The decisions arrived at by the Board in 1786, with reference to the medical officers, may be briefly stated. The principal medical officer at Woolwich was to be called Surgeon-General, and was to receive half-pay of 10s. per diem, while he was to be relieved of the expense of finding any medicines for the hospital. The Surgeon of the Battalion at Woolwich had to provide all the medicines for his Battalion, “excepting bark and wine,” in return for which he was allowed 120l. per annum. The Surgeon of the Battalion detached in England remained at Woolwich with such companies of the Battalion as might be stationed there, providing the medicines required by them, and by the company in Scotland, as well as all the companies of the Battalion when on the line of march,—receiving in return remuneration at the rate of 12l. per company annually. The recruits of the Battalions abroad were also under his care, and he received 12l. annually for each detachment of fifty men, in return for the medicines he had to provide. So far, this Surgeon had little to complain of. But the next burden was always greater than he could bear. He had to take charge of the men of the Invalid Battalion, not merely those at Woolwich, but also those on detachment, furnishing them with medicines, in return for the annual sum of 70l. When one bears in mind that no man entered the Invalid Battalion until he was completely crippled, and that his daily medicine was probably as necessary to him as the air he breathed, the inadequacy of the Surgeon’s remuneration in this item becomes apparent. The Surgeons of the Battalions, to which the companies at Gibraltar and in Canada respectively belonged, went on service with these companies, and received 12l. per annum for each company, in addition to their pay—in return for which they had to provide all medicines “except bark and wine.” The same allowance was paid for detached companies of the various Battalions to the Ordnance Surgeon on the spot. Civil artificers and labourers in the employ of the Ordnance were entitled to medical attendance and medicines, by paying at the rates of one penny and one halfpenny per week throughout the year to the Ordnance medical officer on the station. The rule with regard to officers was worded as follows: “It is expected that the Surgeons of the Artillery and Ordnance at the different places should give their attendance to the military and civil officers without fee; but, with respect to supplying them with medicines, it is recommended to the military and civil officers to subscribe 2 guineas a year each, for which the Surgeon is to supply them with medicines; otherwise they are to pay for such medicines as they use.”

Such were the regulations for the medical officers of the Ordnance,—revealing a system which was faulty and has disappeared, but which it is interesting to reproduce in a history of the Corps. But there were other non-combatants also—no longer represented in the Regiment, but who deserve to be mentioned—the Regimental Chaplains. These gentlemen, at the period treated of, did not belong, as now, to one department for general Army service, but belonged to the various Battalions of the Corps. This, however, did not imply that they did duty with their Battalions; far from it. Excellent men, they drew their pay with a punctuality worthy of all praise, but it was not among their congregations in the Warren, but away in quiet rural rectories—in fat livings which they held. They were pluralists; and they clubbed together to pay a curate in Woolwich to perform their joint duties. It is sad to have to say, also, that they did not pay their substitute very liberally. They paid him each eighteen-pence a day—a sum so inadequate that it drew forth the remonstrances of the Commandant, who wrote to the Master-General that, “considering the Commandant to Master-General, Nov. 14, 1787. reverend gentleman’s constant residence and attendance, his dress and appearance, which are always obliged to be decent, and the disadvantage of having no surplice fees to add to it, it will not permit him even to eat at the mess—the cheapest and best mode of living here.” The sum of two shillings and sixpence a day from each Chaplain was requested for their substitute; such as was given in other Garrisons. It will thus be seen that the system was officially recognised; and, indeed, was but one of the many vicious customs which have disappeared before public opinion. There were certain occasions when the attendance of the Chaplains was insisted upon, although they were few and far between. One such occurred in 1785, when the King announced his intention of coming to Woolwich to review the Regiment. The Chaplains were hurriedly written for, “in order,” wrote the Brigade-Major, “that you may be at Woolwich in proper time to march by with the Regiment.” One of the number replied, that on account of the distance at which he lived, and the fact of his being 86 years of age, he would be unable to attend,—which he greatly regretted, as he would have much liked to march past again before he died. The others obeyed the summons, one only protesting a little on the ground that the Battalion to which he belonged was at that time scattered in the West Indies and Canada. A few years later, in 1792, when a camp was formed at Bagshot, the Chaplains were ordered to attend and encamp with the companies; and from that time their duties ceased, more and more every year, to be so purely honorary as they had been.

