At nightfall on the 17th, while Grouchy was still at Gembloux, the whole of Blucher’s army (except two Divisions, the Ninth and Thirteenth, and the Reserve Cavalry of Thielemann’s Corps, which were posted as rear-guards to the Third and Fourth Corps) had reached Wavre and its neighbourhood. As explained in the third chapter, the Second and Third Corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Dyle, beyond Wavre, and the First and Fourth on the right bank. Pirch I. was between St Anne and Aisemont; Bulow was at Dion-le-Mont. The rear-guards were posted at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; these troops fell back next day as the French advanced. On Blucher’s left, patrols scoured the country towards Namur and Louvain; on his right they watched the Dyle and its approaches. Limale was held by a detachment from Zieten’s Corps to protect the right flank, and cavalry patrols rode to and fro over all the valley of the Dyle. The reserve ammunition columns with full supplies reached Wavre in the afternoon of the 17th, and thus all the batteries were replenished. It speaks well for the Prussian arrangements that these supplies should have reached Wavre at so important a moment; when on account of their unexpected retreat to Wavre, all previous arrangements had to be cancelled.
It was only when Blucher had thus made sure of his concentration and of the refilling of his waggons and limbers, that he replied to Wellington:—
“I shall not come with two corps only, but with my whole army; upon this understanding, however, that, should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th.”
Having reached Wavre in safety, the Prussians, though they had lost none of their courage, began to feel greater confidence. The defeat at Ligny had merely damped their ardour for a space; it had in nowise impaired their fighting value. The men were eager for a further trial with the French, and they were now more determined than before to regain prestige and humble the victors of Jena. Nevertheless, among the lesser troops and the newly raised corps from the Rhenish provinces, there had been many desertions. Most of these had once been French soldiers themselves, and knew the fear of Napoleon. To the number of 8000 these men “absented” themselves after the battle of Ligny, while some fled headlong to Liège. On the whole, considering the heterogeneous composition of Bluchers army, there was very little bad faith among the men.
About midnight on the 17th, a message from Wellington, through Muffling, reached Blucher. It ran:—
“The Anglo-Allied army is posted with its right upon Braine l’Alleud, its centre upon Mont St Jean, and its left upon La Haye; with the enemy in front. The Duke awaits the attack, but calculates on Prussian support.”
Gneisenau was very suspicious of the sincerity of Wellington’s intentions; he believed that the Duke would fall back at the last moment, and involve the Prussian army in a serious disaster. But Blucher had a greater idea of the honour of the words of generals, and finally overcame the reluctance of his Chief of the Staff. He thereupon replied to Wellington that—
“Bulow’s Corps will set off marching tomorrow at daybreak in your direction. It will be immediately followed by the Second Corps. The First and Third Corps will also hold themselves in readiness to proceed towards you. The exhaustion of the troops, part of whom have not yet arrived, does not allow of my commencing my movement earlier.”
An order to this effect was at once sent to Bulow at Dion-le-Mont:—
“You will, therefore, at daybreak, march with the Fourth Corps from Dion-le-Mont, through Wavre, in the direction of Chapelle St Lambert, on nearing which you will conceal your force as much as possible, in case the enemy should not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke of Wellington; but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack on the enemy’s right flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct support; the First and Third will also be held in readiness to move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a detachment in observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall back on Wavre. All the baggage train, and everything not actually required in the field, will be sent to Louvain.”
Now, why was Bulow’s Corps, which was at Dion-le-Mont, to lead the flank march, while Pirch I., Zieten, and Thielemann were all so much nearer to Chapelle St Lambert? Dion-le-Mont was 10 miles by road from Chapelle St Lambert; Aisemont, where Pirch was, was 8 miles; Bierges, Zieten’s headquarters, was only 4 miles; and La Bavette, Thielemann’s headquarters, 6 miles. It followed, then, that Pirch could not move until Bulow’s Corps had passed. Had Bluchers men been so exhausted, it would have saved most of them many miles of weary marching if Zieten and Thielemann had been ordered to Chapelle St Lambert, and Pirch and Bulow to move in nearer to Wavre. Bulow’s Corps had so far taken no part in the fighting, and it may have been Bluchers desire to give them opportunities, but for all that he knew Wellington might be in dire straits as soon as the battle began, so that he should not have hesitated to send off the nearest Corps.
Bulow commenced his march from Dion-le-Mont at daybreak, with Losthin’s Fifteenth Division as advanced guard. At 7 A.M. the Division reached Wavre, but the crossing of the bridges over the Dyle occupied a long time, and the passage through the town was hindered by a disastrous fire which broke out in the main street, through which the troops were marching. Great excitement prevailed, as it was feared that all the reserve ammunition waggons, parked in the town, were in danger. But the troops of the 14th Regiment of the line made great exertions, and were able to overcome the flames. But the Corps had been delayed for two valuable hours, and did not clear Wavre until 10 A.M. Meanwhile, parties of cavalry were busy reconnoitring towards Maransart and Couture. A detachment of Hussars rode out to patrol the valley of the Lasne, and another detachment to establish communication with Ledebur at Mont St Guibert. All the country between Plancenoit and the Dyle was carefully examined, and reports were sent in continually. The Prussian scouting work was very efficiently performed, and is still worthy of notice, even in these days. Every opportunity was taken of searching and feeling for the enemy. Not only were the Prussians accurately informed, but they hindered Napoleon’s communications with Grouchy, by occupying the roads their messengers might use, and compelling them to make very wide détours.
The roads being reported clear, Bulow’s Corps continued on its way, but progress was not rapid, owing to the state of the roads and the exhaustion of the troops. The advanced guard reached St Lambert at about 10.30 A.M., and the main body arrived about mid-day, but the rear-guard (Ryssel’s Division) did not arrive until three o’clock in the afternoon. At Maransart, the reconnoitring party found that the French had no detachments watching their flank, and the valley of the Lasne was clear.
The safe arrival of Bulow’s Corps at St Lambert, and the reports from his scouts, made Blucher resolve to hasten the march of the First and Second Corps. Pirch’s men had broken up their bivouacs at 5 A.M., but had had to wait until 12 noon to allow Bulow’s Corps to pass clear of Wavre. Zieten, on the left bank of the Dyle, marched for Ohain at noon. Blucher was uneasy about Grouchy’s strength, and his intentions. He was anxious to take his whole army towards Mont St Jean, but he was afraid of an attack on his rear and flank. He therefore determined to leave Thielemann’s Corps at Wavre to await Grouchy’s approach, and if the French were not in strength, Thielemann was to march to join the main body, leaving a small force in Wavre as a rear-guard. Blucher himself, leaving Gneisenau to arrange matters at Wavre, rode on to St Lambert at 11 A.M.
