“Lord Londonderry presents his compliments to Mr. Henry Grattan. Lord Londonderry read, in his place in the House of Lords, an extract from the reports of the newspapers of a speech of Mr. O’Connell’s, stated to have been made at a public meeting in Dublin, to address the Queen; in which accusations were made against that party to which Lord Londonderry is proud to belong. The paragraph Lord L. cited is as follows:—‘Mr. Grattan had said, that her Majesty’s life would not be safe if the Tories came into power; and he (Mr. O’Connell) declared solemnly he was convinced she would not live six months, if that event took place.’ Lord Londonderry at once admits, if these sentiments are accurately reported, accusing the Tory party of the intention of murdering the Queen, he considers them as base and infamous. It was to such accusations Lord Londonderry’s epithets applied.”
In a second letter, Mr. Grattan begged to say, that he was not accountable for any opinion or expression in Mr. O’Connell’s speeches. As he had not alluded, in any speech of his, in any way to Lord Londonderry, he requested his lordship would distinctly say, whether he intended that the words ‘base’ and ‘infamous’ should be applied to him? In answer to this letter. Lord Londonderry observed, that, unwilling as he should be to fix upon any individual the responsibility of having uttered such sentiments as those reported in the public accounts of the meeting to which he alluded, he must adhere to the opinion he had already expressed, as applying to any individual who was prepared to avow such language. The epithets complained of were, he said, applied, not to individuals, but to injurious accusations reported to have been publicly uttered against a political body; and since there was no disavowal, on Mr. Henry Grattan’s part, of the language and sentiments reported to have been used, Lord Londonderry regretted he could not recede from the opinions he had already expressed.
In consequence of this correspondence, a meeting was arranged, which took place this day, at three o’clock, on Wimbledon Common. Upon the signal being given, Lord Londonderry received Mr. Grattan’s fire, and fired in the air. Mr. Bodkin, on the part of Mr. Grattan, then expressed himself perfectly satisfied, and the affair terminated.
A hostile meeting took place this day at Coombe Wood, between Lord Powerscourt and Mr. Roebuck; the former attended by the Honourable H. Fitzroy, and the latter by Mr. Trelawney. On the ground endeavours were made in vain to prevent proceeding to extremities; Lord Powerscourt’s second insisting on Mr. Roebuck’s retracting, or apologising for, certain words delivered in a speech at Bath. Mr. Roebuck received his adversary’s fire, discharged his pistol in the air, and, advancing to Lord Powerscourt, said, “Now, my lord, I am ready to make any apology your lordship may suggest; for certainly, in my speech at Bath, I did not mean to imply anything personally offensive.” With this declaration all parties being satisfied, the affair terminated.
A duel was this day fought near Boulogne, between Lord George Loftus and Lord Harley. Shots were exchanged without effect; and the parties returned to Dover on the evening of the same day. The affair originated in certain expressions used by Lord George Loftus towards Lord Harley, on occasion of Lord Harley’s presenting himself to the notice of Lord George, and claiming an acquaintance, of which Lord George had no recollection whatever. Lord Harley stated, that his introduction to Lord George had been at the instance of his brother, Lord Loftus; and, on the faith of this statement, Lord George’s second retracted, in his name, the expressions that gave the offence.
A meeting took place on Wimbledon Common between Lord William Paget and Mr. Thomas Fiske. The former was attended by Captain Baillie, of the Lancers; and the latter by Mr. Nightingale. Mr. Fiske received his lordship’s fire, and fired in the air; when the seconds interfered. It appears that Lord William had called upon Mr. Fiske to deny that he had ever lent money to his lordship, as had been stated in a morning paper; which request was refused to be complied with, on the ground of its being accompanied by a threat; but, after receiving his lordship’s fire, he had no hesitation in declaring, in the presence of Captain Baillie and Mr. Nightingale, that he never had lent any money to his lordship.
The following is from a New York paper:—On the 17th of May, two persons, one named Robert Wynn, and the other Joseph D. Brown, quarreled in a stage-coach between Peru and Chicago, Illinois. Both drew their pistols, fired, and killed each other. One was shot in the head; the other in the heart. They were the only passengers.
The following account of a frightful duel fought near New Orleans, is from the Courier de la Louisiane:—A meeting, as atrocious in the mode of conducting it, as it was disastrous in its result, has just taken place between M. Hippolyte Throuet and M. Paulin Prué, both Frenchmen by birth, and long resident in this city. It originated in a bitterly contested law-suit, and took place in the following manner. The principals were placed at five paces distant from each other, back to back, with a pistol in each hand. At a signal agreed upon, they were to turn round and fire. At the first discharge they fired together, but without effect. Prué then took his second pistol into his right hand; but so precipitately, that it was discharged in the air. Seeing himself thus exposed, without any means of defence, to his adversary’s fire, he presented his bosom to him, and said, “Fire!” Several of the bystanders, of whom there were a great number, trembling for the fate which awaited the disarmed man, cried out from their places, “Don’t fire!” but the seconds interposed, and, demanding who dared to interfere in a matter of the sort, invited Throuet to discharge his pistol against his opponent. Throuet needed not the invitation; but, having kept both Prué and the bystanders for a considerable time in a state of the most painful suspense, still holding Prué covered with his pistol, and grinning ferociously, fired at last, and, the ball passing through Prué’s body, he died instantaneously.
A meeting took place in one of the Kilburn fields, adjoining the New North-road, St. John’s Wood, between Mr. Antonio Garbonia and Mr. Nicholas Kechoff. On the first fire Mr. Garbonia received his antagonist’s ball in his left groin, and fell. Mr. Kechoff advanced to the wounded man, shook hands with him, and immediately quitted the ground with his friends. The cause of the meeting arose from disputed betting at a billiard-table.
In consequence of the Earl of Cardigan having ascertained, that certain letters which had recently been published in the Morning Chronicle, reflecting, as his lordship considered, on his character as an officer and a gentleman, were written by Lieutenant Tuckett, late of the 11th regiment of Dragoons, of which his lordship is Lieutenant-Colonel, the noble Lord sent him, through Captain Douglas, a challenge. This was accepted, and Captain Wainwright, of the Half-pay, was selected by him to arrange the preliminaries. An apology was demanded by the noble Earl; to which the reply was, that if he would deny the allegations contained in the letters referred to, it should be given. Lord Cardigan declared that certain portions were true; but that the greater part were calumnies. On this the apology was refused, and a meeting was the consequence.
