Early in the morning of the 12th, the Allies took possession of Toulouse, and the white flag was hoisted. Lord Wellington was received by the corporation at the Town Hall, and addressed them, pointing out the necessity of weighing well the step which they were about to take at a moment when a congress was possibly sitting, for the purpose of making peace with Napoleon. Vive le Roi! however, was heard from every lip, and every one mounted a white cockade. In the evening of the 12th, a messenger arrived from Paris with the intelligence of Napoleon’s abdication, and the restoration of the Bourbons. The intelligence was very welcome to the inhabitants of Toulouse, who could not but feel rather nervous after the step which they had taken. The same messengers carried to Marshal Soult the news of the Allies entering Paris, and of the official dethronement of Napoleon by the Senate; but he would give them no credence. How faithfully Napoleon was served by his Lieutenants, and how devotedly they clung to his cause, must be apparent to the most superficial reader of his history. In him, who has been called the incarnation of war in all its bad as well as good attributes, they saw but one who was facile princeps in the profession which they loved;—seeing this, they clung to his cause to the bitter end; and with a hungering in their hearts for his leadership, even while serving another prince, they turned to him, after his escape from Elba, with an enthusiasm more like the love of a woman than the cold, reasoning affection of a man. Soldiers, indeed, have many of the qualities of the other sex. Once let them believe in a leader, and no disasters, no slanders will upset their creed; and from a leader, whom they love, even many harsh words will be forgotten in the presence of one word of kindness. There are those who think that a soldier’s mind is like a blank page, on which their own views and wishes may with ease be inscribed. And in one sense they are right. Let skill and courage once be visible in a commander, and the obedience and enthusiasm of his men will be his; but let him supplement these qualities by thoughtful consideration, by kind words, by ready participation in hardships, and he will earn from them a love which shall pass even the love of women. But the kind words will not win it without the skill, nor the consideration without the courage.

On Soult’s refusing to credit the intelligence from Paris, Lord Wellington made arrangements for moving forward with the army. On the 16th, however, a French officer arrived from Paris with despatches for Marshal Soult; and this was followed by an officer arriving from the French army to treat with Lord Wellington. Had the despatches but arrived a little sooner, a loss of life would have been saved at Bayonne. A sortie was made from the city, on the 14th April, which, although unsuccessful, resulted in the death of General Hay and not a few brave officers, and in the capture of that most brave and chivalrous leader, Sir John Hope.

The war was now over; but, before closing this chapter, let a word be said with reference to the services of an officer of the Corps who commanded with distinction the rocket detachments attached to the Allied army at Leipsic in 1813, and who met a soldier’s death many years after, at the battle of Inkermann—Thomas Fox Strangways. At Leipsic he commanded, from the circumstance that his Captain, Bogue, fell early in the day. He was then but a subaltern; but ere he left the field, at the head of his brigade he received the personal From a Letter written by Lady Fox Strangways. thanks of the Allied sovereigns; and the Emperor of Russia, taking from his breast the order of St. Anne, placed it upon that of the young officer whose services had been so eminent on that day. In recounting the story of the battle, Sir Edward Cust says that such was the fearful effect of the rockets, that a whole brigade surrendered after enduring their fire for a few minutes; and it has also been recorded, on the best evidence, that, at a most critical time of the battle, the Crown Prince of Sweden rode up to him, and implored him to advance his brigade, as nothing else would save the day. To his exertions at Leipsic was the subsequent organization of regular rocket troops due; and on this taking place the command of the brave men, who had distinguished themselves at Leipsic, passed into the hands of one both able and brave,—one who had done noble service in the Peninsula, which he was to repeat at Waterloo,—gentle and yet enthusiastic,—the late Sir E. C. Whinyates.

In closing this narrative of the services of the Artillery in the Peninsula, it is impossible to avoid feeling that it has fallen immeasurably short of the narrative to which these services are justly entitled. It is felt that the attempt to place before the reader the chivalry, courage, and endurance of those who represented the Corps in the great wars with France, has been defeated by considerations of space, as well as by the writer’s inexperience. To realise these qualities thoroughly, it will be necessary for the reader to clothe these skeleton pages with the noble drapery of Napier.

But if these qualities, which are matter of history, have failed to receive adequate description, how much greater has been the shortcoming in endeavouring to picture those virtues, which can only be detected in the intimacy of private friendship, or the study of private correspondence! It is only from the latter that the student is now able to see how almost brotherly was the relationship between the officers of the Corps in Lord Wellington’s army. For example:—on hearing of Colonel Dickson’s promotion by the Portuguese Government, in the winter of 1813, what were the words of the man whom he had superseded, and who was as able as himself? “I wish,” wrote Sir Augustus Frazer, “that he were a General; he fully deserves all that can be given him either as honour or reward.” And as he felt, so did all. In the letters, also, announcing the Artillery losses at the various battles in that war, of which it has been said that the Allies “left 40,000 of their own number dead on Cust. the plains and mountains of the Peninsula,” how fervently does the loving, brotherly spirit appear! Each good quality in the dead is fondly dwelt upon; and as one gazes on the loving words, written on pages now so faded by hands so long still, there rises a picture of a Regimental unity which it were a sacrilege now to disturb by internal differences. It is, indeed, well at times to close our eyes to the present, and to look back at the past;—a standard is often to be found there which shall dwarf that which we may have set up in our self-esteem, and thought colossal. Possibly, never in the whole history of the Regiment has there been a time of such intellectual life among its members, as at the present day; but as the great school of experience, which in the beginning of this century made giants of our Artillerymen, is not now open, it may be that there is almost a danger in this mental activity, unless it be tempered by the study of comrades, who in days gone by were the embodiments of duty, courage, and hardihood. Thus history may furnish to the student a stability, which shall allay present restlessness.