While Pirch’s Corps was passing through Wavre, Ledebur’s detachment retired on the town from Mont St Guibert, and the enemy’s cavalry appeared in sight. This was not a pleasant time for action, as the troops were thickly crowded in the defiles and lanes. Sohr’s Brigade of Cavalry, forming Pirch’s rear-guard, fell back, and the Seventh and Eighth Divisions were halted and faced round. The Eighth Division was posted in the wood of La Huzelle, with the Seventh in support. But the French did not press their advance, and at three o’clock, the Prussians retired across the Dyle. Pirch’s Corps then continued its march on St Lambert, leaving Thielemann in defence of Wavre.
As a flank march, Blucher’s movement to St Lambert was both a tactical and a strategical success; although under different circumstances, it would have been a failure. For Grouchy should never have allowed it to be carried out. By efficient reconnoitring, such as was carried out by the Prussian Hussars, Grouchy should have discovered the threatened movement early in the morning of the 18th, and have sent Maurin’s Cavalry Division, followed by Excelmans’ Cavalry and Gérard’s Corps, to Moustier and Ottignies. The cavalry could have reached the bridges there in time to threaten Blucher’s flank, and prevent him, if not from assisting Wellington with a part of his forces, at least from throwing his whole weight into the battle against Napoleon. And even at the end, Grouchy might, had he been too late across the Dyle to prevent Blucher from joining Wellington, have covered Napoleon’s retreat, and saved the Emperor’s army from the disastrous rout which befell it.
Thielemann had been ordered by Blucher to defend Wavre at all costs if the French appeared in force, but if there was no fear of a serious attack, to leave a small rear-guard there and follow the other three Corps.
As Excelmans’ Cavalry had shown so little activity in their attack on the outposts, Thielemann, towards three o’clock, decided to move his Corps towards Ohain, leaving only a small detachment to defend Wavre. In his judgment, if the French had meant to hinder the march towards Wellington, they would have appeared in force several hours ago. So slowly did they appear to be approaching, and in no great numbers, that Thielemann had every reason to suppose that a small force would be sufficient to cover his march, and that his main body would be of much greater assistance at St Lambert than at Wavre. His patrols had so far only seen the opposing cavalry and the head of Vandamme’s Corps; the whole strength of Grouchy’s force was as yet undiscovered. Accordingly, at about 3.30 P.M., the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Divisions, with the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, were ordered to begin marching towards Frischermont and Chapelle St Lambert; and a small detachment under Colonel Zeppelin, consisting of the two Fusilier battalions of the 30th Regiment of the Line and the 1st Kurmark Landwehr Regiment, belonging to the Ninth Division, was detailed to hold Wavre.
When, at 4 P.M., the head of Vandamme’s Corps appeared on the road from La Baraque leading towards the main bridge at Wavre, and Excelmans’ Cavalry was seen massing at Dion-le-Mont, one Division, the Twelfth (Stulpnagel’s) was already on the road to Rixensart, and the Eleventh was in the act of marching. The Ninth Division (Borcke’s), which had been posted near the farm of La Huzelle, fell back before Vandamme, but on reaching Wavre, it was found that the bridges had been barricaded, and no entry was possible. This left the Division in a situation of some danger, but Borcke led his men off to the right, to Basse Wavre, where there was another bridge, about half a mile down the stream. Here they crossed, and destroyed the bridge behind them. This was a most necessary step, because Excelmans’ Dragoons were scarcely a mile and a half away at Dion-le-Mont, and they might at any moment make a dash for Basse Wavre. The destruction of the bridge, too, saved Thielemann the task of defending it, and so scattering his troops, which were already none too numerous. To have left the bridge as a means of possible counter-attack was not desirable, nor even necessary, as a counter-attack by Limale or the Mill of Bierges would have had all the points in its favour.
Having no further orders, Borcke lined the left bank of the Dyle at Basse Wavre with picked marksmen from the 8th Regiment of the Line and the 1st Battalion of the 30th Regiment. These he placed under the command of Major Dittfurth, who had already distinguished himself during the close of the battle at Ligny. These skirmishers extended from Basse Wavre to Wavre, and took cover behind the trees lining the bank, and the neighbouring hedges and walls. Borcke continued his way to Wavre, and there detached one battalion (the 2nd of the 30th Regiment) and two squadrons of cavalry, to reinforce Colonel Zeppelin’s detachment, which, by this time, had loopholed all the buildings along the bank of the river, and were improvising defences. This done, Borcke resumed his march towards the main Prussian army!
General Borcke’s timely reinforcements to Zeppelin, and his prompt initiative in lining the Dyle at Basse Wavre with sharpshooters, afterwards proved to be of the greatest assistance. There was nothing but his own foresight to cause him to take these measures as he passed along, and it was fortunate for Thielemann that he did not march off without detaching these parties.
As soon as Vandamme’s Corps plainly showed signs of attacking, Thielemann immediately halted all his Divisions and began to dispose them for defence.
The position afforded favourable means for defence. The Dyle, ordinarily a shallow stream, but at this time in flood, owing to the heavy rains, ran along the front in a narrow valley. The town of Wavre, situated on the left bank, extended for about half a mile along the stream, and was connected with a few buildings which formed a kind of suburb on the opposite bank, by two stone bridges, one of which, the larger of the two, carried the main Brussels-Namur road. About three-quarters of a mile up-stream, on the left bank, was the Mill of Bierges, destined to be the scene of the fiercest fighting; here there was a wooden bridge, carrying a narrow country road, leading from the village of Bierges. At Limale, a village 2¼ miles up-stream from Wavre, and at Limelette, another village a mile further, there were also wooden bridges. On the right bank of the Dyle, there was a series of hills commanding the town, the river, and the bridges. On the left bank, a similar series of heights, rather steeper but not so high; and numerous hedges, lanes, and hollows on the left bank compensated for the greater “command” of the ground on the opposite side of the stream. All the buildings along the river were hastily loop-holed, and the two bridges at Wavre strongly barricaded. Basse Wavre included a few buildings about half a mile below Wavre; and houses stood on both banks. There were many lanes and cross-roads branching from the main Brussels road, on both sides of the stream, so that the movements of troops could be conducted generally under cover; but the state of the roads was so bad, that any movement at all was extremely difficult and slow. Grouchy’s side commanded Thielemann’s, but the latter’s was well covered, both from artillery and musket fire. Behind Wavre was a hill, which would afford good cover for reserves.
Thielemann saw that the enemy might attack at any or all of the points of passage: and he was therefore determined to be prepared for any emergency. In placing the troops, his one idea was to hold the line of the stream with skirmishers and sharpshooters in sufficient strength to prevent any sudden surprise, and to keep his supports together close at hand, to reinforce any threatened point or to guard his flanks. He placed the Tenth Division (Kampfen’s) behind Wavre, resting on a small wood near the Brussels road. The Twelfth Division (Stulpnagel’s), which had started on its way to St Lambert, was brought back to Bierges, and placed behind the village. The bridge at Bierges was barricaded, and the mill prepared for defence. One battery of Horse Artillery (No. 20) was placed in front of the village. The Eleventh Division (Luck’s) was placed astride the Brussels road, behind Wavre, and on the left of the Tenth Division.