It took place on the afternoon of Saturday, the 12th of September, on Wimbledon Common. The first shot was ineffectual on both sides: on the second, Mr. Tuckett received his adversary’s ball in the back part of the lower ribs, which traversed round to the spine. As Lord Cardigan and his second were moving off after the duel, they were taken into custody, but liberated on bail being given to the police for their appearance before the magistrates at Wandsworth on Monday: when Sir James Anderson deposed, that, after the removal of Mr. Tuckett to his house, he made an examination, and found that a pistol bullet had entered on the upper part of his right hip-bone, slightly shattering it, had passed transversely, and come out over the spine of the back-bone. He said he had visited the patient again on Sunday, and saw no symptoms of present danger. The magistrates decided, that, as the case was one of a serious nature, they could not be contented with ordinary recognizances, but should order the Earl of Cardigan to enter into his own recognizance in the sum of a thousand pounds, and Captain Douglas in the sum of five hundred, to ensure their reappearance before that bench on Monday, the 28th.
The following statement of this affair was published by Lord Cardigan:—“Lord Cardigan having been informed, upon good authority, that the editor of the Morning Chronicle, upon application being made to him for the name of the writer of a letter dated the 3rd of September 1840, signed ‘An Old Soldier,’ which appeared in that paper of the 4th of September, had stated it to come from Mr. Harvey Tuckett, Captain Douglas, at the request of Lord Cardigan, waited upon Mr. Tuckett, on the 11th instant, to demand satisfaction. Mr. Tuckett acknowledged himself the author, and requested time to go into the country, to consult Captain Wainwright as his friend. On Saturday, the 12th instant, Captain Douglas met Captain Wainwright, when the latter solicited in writing the grounds upon which Lord Cardigan demanded satisfaction of his friend Mr. Tuckett. Captain Douglas delivered, about half-past two, P.M., the following statement, viz.—
“‘Lord Cardigan yesterday authorised Captain Douglas to require of Mr. Tuckett to afford him satisfaction, in consequence of a letter, of which Mr. Tuckett has avowed himself the author, and which appeared in the Morning Chronicle of the 4th instant, signed ‘An Old Soldier;’ many parts of which contained matter entirely false, and the whole of which was slanderous, insulting, and calumnious.
“‘Cardigan.’”
“London, September 12”
Lord Cardigan, his second, and the second of Lieutenant Tuckett, were brought before the bench of magistrates at Wandsworth, and were all committed to take their trial at the ensuing sessions of the Central Criminal Court. The charge, as against the noble Lord, was for “shooting with a pistol at Lieutenant Harvey Tuckett, with intent to murder or do him some bodily harm;” and, as against Captain Douglas and Captain Wainwright, for aiding and abetting, in the character of seconds. Lord Cardigan was admitted to bail on his own recognizance of 2000l., and two sureties of 1000l. each; and the two other prisoners were required severally to give bail in the sum of 500l., and two sureties in 250l. each. The parties were then bound over to appear and prosecute the prisoners at the ensuing sessions.
Lieutenant Tuckett being sufficiently recovered to appear before the magistrates of the Wandsworth Court, a special session was this day held, for the purpose of entering into his examination, on the charge of shooting at the Earl of Cardigan, with intent to murder him. The former evidence having been read over, he was fully committed to take his trial upon the charge of felony, and ordered to enter into his own recognizance in the sum of 1000l., and two sureties in 500l. each.
At the session of the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Adolphus, in behalf of the Earl of Cardigan, this day begged leave to ask the judges on the bench a question, before their lordships proceeded to the business of the day. He found, he said, that on the list of causes to be tried, there appeared against the seventh, the name of James Thomas Brudenell, Earl of Cardigan. Now, Lord Cardigan, being a peer of the realm, could not be tried in that court. He therefore submitted, that the name of the noble Earl should be taken from the list. Mr. Justice Bosanquet and Mr. Justice Erskine agreed, that the course would be to remove the indictment, by a writ of certiorari, into the Court of the Lord High Steward, and that it would be very inconvenient to try the case of Captain Douglas before that of Lord Cardigan. It was finally arranged, that the recognizances of all the parties should be respited until the next session.
A little before eleven o’clock. Lord Denman, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, on account of indisposition, entered the House of Lords in his robes, preceded by the Sergeant with the mace, Black Rod carrying the Lord High Steward’s staff, and Garter with the sceptre, and took his seat on the woolsack as Lord Speaker. After prayers the roll of peers was called over, beginning with the junior Baron; after which, the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery delivered the commission to the Lord Speaker, who gave it the Deputy Clerk of the Crown in the Queen’s Bench to read; which he did, the peers standing. The commission authorised their lordships to proceed with the trial of James Thomas Earl of Cardigan, on an indictment found against him for felony, which had been removed before them by certiorari, and appointed Lord Denman Lord High Steward. After the writ of certiorari and the record of the indictment had been read, proclamation was made for the Yeoman Usher to bring the Earl of Cardigan to the bar. On approaching it, he made three reverences, and knelt till directed by the Lord High Steward to rise. He then made three reverences, one to the Lord High Steward, and one to the peers on each side: after which, he was conducted to the stool provided for him within the bar, near to his counsel. The Lord High Steward informed him, that he was charged with the offence of firing with a loaded pistol at Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, with intent to murder him; in a second count with firing with intent to maim and disable him; and in a third count with firing with intent to do him some grievous bodily harm. Being then arraigned by the Deputy Clerk of the Crown, and asked whether he was guilty of the said felony, and how he would be tried, the Earl answered, “By my Peers.” The Attorney-General and Mr. Waddington appeared as counsel for the prosecution; and Sir William Follett, Mr. sergeant Wrangham, and Mr. Adolphus, for the Earl of Cardigan. Mr. Waddington having opened the indictment.