Returning now to the combatant part of the Corps, there are certain details connected with the dress of the officers and men, which can hardly fail to be interesting, and which find a natural place in a chapter like this. Owing to a circumstance arising out of the American War, we are fortunately in possession of very circumstantial accounts on this point. After the Convention of Saratoga, many of the officers of Burgoyne’s army remained prisoners of war for nearly three years. On their return to England, they claimed compensation for loss of their equipment, &c., stating their case as follows:—“The subscribers wish to represent the constant and unavoidable loss they sustained in the mode of payment of their subsistence, as the impossibility of supplying the Convention Army with specie laid them under an absolute necessity of drawing their pay at very extravagant rates, being paid by public bills, in the negotiation of which, from the Congress paper currency, they suffered a discount which in the 1st year may be estimated at 20 per cent.... We beg leave to observe that, in conformity to the wishes of the Generals commanding the troops, we were under the necessity of building huts at our own cost and charges, in order to take the more effectual care of the men, to attend to their wants and to alleviate their distresses. Much expense was incurred on this score. We have also to observe that the Congress at different periods obliged us to remove to most of the provinces in America; and in those several marches of at least 1500 miles, it must naturally occur that many and heavy charges were sustained by us. On being exchanged, we were unavoidably obliged to come to New York individually, and there being no public conveyance, we were necessitated to purchase horses, to transport ourselves and baggage, from people who took every advantage of our distresses,” On the claims of officers on this account reaching the Ordnance, the first step was, simply, to refuse to admit them; on their being urged again in stronger terms, the next step was to refer them to some one else to ascertain the truth of the claimants’ statements, it being an official axiom that any one demanding money was probably an impostor, and to be treated accordingly; and, lastly, on being satisfied of the accuracy of the claim, the invariable course was to offer something considerably less than the sum demanded. From a remonstrance made against the offer in this case we learn what was laid down by the Board of Ordnance in the previous year, 28th June, 1782, as the equipment of an Artillery Subaltern, and the cost at which it was to be valued in compensating for its loss by shipwreck, or imprisonment. It was as follows:—

The contents of the knapsack of an Artillery soldier at this time were as follows; the knapsack itself being made of painted canvas:—

4 white shirts.
1 check shirt.
6 false collars.
1 canvas frock.
1 canvas pair of trowsers.
1 leather cap.
2 pairs of shoes.
1 pair of black cloth gaiters.
1 pair of white stockings (thread).
1 powder-bag and puff.
1 razor.
1 shaving-box. 1 pair of shoe brushes.
1 cloth brush.
1 twin screw and worm.
1 brush and pricker.
1 leather stock.
1 rosette.
1 pair of worsted stockings.
3 pairs of Welsh yarn socks.
1 pair of shoe-buckles.
1 pair of knee-buckles.
1 stock buckle.
1 large and 1 small comb.

The annual issues of clothing were settled by the Master-General on 17th March, 1788, to be as follows.

Each sergeant was to receive annually

1 coat.
1 white cloth waistcoat.
1 white cloth breeches.
1 frilled shirt.
1 black leather stock.
1 pair of worsted stockings.
1 gold laced hat.
Black cloth with 3 dozen buttons for a pair of gaiters.
5s. 3d. in lieu of a pair of shoes.

The same articles were supplied to the other ranks, with the exception that while the corporal’s coat had two epaulettes, the bombardier’s had only one; and that the hats of the drummers were plain, instead of gold-laced. The drummers had also fur caps supplied to them when required. In the West Indies the men received white linen waistcoats and breeches, instead of cloth; and wore white gold-laced hats instead of black.

The men of the Invalid Battalion received the same articles as those of the Marching Battalions, with this exception, that their coats were lined with red instead of white, and their waistcoats and breeches, instead of being white, were blue.

