[640] Pausan. iii. 2, 6; iii. 22, 5. The statement of Müller is to be found (History of the Dorians, iii. 2, 1): he quotes a passage of Pausanias, which is noway to the point.

Mr. G. C. Lewis (Philolog. Mus. ut. sup. p. 41) is of the same opinion as Müller.

[641] M. Kopstadt (in the learned Dissertation which I have before alluded to, De Rerum Laconicarum Constitutionis Lycurgeæ Origine et Indole, cap. ii. p. 31) controverts this position respecting the Periœki. He appears to understand it in a sense which my words hardly present,—at least, a sense which I did not intend them to present: as if the majority of inhabitants in each of the hundred Periœkic towns were Dorians,—“ut per centum Laconiæ oppida distributi ubique majorem incolarum numerum efficerent,” (p. 32.) I meant only to affirm that some of the Periœkic towns, such as Amyklæ, were wholly, or almost wholly, Dorian; many others of them partially Dorian. But what may have been the comparative numbers (probably different in each town) of Dorian and non-Dorian inhabitants,—there are no means of determining. M. Kopstadt (p. 35) admits that Amyklæ, Pharis, and Geronthræ, were Periœkic towns peopled by Dorians; and if this be true, it negatives the general maxim on the faith of which he contradicts what I affirm: his maxim is—“nunquam Dorienses à Doriensibus nisi bello victi erant, civitate æquoque jure privati sunt,” (p. 31.) It is very unsafe to lay down such large positions respecting a supposed uniformity of Dorian rules and practice. The high authority of O. Müller has been extremely misleading in this respect.

It is plain that Herodotus (compare his expression, viii. 73 and i. 145) conceived all the free inhabitants of Laconia not as Achæans, but as Dorians. He believes in the story of the legend, that the Achæans, driven out of Laconia by the invading Dorians and Herakleidæ, occupied the territory in the north-west of Peloponnesus which was afterwards called Achæa,—expelling from it the Ionians. Whatever may be the truth about this legendary statement,—and whatever may have been the original proportions of Dorians and Achæans in Laconia,—these two races had (in the fifth century B. C.) become confounded in one undistinguishable ethnical and political aggregate called Laconian, or Lacedæmonian,—comprising both Spartans and Periœki, though with very unequal political franchises, and very material differences in individual training and habits. The case was different in Thessaly, where the Thessalians held in dependence Magnêtes, Perrhæbi, and Achæans: the separate nationality of these latter was never lost.

[642] Herod. vii. 234.

[643] Thucyd. viii. 6-22. They did not, however, partake in the Lykurgean discipline; but they seem to be named οἱ ἐκ τῆς χώρας παῖδες, as contrasted with οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγωγῆς (Sosibius ap. Athenæ. xv. p. 674).

[644] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 23. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν, οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς εἰσφοράς.

Mr. G. C. Lewis, in the article above alluded to (Philolog. Mus. ii. p. 54), says, about the Periœki: “They lived in the country or in small towns of the Laconian territory, and cultivated the land, which they did not hold of any individual citizen, but paid for it a tribute or rent to the state; being exactly in the same condition as the possessores of the Roman domain, or the Ryots, in Hindostan, before the introduction of the Permanent Settlement.” It may be doubted, I think, whether the Periœki paid any such rent or tribute as that which Mr. Lewis here supposes. The passage just cited from Aristotle seems to show that they paid direct taxation individually, and just upon the same principle as the Spartan citizens, who are distinguished only by being larger landed-proprietors. But though the principle of taxation be the same, there was practical injustice (according to Aristotle) in the mode of assessing it. “The Spartan citizens (he observes) being the largest landed-proprietors, take care not to canvass strictly each other’s payment of property-tax”—i. e. they wink mutually at each other’s evasions. If the Spartans had been the only persons who paid εἰσφορὰ, or property-tax, this observation of Aristotle would have had no meaning. In principle, the tax was assessed, both on their larger properties and on the smaller properties of the Periœki: in practice, the Spartans helped each other to evade the due proportion.

[645] The village-character of the Helots is distinctly marked by Livy, xxxiv. 27, in describing the inflictions of the despot Nabis: “Ilotarum quidam (hi sunt jam inde antiquitus castellani, agreste genus) transfugere voluisse insimulati, per omnes vicos sub verberibus acti necantur.”

[646] Herodot. i. 66. ἐχρηστηριάζοντο ἐν Δέλφοισι ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ Ἀρκάδων χώρῃ.

[647] See O. Müller, Dorians, iii. 3, 1; Ephorus ap. Strabo, viii. p. 365: Harpocration, v. Εἵλωτες.

[648] Kleomenes the Third, offered manumission to every Helot, who could pay down five Attic minæ: he was in great immediate want of money, and he raised, by this means, five hundred talents. Six thousand Helots must thus have been in a condition to find five minæ each, which was a very considerable sum (Plutarch, Kleomenes, c. 23).