The Ninth Division (Borcke’s) was to have been placed in rear of the Tenth and Eleventh Divisions as a general reserve, but Borcke, after detaching the troops to hold Basse Wavre and reinforce Zeppelin, had marched his Division off towards the main army, in the belief that the whole Corps had already marched. As Borcke had made a wide detour from Basse Wavre to La Bavette, there was some reason for his misjudgment. His march was not discovered in time; so Thielemann’s force was reduced by six battalions and one battery of artillery.
Hobe’s Cavalry Division (Marwitz’s and Lottum’s Brigades) was posted with one battery of Horse Artillery (No. 18) near La Bavette: a central position, whence it might be directed on any part of the field. The remainder of the artillery was distributed along the front. The bank of the Dyle and the riverside buildings in Wavre were occupied by Light troops and sharpshooters from the different regiments. Two more companies of infantry were sent to Basse Wavre, under Major Bornstaedt, to reinforce the detachment there. Three battalions and three squadrons under Stengel, from Zieten’s Corps, were sent back to guard the bridge at Limale.
In point of numbers, Thielemann’s troops were less than half as strong as those of Grouchy; and it was evident that the coming fight was to be of the fiercest description. Thielemann’s men were in fine trim and eager for the enemy’s attack.
THE BATTLE OF WAVRE.
Grouchy’s attack at Daybreak, June 19th.
William Stanford & Company, Ltd., The Oxford Geographical Institute.
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.
Vandamme’s advanced guard, between three and four o’clock, had driven Borcke’s Division back on Wavre, and Vandamme, eager to burst into activity after the irritable delays on the march, proceeded to attack without waiting for Gérard, or even for Grouchy’s orders. He was afraid that night would come on and allow the Prussians to escape, as they had done from Sombreffe. He only saw in front of him a force waiting to be attacked; he had no thoughts for the general situation. He was a rough-and-ready soldier, and he thought he saw his chance of beating the Prussians single-handed. He longed for the marshal’s bâton; he was jealous, too, of Gérard.
At this time, Excelmans was at Dion-le-Mont with his cavalry, slightly in rear of Vandamme. Gérard was nearing La Baraque, some 4 miles in rear. Pajol, with his cavalry and Teste’s Division, had just reached Tourinnes.
Before Grouchy could reach Vandamme, the latter had launched the whole of his Tenth Division (Habert’s), consisting of the 22nd, 34th, 70th and 88th Regiments of the Line, against the village opposite Wavre. The French, in heavy columns, supported by a furious cannonade from two batteries of twelve-pounders placed to the right of the Brussels road, cleared the few Prussian sharpshooters from the buildings, and pressed on to the main bridge. But here they were met with a terrible fire from their front and on their flanks, from the sharpshooters lining the hedges and buildings on the opposite bank. The Prussian batteries played fiercely on their columns, and on the whole of the ground behind them, where their own guns were placed. In a few minutes, General Habert and 600 men were down. Attempts to force the barricaded bridge were beaten back with frightful loss, and the Division was placed in a very serious position. If they retreated, they came under the heavy fire of the Prussian batteries on the opposite heights; if they remained where they stood, the enemy’s sharpshooters would annihilate them; to advance was impossible. Gradually, they found shelter, company by company, under the walls of the buildings along the bank, whence they had just driven the Prussians. Vandamme was now deeply committed to the fight.
Grouchy, who had by this time arrived on the scene, unaware of the strength of the Prussians at Wavre, and unaware, too, of Blucher’s march on St Lambert, made arrangements to support Vandamme’s attack by two other attacks on either flank. For this purpose, he ordered Excelmans to move his cavalry from Dion-le-Mont to the front of Basse Wavre, and a battalion under Lefol to make an attempt to cross at the Mill of Bierges.
It was now five o’clock, and a message arrived from Napoleon, sent at 1.30 P.M., saying that Bulow’s Corps had just been seen at St Lambert, and ordering Grouchy to lose no time in moving to join the Emperor’s right, when he would crush Bulow in flank. Grouchy, knowing that he could not now disengage Vandamme, sent orders to Pajol to hasten his march on Limale, and ordered Gérard to lead the Fourth Corps towards that village at once. He conceived the idea of assaulting and carrying Wavre with Vandamme’s Corps, aided afterwards by Excelmans’ Cavalry, while he sent the remainder of his army on Chapelle St Lambert viâ Limale. This was a skilful project, and the best under the circumstances, no doubt; for the movement on Limale would have had the double effect of turning Thielemann’s left flank, while it promised to bring a strong reinforcement on Napoleon’s right. But it was now too late. The opportunity had passed much earlier in the day.
Hulot’s Division, of Gérard’s Corps, had now reached the scene of Vandamme’s efforts, and Grouchy ordered it to move to the left and force a passage at the Mill of Bierges. Lefol’s battalion had made several attempts to cross the bridges there, but had each time been beaten back by the Prussian sharpshooters and the batteries in front of Bierges village. Some guns were sent to aid Lefol and endeavour to silence the Prussian artillery opposite, but they were themselves outnumbered and silenced. On Hulot’s arrival, a fresh battalion was sent to relieve Lefol’s detachment, and the whole Division followed. By this time, both banks of the Dyle, from Bierges to Basse Wavre, were lined with skirmishers and sharpshooters, pouring a terrific fire into each other. Hulot’s Division had great difficulty in moving through the swamps and mud to the bridge at Bierges, and suffered severely from the Prussian batteries. The battalion which relieved Lefol’s began at once to make a fresh attempt to force the bridge, but was beaten off with loss.
Grouchy, impatient and fretful, rode off to meet the remainder of the Fourth Corps and Pajol’s force, still some distance behind on the Namur-Brussels road. Ordering Pajol to make all haste for Limale, he returned to the field, where he found that matters had made no progress. Infuriated by the repeated failures to carry the bridge and Mill of Bierges, he himself led a fresh attack with Hulot’s men, but nothing could overcome the fire of the Prussians. Gérard fell wounded and was carried off the field.
Finding his attacks on Bierges and Wavre unsuccessful, Grouchy left Vandamme and Excelmans to carry on the fight, while he himself led the remainder of Gérard’s Corps to Limale. Pajol had arrived in front of the Limale bridge shortly before dark, with Teste’s Division and his own cavalry. Stengel, who held Limale with three battalions and three squadrons, had omitted to barricade the bridge, and when Pajol perceived this he sent a regiment of Hussars at full speed on the bridge, and, charging four abreast only, these horsemen burst through the Prussians posted at the farther end. The passage was forced and Teste’s Division was sent across; and Stengel, finding himself very much outnumbered, abandoned Limale and took up a position on the heights above the village. Hearing of Stengel’s difficulties, Thielemann sent the Twelfth Division (Stulpnagel’s) and Hobe’s Cavalry to reinforce him. Thielemann saw now that the real point of crossing was Limale, and not Bierges or Basse Wavre, and he moved all the troops he could spare towards his right. Four battalions of the Tenth Division took up Stulpnagel’s former position, and three battalions of the Twelfth Division were left to defend Bierges; the remainder marched to join Stengel.