So much for the clothing of the Regiment at this time; a few words must now be said as to its drills. And perhaps this can be done most easily by describing a field-day, which took place on the morning of the 9th July, 1788, before the King. On the arrival of His Majesty, a salute of 21 guns, at intervals of 8 seconds, was fired by a company, which immediately afterwards fell in on the left of the line. It was not until the preceding year that the Regiment had Order by Master-General, 4 July, 1787. been ordered to fall in in two ranks, when under arms. The King having ridden down the ranks, the Regiment broke into open column, and marched past in slow and quick time. The line having been reformed, and the Manual Exercise practised, the following marvellous evolutions commenced:—Two rounds were fired from flanks to centre of each Battalion; the line then retired one hundred yards towards the Barracks, and fired two rounds from centre to flanks of each Battalion; and then returned to its former ground. Here it fired two rounds by grand divisions from flanks to centre of each Battalion; then one round by wings of each Battalion; and, finally, each Battalion fired a volley.

Having so rung the changes on small-arm firing, a certain number of the men were detached to man 12 field guns, the line opening to allow these guns to come up. As a contrast to modern Field Battery drill, the solemn orders issued to the officer commanding these guns may be quoted:—“Lieutenant-Colonel Walker will advance towards Woolwich Common with his 12 guns, 4 in front, and in three lines. This column will incline to the right, so that the right-hand gun may be near the right-hand hedge. When they have got about halfway between the front of the Barracks and the sunk fence, the 4 guns in the front line are then to halt, while the 4 guns in the centre line form the left of the front line. The 12 guns then in one line will fire two rounds from flanks to centre, then change their front to the left by wheeling on the centre, and in that position fire two rounds from centre to flanks. The 6 guns on the right will then fall in with the rear of the 2nd Battalion, and the 6 guns on the left will fall in with the rear of the 4th Battalion.”

It requires the reproduction of such elephantine movements as the above, to realise sufficiently the progress made since that time in Field Artillery. This most wooden style of drill was the fashion in England; and we owe the change, which followed to the wars of the French Revolution, which taught that a General, to win battles, must be something more than a drill-sergeant, and that an army must learn not merely to fight, but to move, and to move with rapidity. The only element in the field-day just described which gives the student the slightest relief, is a mention made that the Gentlemen Cadets were employed as Light Infantry towards the end of the day. Of course this was all wrong, and one would rather find that they had been employed on a public occasion like this, as Artillerymen; but it is a relief to read of anything implying rapidity of movement, after the dull, ponderous description of the line moving solemnly backwards and forwards, firing from flanks to centre, and centre to flanks.

To this style of drill our want of success in Flanders, in the campaigns shortly to be described, was mainly due. Our Generals had their brains so saturated with the drill-book, that on active service, if they encountered an enemy who violated its rules, they were utterly nonplussed. Had they won a victory by ignoring the regulations under which they had been so strictly exercised, their satisfaction would have been but a doubtful one. They had yet to learn that although drill and dogged courage are admirable qualities in troops, they will not compensate for the lack of those qualities in a General which are necessary to ensure success.

Only one or two points remain to be noticed. First, the amalgamation of the Royal Irish Artillery was contemplated as early as 1788, although it did not take place until after the Union in 1801. The delay was mainly caused by the protest of the officers of the Royal Artillery, who would have suffered greatly from supersession,—the promotion in the Irish corps having been much more rapid than in that from which it sprang. Amalgamation must always produce this supersession to a certain extent; and the Board listened to the remonstrances, and deferred the incorporation of the Irish Artillery for some years. About the same date that this question was being discussed, a long petition was forwarded from Gibraltar, in which the officers of the Royal Artillery there stationed pointed out how much better the position had become of officers in the Royal Engineers of the same standing as themselves, than their own. The wording of the petition was faulty, and its arguments were unsound; thus giving the Master-General an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to administer a dignified rebuke to the malcontents. On one point, however, he admitted the force of their complaint. The rank of Major had been abolished in the Royal Engineers, its holders being made Lieutenant-Colonels, and thus obtaining a decided advantage over their contemporaries in Duke of Richmond, 10 March, 1788. the Artillery. “This difference,” wrote the Master-General, “and there being no rank of Major, is, I admit, an advantage in point of rank in favour of the Engineers. The reason of the rank of Major being suppressed in the Corps of Engineers was that there were no troops belonging to them to be commanded in Battalions, and therefore there could be no use for an officer of that description.” In the year 1827, the rank of Regimental Major was abolished in the Royal Artillery, its holders being made Lieutenant-Colonels, but with Majors’ pay; and in the year 1872, the rank of Major was substituted for that of First Captain, on account of the responsibility attached to the command of a Battery of Artillery.