[649] Such is the statement, that Helots were compelled to appear in a state of drunkenness, in order to excite in the youths a sentiment of repugnance against intoxication (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 28; also, Adversus Stoicos de Commun. Notit. c. 19, p. 1067).

[650] Herod. ix. 29. The Spartans, at Thermopylæ, seem to have been attended each by only one Helot (vii. 229).

O. Müller seems to consider that the light-armed, who attended the Periœkic hoplites at Platæa, were not Helots (Dor. iii. 3, 6). Herodotus does not distinctly say that they were so, but I see no reason for admitting two different classes of light-armed in the Spartan military force.

The calculation which Müller gives of the number of Periœki and Helots altogether, proceeds upon very untrustworthy data. Among them is to be noticed his supposition that πολιτικὴ χώρα means the district of Sparta as distinguished from Laconia, which is contrary to the passage in Polybius (vi. 45): πολιτικὴ χώρα, in Polybius, means the territory of the state generally.

[651] Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 12, 4; Kritias, De Lacedæm. Repub. ap. Libanium, Orat. de Servitute, t. ii. p. 85, Reisk. ὡς ἀπιστίας εἵνεκα τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας ἐξαιρεῖ μὲν Σπαρτιατὴς οἴκοι τῆς ἄσπιδος τὴν πόρπακα, etc.

[652] Thucyd. i. 101; iv. 80; v. 14-23.

[653] Thucyd. iv. 80. οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη.

[654] Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 28; Heraclides Pontic. p. 504, ed. Crag.

[655] Plato, Legg. i. p. 633: the words of the Lacedæmonian Megillus designate an existing Spartan custom. Compare the same treatise, vi. p. 763, where Ast suspects, without reason, the genuineness of the word κρυπτοί.

[656] Myron, ap. Athenæ. xiv. p. 657. ἐπικόπτειν τοὺς ἁδρουμένους does not strictly mean “to put to death.”

[657] Thucyd. v. 34.

[658] Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 7.

[659] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 15; substantially confirmed by Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. 1, 5.

[660] See the authors quoted in Athenæus, iv. p. 141.

[661] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. 2-3, 3-5, 4-6. The extreme pains taken to enforce καρτερία (fortitude and endurance) in the Spartan system is especially dwelt upon by Aristotle (Politica, ii. 6, 5-16); compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 633; Xenophon, De Laced. Repub. ii. 9, with the references in Schneider’s note,—likewise Cragius, De Republica Laced. iii. 8, p. 325.

[662] It is remarkable that these violent contentions of the youth, wherein kicking, biting, gouging out each other’s eyes, was resorted to,—as well as the διαμαστίγωσις, or scourging-match, before the altar of Artemis,—lasted down to the closing days of Sparta, and were actually seen by Cicero, Plutarch, and even Pausanias. Plutarch had seen several persons die under the suffering (Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 16, 18-30; and Instituta Laconica, p. 239; Pausan. iii. 14, 9, 16, 7; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. ii. 15).

The voluntary tortures, undergone by the young men among the Mandan tribe of Indians, at their annual religious festival, in the presence of the elders of the tribe,—afford a striking illustration of the same principles and tendencies as this Spartan διαμαστίγωσις. They are endured partly under the influence of religious feelings, as an acceptable offering to the Great Spirit,—partly as a point of emulation and glory on the part of the young men, to show themselves worthy and unconquerable in the eyes of their seniors. The intensity of these tortures is, indeed, frightful to read, and far surpasses in that respect anything ever witnessed at Sparta. It would be incredible, were it not attested by a trustworthy eye-witness.

See Mr. Catlin’s Letters on the North American Indians, Letter 22, vol. i. p. 157, seq.

“These religious ceremonies are held, in part, for the purpose of conducting all the young men of the tribe, as they annually arrive at manhood, through an ordeal of privation and torture; which, while it is supposed to harden their muscles and prepare them for extreme endurance,—enables the chiefs who are spectators of the scene, to decide upon their comparative bodily strength and ability, to endure the extreme privations and sufferings that often fall to the lot of Indian warriors; and that they may decide who is the most hardy and best able to lead a war-party in case of emergency.”—Again, p. 173, etc.

The καρτερία or power of endurance (Aristot. Pol. ii. 6, 5-16) which formed one of the prominent objects of the Lycurgean training, dwindles into nothing compared to that of the Mandan Indians.

[663] Xenophon, Anab. iv. 6, 14; and De Repub. Lac. c. 2, 6; Isokratês, Or. xii. (Panath.) p. 277. It is these licensed expeditions for thieving, I presume, to which Isokratês alludes, when he speaks of τῆς παίδων αὐτονομίας at Sparta, which, in its natural sense, would be the reverse of the truth (p. 277).