It was now dark, but the battle continued with vigour. Grouchy posted his battalions in front of Limale, and, considering the darkness of the night, it is surprising how he managed to place them without confusion. Stengel’s men kept up a harassing fire on his columns as they wound their way through the muddy lanes from the village to the height above the Dyle and deployed to receive Stulpnagel’s attack. Pajol moved his cavalry to the French left flank.
Stulpnagel, his Division now reduced to six battalions, left one battalion (the Fusilier battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr Regiment) and one battery in a copse north of Bierges, as a reserve, and joined Stengel, who was now on his right, with his remaining five battalions. His orders were to endeavour to regain Limale, and drive the French across the Dyle. He formed his attack with two battalions in first line, with three in support. His two squadrons were sent to reinforce Stengel, and the rest of the cavalry posted in rear, to be in readiness for a flank movement. The darkness was so great that little cohesion was possible between the units, and it is not surprising that the attack fell to pieces. The formation of the ground was unknown, and the little folds and features which make or mar a night attack were plentiful: and unfortunately for the Prussians, they marred their plans. As the front line was advancing in fair order, a hollow lane was suddenly met with, and caused great confusion, being unexpected; but worse than this, the opposite side was lined with French sharpshooters, who poured volleys across into the disordered Prussians. There was, for a time, no attempt to seek cover, and the losses from the fire of the French opposite were heavy, in spite of the darkness. The second line, which was to have supported the first, moved too far to its left, and became itself a front line, engaging more French skirmishers. Stengel, on the right, was charged by cavalry and compelled to retire.
Stulpnagel perceived that little good could come of an attack the successive steps of which had merged into a confused line, and resolved to withdraw to the shelter of the wood behind Point-du-Jour, leaving a line of outposts to watch the front edge. The cavalry took post behind the infantry; and the French fearing to venture through the uncertainties of the night, the fighting on this side ceased.
Meanwhile, on the Prussian left, before Wavre and the Mill of Bierges, the fighting went on most vigorously. The darkness did not prevent the fury of the fight; it only seemed to add to the grimness of it. The whole of Vandamme’s Corps was now engaged, and time after time the French rushed at the barricades on the bridges. Thirteen separate assaults were beaten back by the Prussians, and no less than five times the defenders, in pursuing the routed enemy, attacked and drove them from the houses on the far side of the Dyle. Once, the French had possession of the main bridge, and had even occupied some of the neighbouring buildings, but the Prussian reserves were hurried up, and these drove out the French. Each time there seemed a chance of the enemy obtaining a footing on the left bank, the Prussian reserves, judiciously posted near at hand among the side-streets and dwellings, rushed out and overwhelmed the intruders. Four battalions defended Wavre against the whole of Vandamme’s Corps. But while the attackers were exposed at each attempt to cross the bridges, the defenders were secure behind their loop-holed walls. Only a great superiority of artillery fire, to prepare the way for the assault, and to destroy some of the nearer walls, could have made a crossing successful. A few daring Sappers might have brought up bags of powder to blow in the barricades; they could only have done so by sacrificing themselves, but heroes and brave men were not wanting. Shortage of powder, however, explains the fact that no such attempt was made.
At Basse Wavre, lower down the stream, the attack had not been pressed. Excelmans’ Cavalry had been ordered to make a demonstration on that flank, but cavalry cannot cross a stream without bridge or ford. Only one French battalion, supported by a single gun and two squadrons, had shown themselves, and these were of no use without a bridge to carry them across.
The only advantage which Grouchy had obtained was on his left, which had rolled back the Prussian right, but had in no way destroyed it. Firing ceased at about 11 P.M., and great preparations were made on both sides for a renewal of the fight at daybreak. But Grouchy was well pleased with his success on the left, since he assumed that he had at least cut off half of the Prussian army. It was now too late for him to be of assistance to Napoleon, and the din of the distant battle had long ago died out. But Grouchy took no steps to ascertain how matters stood with the Emperor. He merely sent orders to Vandamme to bring his Corps across the Dyle at Limale, as he intended making an end of the Prussian right flank, and marching to join Napoleon before Brussels, thinking, for a reason which cannot be explained, that the allies had been beaten. Perhaps it was his confident belief in the invincibility of the Emperor; but yet again he made no efforts to gain information or to confirm his own views. Teste’s Division came up during the night, and, crossing the Dyle at Limale, took post on the right flank of Gérard’s Corps, between Limale and Bierges, and resting its own right dank on the Dyle.
Thielemann, on the other hand, had sent an officer’s patrol to reconnoitre on his right, and to ascertain what had occurred at Mont St Jean. This officer returned during the night with the news of Napoleon’s rout, and consequently Thielemann expected Grouchy, who, he supposed, was fully acquainted with the situation, to retreat early next morning, if not during the night. But two incidents occurred which sadly reduced his numbers and which caused a rearrangement of his troops. Stengel, for a reason never yet explained, calmly marched off from Stulpnagel’s right at daybreak, to St Lambert, there to join his own Corps, Zieten’s. Possibly he had personal views of the situation, and considered the battle over! It is uncharitable to suppose that he had feelings against Thielemann or Stulpnagel. But in either or any case, his conduct was most blameworthy and most unsoldierlike. His departure (which must have been noticed before his movement had gone far, and therefore could have been prevented) reduced Thielemann’s force by three battalions and three squadrons; and this at a moment when every man was of importance. But even another inexplicable movement was made by Colonel Ledebur, who, with his detachment of five squadrons and two guns of the Horse Artillery, marched to St Lambert during Grouchy’s attack, bivouacked there for the night, and then moved off to join the Fourth Corps on the 19th. These two detachments were thus of no use whatever to Thielemann, and their extraordinary action must have caused him considerable anxiety, since it might have appeared as desertion. But Thielemann was firm in his belief that Grouchy would retreat, and when, at daybreak on June 19, he saw French troops still in their positions, he assumed that they were merely acting as a rear-guard to cover the general retirement. He therefore ordered Colonel Marwitz, with the 8th Uhlans and two squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, to attack Grouchy’s left flank above Limale, while Hobe, with the 5th and 7th Uhlans, was to advance in support on Marwitz’s left. To replace Stengel’s detachment, the Twelfth Division was extended still further to its right, weakening the whole of its front line, and leaving only three battalions in reserve in the wood near Point-du-Jour. On Stulpnagel’s left, six battalions of the Tenth Division held the line to Bierges and the Dyle. In support, there were three battalions of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr Regiment, from the Eleventh Division, while the 4th Kurmark Landwehr (two battalions) with two squadrons, were posted behind Wavre as a general reserve. Two battalions from the Twelfth Division were posted to hold the Mill of Bierges. The remainder of Thielemann’s force was extended along the Dyle in Wavre and Basse Wavre; but little fighting on this front was now expected.