It was during this period that a blow was struck at the custom, which had hitherto prevailed, of buying and selling the appointments of Adjutant and Quartermaster. On the Colonel Miller, Pamph., 1868. 24th February, 1783, the Master-General ordered that no such appointment should in future be sold, with this exception, that any officer who then held an appointment which he had obtained by purchase would be allowed to sell it when he relinquished it, but must accept 100l. less than he gave for it; and that his successor must also sell for 100l. less than that purchase-money; and so on until the price should be extinguished. It was ruled, at the same time, that a Captain-Lieutenant, holding an Adjutancy, should vacate it on being promoted to a Company; and that as soon as any “warrant” of a Quartermaster should become vacant without purchase, “some meritorious non-commissioned officer should be recommended for the same.”

A privilege which the Regiment had hitherto enjoyed was abolished, and with good reason, in 1785. Prior to that date no charge was ever made for the subsistence of either officers or men of the Royal Artillery when being conveyed by transports to foreign stations, an exemption which was not accorded to the rest of the army. Doubtless the custom arose from the fact that the Board of Ordnance, which in one capacity governed the Artillery, in another capacity hired the transports; but the case had only to be stated to ensure remedy. On the 27th August, 1785, it was ruled that a “stoppage of 3d. per diem (being the same as is made from the rest of His Majesty’s troops) be made from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Royal Artillery during the time they shall be on board ship.” Doubtless, the same individuals would be glad if, in the year of grace 1873, they could travel on board ship at the rate of 3d. per diem.

Perhaps of all the letters which the student finds in the official correspondence of the period, the following is the most amusing. It ought already to have been mentioned that when the Captain of a Company retired on his pay, awaiting a vacancy in the Invalid Battalion, his Captain-Lieutenant received certain allowances connected with the command of the Company. Apparently, the regulations were not very clear on the subject; or, as is very probable, decisions had been given in individual cases, which had not been promulgated to the Regiment—a pernicious custom which existed in the 18th century, and even since. A Captain William Houghton had retired in this way; and from his retirement the following cry of agony reached the 2 April, 1789. Commandant of his Battalion:—“Ever since the day your goodness was made known to the Regiment in getting me leave of absence to retire from duty till provided with an Invalid Company, I have never had a moment’s peace with my Captains-Lieutenant. Their first claim was for one non-effective—I gave it; the next was for both—I gave them; and was then told they had a right to the 6l. per annum allowed for stationery—this I gave up also. They have now demanded my share of the stock purse, and the 20l. per annum granted by His Majesty’s warrant, 27th July, 1772, to the Captains of Artillery, on account of the slowness of promotion in the Regiment. Had I known these were to be the hard conditions of a little rest before death, it would have been all fair; but in that case I certainly should have remained with my Company, provided I had done duty upon crutches.”

Only one point remains now to be mentioned before turning to the causes which led to sudden augmentations in the Regiment, combined with the commencement of hostilities. On the 26th August, 1792, volunteers were called for from the Companies at Woolwich, to form part of a guard ordered to attend His Excellency Viscount Macartney, who had been appointed Ambassador to the Court of the Emperor of China, and also to act as instructors in gunnery to the troops of that potentate. The strength of the party was as follows:—One sergeant, 3 corporals or bombardiers, 1 drummer, and 15 gunners, under the command of Lieutenant Parish. An advance was made to the detachment of a year’s subsistence to purchase necessaries, and a second suit of clothing was given to the non-commissioned officers and men.

It has been difficult to confine this chapter to these purely domestic, although necessary, details, because, after 1787, the whole firmament of history has been lurid with the events in France, which were ripening into a state of things such as has never been seen before, or since. In 1792 it became apparent that war between England and France was inevitable. Recruiting had been brisk since 1787; in 1790 a free pardon had been offered to all deserters, who should return to their Regiments; in the first month of 1793 an augmentation to the Artillery was authorized, which will form the subject of the next chapter; and in October 1793, the following increase to the establishment was ordered, viz.:—

Every officer, without exception, had been ordered to join in 1792; and, although it was not until the beginning of 1793 that the French Ambassador was dismissed from the Court of St. James’s, it was evident that a sufficient casus belli had been found in the operations of the French army in the Low Countries, and the menace to England implied in France obtaining the control of the River Scheldt.