[664] Aristot. Polit. viii. 3, 3,—the remark is curious,—νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τά τ᾽ εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων· οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, etc. Compare the remark in Plato, Protagor. p. 342.

[665] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 31. Aristotle alludes to the conduct of the Spartan women on the occasion of the invasion of Laconia by the Thebans, as an evidence of his opinion respecting their want of courage. His judgment in this respect seems hard upon them, and he probably had formed to himself exaggerated notions of what their courage under such circumstances ought to have been, as the result of their peculiar training. We may add that their violent demonstrations on that trying occasion may well have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honor as from fear, when we consider what an event the appearance of a conquering army in Sparta was.

[666] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 5, 8, 11.

[667] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 3-4; Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13-14.

[668] Eurip. Androm. 598; Cicero, Tuscul. Quæst. ii. 15. The epithet φαινομηρίδες, as old as the poet Ibykus, shows that the Spartan women were not uncovered (see Julius Pollux, vii. 55).

It is scarcely worth while to notice the poetical allusions of Ovid and Propertius.

How completely the practice of gymnastic and military training for young women, analogous to that of the other sex, was approved by Plato, may be seen from the injunctions in his Republic.

[669] Aristot. Polit. vii. 14, 4.

[670] “It is certain (observes Dr. Thirlwall, speaking of the Spartan unmarried women) that in this respect the Spartan morals were as pure as those of any ancient, perhaps of any modern, people.” (History of Greece, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 371.)

[671] Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 15; Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 5. Xenophon does not make any allusion to the abduction as a general custom. There occurred cases in which it was real and violent: see Herod. v. 65. Demaratus carried off and married the betrothed bride of Leotychides.

[672] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. i. 9. Εἰ δέ τις αὖ γυναικὶ μὲν συνοικεῖν μὴ βούλοιτο, τέκνων δὲ ἀξιολόγων ἐπιθυμοίη, καὶ τούτῳ νόμον ἐποίησεν, ἥντινα ἂν εὔτεκνον καὶ γενναίαν ὁρῴη, πείσαντα τὸν ἔχοντα, ἐκ ταύτης τεκνοποιεῖσθαι. Καὶ πολλὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα συνεχώρει. Αἵ τε γὰρ γυναῖκες δίττους οἴκους βούλονται κατέχειν, οἵ τε ἄνδρες ἀδελφοὺς τοῖς παισὶ προσλαμβάνειν, οἳ τοῦ μὲν γένους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως κοινωνοῦσι, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων οὐκ ἀντιποιοῦνται.

[673] Herodot. v. 39-40. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, γυναῖκας ἔχων δύο, διξὰς ἱστίας οἴκεε, ποιέων οὐδαμᾶ Σπαρτιητικά.

[674] Müller, Hist. of Dorians, iv. 4, 1. The stories recounted by Plutarch, (Agis, c. 20; Kleomenês, c. 37-38,) of the conduct of Agesistrata and Kratesikleia, the wives of Agis and Kleomenês, and of the wife of Panteus (whom he does not name) on occasion of the deaths of their respective husbands, illustrate powerfully the strong conjugal affection of a Spartan woman, and her devoted adherence and fortitude in sharing with her husband the last extremities of suffering.

[675] See the Oration of Lysias, De Cæde Eratosthenis, Orat. i. p. 94, seq.

[676] Plutarch, Agis, c. 4.

[677] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 6; Plutarch, Agis, c. 4. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους κατηκόους ὄντας ἀεὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, καὶ πλεῖον ἐκείναις τῶν δημοσίων, ἢ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῖς, πολυπραγμονεῖν δίδοντας.

[678] Aristophan. Lysistr. 80.

[679] See the remarkable account in Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 16; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 29; one of the most striking incidents in Grecian history. Compare, also, the string of sayings ascribed to Lacedæmonian women, in Plutarch, Lac. Apophth. p. 241, seq.

[680] How offensive the Lacedæmonian xenêlasy or expulsion of strangers appeared in Greece, we may see from the speeches of Periklês in Thucydidês (i. 144; ii. 39). Compare Xenophon, Rep. Lac. xiv. 4; Plutarch, Agis, c. 10; Lykurgus, c. 27; Plato, Protagoras, p. 348.

No Spartan left the country without permission: Isokratês, Orat. xi. (Busiris), p. 225; Xenoph. ut sup.

Both these regulations became much relaxed after the close of the Peloponnesian war.

[681] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 25.

[682] Plutarch observes justly about Sparta, under the discipline of Lykurgus, that it was “not the polity of a city, but the life of a trained and skilful man,”—οὐ πόλεως ἡ Σπάρτη πολίτειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἀσκητοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ βίον ἔχουσα (Plutarch, Lyk. c. 30).