The Attorney-General then addressed their lordships as follows:—“I have the honour to attend your lordships on this occasion as Attorney-General for her Majesty, to lay before you the circumstances of the case upon which you will be called to pronounce judgment, without any object or wish on my part, except that I may humbly assist your lordships in coming to a right conclusion upon it, according to its merits. An indictment has been found against a peer of the realm by a grand jury of the country, charging him with a felony, the punishment of which is transportation or imprisonment. That indictment has been removed before your lordships, at the request of the noble prisoner; and, I must say, most properly removed; for an inferior court had no jurisdiction to try him. The charge is, upon the face of it, of a most serious character, and it would not have been satisfactory if it had gone off without any inquiry. The policeman, however, who was bound over to prosecute, fulfilled his recognizances by appearing at the Central Criminal Court, and preferring the indictment.—It is possible, my Lords, that in the course of this trial, questions of great magnitude on the construction of acts of parliament, or respecting the privileges of the peerage, may arise, which it is of great importance to this House, to the Crown, and to the community, should be deliberately discussed. According to all the precedents that can be found, whenever a peer has been tried in parliament, the prosecution has been conducted by the law-officers of the Crown. Fortunately, we have no living memory on this subject. It is now sixty-four years since any proceeding of this sort has taken place; and I am rejoiced to think, that on the present occasion the charge against the noble prisoner at the bar does not imply any degree of moral turpitude, and that, if he should be found guilty, his conviction will reflect no discredit on the illustrious order to which he belongs. At the same time, my Lords, it clearly appears to me, that he has been guilty of infringing the statute law of the realm, which this and all other courts of justice are bound to respect and enforce. Your lordships are not sitting as a court of honour, or as a branch of the legislature: your lordships are sitting here as a court bound by the rules of law, and under a sanction as sacred as that of an oath.
“My Lords, the indictment against the Earl of Cardigan is framed upon an act of parliament which passed in the first year of the reign of her present Majesty. It charges the noble defendant with having shot at Captain Harvey Tuckett, with the several intents set forth in the indictment. I think I shall best discharge my duty to your lordships by presenting to you a brief history of the law on this subject. By the common law of England, personal violence, where death did not ensue from it, amounted to a mere misdemeanour; and, if the wounded party did not die within a year and a day, no felony was committed. The first act which created a felony where death did not ensue was the 5th of Henry IV. cap. 5. By that act certain personal injuries without death were made felonies, with benefit of clergy. Then came the Coventry Act, in the 22nd and 23rd of Charles II, whereby any person lying in wait for, and wounding another with intent to maim or disfigure, was guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy. Under both these acts no offence was committed unless a wound was inflicted; and it was not until the 9th of George I, commonly called the Black Act, that an attempt, where no wound was given, was made a felony. By that act it was enacted, that if any person should wilfully and maliciously shoot at any person in any dwelling-house or other place, he should be guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy, although no wound were inflicted: but it was determined upon that statute,—and in fairness to the noble prisoner it is my duty to remind your lordships of it,—that unless the case was one in which, if death had ensued, it would have amounted to murder, no offence was committed under the statute. That was determined in the case of the King and Gastineaux, which is reported in the first volume of Leach’s Crown Cases, page 417. In that case the law was thus laid down:—‘The offence charged in this indictment is described by the statute on which it is framed, in very few and very clear words, which are—That if any person or persons shall wilfully and maliciously shoot at any person in any dwelling-house or other place, he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy. The word ‘maliciously’ is made to constitute the very essence of this crime; no act of shooting, therefore, will amount, under this statute, to a capital offence, unless it be accompanied with such circumstances as, in construction of law, would have amounted to the crime of murder if death had ensued from such act. This proposition most clearly and unavoidably results from the legal interpretation of the word “maliciously,” as applied to this subject; for there is no species of homicide in which malice forms any ingredient but that of murder; and it follows that neither an accidental shooting, nor a shooting in the transport of passion, excited by such a degree of provocation as will reduce homicide to the offence of manslaughter, are within the meaning of the statute; for from both of these cases the law excludes every idea of malice.’ The law continued on this footing until an act was passed in the 43rd of George III, which is commonly called Lord Ellenborough’s Act. This act did not repeal the Black Act, but greatly extended its operation, and among other enactments contains this:—‘That if any person or persons shall wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully shoot at any of his Majesty’s subjects, or shall wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully present, point, or level any kind of loaded fire-arms at any of his Majesty’s subjects, and attempt, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, to discharge the same at or against his or their person or persons, or shall wilfully, maliciously, or unlawfully stab or cut any of his Majesty’s subjects, with intent in so doing, or by means thereof, to murder, or rob, or to maim, disfigure, or disable such his Majesty’s subject or subjects, or with intent to do some other grievous bodily harm to such his Majesty’s subject or subjects, shall be guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy.’ This act, however, has the following express proviso:—‘Provided always, that in case it shall appear on the trial of any person or persons indicted for the wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully shooting at any of his Majesty’s subjects, that if death had ensued therefrom the same would not in law have amounted to the crime of murder; that then and in every such case the person or persons so indicted shall be deemed and taken to be not guilty of the felonies whereof they shall be so indicted, but be thereof acquitted.’ Your lordships will observe, that by this act it is made a capital offence to shoot at, with intent to murder, or maim, disfigure, or do grievous bodily harm; but the offence came within the statute only when, if death should have ensued, it would have amounted to the crime of murder.
“Next came the statute of the 9th of George IV. cap. 31, which, I believe, is generally called Lord Lansdowne’s Act; that noble Lord having introduced it into parliament when he was Secretary of State for the Home Department. This is entitled ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the statutes relating to offences against the person.’ It repeals the Black Act and Lord Ellenborough’s Act, but it contains provisions similar to those of the latter. The eleventh section enacts, ‘That if any person unlawfully and maliciously shoot at any person, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or do some other grievous bodily harm to such person, he shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall suffer death as a felon.’ But this act contains the same proviso as was inserted in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, ‘That in case it shall appear on the trial of any person, that, if death had ensued therefrom, the same would not have amounted to the crime of murder, the person so indicted shall be acquitted of felony.’ Still it remained a capital offence to shoot at with intent to murder, or maim, or disfigure, or do bodily harm, although no wound was inflicted.