CHAPTER XXII.
The Second American War.

The Canadian incidents in this war have been glanced at in the chapter on the Old Tenth Battalion; and the actions, in which the various Companies were engaged, have been given in the tables of the Battalions to which they belonged. No allusion has, however, been yet made to the disastrous chapter in the history of the war, in which the scene was laid at New Orleans; and, as the largest Artillery force together during the campaign was with the army on that service, it is proposed in this chapter to devote the chief space to the incidents connected with it.

The story of the second American War may be summarised as follows. On the 18th June, 1812, the Government of the United States declared war against Great Britain. It is not uncharitable to repeat what is matter of history, that the United States have always found their grievances against the mother-country more intolerable, when that country has happened to be engaged in war. It was so in 1812; and the dream of annexing Canada, which has haunted American statesmen for nearly a century, seemed likely to be realised. But, then, as since, the United States underrated the loyalty of the Canadians; and their attempted invasion in 1812 proved a ludicrous failure. Their first Cust. attempt was made with a force of 2500 men under a General Hall, who invaded Upper Canada, but was successfully resisted by a force of Regulars and Militia under a British General, Brock, and had to retire to the American side of the St. Lawrence, where he took shelter in Fort Detroit. Here he was followed by General Brock, to whom he surrendered on the 16th August. A similar fate awaited the second attempt made by the United States. A force of 1400 men, under General Wadsworth, crossed into Canada, near Niagara, in October 1812. The reception he met was a warm one; the American fort at Niagara was captured by the English; and after a few minor operations, in which, unfortunately, General Brock was killed, the American General surrendered himself, with 900 men, to General Sheaffé, who had succeeded to the command on the death of General Brock. A third invasion, on a larger scale, was then decided on. One detachment crossed the frontier between Chippewa and Fort Erie, but was repulsed with loss; while the main body menaced Montreal. Such, however, were the preparations made by the English General, Prevost, at the latter place, that the Americans withdrew into their own country without an engagement.

The operations during the year 1813 were on a larger scale, and success was not always on the side of the British. The year commenced with the defeat of the Americans at Fort Detroit by a mixed force under Colonel Procter; but was followed by the capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada. The lakes became the scene of very active hostilities. A severe engagement took place at the rapids of the Miami, a river flowing into Lake Erie, in which the English were successful, but could not maintain their position. Russell. The loss of Fort George, at Niagara, by the English followed; and this became for a time the American General’s head-quarters. Disasters on the lakes, which ensued, made the English position in Upper Canada very feeble; but affairs brightened in the autumn with the discomfiture of the Americans in their attempted invasion of Lower Canada. Operations were therefore ordered to be resumed in the west with vigour; and it having been found that the Americans had evacuated Fort George and set fire to many Canadian villages, the English followed them across the frontier, and took Fort Niagara and Buffalo, setting fire to the latter city in retaliation for the injury done to the Canadian settlements.

The attempts made by the Americans in the beginning of 1814 to invade Lower Canada were so unsuccessful, that the Cust. war was now limited to the more western districts, where they had the advantage on the lakes. The commencement of the campaign in the west was favourable to the Americans, but the arrival of reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington’s army in France speedily gave a change to the aspect of affairs. While the British troops were retreating in good order before the Americans, they were joined by General Drummond, with these fresh troops, and had hardly formed up before they were attacked by the enemy, and the combat known as the battle of Lundy’s Lane followed. It was a very fierce engagement, and lasted till midnight; and Ibid. so closely was it fought, that “several of the British Artillerymen were bayoneted at their guns;” but it ultimately resulted in the precipitate retreat of the Americans. This part of the enemy’s force was subsequently cooped up in Fort Erie, which was invested by General Drummond during the rest of the war. The strength of the Royal Artillery Kane’s List. in Canada had increased in 1814 to eight companies, under the command of Major-General Glasgow.

The commanding officers of Artillery at the various affairs which took place during the war in Canada, hardly worthy of the name of battles, were as follows:—

It had been decided by the English Government to carry the war into the enemy’s country in another direction, and the energy of the officer who commanded the expedition against Washington—Major-General Ross—was a marked contrast to the nervous indecision of Sir George Prevost, in the operations of the latter against the States from Canada. General Ross’s force came from France, and the companies of Artillery were those commanded by Captain—afterwards Sir John—Michell, Captain Carmichael, and Captain Crawford. Some rocket detachments, under Captain Deacon, formed part of the force. The engagements in which this army was engaged were the battle of Bladensburg, the capture of Washington, and the battle of Baltimore; on all which occasions—as in the previous operations in Canada—the Artillery earned the commendations of the Generals under whom they served. In one despatch it was said, that “the Royal Artillery, in the laborious duties they performed, displayed their usual unwearied zeal.” It is pleasant to find how often, in various campaigns, the services of the Corps are alluded to in almost these words. Courage is expected from every soldier; but a zeal, which no labour can weary, is a nobler, and as necessary a quality.

The next episode in the war is one which it is intended to treat at somewhat greater length,—the New Orleans expedition. On the 25th November, 1814, a squadron arrived MS. Journal of the operations against New Orleans by Major Forrest, A. Q.-M.-Gen. from England, with a body of troops under the command of Major-General Keane, and cast anchor in Negril Bay, Jamaica. Here the force, lately commanded by General Ross, who had been killed at the battle of Baltimore, was also assembled; and General Keane, as senior officer, assumed command of the whole, viz.:—

It will be observed, that the numbers of the 1st West India Regiment are not given. This is because at the date of both forces uniting, only seventy men of that Regiment had yet arrived.