A sufficient casus belli, it has been said; but the student of history must indeed be blind who fails to see that this was but a secondary reason. A panic had seized upon the most stable European governments, a dread lest the revolutionary principles which animated the French people should spread beyond the confines of France. Nor was their fear without reason. Even England had been penetrated by Republicanism; societies were formed, ostensibly for Parliamentary Reform, and under the title of Friends of the People, which desired undoubtedly the overthrow of the monarchy. An Englishman, the author of ‘The Rights of Man,’ had been elected a member of the Assembly in Paris, on account of his advanced political opinions; and, after his trial for sedition in England, an English mob showed their sympathy by taking the horses out of his advocate’s carriage, and drawing it themselves to his residence. That unfailing barometer of political disturbance—the funds—told also a tale of great uneasiness. ‘Annual Register,’ 1792. The Three per Cents., which stood in January 1792 at 93⅜, fell before December in the same year to 74; and all other Government securities were at a corresponding discount.

The state of France was, indeed, enough to appal the most indifferent. In the powerful language of the chronicler of the French Revolution, France, roused by many causes, Carlyle. faced the world “in that terrible strength of Nature which no man has measured;” and “whatever was cruel in the panic-frenzy of twenty-five million men—whatsoever was great in the simultaneous death-defiance of twenty-five million men—stood there in abrupt contrast, near by one another.” France was now “seeking its wild way through the New, Chaotic—where Force is not yet distinguished into Bidden and Forbidden—but Crime and Virtue welter unseparated, in that domain of what is called the Passions.” ... “The Gospel of Man’s Rights was preached abroad with the fearfullest Devil’s Message of man’s weaknesses and sins;” and a whole nation was drunk with revenge, and terror, and blood.

Penetrating with different effect into every class of men in England, the tale of the French Revolution penetrated even the recesses of the Ordnance. Raising their eyes from ledgers, and gazing across the Channel, even the members of the Honourable Board were moved; and on the first day of the New Year they resolved on a step, which should bring Field Artillery more into accord with the era in the history of war which was now to commence. Nor was it an hour too soon; for in three weeks’ time, on the 21st January, Carlyle. 1793, “there was in the streets of Paris a silence as of the grave—eighty thousand armed men stood ranked, like armed statues of men; cannons bristled, cannoneers with match burning, but no word or movement; it was as a city enchanted into silence and stone: one carriage, with its escort, slowly rumbling towards the Place de la Révolution, the only sound.” The last of the dragon’s teeth was about to be sown, and a crime to be committed which should bind the governments of Europe together against France, as one man: to whom France should answer, Danton. “The coalesced Kings threaten us: we hurl at their feet, as the gage of battle, the Head of a King.”

Of a truth, the Honourable Board had not moved a day too soon. Let us trace in our next chapter the development of that portion of the Corps which dates its origin from that terrible month of January 1793.

CHAPTER II.
The Necessity, Birth, and Progress of the Royal Horse Artillery.

Of all the so-called Battalion Records, which were kept at the various Head-quarter offices at Woolwich up to the year 1859, and the details of which are, at the best, of the most scanty description, perhaps the most meagre and most disappointing are those of the Royal Horse Artillery.

From the well-known esprit of this branch of the service, it might have been expected that its earlier history would have been treated almost with effusion by those in whose custody was a book purporting to contain a record of its services. But it may be said with truth that for one item of information obtained from the written records of this brilliant arm, ten have been obtained from the traditions handed down verbally, and fondly treasured by successive generations of officers; and even a greater part of the required information has been obtained from works of general military history, and from extant official letter-books.

