Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald thus described the services of his Adjutant: “In justice to the conduct of Captain Pakenham, who acted as my Adjutant in the battle of the 18th, I feel it a duty I owe this most promising officer to state to you that he made himself equally conspicuous by his coolness and bravery, and the precision with which he conveyed my orders to the troops of Horse Artillery I had the honour to command on that occasion.” Sir Augustus Frazer spoke in equally favourable terms of his Adjutant: Ibid. 23 June, 1815. “I beg to submit my hope that, in the promotion which may be expected, the Horse Artillery may not lose the services of Lieutenant Bell, who, both here and in the Peninsula, has acted as Adjutant of Horse Artillery, and is an officer of much professional merit, whose judgment, intelligence, and unceasing application to the duties of his office, have rendered him very valuable.”

Major Bull thus described the conduct of his gallant troop, now D Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery: Major Bull to Sir A. Frazer, 19 June, 1873. “I consider it a duty I owe equally to the officers, non-commissioned officers, gunners, and drivers, to say that, throughout the day, and in every situation, nothing could exceed their coolness, intrepidity, and strict attention to orders; and as a proof of their zeal in the service, at one period of the evening when we were short of ammunition, and H Troop” (Major Ramsay’s) “on our left rather short of gunners, on an application for assistance, several of my men volunteered joining their guns, until our ammunition came up; and as far as was prudent or necessary, I granted their request. I must also beg leave to say that, from Major Cairnes having unfortunately fallen very early in the action, I received the greatest assistance throughout the day from Lieutenant Louis’s activity; and it is but justice to this officer to add, that, when I was under the necessity of quitting the field for half an hour, in consequence of my being wounded, he commanded the troop during my absence in a manner that did himself great credit, and gave me perfect satisfaction at a very arduous period of the action.”

General Colquhoun Grant, in writing of Captain Walcott, To Sir G. A. Wood, dated 15 July, 1815. said: “I beg to recommend this gallant and meritorious officer to your attention.” He added: “I have great pleasure in embracing this opportunity to mention my entire and full approbation of the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Webber Smith, and the officers and men of his troop” (now B Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery), “during the whole of the period they have been attached to the brigade under my command.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald,—an enthusiastic Horse Artilleryman—in addition to the letter quoted above, wrote Ibid. dated 16 July, 1815. as follows: “In addition to the names of the various officers belonging to the six troops of Royal Horse Artillery, attached to the Cavalry, whose lot it was to command troops on the memorable day of the 18th June, it has occurred to me to be no less my duty to express to you my admiration of the cool and determined conduct of Captain Walcott, who was some time detached from his troop on that day; and who, in the handsomest manner, after the whole of his ammunition was expended, volunteered to take charge of some of the guns of Major Ramsay’s troop, after it had suffered much by the loss of officers. It is also highly satisfactory to me to report to you the equally gallant conduct of Captain Dansey, of Captain Whinyates’s Rocket Troop, which I also had an opportunity of witnessing; and who was wounded when detached with rockets in the chaussée, which crossed the centre of the position. You are already aware, from your own observation, how much all the officers of these troops distinguished themselves on the occasion, and what a noble example they set to the non-commissioned officers and men by whom it was so gallantly initiated. Words are indeed inadequate to express my sense of the conduct of all, where the reputation, which the Horse Artillery had before obtained, was so nobly sustained, if not even surpassed; and which I must plead as my excuse for extending the limits of this communication beyond my original intention, viz., that of drawing your attention to the merits of Captains Walcott and Dansey.”