Some modifications in the strength of the Royal Artillery took place during the campaign, but it may be as well to anticipate matters, and to give now the exact details of the force as it ultimately stood, on Christmas Day, 1814.

The information is obtained from the MS. official returns of that date; and those shown as “on board ship” were those who had not landed in time for the engagement on the 23rd December. They were landed immediately after the arrival of Colonel Dickson on the 25th December, which is mentioned hereafter.

Nominal List of Officers, Royal Artillery.

Major Alex. Munro.
Major J. Michell.
Captain L. Carmichael.
Captain H. B. Lane.
Captain Charles Deacon.
Captain Adam Crawford.
Captain W. C. Lemprière.
1st Lieutenant John Crawley.
1st Lieutenant Charles Ford.
1st Lieutenant R. A. Speer.
1st Lieutenant Francis Weston.
1st Lieutenant Benson E. Hill.
1st Lieutenant Alexander Ramsay.
1st Lieutenant Frederick Bayley.
1st Lieutenant James Christie.
1st Lieutenant Henry Palliser.
2nd Lieutenant T. G. Williams.
2nd Lieutenant B. L. Poynter.
2nd Lieutenant Henry Williams.

The fleet sailed from Jamaica on the 27th November, 1814, General Keane and the Admiral, Sir A. Cochrane, having preceded the others to make the necessary arrangements.

On the 24th December, a frigate from England joined the fleet, having brought out Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, as Commander of the Forces, accompanied by Colonel Dickson and Colonel Burgoyne, as commanding officers, respectively, of Artillery and Engineers. On their arrival they learnt that—certain difficulties in the way of a passage to New Orleans through the lakes having been removed—the army had landed at a creek at the head of Lake Borgne on the 24th December. Being very anxious to join them, Sir Edward Pakenham and his staff pushed on in a boat without delay, for a distance of forty miles, through a number of dismal reed-covered islands, reaching the ‘Britannia’ transport at 10 P.M. Here they learnt that General Keane had landed on the morning of the 23rd with 2000 men at the upper part of a creek called Bayou Catalan, at the head of Lake Borgne;—that he had advanced to the bank of the Mississippi, and on the evening of the same day had been attacked by a strong force of the enemy, which he had repulsed, but not without considerable loss;—that the army had not yet moved farther forward, but was waiting for more troops to join,—only 2000 having been landed at first, and the remainder having gone up the creek in schooners, many of which had gone aground. By rowing all night, and adding thirty miles to the journey already made, Sir Edward Pakenham and his staff reached the head-quarters of Sir Alexander Cochrane, which were established in a few fishermen’s huts,—the only habitations that existed for miles round in that most melancholy and unhealthy district. By 11 A.M. on the 25th December, they succeeded in reaching the landing-place at the head of the creek; and ascertaining that the army head-quarters were only 2½ miles farther on, they proceeded to join them. The road which they traversed was merely a wretched marshy footpath along the bank of a little canal or bayou, which extended from the creek almost to the Mississippi, and was navigable for canoes to within 1000 yards of that river. On arriving at headquarters, they found the army on the ground on which they had fought on the 23rd; the number of men landed having been increased to 3500. The Artillery, which had been landed and equipped, was as follows:—

The officers and men who had already landed were as follows:—

Sixty-four horses had also been landed.

The Marine Artillery numbered 1 officer and 26 men, and they were assisted by 3 naval officers and 39 seamen.

The guns were distributed as follows:—

The first duty which Colonel Dickson had to perform was to place what guns he had in battery, to destroy a 14-gun corvette, which lay in the Mississippi, and annoyed the camp. The gallant Colonel had a weakness for hot shot, and having made the necessary arrangements, placing all his guns on the levée (as the river embankment was called), except his 3-pounders, which were sent on with the advanced guard, he opened fire at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 27th December. He fired hot shot from his 9-pounders and shell from the other guns. He got the exact range almost at once, and the practice was excellent. The enemy returned a few random shots, and then the crew made for the shore; and until half-past 10, when the vessel blew up, not another shot was fired from it. The number of rounds expended in destroying this corvette was 191.

The army now prepared to advance against New Orleans; but, from want of horses, Colonel Dickson was obliged to leave two 6-pounders and a light howitzer behind; and as it had been resolved to make the ground which was their first head-quarters a sort of depôt for stores, &c., Captain Crawford was also left behind to superintend the forwarding of the necessary ammunition, &c., for the Artillery. The cold was so intense that the men of the West India Regiments suffered greatly, many dying from its effects, and all being more or less torpid. It seems superfluous to inform the reader that no change had been made in their dress or equipment, on leaving the West Indies, to prepare them for the change in temperature and the continued exposure.

On Sir E. Pakenham’s arrival, a rearrangement took place among the troops of the divisions. Major-General Gibbs was placed in command of the 4th, 44th, 21st, and 1st West India Regiments; and Major-General Keane in command of the 85th, 93rd, 95th, and 5th West India Regiments. The Artillery was distributed, as follows, for the advance:—Captain Deacon’s 3-pounder brigade and half the rocket equipment under Lieutenant Crawley, were to advance with General Gibbs’s brigade by a road leading through the fields to the main piquet-house of the enemy, against which they were to be employed to drive the enemy from the post, and to cover the advance of the column. The small mortars, and the other half of the rocket equipment, under Captain Lane, were attached to General Keane’s brigade, ordered to advance by the chief road, running along the bank of the river. Major Michell’s two 9-pounders and heavy howitzer, and Captain Carmichael’s two 6-pounders, were to be in reserve, and to move with General Keane’s column. The guns left behind with Captain Crawford were placed in battery on the river, to prevent boats or vessels passing up or down.