To support Marwitz’s attack, two batteries (one horse and one foot) opened fire on the French columns massed on the plateau above Limale, but the enemy’s artillery, which was greatly superior, replied fiercely and soon silenced the Prussian guns, five of which were disabled.
Grouchy, who was still ignorant of Napoleon’s defeat, prepared an attack on his part. His numbers vastly exceeded Thielemann’s thin forces, and counted Gérard’s Corps (three divisions), Teste’s Division and Pajol’s Cavalry. (Vandamme had not obeyed Grouchy’s orders of the previous night, to march with his Corps to Limale.) Grouchy now formed three Divisions—Teste’s, Vichery’s and Pecheux’s—in first line, divided into three columns of attack. Teste’s Division formed the right column, and was to attack Bierges and the mill; Vichery’s Division in the centre, to attack the Prussian centre; and Pecheux’s Division against Stulpnagel’s right flank. Each column was provided with a battery of artillery, escorted and preceded by skirmishers. The remaining division—Hulot’s—was in reserve behind the centre column. Pajol’s Cavalry was to turn the Prussian right flank, which rested on the wood of Rixensart. Twenty-eight French against ten Prussian battalions.
Thielemann perceived the coming attack, and reinforced his line with one battalion, which he posted on his left, and which was all he could spare. The French columns were too heavy for the Prussians, who were hopelessly outnumbered. The Twelfth Division gave way, and the French took the wood of Rixensart. Stulpnagel fell back on his supports—the three battalions of the Eleventh Division and two batteries—and took up a new position behind the wood. Teste’s attack on Bierges was stoutly opposed by the two battalions posted there, and four battalions of the Tenth Division were brought up in support. On the Prussian extreme right, the cavalry brigades of Marwitz and Lottum—in all, twelve squadrons—occupied Chambre and secured the flank.
At 8 A.M. definite news arrived of the French rout at Waterloo, and the Prussians were aroused to renew their efforts. The tidings had a great effect on the spirits of the men, and they rushed to the attack with great vigour, recapturing the wood of Rixensart. This counter-stroke deceived Grouchy, who at first believed that the Prussians had been reinforced; but Stulpnagel’s effort was short-lived, and could not be pushed further, for want of supports. Consequently, Grouchy in his turn ordered a fresh attack, and the Prussians were again driven out of the wood. At 9 A.M. Bierges fell into the hands of Teste, who had had a very hard task to drive out the two gallant battalions defending the place. The capture of this point was a serious blow, for the French had now broken through Thielemann’s defence at the angle; and it was no longer possible for the Prussians to resist on both wings. The centre having been broken, and the right seriously threatened by overwhelming numbers, Thielemann could not but withdraw.
Vandamme had remained in front of Wavre, but had not attacked, although the defence had been greatly weakened by detachments for the right.
At 10 A.M. Thielemann ordered the retreat. He knew that Grouchy must himself retreat sooner or later, but to hold on to Wavre too long would mean Thielemann’s own destruction. By retreating, he would gain time, and when the opportunity occurred, he would again advance, and possibly convert Grouchy’s retirement into a rout. Under the protection of Marwitz’s Cavalry—the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and 6th Landwehr Cavalry with three batteries of horse artillery—the infantry retired, and Zeppelin evacuated Wavre. The rear-guard, posting itself on the Brussels road, threatened the French left whenever an opportunity occurred.
As soon as Zeppelin withdrew from Wavre, Vandamme pushed his men across the Dyle, both at Bierges and Wavre, and advanced up the Brussels road. In rear of Wavre, in a hollow behind the town, two battalions of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr Regiment were posted, and these were compelled to fall back. But one of the battalions, reaching a small wood near La Bavette, re-formed, and attacked and drove back a squadron of French cavalry which was pursuing. The other battalion overthrew a French battalion, and then continued its retreat. Marwitz’s Cavalry repulsed the squadrons at the head of Vandamme’s columns, which were now advancing towards La Bavette by the main road and by a parallel lane on the left. The Prussian infantry retreated towards Louvain, through the villages of St Achtenrode and Ottenburg; but behind St Achtenrode, Thielemann halted and took up a defensive position. To retreat too far would hinder his plan of turning back again to attack Grouchy when he retired. The French, too, had halted about La Bavette, having at this moment heard definite news of Napoleon’s disaster. No cavalry pursued the Prussians, for in the close and intersected country beyond La Bavette it was impossible for cavalry to manœuvre, and only with difficulty could it be traversed by infantry.
As to Borcke in the meantime, his Division had reached Couture at 8 P.M. on the previous evening, and a report was sent to Blucher. A reply was returned that Borcke was to remain at Couture and await further orders. But early next morning, hearing from Stengel, who had passed through St Lambert, that the French were following him, Borcke extended two of his battalions from St Robert to Rixensart, with the remaining four in reserve. He had an idea that the French were advancing in his direction, but had he only known the true position of Grouchy’s troops, he might have been so bold as to attack them in rear. He certainly would have caused a panic among Grouchy’s men, who would naturally suppose that Blucher was returning with the main body. But, seeing three French cavalry regiments detached to watch him, Borcke held back, and positively took no action, although the Prussians still held Wavre. What a diversion he might have made!
In the fighting of the 18th and 19th, Thielemann lost 2,500 men; the French about 2,200; and the results were very creditable to the Prussians. Attacked by more than double his numbers, and with very little time to prepare his defence, Thielemann had held off the French during all the critical hours of the afternoon and evening of the 18th. He had successfully occupied the whole of Grouchy’s force during the time when the latter might still have been of use to Napoleon. Without knowing it, Grouchy had been almost surrounded, but Borcke’s Division took no advantage of its position. How near to, and yet how far from, succouring Napoleon was Grouchy! A little fore-thought, more energy, and a bolder initiative on Grouchy’s part would have overcome the opposition of the elements, and rendered Napoleon’s great stroke a success.
As an example of a defence of a river and village, the battle of Wavre was a brilliant exploit. The courage on both sides was of the highest order. Thielemann held Wavre as long as he could, and only withdrew when he saw that his opportunity would occur the moment Grouchy learned the result of Waterloo. To stay in his position, after the French had taken Bierges, would have been to court disaster, but to retreat too soon would have ruined his chances of rallying again to the attack. In the previous night’s attacks, the Prussians had shown great courage and tenacity, and the French were no less courageous and determined; their movements in the darkness were carried out with surprising skill, and reflect highly on their management and control. Vandamme’s repeated efforts against the bridges might have been avoided, and every available man brought across the Dyle at Limale, leaving only enough men to watch Zeppelin in and around Wavre itself.
MAP ILLUSTRATING GROUCHY’S RETREAT FROM NAMUR, JUNE 20-28, 1815.
William Stanford & Company, Ltd., The Oxford Geographical Institute.
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.