About the perfect habit of obedience at Sparta, see Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 9, 15-iv. 4, 15, the grand attributes of Sparta in the eyes of its admirers (Isokratês, Panathen. Or. xii. pp. 256-278), πειθαρχία—σωφροσύνη—τα γυμνάσια τἄκει καθεστῶτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συνόλως τὴν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίαν.

[683] Aristot. Polit. viii. 3, 3. Οἱ Λάκωνες ... θηριώδεις ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις.

That the Spartans were absolutely ignorant of letters, and could not read, is expressly stated by Isokratês (Panathen. Or. xii. p. 277). οὗτοι δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰσὶν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ γράμματα μανθάνουσιν, etc.

The preference of rhetoric to accuracy, is so manifest in Isokratês, that we ought to understand his expressions with some reserve; but in this case it is evident that he means literally what he says, for in another part of the same discourse, there is an expression dropped, almost unconsciously, which confirms it. “The most rational Spartans (he says) will appreciate this discourse, if they find any one to read it to them,”—ἢν λάβωσι τὸν ἀναγνωσόμενον (p. 285).

[684] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 22; vii. 13, 11; viii. 1, 3; viii. 3, 3. Plato, Legg. i. pp. 626-629. Plutarch, Solôn, c. 22.

[685] Thucyd. iv. 126. Οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσι, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

The most remarkable circumstance is, that these words are addressed by Brasidas to an army composed, in large proportion, of manumitted Helots (Thucyd. iv. 81).

[686] Plato treats of the system of Lykurgus, as emanating from the Delphian Apollo and Lykurgus as his missionary (Legg. i. p. 632).

[687] Alcæi Fragment. 41, p. 279, ed. Schneidewin:—

Compare the Schol. ad Pindar. Isthm. ii. 17, and Diogen. Laërt. i. 31.

[688] Thucydid. i. 6. μετρίᾳ δ᾽ αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν. See, also, Plutarch, Apophthegm. Lacon. p. 210. A.-F.

[689] Xenoph. Republ. Laced. c. 7.

[690] Plato, Legg. iii. p. 684.

[691] Aristotel. Politic. ii. 2, 10. ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσε.

[692] Aristot. Politic. ii. 4, 1, about Phaleas; and about Sparta and Krete, generally, the whole sixth and seventh chapters of the second book; also, v. 6, 2-7.

Theophrastus (apud Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 10) makes a similar observation, that the public mess, and the general simplicity of habits, tended to render wealth of little service to the possessor: τὸν πλοῦτον ἄπλουτον ἀπεργάσασθαι τῇ κοινότητι τῶν δείπνων, καὶ τῇ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν εὐτελείᾳ. Compare Plutarch. Apophthegm. Lacon. p. 226 E. The wealth, therefore, was not formally done away with in the opinion of Theophrastus: there was no positive equality of possessions.

Both the Spartan kings dined at the public mess at the same pheidition (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 30).

Herakleidês Ponticus mentions nothing, either about equality of Spartan lots or fresh partition of lands, by Lykurgus (ad calcem Cragii, De Spartanorum Repub. p. 504), though he speaks about the Spartan lots and law of succession as well as about Lykurgus.

[693] Isokratês, Panathen. Or. xii. pp. 266, 270, 278: οὐδὲ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνηκέστων κακῶν.

[694] Plutarch, Agis, c. iv.

[695] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 21. Παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λακῶσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾷν.... Ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. So also Xenophon, Rep. Lac. c. vii. ἴσα μὲν φέρειν εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ὁμοίως δὲ διαιτᾶσθαι τάξας.

The existence of this rate-paying qualification, is the capital fact in the history of the Spartan constitution; especially when we couple it with the other fact, that no Spartan acquired anything by any kind of industry.

[696] Herakleidês Ponticus, ad calcem Cragii De Repub. Laced. p. 504. Compare Cragius, iii. 2, p. 196.

Aristotle (ii. 6, 10) states that it was discreditable to buy or sell a lot of land, but that the lot might be either given or bequeathed at pleasure. He mentions nothing about the prohibition to divide, and even states what contradicts it,—that it was the practice to give a large dowry when a rich man’s daughter married (ii. 6, 11). The sister of Agesilaus, Kyniska, was a person of large property, which apparently implies the division of his father’s estate (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 30).