On the morning of the 28th December, at daybreak, the army moved forward; but the results of the day’s operations were far from favourable. General Gibbs’s column marched against the enemy’s piquet-house, known as La Ronde’s, and the 3-pounders and rockets having opened on it, it was soon evacuated by the American troops. Both columns then pressed on, and suddenly, at a turn of the road, found themselves within 700 or 800 yards of the enemy, whose force was drawn up behind an entrenchment flanked on either side by the river and a wood. A corvette was at anchor in the stream, to assist the American troops. A brisk cannonade was immediately opened against the English, and, although heartily replied to, the advantages of the enemy’s position were such that it was found advisable to withdraw to a distance of about 2200 yards from the enemy’s line, and to take up a position parallel to that of the Americans, and flanked by the river and the wood. Captain Carmichael’s 6-pounders had been disabled by the enemy’s fire, and were therefore exchanged for those left behind at the depôt. Entrenchments were thrown up in front of the 9-pounders, and a battery commenced in which it was proposed to place two 18-pounders which had been brought from the ships, transported on bullock-waggons originally intended for the conveyance of sugar hogsheads. This battery was at the angle of a field adjoining the high road to New Orleans, which ran parallel to the river. It was placed under the command of Lieutenant Speer, with a detachment of twenty gunners; and, as might have been expected from Colonel Dickson’s well-known proclivities, it was speedily supplied with the necessary apparatus for heating shot.

As Sir Edward Pakenham had decided on deferring any assault on the enemy’s position until some effect had been produced by heavy artillery, every exertion was used to land 18-pounder guns and 24-pounder carronades from the ships, and to draw them as far as La Ronde’s house, to remain there until the batteries should be got ready. Ammunition was also landed; but it was found necessary to take all the made cartridges to pieces and make fresh quantities, for which purpose all the available cotton and sheeting were taken from the houses in the neighbourhood, and all the regimental tailors were employed in making cartridges. The want of any artillery machines for the transport or placing of heavy ordnance was severely felt; the necessary guns however having been brought up on the 31st December, and ammunition having been prepared at the rate of 68 rounds per gun and 40 for each carronade, Sir Edward Pakenham directed that batteries should be made and armed that evening, as follows,—their position being where the army had penetrated when the first encounter with the enemy behind his entrenchments took place—about 800 yards distant from the American line:—

1. On the high road, and immediately adjoining the river, two 18-prs., with 50 rounds a gun, to fire upon the enemy’s defences on the right: officer in charge, Captain Lemprière. This battery was the most advanced of all.

2. A little in rear, and to the right of No. 1, was a battery of three 5½-inch mortars, with 30 shells each, under Captain Lawrence. A little in front of this battery, Captain Lane with the rocket battery was stationed.

3. To the right of the rocket battery a 7-gun battery was erected for Major Michell’s two 9-prs. and one heavy howitzer, and Captain Carmichael’s three 6-pounders (one of the disabled 6-prs. having been repaired) and his light howitzer. This battery was to be employed against the enemy’s guns, and the centre of his line.

4. On the centre road, which was parallel to the river and main road, and at right angles to the enemy’s entrenchments, there was a 10-gun battery, consisting of six 18-prs. under Captain Crawford, R.A., and four 24-pr. carronades under Captain Money, R.N. These guns were to be employed in the first instance against the enemy’s artillery, and afterwards to break down the entrenchment a little to the left of the centre.

5. To the right of the 10-gun battery was a second rocket battery under Lieutenant Crawley.

As these batteries had to be erected between 8.30 P.M. on the 31st December, 1814, and 5.45 A.M. on the following day, they could not be very strong. They were constructed of sugar casks filled with earth not rammed, one cask in thickness, and backed up. They were only one cask in height, and, as the platforms were also a little raised, it followed that the gunners, when standing erect, were head and shoulders above the parapet. The platforms were very ill-laid, uneven, and unsteady.

The night was very dark, and the working parties were not collected without much difficulty; but on Sunday morning, New Year’s Day, 1815, at daylight, all was ready. A heavy fog, however, came on at 4 o’clock, and not until 9 o’clock was it possible to see the enemy’s works. During the interval, the columns of Infantry moved to their respective posts to be in readiness for the assault.

On the fog clearing away, the English batteries opened vigorously, and at first a little confusion was apparent among the Americans. This soon disappeared, however; and, as their batteries were strong, and the embrasures strongly constructed with cotton bags, they soon served their guns admirably, and their heavy shot, penetrating the slight English batteries, caused a considerable number of casualties. After about three hours’ firing, the ammunition in the 10-gun English battery was nearly exhausted, the 7-field-gun battery had been silenced, a cheek of the heavy howitzer carriage was shattered, and several other injuries to the gun-carriage had been received. The heavy guns had, fortunately, received no injury; but want of ammunition soon compelled them to be silent also, to the great delight of the enemy. Even, however, if the ammunition had not failed, the nature of the batteries was such that the men could not have gone on much longer. The Americans fired from ten to twelve guns in their lines, and from four to five on the other side of the river, many of them being heavy guns—32-pounders and 24-pounders;—and although several of them had been dismounted by the fire of the English, the remainder were as active at the last moment as at any time during the day. The casualties among the Royal Artillery were as follows:—

Lieutenant Alexander Ramsay: mortally wounded.
12 Artillerymen killed.
13 Artillerymen wounded.