The first section of these old Record Books professes to treat of the circumstances of the original formation of the particular part of the Regiment concerned. In the Records of the Royal Horse Artillery this section is compressed into two lines. “The Royal Horse Artillery was formed as an additional corps to the Regiment of Artillery on the 1st February, 1793.” Remarkable for its brevity, this account of the formation of the Royal Horse Artillery is also remarkable for its inaccuracy. It was not an additional corps to the Royal Artillery, but from the very commencement an essential, integral part of it. The Driver Corps, formed in 1794, was an additional corps to the Royal Artillery; but its officers were, until after Waterloo, drawn from a different source, and its men were never Artillerymen. The Royal Horse Artillery, on the other hand, was invariably officered by the Royal Artillery, and was recruited from its ranks. Of the wisdom, or otherwise, of this policy, it will be necessary to treat hereafter; but of the fact there can be no doubt. Yet again, in the brief record quoted above, are compressed other inaccuracies. The Horse Artillery did not spring into existence, as a corps, on 1st February, 1793, as the words would imply. Two troops were authorised in January of that year, but not for twelve years of straggling augmentations of staff-officers and troops, can it be said to have attained its proper maturity. The earlier wars of the French Revolution were the boyhood of the Royal Horse Artillery, as the Peninsular campaign was its glorious manhood. After Waterloo, until the Crimean War, its history was a blank page.

It is fortunate that an officer of the Regiment has been found, at once so capable and so patient in tracing out the circumstances which impressed on the world the necessity Captain H. W. L. Hime, Royal Artillery. Proceedings R. A. Institution. of this arm, as the author of the papers on ‘The Mobility of Field Artillery, Past and Present.’ According to this writer, England was the last among the leading nations in Europe to adopt the use of Horse Artillery. As early as 1788, the subject had strongly attracted the attention of the Master-General of the Ordnance; but, unfortunately, he referred it to a committee. The period of gestation, so to speak, in committees on military subjects is very great; in this particular instance the winter of 1792 had arrived without any result from their labours.

The introduction of Horse Artillery into the Prussian service dates from 1759; and in 1792 this arm was introduced into the French and Swedish armies. In other European countries improvement had been made in Field Artillery, without, however, adopting the system of mounted detachments; but this latter is the distinctive mark of Horse Artillery. It has been asserted, and on good authority, that Horse Artillery was used in India prior even to its adoption by Frederick the Great—and dating as far back as 1756. If the existence of an Artillery without mobility was sufficient to impress on the authorities in that country a sense of the necessity of some improvements, the argument was not wanting. In an engagement between the English ‘History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan,’ vol. i. pp. 312-368. and French troops near Trichinopoly in 1753, “the English, for more expedition, marched without any field-pieces;” and when the infantry advanced against the French in an action fought shortly afterwards, “the artillery, in the hurry, could not keep up with the battalion.” The advantage of a more mobile artillery must certainly have been apparent after such melancholy exhibitions.

It has already been mentioned in this work that rapidity of movement, more especially under fire, was rendered hopeless by the frequent employment of peasants to act as drivers to the batteries. The formation of the Royal Horse Artillery did not free the Field Batteries from this evil. A quaint circumstance in proof of this is narrated by the Hime. author already mentioned. “In 1798, the Commandant of Woolwich inspected some guns manned by gunners of the 8th Battalion, R.A. The guns were each drawn by three horses in single file, which were driven by contract drivers on foot, hired for the occasion, dressed in white smocks ‘Aide-Mémoire to the Military Sciences,’ art. ‘Ordnance.’ with blue collars and cuffs, and armed with long carter’s whips of the ordinary farm pattern. When this formidable array had been reviewed, the Commandant, General Lloyd, and the Garrison Adjutant, expressed their joint opinion that field artillery movements could not be performed quicker.” The increase of mobility over that old system—of which the above is a real, although, perhaps, exceptional illustration—which followed the introduction of Horse Artillery can best be shown by another and later instance. At the battle of Fuentes d’Onor, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery—now D Battery, B Brigade—was surrounded and cut off by the French cavalry. It was at the time under the command of the 2nd Captain, Norman Ramsay. Gleig. “Guns thus dealt with are almost always lost, and consequently the army ceased to think of Ramsay and his men, except as prisoners. Presently, however, a great commotion was observed among the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point, where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated Napier. some extraordinary occurrence.... Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated; an English shout pealed high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his troop, his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain; the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate career.” Between the crawling peasant-driven team on Woolwich parade, and this glowing description of a Horse Artillery battery but a very few years later, there is a contrast, which shows at a glance the immense stride in the direction of mobility, which had followed the introduction of that branch of the Regiment to whose story this chapter is devoted. Much of this improvement was due to the fostering care of the Master-General, and of the Deputy-Adjutant-General, afterwards Sir John Macleod; much also was due to the encouragement of General Officers, who found to their amazement a force of Artillery, which could conform to their most rapid movements; and not a little was due to the practical school of experience opened in the Peninsula; but, to their honour be it stated, the rapid progress towards the standard of perfection attained by the Royal Horse Artillery was mainly due to the labours, the devotion, of the officers belonging to it, who were inspired by the same esprit and the same conscientious regard for their duties, as have continued to animate the officers of that brilliant arm to this day.