Whether there was ever any law prohibiting a father from dividing his lot among his children, may well be doubted. The Rhetra of the ephor Epitadeus (Plutarch, Agis, 5), granted unlimited power of testamentary disposition to the possessor, so that he might give away or bequeathe his land to a stranger if he chose. To this law great effects are ascribed: but it is evident that the tendency to accumulate property in few hands, and the tendency to diminution in the number of qualified citizens, were powerfully manifested before the time of Epitadeus, who came after Lysander. Plutarch, in another place, notices Hesiod, Xenokrates, and Lykurgus, as having concurred with Plato, in thinking that it was proper to leave only one single heir (ἕνα μόνον κληρόνομον καταλιπεῖν) (Ὑπομνήματα εἰς Ἡσίοδον, Fragm. vol. v. p. 777, Wyttenb.). But Hesiod does not lay down this as a necessity or as a universal rule; he only says, that a man is better off who has only one son (Opp. Di. 374). And if Plato had been able to cite Lykurgus as an authority for that system of an invariable number of separate κλῆροι, or lots, which he sets forth in his treatise De Legibus (p. 740), it is highly probable that he would have done so. Still less can Aristotle have supposed that Lykurgus or the Spartan system either insured, or intended to insure, the maintenance of an unalterable number of distinct proprietary lots; for he expressly notices that scheme as a peculiarity of Philolaus the Corinthian, in his laws for the Thebans (Polit. ii. 9, 7).

[697] Polybius, Fragm. ap. Maii. Collect. Vett. Scrip. vol. ii. p. 384.

Perhaps, as O. Müller remarks, this may mean only, that none except the eldest brother could afford to marry; but the feelings of the Spartans in respect to marriage were, in many other points, so different from ours, that we are hardly authorized to reject the literal statement (History of the Dorians, iii. 10, 2),—which, indeed, is both illustrated and rendered credible by the permission granted in the laws of Solôn to an ἐπίκληρος who had been claimed in marriage by a relative in his old age,—ἂν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κύριος γεγονὼς κατὰ τὸν νόμον αὐτὸς μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ πλησιάζειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὀπυίεσθαι (Plutarch, Solôn, c. 20).

I may observe that of O. Müller’s statements, respecting the lots of land at Sparta, several are unsupported and some incorrect.

[698] Plutarch, Kleomenês, cap. 2-11, with the note of Schömann, p. 175; also, Lycurg. cap. 8; Athenæ. iv. p. 141.

Phylarchus, also, described the proceedings of Kleomenês, seemingly with favor (Athenæ. ib.); compare Plutarch, Agis, c. 9.

Polybius believed, that Lykurgus had introduced equality of landed possession, both in the district of Sparta, and throughout Laconia: his opinion is, probably, borrowed from these same authors, of the third century before the Christian era. For he expresses his great surprise, how the best-informed ancient authors (οἱ λογιώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων), Plato, Xenophon, Ephorus, Kallisthenês, can compare the Kretan polity to the old Lacedæmonian, the main features of the two being (as he says) so different,—equality of property at Sparta, great inequality of property in Krete, among other differences (Polyb. vi. 45-48).

This remark of Polybius, exhibits the difference of opinion of the earlier writers, as compared with those during the third century before the Christian era. The former compared Spartan and Kretan institutions, because they did not conceive equality of landed property as a feature in old Sparta.

[699] Respecting Sphærus, see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 8; Kleomen. c. 2; Athenæ. v. p. 141; Diogen. Laërt. vii. sect. 137.

[700] Hist. of Greece, ch. viii. vol. i. pp. 344-347.

C. F. Hermann, on the contrary, considers the equal partition of Laconia into lots indivisible and inalienable, as “an essential condition” (eine wesentliche Bedingung) of the whole Lykurgean system (Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer, sect. 28).

Tittmann (Griechische Staatsverfassungen, pp. 588-596) states and seems to admit the equal partition as a fact, without any commentary.

Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterthumskunde, v. 4, 42, p. 217) supposes “that the best land was already parcelled, before the time of Lykurgus, into lots of equal magnitude, corresponding to the number of Spartans, which number afterwards increased to nine thousand.” For this assertion, I know no evidence: it departs from Plutarch, without substituting anything better authenticated or more plausible. Wachsmuth notices the partition of Laconia among the Periœki in thirty thousand equal lots, without any comment, and seemingly as if there were no doubt of it (p. 218).

Manso, also, supposes that there had once been an equal division of land prior to Lykurgus,—that it had degenerated into abuse,—and that Lykurgus corrected it, restoring, not absolute equality, but something near to equality (Manso, Sparta, vol. i. pp. 110-121). This is the same gratuitous supposition as that of Wachsmuth.

O. Müller admits the division as stated by Plutarch, though he says that the whole number of nine thousand lots cannot have been set out before the Messenian war; and he adheres to the idea of equality as contained in Plutarch; but he says that the equality consisted in “equal estimate of average produce,”—not in equal acreable dimensions. He goes so far as to tell us that “the lots of the Spartans, which supported twice as many men as the lots of the Periœki, must, upon the whole, have been twice as extensive (i. e. in the aggregate): each lot must, therefore, have been seven times greater,” (compare History of the Dorians, iii. 3, 6; iii. 10, 2.) He also supposes, that “similar partitions of land had been made from the time of the first occupation of Laconia by the Dorians.” Whoever compares his various positions with the evidence brought to support them, will find a painful disproportion between the basis and the superstructure.