“Things remained on this footing until the act was passed on which the present indictment was framed. This act, which received the royal assent on the 17th of July 1837, is the 1st of Victoria, cap. 85, and is entitled, ‘An Act to amend the laws relating to offences against the person.’ The preamble recites that ‘it is expedient to amend so much of the act of the 9th of George IV. as relates to any person who shall unlawfully and maliciously shoot at any person, or who shall, by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person,’ &c.; and by the second and third section it enacts, ‘That whosoever shall stab, cut, or wound any person, or shall, by any means whatsoever, cause to any person any bodily injury dangerous to life, with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted, shall suffer death.’ Therefore, by this act, to shoot at a person and inflict a wound dangerous to life remains a capital offence; but the act of shooting, when no wound is inflicted, is no longer a capital offence, and remains a felony only, punishable with transportation or imprisonment. The fourth section enacts, ‘That whosoever unlawfully and maliciously shall shoot at any person, or shall, by drawing a trigger, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or do some other grievous bodily harm to such person, he shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable to be transported beyond the seas,’ &c. This act contains no such proviso as is to be found in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, and that of the 9th of George IV.; a circumstance which it is material your lordships should bear in mind, when you come to deliberate on your judgment with regard to the second and third counts of the indictment.
“My Lords, I am happy to say that the indictment contains no count on the capital charge: a wound was inflicted; but the prosecutor has very properly restricted the charge to firing at, with intent, without alleging that any wound dangerous to life was inflicted. The first count charges, that the Earl of Cardigan shot at Captain Tuckett with intent, in the language of the law, to commit the crime of murder. The second count charges the Earl of Cardigan with the same act, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable Captain Tuckett; and the third count charges his lordship with the same act, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm. It will be for your lordships to say whether, upon the facts which I shall lay before you, and which I am instructed to say can be clearly made out in evidence, each and every one of the counts must not be considered as fully established. The substance of the evidence in this case is, that on the 12th of September last the Earl of Cardigan fought a duel with pistols, on Wimbledon Common, with Captain Tuckett, and wounded him at the second exchange of shots. It will appear that, about five o’clock in the afternoon of that day, two carriages, coming in opposite directions, were seen to arrive on Wimbledon Common, and a party of gentlemen alighted from each. It was evident to those who observed what was going on, that a duel was in contemplation. The parties went to a part of the common between the road that leads to Lord Spencer’s park and a windmill. The seconds made the usual preparations: the principals, the Earl of Cardigan and Captain Tuckett, were placed at a distance of about twelve yards; they exchanged shots without effect; they received from their seconds each another pistol; they again fired, and Captain Tuckett was wounded by the Earl of Cardigan. Mr. Dann, who occupied the mill, his son, and Sir James Anderson, a surgeon, who was standing close by, went up immediately. The wound was examined, it bled freely; but fortunately—and I am sure no one rejoices at the circumstance more than the noble prisoner—it proved to be not of a dangerous nature. Mr. Dann, the miller, who was a constable, took the whole party into custody. The wound was again formally examined, and Sir James Anderson pressed that he might be set at liberty, and allowed to take Captain Tuckett to his house in London; which was immediately acceded to, upon the Captain’s promising to appear before the magistrates, when he was recovered. The miller retained the Earl of Cardigan, and his second, Captain Douglas, as well as Captain Wainwright, the second of Captain Tuckett. The Earl of Cardigan had still a pistol in his hand when the miller approached him; and two cases of pistols were on the ground, one of which bore the crest of the noble Earl, and was claimed by him as his property. The parties in custody were conducted before the magistrates at Wandsworth, when the Earl of Cardigan made use of these words:—‘I have fought a duel; I have hit my man, I believe not seriously.’ Then, pointing to Captain Douglas, he said, ‘This gentleman is also a prisoner, and my second.’ He was asked whether the person he had hit was Captain Reynolds; upon which he replied, ‘Do you think I would condescend to fight with one of my own officers?’ His lordship was compelled by the magistrates to enter into recognizances to appear when called upon; which he did from time to time, till at last the matter was carried to the Central Criminal Court. The witnesses I shall call before your lordships are the miller, his wife and son, and the policeman named Busain, who was at the station-house, and will speak to the declarations made by the Earl of Cardigan. I can offer no evidence respecting the origin of the quarrel. Captain Douglas is to take his trial for his share in the transaction: he, as your lordships will observe, is jointly indicted with the Earl of Cardigan. A bill was also preferred against Captain Tuckett and Captain Wainwright, but the grand jury had thrown it out. Those gentlemen, however, are still liable to be tried; and it would not be decorous to summon them before your lordships, to give evidence which might afterwards be turned against themselves when they would be on trial for their lives. I shall call Sir James Anderson, who has hitherto spoken fairly on the subject, and, I suppose, will now make no objection to state all that fell within his observation.
“Upon these facts it will be for your lordships to say whether all the counts of the indictment are not fully proved and supported. With respect to the first count, it is painful to use the language which it necessarily recites; but it will be for your lordships to say whether, in point of law, the noble prisoner at the bar did not shoot at Captain Tuckett with intent to commit the crime therein mentioned. I at once acquit the Earl of Cardigan of anything unfair in the conduct of this duel. Something has been said respecting the noble Earl’s pistols having rifle barrels, while those of Captain Tuckett had not such barrels. However that may have been, I have the most perfect conviction, that nothing but what was fair and honourable was intended; and that the Earl of Cardigan most probably imagined, when he carried his pistols to the field with him, that one of them would be directed against his own person. Nor do I suppose that there was any grudge, any personal animosity, any rancour or malignity, on the part of the noble Earl towards his antagonist. Whether the noble Earl gave or received the invitation to go out, I believe his only object was to preserve his reputation, and maintain his station in society as an officer and a gentleman. His lordship is in the army; he is Lieutenant-Colonel of the 11th Hussars; and no doubt he, on this occasion, only complied with what he considered to be necessary to be done, according to the usages of society. But, if death had ensued under these circumstances, it would have been a great calamity; and, although moralists of high name have excused and even defended the practice of duelling, your lordships must consider what, in this respect, is the law of England. There can be no doubt that, by the law of England, parties who go out deliberately to fight a duel, if death ensues, are guilty of murder. It will be my duty to state to your lordships a few of the leading authorities on this point. I will mention the highest authorities known to the law of England—Hale, Hawkins, Foster, and Blackstone. Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown, vol. i. page 453, says:—‘If A and B suddenly fall out, and they presently agree to fight in a field, and run and fetch their weapons, and go to the field and fight, and A kills B, this is not murder, but homicide; for it is but a continuance of the sudden falling out, and the blood was never cooled; but if there were deliberation, as that they went on the next day,—nay, though it was the same day, if there were such a competent distance of time that in common presumption they had time of deliberation,—then it is murder.’ In the first volume of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, c. 31, sec. 21, the law on this subject is thus laid down:—‘It seems agreed, that whenever two persons in cool blood meet and fight on a precedent quarrel, and one of them is killed, the other is guilty of murder, and cannot help himself by alleging that he was struck first by the deceased; or that he had often declined to meet him, and was prevailed upon to do it by his importunity; or that it was his intent only to vindicate his reputation; or that he meant not to kill, but only to disarm his adversary; for, since he deliberately engaged in an act highly unlawful, in defiance of the laws, he must, at his peril, abide the consequence thereof. And from hence it follows, that if two persons quarrel over-night, and appoint to fight next day, or quarrel in the morning and agree to fight in the afternoon, or such a considerable time after, by which, in common intendment, it must be presumed that the blood was cooled, and then they meet and fight, and one kills the other, he is guilty of murder. And whenever it appears, from the whole circumstances, that he who kills another on a sudden quarrel, was master of his temper at the time, he is guilty of murder; as if, after the quarrel, he fall into a discourse, and talks calmly thereon; or, perhaps, if he have so much consideration as to say that the place wherein the quarrel happens is not convenient for fighting, or that, if he should fight at present, he should have the disadvantage by reason of the height of his shoes.’ The last observation refers to Lord Morley’s case, where, though a case of manslaughter, it was a circumstance strongly pressed to show that the offence was one of a deeper dye. Sir Michael Foster, in his Discourse on Homicide, says:—‘Upon this principle, deliberate duelling, if death ensues, is, in the eye of the law, murder; because duels are generally founded on a feeling of revenge: and though a person should be drawn into a duel upon a motive not so criminal, but merely upon the punctilio of what the swordsmen call honour, that is no excuse; for those who deliberately seek the blood of another, act in defiance of all laws, human and divine. But if, on a sudden quarrel, they fight upon the spot, or if they presently fetch their weapons, and go into a field and fight, and one of them falleth, that is but manslaughter, because it may be presumed the blood never cooled. It will be otherwise if the parties appoint the next day to fight, or even the same day, at such an interval as that the passion may have subsided, or if, from any circumstances attending the case, it may reasonably be presumed that their judgment had controlled the first transports of passion before they engaged. The same rule will hold if, after a quarrel, the parties fall into other discourse or diversions, and continue so engaged as to afford reasonable time for cooling.’ Blackstone, in his fourth volume, page 199, thus writes, when describing and defining the crime of murder:—‘This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder; thinking it their duty, as gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their fellow-creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power, either divine or human, but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man; and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder on them, and on their seconds also.’
“My Lords, these are the highest authorities known to the law of England, and they are uniformly followed by the English judges. The most recent cases of this nature which have occurred within the last few years, are those of Sir John Jeffcott,[8] and the parties concerned in the death of Mr. Mirfin; and in these the doctrine I have stated to your lordships was laid down and acted upon strictly. Such, then, being the definition of murder constantly given from the bench on trials for life and death, are not your lordships to suppose that the legislature has made use of the word ‘murder’ in the same sense; and that when we find in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, in the 9th of Geo. IV. and in this of the 1st of Victoria, the expression ‘with intent to commit murder,’ it means with intent to do that which, if accomplished, would amount in law to the crime of murder? The legislature, and your lordships as part of it, must be taken to have well known what was the legal definition of murder, and to have used the expression, in a judicial act, in its legal sense. Then, my Lords, however painful the consideration may be, does it not necessarily follow, that the first count of the indictment is completely found? The circumstances clearly show that the Earl of Cardigan and Captain Tuckett met by appointment. The arrangements being completed, they fired twice; the Earl of Cardigan took deliberate aim, fired, and wounded his antagonist. He must be supposed to have intended that which he did. If, unfortunately, death had ensued, would not this have been a case of murder? The only supposition by which the case could be reduced to one of manslaughter would be, that the Earl of Cardigan and Captain Tuckett met casually on Wimbledon Common; that they suddenly quarreled; and that, whilst their blood was hot, they fought; but your lordships will hardly strain the facts so far as to say that this was a casual meeting, when you see that each party was accompanied by a second, and supplied with a brace of pistols, and that the whole affair was conducted according to the forms and solemnities observed when a deliberate duel is fought.—With respect to the second and third counts, I know not what defence can possibly be suggested; because, even if it had been a casual meeting, and if death had ensued under circumstances which would have amounted only to manslaughter, that would be no defence to the second and third counts. I presume to assert that, on the authority of a case which came before the fifteen judges of England, and which was decided; two most learned judges doubting on the occasion, but not dissenting from the decision. The two judges who doubted, were his Grace the Lord High Steward, who presides over your lordships’ proceedings on this occasion, and Mr. Justice Littledale. It would not become me to say anything of the learning and ability of the noble High Steward in his presence; but, with respect to Mr. Justice Littledale, I will say, that there never was a more learned or acute judge than he was, whose retirement from the bench the bar has lately witnessed with reluctance and regret. I therefore attach the greatest weight to any doubts proceeding from such a quarter; but the thirteen other judges entertained no doubt upon that occasion, and came to the conclusion, that, upon the fourth section of the act upon which the present indictment was framed, it is not necessary for a conviction, that if death ensued the offence should amount to murder. The case to which I refer is to be found in the second volume of Moody’s Crown Cases, page 40. It was a case tried before Mr. Baron Parke, on the Norfolk Spring Circuit, in 1838.”
The Lord High Steward.—“What is the name?”