Owing to the uneven and loose state of the platforms, the ship carriages were found to be very awkward and unmanageable, so that the fire did not attain the necessary precision, nor could it be kept up with the rapidity necessary to silence the enemy’s guns. The carronades recoiled off the platform every round. The insufficient strength of the batteries, and the fact of the men being so unprotected, also tended to make the fire less active, and to prevent its silencing guns which were protected by good and solid cover. Colonel Dickson, in his report, said that if he had had heavy ordnance on proper travelling carriages, he was convinced that, with the same quantity of ammunition, he would have silenced or dismounted every gun in the American lines. It has been urged, and with reason, that it was a mistake to commence with so small a quantity of ammunition; but it must be remembered that there was no immediate certainty of a further supply, and the necessity of doing something had become every hour more urgent, as the Americans were busy daily in strengthening their position.

In consequence of the failure on the 1st January, Sir Edward Pakenham resolved to defer further action until the arrival of some reinforcements which he knew to be on the way, and in the meantime to withdraw the guns from the batteries, and the troops from the advanced position which they had taken up. The removal of the guns was not effected without great difficulty. The rain, which was falling continuously, had made the batteries and roads knee-deep with mud; but, thanks to the energy of Sir Edward himself, the whole was effected before daylight on the 2nd.

Although superfluous, it will confirm what has been so often said in the course of this history, with reference to the supply department of the Ordnance, if a few words written by Colonel Dickson be now quoted, with reference to the expedition against New Orleans, which had begun so unfortunately, and was to end so disastrously. “With respect,” he wrote, “to our own ammunition and stores, great quantities of articles have been sent that are perfectly unnecessary and never have been demanded, whereas others greatly required have never been sent, although demanded in the most urgent manner.” In this respect the narrative of the services of the Royal Artillery is singularly monotonous.

On the 3rd January, General Lambert arrived at head-quarters, and on the following day the 7th and 43rd Regiments marched in. The attack, which was now decided upon, cannot be understood without some preliminary explanation. It must be borne in mind that the Americans did not content themselves with remaining idly behind their entrenchments. They had erected flanking works at each end of their line, and had also made and armed batteries on the other side of the river, which were useful both for direct and enfilade fire. It was therefore resolved to send a column across the river, to attack and, if possible, capture the batteries there, prior to the general assault on the enemy’s main work. To do this it was necessary to obtain boats: and a canal was dug from the head of the lake to within a few yards of the river, up which forty-two ships’ boats were brought, ready to be launched in the river on the night of the attack. Considerable changes were made in the position and armament of the English batteries. In order to support the attack on the other side, the following guns were placed so as to command the river and fire at the enemy’s batteries on the right bank:—

The batteries against the main entrenchment on the left bank were two in number, containing four 18-pounders and four 24-pounders. It was first intended that Captain Michell’s brigade of heavy howitzers and 9-pounders should be sent across the river, if the attack on that side should prove successful; but this plan was subsequently altered, and Captain Michell’s brigade, with Captain Deacon’s, was employed in the main attack on the enemy’s line.

The attack took place on the morning of Sunday, the 8th January. As soon as it was dark on the previous night, the operation of carrying the boats from the canal to the Mississippi commenced, but was found to be more difficult than had been anticipated. There was scarcely any water in the opening which had been cut in the levée,—and between that and the stream the water was shallow, and the mud very deep. The greater part of the night was spent in getting the boats afloat. At 3.15 A.M. only thirty boats had been launched into the deep water, and the 85th Regiment alone had been embarked. The fatiguing nature of the work passed description, and the exertions made by all to overcome the difficulties were beyond praise. Many of the working parties were obliged to stand in mud which almost reached their waists; and yet there was not a word of complaint. Had the determination of the troops in the battle of the 8th been equal to that displayed on the night preceding, a painful chapter in English history need never have been written. The difficulties experienced in getting the force under Colonel Thornton transported across the river were almost equalled by those experienced in getting the batteries ready for the main attack. The ground over which the guns had to be transported was very heavy, and intersected with ditches: and at 4.30 A.M. the batteries were not yet half finished. The reader will bear in mind that it was necessary to defer the erection and armament of these batteries until the night preceding the engagement, in order to deceive the enemy.

When Sir Edward Pakenham quitted his quarters at 5 A.M. on the 8th, he was surprised to hear that Colonel Thornton’s party had not yet crossed the river; and, as it was so nearly daylight, he hesitated as to the wisdom of letting them go, as there would not be time for them to get possession of the works on the other side, and to bring up artillery to enfilade the enemy’s line in support of the general attack, which was to take place at daylight. Still, bearing in mind that, at the worst, Colonel Thornton’s movements would operate as a timely diversion, he sent to enquire how many men had been embarked: and, having been informed that the 85th Regiment, with some Marines—amounting in all to 460—had been put on board, and that there was room for 100 more,—he ordered that additional number to be embarked, and the whole to cross without delay.

Too literal obedience to orders is often fatal. Had the officer superintending the launching of the boats made use of a smaller number, and made more frequent trips with them across the river, there is little doubt that he would easily have succeeded in transporting the whole force in sufficient time. But, having received orders to launch forty-two boats, he obeyed his orders to the letter; nor did the unexpected difficulties which he encountered suggest to him the propriety of consulting Sir Edward Pakenham, with a view to modifying his orders, and bringing them into accord with the altered circumstances. The hurried embarkation at the end, and the smaller force employed, produced the alteration already mentioned in the disposition of the Artillery intended to accompany Colonel Thornton’s force. Major Michell, without his guns, and Captain Lane’s rocket detachments alone crossed the river.