In reporting the death of Major Lloyd, from his wounds, Dated Paris, 3 Aug. 1815. Sir George Wood wrote: “I can, without hesitation, affirm that a braver, or more zealous officer, never entered a field of battle; and who did his duty on the 16th and 18th to the satisfaction of every General officer.” A few days later, in enclosing a letter from Lieutenant Brereton, Sir Ibid. 17 Aug. 1815. George said: “I have received from every commanding officer the handsomest testimony of the conduct of Lieutenant Brereton, both in the Peninsula, and at the battle of Waterloo; and I have it from General Byng to say that, on the battle of the 16th (the Horse Artillery not being engaged on that day), he proffered his service to act as aide-de-camp, which service he performed to the great satisfaction of the General.” At a subsequent date, in forwarding an application from Major Percy Drummond, Ibid. 8 Oct. 1815. Sir George Wood said: “I have ever found Major Drummond a most active, zealous, and attentive officer, having been under my command on several occasions, particularly in the battle of Waterloo.” In acknowledging a letter from Ibid. 28 Jan. 1816. Major Rogers, Sir George said: “Your company at all times did you every justice, and proved it under your command at the battle of Waterloo, in which your brigade bore a distinguished feature.” Almost every officer who served in the Artillery at Waterloo, received from his gallant commander some official commendation; and, by this means, many Regimental incidents connected with the battle have been handed down. In writing, for example, about an officer who lived to be a revered General in the Corps, Sir George Wood said: Dated Valenciennes, 29 Feb, 1816. “Lieutenant William Anderson has conducted himself in every situation as a good and zealous officer. On the 18th June,—on many occasions during that day,—he carried my orders, and brought off some disabled guns under a severe fire. Having my horses shot, I was forced to dismount him.”

At the battle of Waterloo, the Artillery expended 10,400 rounds of ammunition. The amount fired by one battery, Captain Sandham’s, has already been stated; and it may be mentioned here that Captain Whinyates’s troop fired 309 shot, 236 spherical case, 15 common case, and 52 rockets.

The subsequent operations of the English army during the year, in which this history comes, for the present, to an end, will merely be glanced at. The main body of the army marched at once towards Paris; and the damage suffered by the Artillery during the battle was so quickly repaired, that Sir George Wood was able to take every gun with him that had been on the field, with four 18-pounders in addition; Sir George Wood to D.-A.-Gen., dated 3 July, 1815. making a total of 123 pieces of ordnance, and over 20,000 rounds of ammunition, with which the army marched on Paris. The collapse of any opposition, and the ultimate occupation of that city by the Allies, are facts well known to the reader. There were, however, some Artillery operations against the French fortresses, in which some brigades of Artillery, under Sir Alexander Dickson, were engaged. Maubeuge surrendered on the 12th July, and was taken possession of on the 14th, after three days’ open trenches, and firing. Landrecy surrendered on the 21st, and was taken possession of on the 23rd July, after two day’s open trenches, Sir A. Dickson, to D.-A.-G., dated 12 Aug. 1815. and about two hours’ firing. Marienbourg surrendered on the 28th, and was taken possession of on the 30th July, after one day’s open trenches and heavy bombardment. Philippeville was taken possession of on the 10th August, having surrendered on the 8th, after one day’s open trenches and heavy bombardment. Sir Alexander Dickson spoke in the highest terms of the officers and men under his command; he attributed to their energy the fact that at every place he was able to collect, previous to commencing operations, sufficient ordnance and ammunition to have reduced it, as he said, by main force. At Maubeuge, he had 60 guns—30 of which were 24-pounders,—20,000 round shot, and 26,000 shells. At Landrecy he had 60 guns, 24,000 round shot, and 22,000 shells. At Marienbourg, he had 15 mortars, with 3000 shells; and 6 24-pounders arrived, just as the place surrendered. At Philippeville, he had 66 pieces of ordnance, with 17,000 round shot, and 23,000 shells. During these operations, the Artillery was attached to a corps of the Prussian army, by which the sieges of the fortresses were conducted. The terms on which the duties were performed Sir A. Dickson to D.-A.-G., dated 12 Aug. 1815.were somewhat peculiar. “Our line of duty,” wrote Sir A. Dickson, “is to move the battering-train, keep it in order, fix the shells, fill the cartridges, and, in short, do every individual thing except fighting the guns: which my instructions neither authorize me to do, nor would it be pleasant to do, if they did; for we should not get the credit we ought, when working in competition with the Prussian Artillery: whereas, as the duty is conducted now, every fair and just credit is allowed for our exertions, and the service goes on with the utmost cordiality. Prince Augustus of Prussia is chief of the Artillery of that kingdom, and he takes into his own hand very much the application of the artillery; which is very pleasant for me, as I receive all the arrangements and instructions, direct from his Royal Highness. An application is given in every morning at the park during a siege, expressing the ordnance and ammunition required for the next day; and in the evening the Prussian Artillery come to receive their demands. I have, however, a few officers and men of the Royal Artillery in the trenches, to afford any assistance when required; and also to watch the practice, report about the fuzes, &c.”