The Attorney-General.—“The case is anonymous, the name of the prisoner not being given; but it is an authentic case, and the point in doubt is clearly set forth in the question submitted to the fifteen judges. I will read what is material to your lordships:—‘The opinion of the judges is requested by Mr. Baron Parke and Mr. Baron Bolland, upon two questions which arose in the Norfolk Spring circuit, 1838.’ The first question only is material. The case first recites the 9th George IV. sec. 11 and 12, and the preamble and enacting part of 1st Victoria; points out the circumstance that the latter act does not contain the same proviso as is found in those of Lords Ellenborough and Lansdowne; and then submits this question for the opinion of the judges:—‘Is it now a defence to an indictment for wounding with intent to maim, &c. that, if death had ensued, the offence would not have been murder, but manslaughter?’ Your lordships will observe, that shooting at, with intent to maim or disable, and stabbing with the same intent, are in the same category, and must be attended with all the same rules and incidents. This opinion will therefore have the same authority as if the question submitted by Barons Parke and Bolland had been whether, on an indictment for shooting at, with intent to disable, it would be a defence to show, that, if death had ensued, the offence would not have amounted to murder. The opinion of the judges was as follows:—‘At a meeting of the judges in Easter term, 1838, they all thought it to be now no defence to such an indictment, that, if death had ensued, the offence would not have been murder, but manslaughter; except the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Denman, and Mr. Justice Littledale.’ The Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Littledale, it will be observed, did not dissent, they only doubted; but the other thirteen judges seem clearly to hold, that the plea set forth does not now amount to any defence; and I apprehend that the judges probably reasoned in this manner,—the intention of the legislature being to make offences which before were capital, punishable only with transportation or imprisonment, the quality of the offence is not precisely the same as before; and that if a person maims another or disables him, or does him some grievous bodily harm, even though it were an unpremeditated act, arising out of a sudden scuffle, it should nevertheless be an offence under this act, which gives a discretionary power to the court before whom the offence is tried, either to transport for fifteen years, or to imprison for a single hour. The judges, doubtless, considering this discretionary power, and the omission of the proviso which was in the preceding acts,—seeing that the capital punishment was abolished,—came to the conclusion that the offence was committed, though, if death had ensued, it would not under the circumstances have amounted to the crime of murder. Looking to the authority of this case, I know not what defence can possibly be urged with respect to the second and third counts. I rejoice, my Lords, to think the noble prisoner will have an advantage upon this occasion, which has never before been enjoyed by any peer who has been tried at your lordships’ bar; an advantage which neither Lord Lovat, Lord Byron, Lord Ferrers, nor the Duchess of Kingston could claim. He will have the advantage of the assistance of my most able, ingenious, zealous, and learned friend. Sir William Follett, who will address your lordships in his behalf upon the facts and merits of the case. This privilege is secured to the noble prisoner under that most admirable law which your lordships passed a few years ago, by which, in all cases of felony, the party accused has the advantage of addressing, through his counsel, the tribunal which is to determine on his guilt or innocence. Notwithstanding, however, all the learning, ability, and zeal of my honourable and learned friend, I know not how he will be able to persuade your lordships to acquit his noble client on any one count of this indictment. My learned friend will not ask your lordships—and if he did, he would ask you in vain—to forget the law by which you are bound. My Lord, Captain Douglas stands on his trial before another tribunal, and his trial has been postponed by the judges, on the express ground that the same case is first to be tried by the highest criminal court known in the empire. Your lordships are to lay down the law by which all inferior courts are to be bound. I beg leave, on this subject, to read the words made use of at this bar by one of the most distinguished of my predecessors, who afterwards, for many years, presided with great dignity on the woolsack—I mean Lord Thurlow. When Lord Thurlow was Attorney-General, in addressing this House, in the case of the Duchess of Kingston, he made use of this language:—‘I do desire to press this upon your lordships as a universal maxim; no more dangerous idea can creep into the mind of a judge, than the imagination that he is wiser than the law. I confine this to no judge, whatever may be his denomination, but extend it to all; and, speaking at the bar of an English court of justice, I make sure of your lordships’ approbation when I comprise even your lordships, sitting in Westminster Hall. It is a grievous example to other judges. If your lordships assume this, sitting in judgment, why not the King’s Bench? Why not commissioners of oyer and terminer? If they do so, why not the quarter-sessions? Ingenious men may strain the law very far; but to pervert it, was to new-model it. The genius of our constitution says, judges have no such authority, nor shall presume to exercise it.’ I conclude, my Lords, with the respectful expression of my conviction, that your lordships’ judgment in this case, whatever it may be, will be according to the law and justice of the case; and that you will preserve the high reputation, in the exercise of your judicial functions, which has so long been enjoyed by your lordships and your ancestors.”—The honourable and learned gentleman then bowed to their lordships, and was about to withdraw, when he again turned to the House and said: “Will your lordships allow me to mention, that, on account of the sudden illness of my learned friend, the Solicitor-General, he is deprived of the honour of attending to-day before your lordships, as he had intended.”
Thomas Hunt Dann, the miller at Wimbledon, was then examined by Mr. Waddington, and deposed to the facts, as described by the Attorney-General. He said, he consented to allow the wounded gentleman to go home, on his giving him a card, with the address of the party upon it.—After which, the Attorney-General offered to give in as evidence the card which the witness received.—Sir William Follett objected to the reading of it as evidence; and, after considerable discussion, the Lord High Steward proposed to postpone the consideration of the objection.—The son and wife of the miller were then examined; after which, Sir James Anderson being sworn, the Lord High Steward said:—“With the permission of the House, I think it my duty to inform you, that, after the opening we have heard from the Attorney-General, you are not bound to answer any question which may tend to criminate yourself.” Sir James was then thus examined by the Attorney-General:—“Of what profession are you?”—“I am a physician.”—“Where do you live?”—“In New Burlington Street.”—“Are you acquainted with Captain Tuckett?”—“I must decline answering that question.”—“Were you on Wimbledon Common on the 12th of September?”—“I must decline answering that also.” (Laughter.)—“Were you on that day called on to attend any gentleman that was wounded?”—“I must decline that again.” (Laughter.)—“Can you tell where Captain Tuckett lives?”—“I must decline the question.”—“Has he a house in London?”—“I decline answering that question.” (Laughter.)—“Do you decline answering any question whatever respecting Captain Tuckett?”—“Any question that may criminate myself.”—“And you consider answering any question respecting Captain Tuckett may tend to criminate you?”—“Possibly it would.”—“And on that ground you decline?”—“I do.”
John Busain, an inspector of the metropolitan police, was examined by the Attorney-General. He deposed, that he was on duty when Lord Cardigan and Captain Douglas came to the station-house at Wandsworth, on the evening of the 12th of September.—“I bowed, and asked his business. He said he was a prisoner, he believed. ‘Indeed, sir,’ said I; ‘on what account?’ His lordship said, ‘I have been fighting a duel, and I have hit my man; but not seriously, I believe; slightly, merely a graze across the back.’ He then pointed over his shoulder and looked over, and said, ‘This gentleman also is a prisoner; my second. Captain Douglas.’ He presented me with his card, and I saw ‘The Earl of Cardigan, of the 11th Dragoons.’ I then alluded to the duel, and said, ‘Not with Captain Reynolds, I hope?’ and his lordship spurned the idea of fighting a duel with one of his own officers.” On being desired to repeat the words of the Earl of Cardigan, the witness said, “To the best of my recollection his lordship’s reply was—when I said I hoped it was not with Captain Reynolds, he stood up erect, and seemed to reject it, by his action, with the utmost disdain, and said, ‘Oh, no; do you suppose I would fight with one of my own officers?’ These were the words, to the best of my recollection.”