Grouchy first heard the news of Napoleon’s defeat at half-past ten on the morning of the 19th, just as he was preparing to pursue Thielemann and push his infantry towards Brussels. The news was brought by a staff officer, riding up with the most dejected appearance. He could scarcely get his words out, and Grouchy seemed at first to believe that the fellow was mad. But at last there was no doubt about it: the French had been severely beaten. What was Grouchy to do? Should he continue his own operations, as if nothing had happened, and keep his men in ignorance, whereby he might yet cover Napoleon’s retreat? Or should he retreat himself before he was hemmed in?
At first he thought of marching against Blucher’s rear, but very little reflection showed him that Thielemann would in the meantime attack his rear, and his 30,000 men would be caught between two forces. Then Vandamme, always impetuous and for action, proposed that they should march straight on Brussels, set free the French prisoners there, and retire by Enghien and Ath to Lille. This was a daring but futile plan.
Of what use would such a movement have been, even had it been successfully carried out? To march boldly completely round the rear of the allied armies, liberate a few prisoners, and then march off in the opposite direction, would have been to waste the only formed body left of all Napoleon’s army. And what would Thielemann do in the meantime? There was now no hope of winning over Brussels or the Dutch-Belgians, otherwise there would have been some weight in Vandamme’s extraordinary proposal. But Grouchy counselled otherwise. He knew that he already ran the risk of being attacked in flank, most probably in rear, by a portion of Blucher’s army, while Thielemann would certainly advance again as soon as the retreat began. He therefore decided to retreat on Namur, where he would act further according to circumstances. It was useless as well as dangerous to direct his retreat towards the line taken by the remnants of Napoleon’s host, where all would be confusion; it was better by far to retreat on his own line and endeavour to preserve his troops intact as long as possible. At Namur, he might do great things yet; for Namur had not, like Charleroi, witnessed first the triumph and then the downfall of Napoleon’s last plans.
Even at this moment, Grouchy was already in danger of being attacked in rear. For Pirch I. had received orders on the night of the 18th to march towards Namur with his Corps (the Second) and cut off Grouchy from the Sambre; and by the time that Grouchy heard of the rout, he had reached Mellery, on the Tilly-Mont St Guibert road, and 8 miles in Grouchy’s rear. But his troops were exhausted, and his Divisions scattered—the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth Divisions, twenty-four squadrons of his reserve cavalry, and the reserve artillery, were with him; but the Fifth Division and the rest of his cavalry were pursuing the French on the Charleroi road. So Pirch ordered a halt at Mellery.
Blucher’s main body was pursuing the French by Charleroi in the direction of Avesnes and Laon. The cavalry of the First and Fourth Corps, also twelve squadrons belonging to the Second Corps, were at this time following up the fugitives between Frasnes and Gosselies, while the Prussian infantry followed as rapidly as their exhaustion would allow. Bulow’s Corps had pursued over-night as far as Genappe, where it bivouacked, and then resumed its march at daybreak, sending out cavalry—the 8th Prussian Hussars, followed by two other regiments—to watch Grouchy’s movements on the left. The Fourth Corps was leading the Prussian main body in the pursuit. The First Corps followed, and likewise sent out cavalry to watch the left flank for signs of Grouchy.
Meanwhile, Grouchy began his retreat. His troops had reached the line La Bavette-Rosieren, in their pursuit of Thielemann, and now Excelmans’ Cavalry was sent off with orders to make all speed to Namur and secure the bridges over the Sambre at that place. Excelmans reached Namur at 4.30 P.M., a little more than five hours to cover 30 miles by devious lanes and byways in a terrible condition after the rains.
Gérard’s Corps, preceded by the Seventh Cavalry Division (six squadrons under Vallin, who had taken Maurin’s place), re-crossed the Dyle by the bridge at Limale, and moved by a narrow lane to the main Namur-Brussels road. Vandamme’s Corps withdrew from La Bavette, and marched through Wavre, Dion-le-Mont, Chaumont, Tourinnes, Sart à Walhain, Grand Leez, St Denis to Temploux on the Namur-Nivelles road, where it arrived at 11 P.M. and there bivouacked. Gérard’s Corps had reached Temploux an hour earlier.
Pajol, in command of the rear-guard, which was composed of the Fourth Cavalry Division—twelve squadrons, under Baron Soult—and Teste’s Infantry Division, demonstrated against Thielemann to keep him occupied until Wavre had been cleared, and then retreated by Corbaix, Walhain, Sauvenière, to Gembloux, where he bivouacked for the night.
As has been seen, Pirch was at Mellery with the Second Corps during the 19th from 11 A.M.; but he did not wish to risk attacking Grouchy without news of Thielemann. Grouchy’s army was still in good order and capable of stout fighting, but Pirch might have assisted the general situation by at least threatening Gérard’s right flank as he retreated. It is not likely that Grouchy would have checked his retreat on Namur, even if Pirch had shown himself, but Gérard would have been obliged to face round, and might possibly have been cut off; or if Grouchy had halted to confront Pirch, Thielemann would have had a good opportunity to attack him in flank.
Thielemann only heard of the French retreat towards 6 P.M. on the 19th, and his intelligence came through General Borcke, who discovered Grouchy’s movement, from St Lambert. Pajol had a rear-guard still in front of Thielemann, and as the latter’s troops were tired with their recent exertions, the Prussians postponed their pursuit until the next day, the 20th, when Borcke was ordered to march at daybreak with the Ninth Division from St Lambert, across the Dyle, and towards Namur.
At daybreak on the 20th, Grouchy’s rear-guard left Gembloux and marched on Namur by St Denis and La Falize. His infantry left Temploux about 9 A.M. Gérard’s Corps was intended to lead, Vandamme’s Corps covering the retreat of the Fourth, but Vandamme upset the arrangements by betaking himself over-night to Namur, leaving no instructions behind him for his Divisional generals. Consequently, the Divisions of the Third Corps moved off by themselves, early in the morning, and Gérard’s Corps, which was carrying the wounded with it, was left uncovered. A short distance beyond Temploux, the column was attacked by Prussian cavalry which had been sent off in pursuit by Thielemann at daybreak that morning. And at the same time, more cavalry were seen coming against the rear, along the Nivelles-Namur road. This was the cavalry heading Pirch’s Corps, which had marched from Mellery to Sombreffe. Gérard’s column had now stumbled on Vandamme’s rear-guard, posted 3 miles outside Namur; and Vandamme himself coming out from Namur, Grouchy ordered him to clear the road for the Fourth Corps, and cover its march with his rear-guard.
Thielemann’s Cavalry, accompanied by a battery of horse artillery, had come on at a great pace, and were almost too exhausted to attack the French with any vigour; but they managed to drive back the enemy’s cavalry and capture three guns. Further attack on the French rear-guard was left to Pirch’s Corps, which was now hurrying up.