After the fall of Philippeville, Major Carmichael’s company, with the advanced division of the battering-train, consisting of thirty-three mortars and howitzers, reached a point near Rocroy, on the 15th August:—followed by Major Michell’s and Major Wall’s companies with ten 24-pounders, and a large supply of ammunition. The Prussians opened the trenches on the night of the 15th, and batteries were prepared for twenty-one mortars and howitzers. With such effect were these opened on the morning of the 16th, that before 9 A.M. Rocroy capitulated. After this event, Prince Augustus expressed himself highly satisfied with the exertions of the British Artillery attached to the battering-train; and orders reached Sir Alexander Dickson from the Duke of Wellington to bring the second battering-train, which was at Antwerp, to Brussels, and to land it forthwith. The next operation of any importance was against the town of Givet, against which no fewer than one hundred guns were collected. Before the bombardment commenced, however, the Governor consented to give up the place, and retire into Charlemont; which he did on the 11th September.

A force under Sir Charles Colville had been sent against Cambray, immediately after Waterloo, and the place—after a short siege—was carried on the 25th June. Of the conduct To the Duke of Wellington, 26 June, 1815. of the Artillery on this occasion, Sir Charles wrote: “The three brigades of Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Webber Smith, and Majors Unett and Brome, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker, made particularly Sir George Wood to D.-A.-G., Paris, 4 Sept. 1815. good practice.” The services of Major Unett’s brigade (now 3 Battery, 7th Brigade) received special mention in a report from Sir Charles Colville to Sir George Wood; and the following extract from a letter written by its gallant commander may interest the officers and men now serving in Major Unett to Sir G. Wood, dated 3 Aug. 1815. the battery. “My brigade, being in reserve, had not an opportunity of witnessing the late glorious battle of Waterloo, but it afterwards proceeded with the 4th Division of the army for the purpose of reducing the fortress of Cambray; and, in justice to my officers, I must be permitted to say that my three subalterns, never having been under fire before, deserve much praise for their cool and steady behaviour at their guns (within four hundred yards of the curtain of the citadel, in an open field), and which was clearly evinced by the uncommon good practice made, which so completely silenced the enemy as to cause (by driving them from their guns and ramparts) a most trifling loss to our Infantry when they stormed the place.” The French king entered Cambray on the day after it was taken: and on the same day, Peronne was taken by General Maitland and the Guards.

Arrangements for concluding hostilities, and entering upon a treaty, were soon made in Paris. One of the conditions inflicted on the French people was that an army of occupation should be left in France for five—afterwards reduced to three—years; and considerable difficulty was found in apportioning the various arms in the English contingent of that army.

The Duke of Wellington decided on reducing the Artillery share to a point far below what Sir George Wood thought desirable; and the latter urged his views very strongly, but, as he said, “What can a Lieut.-Colonel do against a Field-Marshal?”49 However, his importunity succeeded in obtaining an addition of two companies to the Artillery force which was at first intended to remain in France.

The following was the number ultimately decided upon:—

1 Colonel	for duty as the Regimental Staff of the Royal Artillery in the Army of Occupation.
1 Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
1 Brigade Major

Three troops of Royal Horse Artillery to be attached to the Cavalry, and to amount to 542 of all ranks, with 516 horses.

Seven brigades of Foot Artillery, having a company of Artillery to each; six of which were to be attached to the three divisions of the army, and one to be in reserve. The total of all ranks, with these brigades, amounted to 790; and there were in addition 599 officers and men of the Royal Artillery Drivers, and 770 horses.

For duty with the small-arm ammunition brigades for the three divisions of the army, there were three officers of Royal Artillery; 150 non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Artillery Drivers; and 210 horses.

There was also a company of Royal Artillery in reserve, numbering 111 of all ranks.

One Lieut.-Colonel and one Major were attached to the Royal Horse Artillery.

