conspicuous among the poor as among the opulent. The rich prepares a roasted lamb or sheep, and the poor, with equal cordiality, gives his turkey, milk, honey,—whatever he has. Nor is their generosity confined to strangers, but generally extends to all who are in want.... Friendship is lasting among the Morlacchi. They have even made it a kind of religious point, and tie the sacred bond at the foot of the altar. The Sclavonian ritual contains a particular benediction, for the solemn union of two male or two female friends, in presence of the whole congregation. The male friends thus united are called Pobratimi, and the females Posestreme, which means half-brothers and half-sisters. The duties of the Pobratimi are, to assist each other in every case of need and danger, to revenge mutual wrongs, etc.: their enthusiasm is often carried so far as to risk, and even lose their life.... But as the friendships of the Morlacchi are strong and sacred, so their quarrels are commonly unextinguishable. They pass from father to son, and the mothers fail not to put their children in mind of their duty to revenge their father, if he has had the misfortune to be killed, and to show them often the bloody shirt of the deceased.... A Morlach is implacable, if injured or insulted. With him, revenge and justice have exactly the same meaning, and truly it is the primitive idea, and I have been told that in Albania the effects of revenge are still more atrocious and more lasting. There, a man of the mildest character is capable of the most barbarous revenge, believing it to be his positive duty.... A Morlach who has killed another of a powerful family is commonly obliged to save himself by flight, and keep out of the way for several years. If during that time he has been fortunate enough to escape the search of his pursuers, and has got a small sum of money, he endeavors to obtain pardon and peace.... It is the custom in some places for the offended party to threaten the criminal, holding all sorts of arms to his throat, and at last to consent to accept his ransom.”

Concerning the influence of these two distinct tendencies—devoted personal friendship and implacable animosities—among the Illyrico-Sclavonian population, see Cyprien Robert, Les Slaves de la Turquie, ch. vii. pp. 42-46, and Dr. Joseph Müller, Albanien, Rumelien, und die Œsterreichisch-Montenegrenische Gränze, Prag. 1844, pp. 24-25.

“It is for the virtue of hospitality (observes Goguet, Origin of Laws, etc. vol. i. book vi. ch. iv.), that the primitive times are chiefly famed. But, in my opinion, hospitality was then exercised, not so much from generosity and greatness of soul, as from necessity. Common interest probably gave rise to that custom. In remote antiquity, there were few or no public inns: they entertained strangers, in order that they might render them the same service, if they happened to travel into their country. Hospitality was reciprocal. When they received strangers into their houses, they acquired a right of being received into theirs again. This right was regarded by the ancients as sacred and inviolable, and extended not only to those who had acquired it, but to their children and posterity. Besides, hospitality in these times could not be attended with much expense: men travelled but little. In a word, the modern Arabians prove that hospitality may consist with the greatest vices, and that this species of generosity is no decisive evidence of goodness of heart, or rectitude of manners.”

The book of Genesis, amidst many other features of resemblance to the Homeric manners, presents that of ready and exuberant hospitality to the stranger.