The French retreated through Namur, after being well treated by the inhabitants (who supplied them with food, transport, and boats), and leaving Teste’s Division with eight guns in defence of the town against Pirch’s Corps. The remainder of Grouchy’s army crossed the Sambre by the Namur bridge and marched on Dinant by the valley of the Meuse.
In Namur, Teste made a brilliant defence. The town was fortified, but the works were out-of-date and dilapidated; and there was no time to improve the local resources. Teste’s men only numbered 2,000, with eight guns, and Pirch’s Corps was some 20,000 strong. All the wounded, the baggage, and the transport had been sent across the Sambre, and the bridge barricaded.
Pirch had suffered severely in his attack on Vandamme’s rear-guard outside Namur, losing over 1,200 men. The French had beaten back his three assaulting columns, and withdrawn into the town without letting the Prussian cavalry cut them off. Consequently Pirch was in no mind for a costly assault on Namur while Teste’s Division held the place; and he knew that Teste would not hold his position longer than was absolutely necessary for Grouchy with the main body to gain a safe distance. He contented himself with holding the enemy’s attention in front, while he despatched the main body of the Seventh Division to threaten the retreat over the Sambre. But as soon as the main portion of Grouchy’s army had cleared the river, Teste began to make his own preparations for retreat. He ordered a sortie to be made against the Prussians on the north, to gain time and to divert their attention from the bridge; and when all was ready, he withdrew his troops rapidly in single file across the parapets of the barricaded bridge, setting fire to a heap of faggots and lumber piled up against the enemy’s end. The guns had to be left behind.
It was nightfall now—that is to say, towards 9 P.M.—when Teste’s Division filed across the bridge. The Prussians entered on the north, but their way was barred by obstacles, and they were too late to prevent the last men from escaping over the river. Their pursuit was checked by the burning barricades, which had to be put out before the bridge could be used; and the troops were halted in the town for the night, only a few cavalry being pushed across the river on the road to Dinant, ready for pursuit next day.
Teste continued his retreat unharmed, and reached Dinant at daybreak next day, the 21st. Grouchy’s main body had arrived there over-night, and the whole force proceeded to Phillippeville on the 21st. Pirch spent the night at Namur with his Corps; Thielemann’s cavalry at Temploux, his infantry at Gembloux.
Between Namur and Dinant, Grouchy had barricaded every narrow passage, and placed obstacles at intervals on the roads; and in this way hindered the chances of Prussian pursuit, and gaining time for himself.
The scattered remnants of Napoleon’s army were fleeing along the roads from Charleroi towards Avesnes, Laon, and Phillippeville. Grouchy therefore designed his retreat so as to bring his army clear of pursuit as quickly as possible, and to work his way towards the fragments which were with difficulty being collected round Laon by Soult, Reille, and others. He hoped to reach Paris before the allied armies, in time to organise a defence, or perhaps to effect a junction with the army of the Alps under Suchet and with Lecourbe. Napoleon himself had given up the plan of rallying his routed army under Grouchy’s still formidable force, and had ridden in haste to Paris, where his position was already precarious.
On the 21st, Grouchy marched from Dinant to Phillippeville, but Pirch I. did not pursue. His Corps was required elsewhere, to blockade some of the fortresses which barred the line of advance of Blucher’s army. Grouchy might have retired through Givet and down the valley of the Meuse, instead of risking the more dangerous road to Phillippeville. But his aim was to draw near to any body of troops which were left from Napoleon’s army, and to avoid marching down the narrow defile of the Meuse valley where he would be liable to an attack in flank or in rear, under great disadvantages. Zieten was at Beaumont on 20th June, 12 miles from Phillippeville, but he had marched at daybreak on the 21st. Pirch, marching to Thuin on the 21st, was moving parallel to Grouchy, but the latter’s march was not hindered.
Four French fortresses barred Blucher’s advance—Landrécies, Maubeuge, Avesnes and Rocroi. It was necessary to reduce these before any further advance on Paris was made; hence Grouchy was able to retreat unmolested for the greater part of his movement. On the 22nd he reached Rocroi; and Mezières on the 23rd. His force constituted an important menace to the left flank of the Prussian army; and Blucher was thus obliged to detach several parties of cavalry to watch the French movements.
Zieten took Avesnes on the 21st, and Grouchy’s march from Phillippeville to Rocroi was in danger; but his strength was not accurately known at the Prussian headquarters, and Blucher was anxious to push on to Paris. The fall of Paris was expected to put an end to the French resistance. The capture of Avesnes relieved Blucher of the danger which threatened his army if he advanced, and it also gave him an advanced depôt for his supplies.
On the 22nd, Soult was at Laon endeavouring to collect the remnants of Napoleon’s army. He succeeded in gathering some 3,000 fugitives, mostly of Reille’s Corps and d’Erlon’s, and with these he hoped to join Grouchy. Urgent messages from Paris implored Grouchy to unite all the forces he could find and oppose the advance of the allies. This was easier said than done, for it was now a race between Blucher and Grouchy. Grouchy had to take a long detour to avoid being cut off; while the Prussians could advance direct on Paris, leaving detachments to watch the fortresses which might prove dangerous in the rear, and keeping close observation on the left flank on Grouchy’s operations. Those fortresses which had not been taken by Zieten and Bulow were blockaded by Pirch, and nearly all of them—at least all those which menaced the advance—being garrisoned by ill-spirited and disheartened troops, and capable of little resistance, were compelled to surrender. But Blucher was careful to take no risks, and systematically he cleared the way for his advance. The shorter line by which he marched ensured his reaching Paris before Grouchy, if only with one Corps. Retreating troops move quickly, but the Prussians proved themselves capable of some wonderful forced marches.
For the French it was a time when the Napoleon of former days would have revived the broken fortunes of his country, and rallied every soldier for the protection of Paris. He would have brought up all the troops in the West, from the Pyrenees, and from the Alps; and he would have led a new army of 100,000 or 150,000 men against Blucher. The old strategy of 1814 would have been repeated, and many a loss suffered by the allies before they could bring all their six armies to converge on Paris. But now there was no Napoleon to fill the vacancy. The Emperor was defeated in Paris as well as at Mont St Jean. He had no party, no power; Frenchmen were wearied and sickened by the disasters he had brought on their country through his insatiable ambition. Grouchy alone showed power and resolution; yet he only led his forces in retreat. Could he still save the country?
The 23rd was a day of comparative rest for the Prussian army. Blucher was anxious to draw in his Corps for his advance on Paris. Thielemann moved from Beaumont to Avesnes. On the 24th the advance was resumed. The Prussian army was to march in two columns. On the left, nearer Grouchy, Zieten’s and Thielemann’s Corps were to march by the valley of the Oise on Compiègne, keeping a sharp watch for Grouchy. On the right, Bulow’s Corps, the Fourth, was to march by St Quentin, Ham, Roye, to Pont St Maxence.