Two Lieut.-Colonels and one Major were attached to the Royal Artillery.

And one Lieut.-Colonel was attached to the Royal Artillery Drivers.

The following were the five troops of Horse Artillery selected to return to England, when the above establishment was decided upon:—

Orders for the shipment of the battering-train also arrived in the end of 1815, with a view to its return to England; and, as Sir Alexander Dickson’s active duties on the continent then ceased, it seems but justice to the memory of one whose name has occupied so prominent a place in these pages, to quote a passage from a letter written by Sir George Wood, proving that his exceptional Peninsular honours had To D.-A.-G., R.A., dated Cambray, 2 April, 1816. not unfitted him for serving, when required, in a subordinate position:—“You may expect Sir A. Dickson in the course of the next week at Woolwich. I have found him the same good officer and man, as you well know him.”

The reductions, which followed the battle of Waterloo have been frequently alluded to in these volumes. They would furnish but a gloomy topic for the historian, for the pruning-knife was used without regard to sentiment, and some of the best companies in the regiment were the victims.

It is more pleasant to close this story in 1815, when the Corps was at the greatest strength attained since its birth,—a hundred years before. Suffice it to say that from 114 Kane’s List. troops and companies in that year, it fell to 79 before 1819, and even these were mere ghosts or skeletons of their former selves. For nearly thirty years, after 1819, the history of the Regiment was almost a blank page, and hopelessness and depression weighed heavily on its members.

But 1815 is the year in which this narrative ends; nor is it meant to close it with any gloomy foreshadowing of the years of inaction and despondency, which rolled on with dismal monotony, until the Regimental firmament was lit by the lurid fires of the Crimean struggle. In 1815 the military reputation of England was at a maximum. She possessed an army which had graduated with honours in the sternest school, and a General to whose words the Sovereigns of Europe listened with deference. Determination, single-mindedness, and an exalted sense of duty were the qualities which had animated the Duke of Wellington through his whole career. Their reward was found in his successes; and his successes were crowned in Paris. Imperfections exist in the most able, and even in the most conscientious; and England’s greatest General was certainly no exception to this rule. But, if we allow for the irritation caused by frequent and injudicious interference,—and for occasional hastiness, which led him to speak without always testing the accuracy of his information,—we must admit the Duke of Wellington to have been the most perfect type of an English soldier ever presented in the pages of our history. When, however, the Artilleryman seeks for something that is genial and lovable in the soldiers of that victorious age,—he turns from the cold and undemonstrative Chief, and dwells fondly on the men who had by their exertions raised Artillery, as a science, to an unprecedented point, and had elevated with it the Corps Hime. they loved. The researches of a recent writer have brought to light words spoken by a chivalrous enemy, which should be emblazoned in the records of every battery, and impressed General Foy. on the mind of every Artilleryman:—“Les canonniers Anglais se distinguent entre les autres soldats par le bon esprit qui les anime. En bataille leur activité est judicieuse, leur coup d’œil parfait, et leur bravoure stoïque.” Of the latter three qualities, two may be ensured by diligence in peace, and the third is tested by the difficulties and dangers of war: but the history of the great and the good in the Corps must indeed have been feebly written, if it do not strengthen among its living members that which exists now, as of old, “le bon esprit qui les anime.”

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.
The Duke of Wellington, and the Artillery at Waterloo.

In the first volume of Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges in Spain,’ edited by Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Jones, the following passage occurs: “It becomes the duty of the Editor to remove the very injurious and unmerited censure cast upon the officers of Engineers who were employed at the Siege of Badajoz, and which is contained in a letter from the Earl of Wellington to Major-General G. Murray, a copy of which is published in the collection of the Despatches of the Duke of Wellington.”

The Editor then proceeds to prove, most clearly and successfully, that the hasty language used with reference to the Engineers was not only injurious, but also unmerited.

The same great General is also convicted by his admirer, Napier, of hasty inconsistency in his private correspondence. It was of the very same troops, and referring to precisely the same time, that the Duke of Wellington wrote in one Napier’s ‘Peninsular War,’ vol. vi., p. 166. letter: “The soldiers are detestable for everything but fighting; and the officers are as culpable as the men:” and in another, “that he thought he could go anywhere, and do anything with the army that fought on the Pyrenees.”