The views of Schömann, as far as I collect from expressions somewhat vague, seem to coincide with those of Dr. Thirlwall. He admits, however that the alleged Lykurgean equalization is at variance with the representations of Plato (Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. iv. 1, 7, note 4, p. 116).

[701] Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 8. συνέπεισε τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν εἰς μέσον θέντας, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναδάσασθαι, καὶ ζῆν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἅπαντας, ὁμαλεῖς καὶ ἰσοκλήρους τοῖς βίοις γενομένους, τὸ δὲ πρωτεῖον ἀρετῇ μετιόντας· ὡς ἄλλης ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ οὔσης διαφορᾶς, οὐδὲ ἀνισότητος, πλὴν ὅσην αἰσχρῶν ψόγος ὁρίζει καὶ καλῶν ἔπαινος. Ἐπάγων δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον, διένειμε, etc.

[702] Plutarch, Agis, c. 19-20.

[703] I read with much satisfaction, in M. Kopstadt’s Dissertation, that the general conclusion which I have endeavored to establish respecting the alleged Lykurgean redivision of property, appears to him successfully proved. (Dissert. De Rerum Laconic. Const. sect. 18, p. 138.)

He supposes, with perfect truth, that, at the time when the first edition of these volumes was published, I was ignorant of the fact, that Lachmann and Kortüm had both called in question the reality of the Lykurgean redivision. In regard to Professor Kortüm, the fact was first brought to my knowledge, by his notice of these two volumes, in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher, 1846, No. 41, p. 649.

Since the first edition, I have read the treatise of Lachmann (Die Spartanische Staats Verfassung in ihrer Entwicklung und ihrem Verfalle, sect. 10, p. 170) wherein the redivision ascribed to Lykurgus is canvassed. He, too, attributes the origin of the tale, as a portion of history, to the social and political feelings current in the days of Agis the Third, and Kleomenês the Third. He notices, also, that it is in contradiction with Plato and Isokratês. But a large proportion of the arguments which he brings to disprove it, are connected with ideas of his own respecting the social and political constitution of Sparta, which I think either untrue or uncertified. Moreover, he believes in the inalienability as well as the indivisibility of the separate lots of land,—which I believe to be just as little correct as their supposed equality.

Kopstadt (p. 139) thinks that I have gone too far in rejecting every middle opinion. He thinks that Lykurgus must have done something, though much less than what is affirmed, tending to realize equality of individual property.

I shall not say that this is impossible. If we had ampler evidence, perhaps such facts might appear. But as the evidence stands now, there is nothing whatever to show it. Nor are we entitled (in my judgment) to presume that it was so, in the absence of evidence, simply in order to make out that the Lykurgean mythe is only an exaggeration, and not entire fiction.

[704] Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11) remarks that the territory of the Spartans would maintain fifteen hundred horsemen and thirty thousand hoplites, while the number of citizens was, in point of fact, less than one thousand. Dr. Thirlwall seems to prefer the reading of Göttling,—three thousand instead of thirty thousand; but the latter seems better supported by MSS, and most suitable.

[705] Plutarch, Agis, c. 5.

[706] Herod. vi. 61. οἷα ἀνθρώπων τε ὀλβίων θυγατέρα, etc; vii. 134.

[707] Herod. vi. 70-103; Thucyd. v. 50.

[708] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 11; Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. v. 3; Molpis ap. Athenæ. iv. p. 141; Aristot. Polit. ii. 2, 5.

[709] Thucyd. i. 6; Aristot. Polit. iv. 7, 4, 5; viii. 1, 3.

[710] Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, 10-13; v. 6, 7.

[711] The panegyrist Xenophon acknowledges much the same respecting the Sparta which he witnessed; but he maintains that it had been better in former times (Repub. Lac. c. 14).

[712] The view of Dr. Thirlwall agrees, in the main, with that of Manso and O. Müller (Manso, Sparta, vol. i. pp. 118-128; and vol. ii. Beilage, 9, p. 129; and Müller, History of the Dorians, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 10, sect. 2, 3).

Both these authors maintain the proposition stated by Plutarch (Agis c. 5, in his reference to the ephor Epitadeus, and the new law carried by that ephor), that the number of Spartan lots, nearly equal and rigorously indivisible, remained with little or no change from the time of the original division, down to the return of Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war. Both acknowledge that they cannot understand by what regulations this long unalterability, so improbable in itself, was maintained: but both affirm the fact positively. The period will be more than four hundred years if the original division be referred to Lykurgus: more than three hundred years, if the nine thousand lots are understood to date from the Messenian war.

If this alleged fact be really a fact, it is something almost without a parallel in the history of mankind: and before we consent to believe it, we ought at least to be satisfied that there is considerable show of positive evidence in its favor, and not much against it. But on examining Manso and Müller, it will be seen that not only is there very slender evidence in its favor,—there is a decided balance of evidence against it.