On the 24th Zieten took Guise without firing a shot, and thus secured another important point, to serve as a depôt, and as a refuge for wounded. The First Corps halted for the night in the town, sending out its cavalry as far as La Fère and Marle. Thielemann marched from Avesnes to Nouvion, and threw out scouts to Hirson and Vervins. Bulow reached the neighbourhood of St Quentin.
Grouchy, on the 24th, marched from Mezières to Réthel; Soult, from Laon to Soissons. The Prussians were observed to be gaining.
On the 25th Zieten moved from Guise to Cérisy, with cavalry towards La Fère. Thielemann marched from Nouvion to Origny; Bulow, from St Quentin to Chauny.
Grouchy, finding Soult had retreated from Laon, changed his direction, and hastened with part of his forces along the valley of the Aisne to Soissons, while Vandamme, with the remains of the Third and Fourth Corps, marched to Reims, where he arrived on the 25th.
Blucher, learning from the reports of the advanced cavalry of Soult’s retreat from Laon, now directed his troops to seize the passages of the Oise, cross the river, and cut off both Grouchy and Soult between Soissons and the capital. It was a race for the bridges of the Oise, and for Crepy and Senlis.
So anxious was the Prussian Commander-in-Chief, that at midnight on the 25th-26th, he ordered Zieten to make a forced march with his advanced guard on Compiègne. A squadron of Hussars managed to reach that place at midnight on the 26th-27th, and found that a large body of French were expected there at any moment from Soissons. The remainder of Zieten’s advanced guard could get no further than Noyon that night, while the main body of his Corps bivouacked at Chauny. They were too exhausted to go further that day. Thielemann, however, marched from Origny to Guiscard, 20 miles as the crow flies; and Bulow from Ham to Ressons, 25 miles.
The French, in the meantime, were also hurrying to the Oise. Grouchy had taken over the command of Soult’s motley force, and d’Erlon was sent forward with about 4,000 men to reach Compiègne before the Prussians if possible, and secure the bridge there. Vandamme was hurrying from Reims towards Soissons with the Third and Fourth Corps.
At 4.30 A.M. on the 27th, Zieten’s advanced guard, consisting of a Division, marching during the night, reached Compiègne, and Jagow, in command, immediately took steps for its defence. Half an hour later the head of d’Erlon’s troops appeared on the Soissons road! This was indeed a narrow margin for success.
D’Erlon at once attacked, but a battery of Prussian horse artillery, posted on the road, opened such a heavy fire on his columns that the men gave way, and took refuge in a wood. From thence a sharp fire was kept up by the French skirmishers, and four guns were brought up to cope with the Prussian artillery; but these were soon silenced, and d’Erlon ordered the retreat, finding that he could no longer gain the bridge over the Oise, or delay the Prussian advance. As soon as he retreated, a regiment of Hussars was sent in pursuit, but Jagow’s men were too tired by their long forced march to follow up, and d’Erlon’s Corps was allowed to gain much time. Zieten with his main body reached Compiègne at mid-day; and found Blucher already there. Zieten was then ordered to send the Second Division (this division had relieved the Third, under Jagow, as advanced guard) towards Villets Coterets to cut off any force which might be retreating from Soissons on Paris; also to send his reserve cavalry and artillery to Gillicourt.
Just as Zieten’s troops reached Gillicourt, d’Erlon’s rear-guard left that place, and followed d’Erlon to Crepy. From Crepy, however, the French were again driven out by the Prussian cavalry, and d’Erlon retreated westwards towards Senlis, hoping to gain the bridge at Creil. Zieten’s Fourth Division with his cavalry and artillery bivouacked at Gillicourt; his Second Division near Villets Coterets.
Bulow, in the meantime, was hastening down from Ressons to seize the bridges at Pont St Maxence and Creil; and his advanced guard was ordered to detach a “flying column” to secure the passages. Accordingly, Sydow took a squadron of Hussars and a company of infantry, and marched with all speed to Creil, the infantry being carried in carts. Just as the Prussians reached the bridge, part of d’Erlon’s advanced cavalry was observed making for the same place from the opposite side. Sydow attacked with his squadron and drove back the French; and on the arrival of the rest of Bulow’s advanced guard, a regiment of infantry was left to hold Creil, while a regiment of cavalry pushed on to Senlis, where it was expected to find d’Erlon. But on reaching that village, it was found to be unoccupied, and the Prussians halted there. At nightfall, however, Kellermann, leading d’Erlon’s column, came up from Crepy with a brigade of heavy cavalry, and immediately charged down on the Prussians. The latter were unprepared, and were speedily routed. They fled back to Pont St Maxence, and Kellermann fell back on d’Erlon’s infantry. Sydow now came up with the rest of Bulow’s advanced guard, expecting to find Senlis already occupied by Prussians, but he was astonished by their absence. However, he occupied Senlis at 10 P.M. When d’Erlon approached, he was met with a heavy fire from the Prussian sharpshooters, who had loop-holed the nearest houses and taken shelter behind walls. Finding Senlis too strongly held, d’Erlon withdrew, and made his way towards Gonesse, while Reille took part of his force to Nanteuil. Night put an end to pursuit.
Thus at the close of the 27th, all the bridges over the Oise were in Blucher’s hands, and there seemed every prospect of Grouchy’s forces being cut off from Paris. The French had now three separate columns in retreat, and there was a great danger of two of these being cut off.
On the 28th, long before dawn, the Second Division of Zieten’s Corps approached Villets Coterets, where Grouchy had his headquarters. The Prussians, hearing that the place was not strongly held, resolved to carry it by surprise; but Grouchy had 9,000 men posted on the road to Nanteuil, and these attacked and drove back the Prussians. Suddenly, however, a panic seized the greater part of the French troops, who, seeing a movement of Prussian troops towards Crepy, thought that their retreat was being cut off, and they fled in a body down the road towards Meaux. Thus Villets Coterets fell into the hands of the Prussians.
Vandamme, after restoring some order among the fugitives, led them, the remains of the Third and Fourth Corps, scarcely 8,000 men, by Meaux, La Ferté, and Lagny to Paris.
Zieten pushed on to Nanteuil on the 28th, where Reille’s rear-guard was found and driven out. Reille was retreating on Gonesse, to effect a junction with d’Erlon, who was falling back from Senlis. Bulow was marching rapidly on St Denis, and had reached Marly la Ville by the evening of the 28th, threatening to cut off Reille and d’Erlon. Thielemann hastened from Compiègne and reached Crepy that night.
On the 29th Blucher’s Corps closed in, and by nightfall they occupied the following positions:—Bulow’s Corps at Le Bourget and St Denis; Thielemann’s Corps at Dammartin; Zieten’s at Blanc Mesnil and Aulnay. Grouchy’s forces had entered Paris, having lost 4,000 men and 16 guns in the numerous skirmishes along the Oise. But they had won the race, and their retreat must be considered as a skilful operation. It had little actual effect on the advance of the allies, but Grouchy, who had so slurred his reputation in the great operations entrusted to him by Napoleon, in his retreat somewhat retrieved his character as a general.