Well might Napier say that the vehemence of the censure in the former of the quotations is inconsistent with the latter, and now celebrated, observation.

It now becomes the painful, and yet necessary, task of the chronicler of the services of the Royal Artillery, as of the member of the sister corps already quoted, “to remove a very injurious and unmerited censure” cast upon the Regiment, in a private letter, written by the Duke of Wellington, with reference to its conduct at the battle of Waterloo. Of this letter’s existence the world was ignorant until the year 1872, when it made its appearance in a volume of ‘Supplementary Letters and Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,’ published by his son. The sensation which it was certain ‘Athenæum.’ to produce was foretold by one of the reviews, and was anticipated by the noble Editor. As, however, his object was to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, the present Duke did not feel justified in withholding from publication any letter, which was found among his father’s papers, merely because it might wound the feelings of its readers, or give a new interpretation of historical events. And although the indiscriminate publication of a man’s private correspondence is a doubtful tribute to his memory, and a severe test of his reputation, it is, on the whole, fortunate for the Royal Artillery that this letter made its appearance, while officers were yet alive, who had taken a part in the battle referred to in its pages, and clearly remembered its details.

The original letter was written by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Mulgrave, then Master-General of the Ordnance, on the 21st December, 1815. The published letter was from a copy, or draft, of the original, which was found among the Duke’s papers. The hope that perhaps there may have been modifications in the original, which did not exist in the draft or copy, disappears before the fact that Lord Mulgrave’s answer was also found among the Duke’s papers, expressing his amazement at the letter he had just received. The harsh statements in the published draft, or copy, were doubtless, therefore, left in the original when forwarded. The circumstances under which the letter were written were as follows. The field officers of the Royal Artillery, who had been present at Waterloo, applied to the Master-General ‘Hist. R. A.,’ vol. ii. p. 356. of the Ordnance for the same pensions for service as had been given after Vittoria. The indignation with which the Duke of Wellington had heard of the Vittoria pensions was well known in the Regiment: nor can one avoid sympathising with him. Discipline must suffer if the power of rewarding, or recommending for reward, be independent of the commander of the forces as a channel. The special interference of the Ordnance on behalf of the Corps, which was their protégé, was not merely a breach of discipline, to which a man like the Duke of Wellington was not likely tamely to submit, but must have had an irritating effect on the rest of the army. When, therefore, the field officers of Artillery present at Waterloo resolved to apply for the same reward as had been given after Vittoria, they had the alternative before them of making their request through the Duke, basing it upon a precedent which was detestable in his eyes, or of availing themselves of the dual government, under which they served, by making a direct application to the Ordnance. Of these alternatives, the former would have been the more soldierlike, but was not likely to succeed: the latter, therefore, was unfortunately adopted.

The application was not couched in a very official form, nor was it officially pressed by Sir George Wood. The only reference to it which can be traced in that officer’s correspondence is in a letter announcing Major Lloyd’s death, Dated Paris, 3 Aug, 1815. in which he writes:—“Should Lord Mulgrave, in his goodness, be inclined to grant pensions to field officers and captains commanding brigades, similar to the battle of Vittoria, I hope and trust that the late Major Lloyd’s family may receive the benefit his service deserved.” The precedent of Vittoria was not quite a parallel case to that of Waterloo: in the former every brigade with the army had been in action; while, in the latter, some had been detached. It seems to have been on this distinction, mainly, that Lord Mulgrave based his refusal to grant the reward. To justify himself, he referred the matter to the Duke of Wellington, who approved of the refusal, as might have been expected, but did so in terms which reveal an inaccuracy, and a hastiness, unparalleled in his Grace’s correspondence. He wrote as follows:—

“To the Earl of Mulgrave.

“Paris, 21st December, 1815.

“My dear Lord,

“I received yesterday your Lordship’s letter of the 10th, regarding the claim of the field officers of the Artillery, present in the battle of Waterloo, to the same measure of favour granted to those in the battle of Vittoria.

“In my opinion you have done quite right to refuse to grant this favour, and that you have founded your refusal on the best grounds. I cannot recommend that you should depart from the ground you have taken. To tell you the truth, I was not very well pleased with the Artillery in the battle of Waterloo.