The evidence produced to prove the indivisibility of the Spartan lot, is a passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, c. 2 (ad. calc. Cragii, p. 504), πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται,—τῆς ἀρχαίας μοίρας ἀνανέμεσθαι (or νενεμῆσθαι) οὐδὲν ἔξεστι. The first portion of this assertion is confirmed by, and probably borrowed from, Aristotle, who says the same thing, nearly in the same words: the second portion of the sentence ought, according to all reasonable rules of construction, to be understood with reference to the first part; that is, to the sale of the original lot. “To sell land, is held disgraceful among the Lacedæmonians, nor is it permitted to sever off any portion of the original lot,” i. e. for sale. Herakleidês is not here speaking of the law of succession to property at Lacedæmon, nor can we infer from his words that the whole lot was transmitted entire to one son. No evidence except this very irrelevant sentence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.

Having thus determined the indivisible transmission of lots to one son of a family, Manso and Müller presume, without any proof, that that son must be the eldest: and Müller proceeds to state something equally unsupported by proof: “The extent of his rights, however, was perhaps no farther than that he was considered master of the house and property; while the other members of the family had an equal right to the enjoyment of it.... The master of the family was, therefore, obliged to contribute for all these to the syssitia, without which contribution no one was admitted.”—pp. 199, 200.

All this is completely gratuitous, and will be found to produce as many difficulties in one way as it removes in another.

The next law as to the transmission of property, which Manso states to have prevailed, is, that all daughters were to marry without receiving any dowry,—the case of a sole daughter is here excepted. For this proposition he cites Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 227; Justin, iii. 3; Ælian. V. H. vi. 6. These authors do certainly affirm, that there was such a regulation, and both Plutarch and Justin assign reasons for it, real or supposed. “Lykurgus, being asked why he directed that maidens should be married without dowry, answered,—In order that maidens of poor families might not remain unmarried, and that character and virtue might be exclusively attended to in the choice of a wife.” The same general reason is given by Justin. Now the reason here given for the prohibition of dowry, goes, indirectly, to prove that there existed no such law of general succession, as that which had been before stated, namely, the sacred indivisibility of the primitive lot. For had this latter been recognized, the reason would have been obvious why daughters could receive no dowry; the father’s whole landed property (and a Spartan could have little of any other property, since he never acquired anything by industry) was under the strictest entail to his eldest son. Plutarch and Justin, therefore, while in their statement as to the matter of fact, they warrant Manso in affirming the prohibition of dowry (about this matter of fact, more presently), do, by the reason which they give, discountenance his former supposition as to the indivisibility of the primitive family lots.

Thirdly, Manso understands Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11), by the use of the adverb νῦν, to affirm something respecting his own time specially, and to imply at the same time that the ancient custom had been the reverse. I cannot think that the adverb, as Aristotle uses it in that passage, bears out such a construction: νῦν δὲ, there, does not signify present time as opposed to past, but the antithesis between the actual custom and that which Aristotle pronounces to be expedient. Aristotle gives no indication of being aware that any material change had taken place in the laws of succession at Sparta: this is one circumstance, for which both Manso and Müller, who both believe in the extraordinary revolution caused by the permissive law of the ephor Epitadeus, censure him.

Three other positions are laid down by Manso about the laws of property at Sparta. 1. A man might give away or bequeathe his land to whomsoever he pleased. 2. But none except childless persons could do this. 3. They could only give or bequeathe it to citizens who had no land of their own. Of these three regulations, the first is distinctly affirmed by Aristotle, and may be relied upon: the second is a restriction not noticed by Aristotle, and supported by no proof except that which arises out of the story of the ephor Epitadeus, who is said to have been unable to disinherit his son without causing a new law to be passed: the third is a pure fancy.

So much for the positive evidence, on the faith of which Manso and Müller affirm the startling fact, that the lots of land in Sparta remained distinct, indivisible, and unchanged in number, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. I venture to say that such positive evidence is far too weak to sustain an affirmation in itself so improbable, even if there were no evidence on the other side for contradiction. But in this case there is powerful contradictory evidence.

First, the assertions of these authors are distinctly in the teeth of Aristotle, whose authority they try to invalidate, by saying that he spoke altogether with reference to his own time at Sparta, and that he misconceived the primitive Lykurgean constitution. Now this might form a reasonable ground of presumption against the competency of Aristotle, if the witnesses produced on the other side were older than he. But it so happens, that every one of the witnesses produced by Manso and Müller, are younger than Aristotle: Herakleidês Ponticus, Plutarch, Justin, Ælian, etc. Nor is it shown that these authors copied from any source earlier than Aristotle,—for his testimony cannot be contradicted by any inferences drawn from Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophon, Plato, Isokratês, or Ephorus. None of these writers, anterior to, or contemporary with, Aristotle, countenance the fancy of equal, indivisible, perpetual lots, or prohibition of dowry.