While the Committee, appointed to decide the question of Horse Artillery in connection with our service, was—according to wont—babbling harmlessly and fruitlessly in the fourth year of its existence, a virtual rupture took place between England and France. The Duke of Richmond, then Master-General, immediately took the matter himself in hand; and of three schemes, very dissimilar, over which the Committee had been debating, he selected the following, as the basis of the organization of a troop of Royal Horse Artillery.

The formation of the first two troops, A and B, took place at Woolwich, having been ordered in January 1793. The Captains were R. Lawson, afterwards so distinguished in Egypt, and the Brigade-Major of the Regiment, J. Macleod, afterwards Deputy-Adjutant-General. In these—as in the other troops subsequently formed—great care was taken to appoint none but officers of well-known ability. This fact, combined with the permission given to the Horse Artillery to select the best recruits joining the Regiment, had the immediate effect of causing the new branch to be looked on as a corps d’élite: as, indeed, was the case in every other country in Europe, except Austria. Whether this has proved a benefit, or otherwise, to the corps, will hereafter be considered. The esprit generally to be found in a corps d’élite was fanned by other, minor, considerations. It must be remembered that the gunners of Field Artillery, other than Horse Artillery, and of Garrison Artillery, were, and still are, interchangeable. But in the Horse Artillery “the men were magnificently dressed, they were amply paid, and they were not haunted by the constant dread of being suddenly and forcibly torn from the Field Artillery service, which they loved, and thrust into the Garrison Artillery service, Hime. which was strange to them.” Only 4 guns per troop were granted at first; and the establishment consisted, in addition to the officers, of 8 non-commissioned officers, 49 gunners, R. H. A. Records. and 35 drivers. On the formation of C and D Troops, on 1st November, 1793, the armament of each troop was raised to 6 guns, and the establishment per troop was 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 45 drivers, and 187 horses.

The officers appointed to command the new troops were, E. Howorth, afterwards Sir E. Howorth, who subsequently commanded the Artillery at Talavera, Busaco, and Fuentes d’Onor, and J. M. Hadden, who afterwards became Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. The reader will continue to observe the selection always made of able officers to command the troops of Horse Artillery. In 1794, E and F Troops were formed, and the command given respectively to Captain W. Cuppage, an officer who afterwards held for twenty-six years the appointment of Inspector of the Royal Carriage Department, and to Captain J. Butler, an officer who afterwards became Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.

In 1794, the number of guns per troop was augmented to 8; and this remained the establishment until 1804, in which year the number was reduced to 6; at which it continued until the reductions after the battle of Waterloo. In 1794, when the number of guns was raised to 8, the following was the establishment: 15 non-commissioned officers, 97 gunners, 71 drivers, 246 horses per troop. This was reduced in the following year very considerably, and became 15 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 51 drivers, and 170 horses.

The next variation in the establishment was caused by the formation, in Ireland, of G Troop, from detachments serving in that country. The command of the new troop was given to Captain—afterwards Sir—G. B. Fisher, an officer who in 1827 was appointed Commandant of Woolwich. For two years after the formation of G Troop, the establishment of the troops was as follows: 8 guns, 16 non-commissioned officers, 96 gunners, 58 drivers, and 190 horses. An augmentation of 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 gunner per troop took place in 1803.

In 1804, the number of guns per troop having being reduced to 6, H Troop was formed at Woolwich, and the command given to Captain A. Macdonald, a smart officer, who subsequently had the good fortune to command the Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division at Waterloo. On the reduction to 6 guns, the strength of each troop was, 14 non-commissioned officers, 75 gunners, 46 drivers, and 142 horses.