At 5.30 A.M. Sir Edward proceeded to the front. Colonels Dickson and Burgoyne followed him; and the description of the battle may be summarised from the voluminous account of the former officer. Day was fast breaking, and, as they passed the house known as La Ronde’s, a rocket was fired, which, they afterwards learned, was a signal for the advance of the columns to the attack. They had not proceeded much farther when the fire of musketry commenced, followed by that of artillery; and, as they proceeded to a point about 600 yards distant from the enemy’s line, they observed the reserve troops moving forward by a road on their flank. It was evident that the attack should have been made a little earlier in the morning, as the Americans could not have directed their fire with such certainty against the English columns, which, as Colonel Dickson rode forward, he perceived must be distinctly visible from the enemy’s lines. At first the musketry fire was scattered along the line; it then became more general, although not so incessant as might have been expected. The fire of artillery was heavy, and kept up with the utmost vigour; but as Colonel Dickson advanced, he observed the infantry fire to be slackening,—heard that Sir Edward Pakenham was badly wounded,—and met the troops coming back in great confusion, the 1st Brigade, however, which had been in reserve, continuing to advance in good order. Seeing the field Artillery on his left slowly retiring, Colonel Dickson rode up, and ascertained from Captain Carmichael that he had moved forward according to order, taken up a position, and opened as soon as the musketry fire commenced; but that he had scarcely fired five rounds a gun when the attacking columns broke at the head, and such numbers of men came in front of his guns that he was obliged to cease firing; and being under a most heavy fire, without the power of returning it, he had thought it best to fall back. One 3-pounder gun had been dismounted, both gun-wheels having been shot away. It was soon apparent that the attack had entirely failed; but the sight of the 1st Brigade continuing to advance, and the 2nd commencing to re-form, gave some hopes of its renewal. These were, however, soon dissipated; the artillery and musketry fire of the enemy continued unslackened; and the 1st Brigade, followed by the other troops, was soon observed to move to the right towards the wood, and to lie down under cover. During the whole of these events, the fire from the Royal Artillery batteries, under Major Munro, was kept up with the greatest vigour. Colonel Dickson then moved the brigades of Artillery, and formed line for action on the road. While doing this, he heard that both General Gibbs and MS. Journal of Sir A. Dickson. General Keane were wounded,—the former mortally. “A little afterwards,” he wrote, “I heard of the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, who perished in a noble effort to re-establish the confidence of the troops, which had halted from panic just as they were arriving at the line of the enemy,—a panic which no exertion could restore, and which occasioned their total repulse and defeat. Major Macdougal, Sir Edward’s aide-de-camp, informed me that at the moment the column of General Gibbs’ brigade stopped they began firing front and rear, and Sir Edward, who was at some distance behind to observe the operation, immediately galloped up to the head of the column, exclaiming, ‘Lost from want of courage!’ and was trying to encourage the troops on, which he succeeded in doing for a few yards, when he was wounded in the thigh, and his horse killed. Major Macdougal having extricated and raised him from the ground, he was in the act of mounting Macdougal’s horse when he was hit again, and fell into Macdougal’s arms, ejaculating a few words, which were the last he spoke. He expired just as he was conveyed to General Gibbs’ house, thus falling a sacrifice to the misconduct of his troops, by which Great Britain lost one of her ablest and bravest soldiers, and myself one I must ever regret both as a commander and a friend.”

The troops advanced until very near the enemy’s line; but, the enemy’s fire becoming extremely heavy, they stopped, and began firing; and, confusion taking place, nothing could induce them to advance farther; so that, after losing a great number of officers and men, they fell back. A party, consisting of the light companies of the 7th, 43rd, and 93rd Regiments, with one hundred negroes, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Rennie, 21st Regiment,—taking with them a spiking party of Artillery, under Lieutenant Ford,—attacked the advanced work on the right of the enemy’s line, which they succeeded in carrying, but not without great loss, Colonel Rennie and many officers and men being killed. They kept possession of the outwork for some time, and at last were obliged to leave it, in consequence of the heavy fire from the main work. This force was the advanced part of General Keane’s column, which consisted of the 93rd Regiment, with two companies of the 95th. It had been arranged that, in the event of Colonel Thornton succeeding in capturing the works on the other side of the river, General Keane’s column should press after Colonel Rennie’s force, and endeavour to turn the right of the enemy’s line through the small outwork. Unfortunately, the delay in sending Colonel Thornton’s force across caused Sir Edward Pakenham to alter this plan; and General Keane’s column was ordered to join the left of the 2nd Brigade in the main attack. What was the result? General Keane complied with the new order, and attacked the line to the left of the 2nd Brigade; but the ditch was found to be too deep at this place, and, after the most gallant exertions, his attack was repulsed with heavy loss. Had Colonel Rennie’s force, on taking the outwork, been followed by the 93rd Regiment, it is extremely probable that, by means of the open communication between it and the main work, the latter might have been entered and carried.

In the meantime, Colonel Thornton’s force, which had crossed the river without opposition, advanced rapidly, and carried everything before them. They turned and captured with great gallantry the whole of the enemy’s entrenchments, becoming possessors of the flanking batteries, which it had been decided, if possible, to secure and silence before the main attack commenced. These batteries contained sixteen Major Michell to Colonel Dickson, 8 Jan. 1815. guns and howitzers; and on one of the latter was found the inscription, “Taken at the surrender of York Town in 1781.” Major Michell’s conduct during this attack was thus described in Colonel Thornton’s despatch: “Major Michell of the Royal Artillery afforded me much assistance by his able direction of the firing of some rockets, it not having been found practicable in the first instance to bring over the artillery attached to his command.” Had the attack on the left bank of the Mississippi been as well carried out as that on the right, the defeat of the Americans would have been certain. As it was, General Lambert, to whom the command fell on the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, seeing how desperate the state of affairs was, and bearing in mind that no fewer than 2000 men had been killed or wounded, decided on withdrawing the army to its old encampment, which was to be strengthened to prevent surprise—should the enemy adopt the offensive. He also recalled Colonel Thornton’s force from the other bank, but not until that gallant officer had demolished the captured batteries and spiked their guns. He then decided on abandoning the expedition;—levelling the batteries which had been thrown up;—and rendering the heavy ordnance unserviceable. The boats were removed from the river and placed in the canal, and the wounded were sent away as rapidly as the limited boat accommodation would permit. In answer to some proposals made by General Lambert, the Americans agreed that all prisoners should be returned on both sides; and promised that the wounded in their possession should be sent down the river to the English ships.