The fact is, that Aristotle is not only our best witness, but also our oldest witness, respecting the laws of property in the Spartan commonwealth. I could have wished, indeed, that earlier testimonies had existed, and I admit that even the most sagacious observer of 340-330 B. C. is liable to mistake when he speaks of one or two centuries before. But if Aristotle is to be discredited on the ground of late date, what are we to say to Plutarch? To insist on the intellectual eminence of Aristotle would be superfluous: and on this subject he is a witness the more valuable, as he had made careful, laborious, and personal inquiries into the Grecian governments generally, and that of Sparta among them,—the great point de mire for ancient speculative politicians.

Now the statements of Aristotle, distinctly exclude the idea of equal, indivisible, inalienable, perpetual lots,—and prohibition of dowry. He particularly notices the habit of giving very large dowries, and the constant tendency of the lots of land to become consolidated in fewer and fewer hands. He tells us nothing upon the subject which is not perfectly consistent, intelligible, and uncontradicted by any known statements belonging to his own, or to earlier times. But the reason why men refuse to believe him, and either set aside or explain away his evidence, is, that they sit down to the study with their minds full of the division of landed property ascribed to Lykurgus by Plutarch. I willingly concede that, on this occasion, we have to choose between Plutarch and Aristotle. We cannot reconcile them except by arbitrary suppositions, every one of which breaks up the simplicity, beauty, and symmetry of Plutarch’s agrarian idea,—and every one of which still leaves the perpetuity of the original lots unexplained. And I have no hesitation in preferring the authority of Aristotle (which is in perfect consonance with what we indirectly gather from other authors, his contemporaries and predecessors) as a better witness on every ground; rejecting the statement of Plutarch, and rejecting it altogether, with all its consequences.

But the authority of Aristotle is not the only argument which may be urged to refute this supposition that the distinct Spartan lots remained unaltered in number down to the time of Lysander. For if the number of distinct lots remained undiminished, the number of citizens cannot have greatly diminished. Now the conspiracy of Kinadôn falls during the life of Lysander, within the first ten years after the close of the Peloponnesian war: and in the account which Xenophon gives of that conspiracy, the paucity of the number of citizens is brought out in the clearest and most emphatic manner. And this must be before the time when the new law of Epitadeus is said to have passed, at least before that law can have had room to produce any sensible effects. If, then, the ancient nine thousand lots still remained all separate, without either consolidation or subdivision, how are we to account for the small number of citizens at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadôn?

This examination of the evidence, for the purpose of which I have been compelled to prolong the present note, shows—1. That the hypothesis of indivisible, inalienable lots, maintained for a long period in undiminished number at Sparta, is not only sustained by the very minimum of affirmative evidence, but is contradicted by very good negative evidence. 2. That the hypothesis which represents dowries to daughters as being prohibited by law, is, indeed, affirmed by Plutarch, Ælian, and Justin, but is contradicted by the better authority of Aristotle.

The recent edition of Herakleidês Ponticus, published by Schneidewin, in 1847, since my first edition, presents an amended text, which completely bears out my interpretation. His text, derived from a fuller comparison of existing MSS., as well as from better critical judgment (see his Prolegg. c. iii. p. liv.), stands—Πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται· τῆς δὲ ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν (p. 7). It is plain that all this passage relates to sale of land, and not to testation, or succession, or division. Thus much negatively is certain, and Schneidewin remarks in his note (p. 53) that it contradicts Müller, Hermann, and Schömann,—adding, that the distinction drawn is, between land inherited from the original family lots, and land otherwise acquired, by donation, bequest, etc. Sale of the former was absolutely illegal: sale of the latter was discreditable, yet not absolutely illegal. Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, 10) takes no notice of any such distinction, between land inherited from the primitive lots, and land otherwise acquired. Nor was there, perhaps, any well-defined line of distinction, in a country of unwritten customs, like Sparta, between what was simply disgraceful and what was positively illegal. Schneidewin, in his note, however, assumes the original equality of the lots as certain in itself, and as being the cause of the prohibition: neither of which appears to me true.

I speak of this confused compilation still under the name of Herakleidês Ponticus, by which it is commonly known: though Schneidewin, in the second chapter of his Prolegomena, has shown sufficient reason for believing that there is no authority for connecting it with the name of Herakleidês. He tries to establish the work as consisting of Excerpta from the lost treatise of Aristotle’s περὶ Πολιτειῶν: which is well made out with regard to some parts, but not enough to justify his inference as to the whole. The article, wherein Welcker vindicates the ascribing of the work to an Excerptor of Herakleidês, is unsatisfactory (Kleine Schriften, p. 451).

Beyond this irrelevant passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, no farther evidence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.