Charles William Walthew, chemist, residing at No. 29, in the Poultry, deposed, that Captain Tuckett occupied rooms in his house, and had carried on business there for fifteen months. His residence was at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. On being asked to tell what the Captain’s Christian names were, if he knew them, Sir William Follett objected to this course of examination. Their lordships, he said, observed the question put: his learned friend had asked where Captain Tuckett lived, and the answer was, No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road, for the purpose of identifying this Captain Tuckett, who carried on business in the Poultry, with a Captain Tuckett who lived in that place. The Lord High Steward agreed that there was no proof at present that that person lived at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. The examination was not proceeded with. The last witness called was Edward Septimus Codd. He said he knew Captain Tuckett, of the 11th Light Dragoons. His Christian name was Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett.
The Attorney-General said, he would now, with their lordships’ permission, propose to read the card, upon which their lordships had been pleased to say that they would consider whether it was admissible or not. On being asked by Lord Brougham whether that was his case, he replied, that he should first wish to know whether the card was to be received or rejected. Sir William Follett requested to see the card; and, having examined it, he said he did not think it necessary to object to its being read. It was accordingly delivered in and read. Upon one side was engraved “Captain Harvey Tuckett, 13, Hamilton Place, New Road;” and on the other was written “Captain H. Wainwright.” The Attorney-General said that that was the case on the part of the prosecution.
Sir William Follett.—“This being the case on the part of the prosecution, I venture to submit to your lordships, that there is no case which calls on the prisoner for an answer; and I think your lordships will see at once, that the counsel for the prosecution have failed in proving an essential part of their case. My Lords, I apprehend it is not necessary to cite any authority to show that the prosecutor is bound to prove the Christian and surname of the person against whom the alleged offence is committed; and that if he fails to prove either the Christian or the surname, he fails in his case. Now, there is no evidence whatever to show that the person against whom the shot was discharged was Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett. The evidence before your lordships would rather lead to a contrary presumption, if presumption could be acted upon in a case like this. I apprehend that positive evidence must be given to prove the identity of the party. The evidence is this,—the counsel for the prosecution have called a person named Codd, who is an army-agent, and who receives the half-pay of a Captain Tuckett, who was formerly in the 11th Dragoons, and is named Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett. Is there anything in this evidence to identify that Captain Tuckett with the person alleged to have been on Wimbledon Common on the 12th of September? Mr. Codd does not know where that Captain Tuckett lives; he never saw him except at his office in Fludyer Street, and at an insurance office. What is the rest of the evidence on this point? A person who lives in the Poultry says that a Captain Harvey Tuckett rents offices of him, but that he does not know where he lives. There is, therefore, not an iota, not a scintilla of evidence, to connect that Captain Tuckett with the gentleman supposed to be engaged in this transaction. I therefore submit that my learned friends have entirely failed in an essential part of the case for the prosecution. I would beg leave to refer your lordships to the case of the King v. Robinson, in Holt’s Reports, p. 595, in which it is laid down that it is essentially necessary to prove the Christian and surname of the party against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, and there is no proof of his Christian name in this case.”
The Attorney-General.—“My Lords, the question is, whether there is any evidence whatever to prove the fact of the Christian name of Captain Tuckett, the gentleman wounded. If there is the smallest scintilla of evidence on this point, the prosecution cannot be stopped on the ground taken up by my learned friend. We are now as if we were before a jury, and the learned judge who presided were called upon to direct an acquittal, upon the ground that there was no evidence for their consideration. I submit to your lordships, that there is abundant evidence to show that the name of the party wounded is Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett. How does the case stand? My learned friend withdrew all objection to the reading of the card. Well, then, the gentleman who was wounded by Lord Cardigan on the 12th of September, was Captain Harvey Tuckett. We have got, therefore, one of his names; and how does the case stand with regard to the rest? Am I obliged to call the clerk of the parish where he was baptised, in order to prove his baptismal register? Am I to call his father or his mother, or his godfathers or godmothers, to prove the name that was given to him at the baptismal font? I apprehend that such evidence is wholly unnecessary. I contend that, from the facts proved, there is abundant evidence to show the identity of the party wounded was Captain Harvey Tuckett. I suppose my learned friend will not deny that there is abundant evidence to show that the Captain Tuckett who was wounded lived at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. One of the witnesses called there three times; he asks each time for Captain Tuckett, and each time he is introduced to a gentleman bearing that name. Your lordships, therefore, will have no doubt that the Captain Tuckett who lives at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road, is the one who fought the duel with Lord Cardigan on the 12th of September, on Wimbledon Common. Now, my Lords, we go by steps. Is there any doubt that this Captain Tuckett is the Captain Tuckett who took the offices in the Poultry? At the time he did so, he gave a reference to No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road; and your lordships will therefore feel, no doubt, that there is evidence to show that the Captain Tuckett who took the place of business in the Poultry, was the same who lived in Hamilton Place. Then we have only one other stage, and that is to see whether the Captain Tuckett is the Captain Tuckett of whom Mr. Codd spoke, whose name he proved to be Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, and who had been an officer of the 11th Dragoons, of which regiment the Earl of Cardigan was, and still is, the colonel.”
Sir W. Follett.—“There is no proof of that whatever.”
The Attorney-General.—“It was so stated, and the witness was not cross-examined. Well, then, my Lords, a Captain Tuckett, whose name is Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, was proved by Mr. Codd to have been an officer of the 11th Hussars, Lord Cardigan’s regiment. He gave his card, with the 11th Hussars upon it.”
Sir W. Follett.—“No, no; you are quite mistaken.”