The retreat of the English army towards the landing-place, where they were to re-embark, was admirably conducted in the face of great difficulties. The design was so effectually concealed from the enemy, that by the 18th January the whole army, with its field artillery and stores, had moved, and the bridges in its rear had been destroyed, without attracting the enemy’s notice. It may interest the reader to know that the rocket detachments acted as the Artillery of the rear-guard. On the evening of the 28th January the whole of the army had embarked on board the fleet. In the despatch from General Lambert reporting the ‘London Gazette,’ 8 March, 1815. re-embarkation of the army, he wrote: “Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, Royal Artillery, has displayed his usual abilities and assiduity: he reports to me his general satisfaction with all the officers under his command, especially Major Munro, senior officer of the Royal Artillery previous to his arrival, and the officers commanding companies.”

Before the news of the Peace, which had been concluded between England and America, reached the army which had been discomfited at New Orleans, a successful affair for the English arms took place. General Lambert had now proceeded with his force against Fort Bowyer, Mobile, and, after deliberate approaches by the Engineers, and the erection of powerful batteries, the fort was summoned. After a short parley, its Governor surrendered: begging, however, to be permitted to defer its evacuation until the following day, as so many of his men had got drunk. This was agreed to: but the gate of the fort was immediately given over to a company of British Infantry, and the British flag was hoisted. On the 12th February, the garrison marched out; and on the 13th, the arrival of the news of the Peace, which had been signed at Ghent, put an end to further operations.

The Second American War was unjustifiable in its commencement—was unpopular with the majority of the Northern States—and failed to effect either of the two great objects desired by the Americans—the annexation of Canada, or the coercion of embarrassed England into their own terms. Sixty years have passed away; and the first of these dreams is as visionary as it ever was. The loyalty of Canada is undimmed; and her power for self-defence is marvellously increased. She remains a Naboth’s vineyard in the eyes of American Ahabs: but their power for gratifying their lust is diminishing yearly with the development of Canadian resources, and the political manhood of the Canadian people. What is to be said of the second of the two objects which inspired the men who declared the war of 1812? For nearly three years—while they were fighting obscure and petty battles in the north and west, in which the combatants were numbered by hundreds only—the country, which they had attacked so wantonly while bearing her Titanic burden of war, was writing on the pages of history tales of conquest in Europe, which shall never die. Not until her hands were free again did England suffer the disaster at New Orleans: as if the fates grudged her unfilial sons their wish to strike with disaster the parent country, while in the agony of another struggle. And ere they obtained this one solace from New Orleans, the hand of the invader had reached the American capital.

But what better description of the uselessness of this war can be given than the words used by a modern historian in describing the Peace agreed to between the two countries? Russell’s ‘History of Modern Europe.’ “No notice whatever,” he writes, “was taken of the circumstances which occasioned the war.”

CHAPTER XXIII.
Waterloo.

The year, with which this narrative must for the present be brought to an end, was an eventful one. The same year which witnessed the great battle of Waterloo was the hundredth of the Regiment’s existence. How marvellous was the development of England’s Artillery between 1716 and 1815, cannot be better seen than in contrasting the two struggling companies of the former year with the magnificent force of Artillery collected in Belgium in 1815, of which its commander, To D. A. G. dated Brussels, 16 May, 1815. Sir George Wood, wrote: “I do believe there never was in the world such a proportion of Artillery so well equipped. The result must be felt by Europe.”

The growing importance of the arm is apparent from the following statistics. The proportion of guns per 1000 men in the British armies at Marlborough’s three famous battles was as follows: Blenheim, 1·2; Ramilies, 2; and Malplaquet, 1·1. In the Peninsula, the proportion was somewhat higher: at Corunna, 3; Talavera, 1·2; Albuera, 1·2; Salamanca, 2; Vittoria, 1·3; Nivelle, 1·3; Orthes, 1·3; and Toulouse, 1·2. But during the whole of the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington complained that he was inadequately supplied with Artillery; and as soon as war was inevitable in 1815, he urged upon the Government at home to send him a large proportion of that arm. The result was that in the British army at the battle of Waterloo the proportion of guns per 1000 men was no less than 3·7.

The circumstances, which led to this great battle, must first be briefly stated. It will be in the reader’s recollection that in February 1815, Napoleon quitted Elba; and on the 20th March entered the Tuileries. As he had foreseen, the army rallied round him; but to his mortification he found coldness and even mistrust on the part of the Chambers, and a decided apathy on the part of the civil population. He beheld also the whole of continental Europe resolving to arm against him,—to stamp out the man, who had so audaciously violated the solemn Convention of Paris; while England—to compensate for the weakness of her military contingent—furnished money to the other Powers, and a General whose name was in itself a host. No uncertain sound came from the European council, which sat at Vienna; and Napoleon saw before him a stern and growing resolution for war to the bitter end. He was not sorry. If he could win battles, he knew that he would have found a cure for all coldness at home:—the army, which had again placed him on the throne, would, if victorious, consolidate his power, and make him independent of all who distrusted him. He commenced, therefore, to reorganize and equip a force which should sweep all before it. He hastened his preparations, in the hope of encountering his enemies in detail, before they should have effected that concentration of their armies along the entire eastern frontier of France, which he knew they contemplated. It will be seen, hereafter, that on more than one occasion during this last of Napoleon’s campaigns, he was guilty of unaccountable lack of energy; but no one can fail to admire the spirit and ability with which in the short spring of that fatal year he organized the army, which was to ensure his complete success, or witness his utter ruin.