In 1805, an augmentation of four troops took place—I, K, L, and M; and the commands were given respectively to Captain W. Millar, an officer who subsequently became Inspector of Artillery, and Director-General of the Field Train Department; to Captain C. Godfrey, an officer who went on half-pay a few years later, in 1811; to Captain N. Foy, who died in 1817; and to Captain the Hon. W. H. Gardner, who died as a Colonel-Commandant in 1856.

For the few years following this augmentation, the establishment remained virtually the same; but, in January 1813, 194 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men were added to act as Rocket Detachments, and also as a depôt to supply the troops on service. A depôt for the Royal Horse Artillery has existed under various names, and in somewhat chequered circumstances. It commenced—as stated above—in 1813; it existed for many years in the form of an Adjutant’s Detachment at Woolwich; in 1859 it was transferred to Canterbury; on a somewhat larger scale it was transferred to Maidstone after the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian Artilleries; for a short time subsequently, the Horse Artillery Batteries at home acted as a depôt for those serving abroad; and, at the date of the publication of this work, the last-mentioned arrangement is supplemented by the existence of two Horse Artillery Batteries in the general depôt for the Regiment.

In 1814, the various Rocket Detachments were combined, those at home becoming the 1st, and those abroad the 2nd, Rocket Troop. The officers appointed to command these were Captain W. G. Elliott, an officer who retired from the Regiment in 1828, and Captain—afterwards Sir—E. C. Whinyates, an officer whose ability, zeal, and services have hardly been surpassed in the Regiment. He ultimately—after a long and active career—became Commandant of Woolwich, where his kindly manners were long remembered. He commanded the Rocket Troop at Waterloo, where he was severely wounded.

Among the many heart-breaking reductions which exasperate the Artillery student, perhaps none are more distressing, than the reduction of the 2nd Rocket Troop in 1816. The 1st Rocket Troop had never been out of England; the 2nd had done good service at Leipsic and Waterloo. Neither of them had had a long existence; but one had had a stirring, glorious history. On the 16th May, 1815, the following order had been issued:—“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to command that the Rocket Troop of Royal Artillery, which was present at the Battle of Leipsic, be permitted to wear the word ‘Leipsic’ on their appointments, in commemoration of their services on that occasion.” And to the same troop the reward fell, given to those who had been at the Battle of Waterloo. Yet, when the pruning-knife came to be used, the troop which had earned these honours was selected for reduction; and, as if adding insult to injury, the word ‘Leipsic’ came actually to be worn by the surviving troop, which had never been on active service at all! On its reduction, the officers of the 2nd Rocket Troop were transferred to the Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers.

Up to this point, we have traced the growth, numerically, of the Royal Horse Artillery. The conclusion of hostilities after Waterloo led to very extensive reductions. In 1816, besides the 2nd Rocket Troop, D, K, L, and M Troops were Vide vol. i. p. 394. reduced, with the consequent changes of designation in the surviving troops. From a total, of all ranks, amounting to 2675, in 1815, and 2621 horses, the Horse Artillery fell in 1816 to 1181 men and 959 horses. Of the six troops in France with the Army of Occupation, the following was the establishment per troop, each troop having 6 guns:—

5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 56 drivers, 168 horses.

The troops on home service were allowed only 4 guns, and an establishment of 5 officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, 56 gunners, 24 drivers, 102 horses.

But this was merely a beginning. In 1819, B and G Troops were reduced; the troops in France were brought on the Home Establishment, and the number of guns per troop reduced to 2. The strength was then 5 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 47 gunners, 18 drivers, 36 horses, per troop; and the total strength of the Royal Horse Artillery did not exceed 616 of all ranks, and 317 horses.2

At this miserable establishment the troops remained for some years. In 1828, the two troops on service in Ireland were raised to 4 guns, and remained so; the relieving troops taking over 2 guns, and a suitable proportion of men, from those they relieved. In 1848, all the troops were raised to 4 guns, with the required increase of men and horses; and this lasted until 1852, when each troop was raised to 6 guns, the present establishment.

In 1847, the Rocket Troop became I Troop: and rocket carriages were added to the equipment of the whole.3