The Attorney-General.—“Well, he has one name at least corresponding with that of the Captain Tuckett who fought the duel on Wimbledon Common. Will your lordships require strict evidence of this gentleman’s Christian name—evidence that will amount to a demonstration? If there is evidence from which the inference may be fairly drawn, is not that sufficient? Well, then, here is a Captain Tuckett, whose name is proved to be Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, who has been in the 11th Hussars, from which he retired three or four years ago, and who receives his half-pay quarterly from Mr. Codd, his agent. May it not be fairly inferred from these circumstances, that this was the same Captain Tuckett who had offices in the Poultry, and who had fought a duel? Is there not evidence from which that identity may be fairly inferred? Is the prosecution to be stopped on the ground that there is no evidence whatever to go to a jury, or to your lordships, that this Captain Tuckett, whose name is proved to be Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, is the same who was the antagonist of the Earl of Cardigan on the 12th September? I believe there is no reasonable being, who, having heard this evidence out of a court of justice, would hesitate in drawing the inference. I apprehend, that what is sufficient to convince a reasonable man out of a court of justice ought to be sufficient to convince a judge or judges sitting in a court of justice, if the inference which is to be drawn can be drawn according to the rules of evidence. Now, according to the rules of evidence, would any person out of a court of justice doubt for a moment that this is the same individual who fought on the 12th of September? Well, then, if that inference would be drawn out of a court of justice, can it be said that in a court of justice there is not a scintilla of evidence from which such an inference can be drawn? This would be a most unsatisfactory conclusion of such a trial. Your lordships will weigh the evidence maturely and deliberately, and if you think that it is not sufficient to convict the noble Lord at the bar, of course you will acquit him, and will say, ‘Not guilty, upon my honour,’ but you will not stop the prosecution upon an objection like this.”
Sir W. Follett.—“My Lords, I will trouble your lordships with a very few words in reply to the observations of the Attorney-General. It may be a very unsatisfactory termination of this case after all the care and trouble which has been bestowed upon the prosecution, but I apprehend that this is not a case in which the noble lord at the bar will have to appeal to the honour or the conscience of his peers. The question is, whether sufficient evidence of identity has been given. My learned friend asks whether he is to call the clerk of the parish, or the father or mother of Captain Tuckett, to prove his Christian name. Now, that is not the objection, and the Attorney-General knows it perfectly well. What we object to is, that the counsel for the prosecution have called a person of the name of Codd, who has proved that he was acquainted with a Captain Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to connect that Captain Tuckett with the gentleman who fought the duel on Wimbledon Common. What is the proof? Does any judge who hears me feel himself prepared to say that the fact of a Captain Tuckett having been in a particular regiment is evidence of identity in this case? My learned friend says, that if a person out of the House may fairly draw such an inference, such an inference may properly be drawn within its walls. May I ask your lordships if that is the way in which trials of this nature are to be conducted? It is possible that your lordships sitting out of the House, after all that has been said and written, might draw such an inference as that which my learned friend wishes you to make; but you are now sitting here, as if you had never heard one word of the case before. You are now sitting as judges on the evidence adduced, and you are to say whether, because a Captain Tuckett who was formerly in the 11th Dragoons has the same Christian name, he is to be identified with the Captain Tuckett who fought on Wimbledon Common. There is no evidence to show that the Harvey Tuckett mentioned in the evidence of Codd, is the same Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett mentioned in this indictment. Mr. Codd does not know him to be the same; he never saw him either in the Poultry or at Hamilton Place. The whole of his evidence is this,—that he knows a Captain Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, that he was in the 11th Dragoons; and that he receives for him his half-pay. There may be two Harvey Tucketts; and since my learned friend, the Attorney-General, has referred to your lordships’ knowledge of what may have occurred out of doors, I would remind your lordships that in the very regiment commanded by the noble Lord at the bar there were two officers bearing the same surnames certainly, and I think the same Christian names. I submit to your lordships, that there is no evidence whatever to prove that Captain Harvey Tuckett mentioned in the evidence of Mr. Codd, is the same person as the Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett mentioned in this indictment; and, however unsatisfactory a termination it may be to the persons conducting the prosecution, I submit to your lordships that they have entirely failed in the proof of their identity.”
The Lord High Steward.—“I stated, when this objection was first taken, that I thought strangers ought to withdraw, and I am still of that opinion. The learned counsel, however, did not object to the argument of the Attorney-General, and therefore I did not think it right to interrupt him; but I wish to say, with a view to the general administration of criminal justice, that, when similar objections are taken in a criminal court, the counsel for the prosecution is at the utmost called upon to state what portion of evidence he believes to be sufficient to make out his case. I do not recollect any case in which an argument has been heard on the subject. I mention this as a point which may be of consequence in the practice of the courts of criminal law hereafter; and I now move your lordships that strangers be ordered to withdraw.”
The counsel and strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and the Earl of Cardigan retired in the custody of the Yeoman Usher. A protestation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, for himself and the rest of the Bishops, was delivered, desiring leave to be absent when judgment was given; leave was accordingly given. After which, the objection taken by Sir William Follett was taken into consideration. After the Lord High Steward had delivered his opinion thereupon, as an individual member of the court, and declared it to be his judgment that the Earl of Cardigan was entitled to be declared Not guilty, it was moved, that the House do now proceed to give their opinion whether the said Earl is guilty or not guilty of the charge in the indictment; which, being put, passed in the affirmative. Strangers being again admitted, after proclamation made for silence, the Lord High Steward, standing up, by a list called every peer by his name, beginning with the junior Baron, and asked him, “John Lord Keane, how says your lordship; is James Thomas Earl of Cardigan guilty of the felony whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty.” Whereupon each peer, upon his name being called, standing up in his place uncovered, and laying his right hand upon his breast, answered, “Not guilty, upon my honour:” the only exception being the Duke of Cleveland, who said, “Not guilty legally, upon my honour.” After all the peers had given their verdict, the Lord High Steward, standing up uncovered, declared his opinion to the same effect. The Earl of Cardigan being then brought to the bar, the Lord High Steward said, “James Thomas Earl of Cardigan, you have been indicted for a felony, for which you have been tried by your peers, and I have the satisfaction of informing you that their lordships have pronounced you not guilty, by an unanimous sentence. The number of their lordships who gave this verdict I have not precisely at this moment before me, or I should have been glad to have stated it to your lordship; but their lordships have unanimously said ‘Not guilty.’” The Earl of Cardigan having retired, proclamation was made for dissolving the commission; and the white staff being delivered to the Lord High Steward by the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, his Grace stood up uncovered, and, holding the staff in both hands, broke it in two, and declared the commission to be dissolved.