To realise his difficulties, one must bear in mind the state Hooper. of the country which he governed. “France had exhausted her vigour in the unrestrained indulgence of her passion for military glory. Her blood was impoverished,—her muscles relaxed, her nerves unstrung, her moral force debilitated by twenty-three years of almost uninterrupted warfare. The laurels gathered in a hundred battles were poor compensation for a paralyzed industry and a crippled commerce,—for desolate corn-fields and half-cultured vineyards. She was ’la belle France’ no longer;—she had used her prime in the debauch of war!” And yet from this country, Napoleon, before the middle of June, had raised the effective force of the regular army to no less than 276,000 men; besides having 200,000 other and inferior troops.

He determined to carry the war first into Belgium. For concentrating an army with this view, the line of fortresses on the French frontier to the north-east offered special advantages. And, on crossing it in force, he hoped to defeat the Prussians and English separately,—to make by this means the war and the Government unpopular in England,—and to detach from the Allies some whom he believed to be but half-hearted in their opposition to him. Another and important reason for selecting Belgium as the theatre of his operations, was the undoubted presence in that country of many who on his first success would flock to his standard.

On the night of the 14th June, Napoleon had collected on the French side of the frontier an army ready to march on the following morning, consisting of 128,000 men, and 344 guns. Of this number, 22,000 were cavalry; and the whole force was divided into five corps d’armée, besides the Imperial Guard, and four corps of reserve cavalry. On that night he slept at Avesnes, which he made his head-quarters, and from which he issued a characteristic address to his troops. Leaving him there,—with the great mass of his Hooper. army “gathered, so to speak, to a head at Beaumont,” and pointing directly upon Charleroi,—the reader is invited to turn to the English army, and examine its constitution and disposition.

A force of Artillery had been in Holland for some time with Sir T. Graham,—under the command of Sir G. A. Wood; and this formed the nucleus of the contingent of that arm in the Duke of Wellington’s army in Belgium. Many names familiar to the reader re-appear in the lists of those who fought at Waterloo. Colonel—now Sir Alexander—Dickson was still in America; but arrived in time for the battle. Others, who had received honours for their Peninsular services, were also there: Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir John May, Sir Hew Ross, and Sir Robert Gardiner. Norman Ramsay, transferred to another troop in order to be present, had also joined; and was already, as Sir Augustus Frazer Frazer’s Letters, p. 532. wrote, “adored by his men:—kind, generous, and manly, he is more than the friend of his soldiers.” Other names will appear, as the narrative proceeds; suffice it at present to say that it is doubtful if ever in one field, or even in one generation, the Regiment has had so many able men gathered together.

Sir George Wood was enthusiastic, and revelled in his command. His enthusiasm, while not forbidding him to point out his wants, aided him in remedying or bearing them. They were at first but two in number; but they were rather important to a force, for they were officers and men. Fortunately for him and the Corps, General Macleod was still Deputy Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery, and was indefatigable in supplying Sir George Wood’s demands. As fast as the companies and drivers arrived from America, they were sent to Belgium; but the demand still exceeded the supply. Only six days before the battle, it is recorded that no fewer than 1000 drivers were wanting. This had been partly caused by the Duke of Wellington insisting on the formation of three brigades of 18-pounders, to be placed under the command of Sir Alexander Dickson; and partly by the demands of the small-arm ammunition trains. He would neither hire nor enlist Belgian drivers, saying that he placed too much consequence on his Artillery to trust it to such a crew; and he ordered Sir George Wood to write to General Macleod, requesting that four companies of foot Artillery might be sent out to act as drivers. It was not often that the Duke tried to coax the Board, or honoured Sir G. Wood to D. A. G. Brussels, 9 June, 1815. it with his reasons; but on this occasion he did. He said that he was well aware that it was not the particular duty of Artillery soldiers to take care of horses, but he was confident that should the Master-General be pleased to allow that duty to be performed by gunners for the present, the service would receive much greater benefit,—“the Artillery officers having more power over their own men, than any given number from the Line;” and that in the case of a siege they might do their Artillery duties in the trenches, as at Antwerp in 1814.

It was on the 4th April, 1815, that the Duke of Wellington reached Brussels. Less fortunate than Sir George Wood, he found that his demands, at first, were merely made excuses by the authorities at home for the exercise of official patronage. He at last ironically suggested to them that it would be well, before sending him any more Generals, to send him some men for them to command. The local arrangements, as far as the Artillery was concerned, are graphically described in Sir A. Frazer’s letters, and in General Mercer’s journal of the Waterloo campaign. The historian must, however, draw his information from a less sparkling stream,—the official letters of Sir George Wood and others. From these it is ascertained that Ostend was the principal port of disembarkation for artillery and stores: that Sir George Wood himself, and afterwards Sir A. Frazer and Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Adye, superintended the arrival of these at Ostend, and their removal to various places; and that in these matters they were assisted by a man whom all united to pronounce marvellously able, Mr. Commissary Stace.