“The army was formed in squares immediately on the slope of the rising ground, on the summit of which the Artillery was placed, with orders not to engage with artillery, but to fire only when bodies of troops came under their fire. It was very difficult to get them to obey this order. The French cavalry charged, and were formed on the same ground with our Artillery in general, within a few yards of our guns. In some instances they were in actual possession of our guns. We could not expect the artillerymen to remain at their guns in such a case. But I had a right to expect that the officers and men of the Artillery would do as I did, and as all the staff did, that is, to take shelter in the squares of the Infantry till the French cavalry should be driven off the ground, either by our Cavalry or Infantry. But they did no such thing; they ran off the field entirely, taking with them limbers, ammunition, and everything: and when, in a few minutes, we had driven off the French cavalry, and had regained our ground and our guns, and could have made good use of our artillery, we had no artillerymen to fire them; and, in point of fact, I should have had no Artillery during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a reserve in the commencement.

“Mind, my dear Lord, I do not mean to complain; but what I have above mentioned is a fact known to many; and it would not do to reward a corps under such circumstances. The Artillery, like others, behaved most gallantly; but when a misfortune of this kind has occurred, a corps must not be rewarded. It is on account of these little stories, which must come out, that I object to all the propositions to write what is called a history of the battle of Waterloo.

“If it is to be a history, it must be the truth, and the whole truth, or it will do more harm than good, and will give as many false notions of what a battle is, as other romances of the same description have. But if a true history is written, what will become of the reputation of half of those who have acquired reputation, and who deserve it for their gallantry, but who, if their mistakes and casual misconduct were made public, would not be so well thought of? I am certain that if I were to enter into a critical discussion of everything that occurred from the 14th to the 19th June, I could show ample reasons for not entering deeply into these subjects.

“The fact is, that the army that gained the battle of Waterloo was an entirely new one, with the exception of some of the old Spanish troops. Their inexperience occasioned the mistakes they committed, the rumours they circulated that all was destroyed, because they themselves ran away, and the mischief which ensued; but they behaved gallantly, and I am convinced, if the thing was to be done again, they would show what it was to have the experience of even one battle.

“Believe me, &c.,
(Signed) “Wellington.

“P.S.—I am very well pleased with the field officers for not liking to have their application referred to me. They know the reason I have not to recommend them for a favour.”

In discussing this letter, it is proposed to examine what may be termed the internal and external evidences of its inaccuracy, commencing with the former.

In his despatch of the 19th June, 1815, announcing the victory, the Duke wrote: “The Artillery and Engineer departments were conducted much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir George Wood and Colonel Smyth.” Evidently, then, the fact “known to many” of the Artillerymen running off the ground had not been known to him when he wrote his despatch, or he could hardly have described the Artillery department as having been conducted much to his satisfaction. Nor does the fact, even when made known to him, seem to have produced the effect upon his Grace’s mind, which misconduct among the troops under his command, in the face of an enemy, would at any other time have instantly created. Were not the genuineness of the letter beyond all question, some of the contradictions and inconsistencies in it would have justified the reader in pronouncing it a forgery, invented to throw discredit on the reputation of England’s greatest General. Was it the Duke of Wellington who, after writing the words, “They ran off the field entirely, taking with them limbers, ammunition, and everything,” proceeded to say, “The Artillery, like others, behaved most gallantly”? Was it the Iron Duke who, after saying, “In point of fact, I should have had no Artillery during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a reserve in the commencement,” went on, with the resignation of a martyr, to say, “Mind, my dear Lord, I do not mean to complain”? The inconsistency with his known character is astounding.

After describing the disappearance of his Artillerymen, and the straits to which he was consequently reduced, he proceeds in this letter to say: “It would not do to reward a corps under such circumstances.” If he were correctly informed as to these circumstances, there would not have been a single individual in the whole of his army who would have differed from him as to his conclusion. But, unfortunately for him, he endeavoured to prove too much. Not content with giving, as a reason for withholding rewards, an assertion which, if accurate, would have more than justified him, he must needs strengthen an already overwhelming case by a mysterious insinuation in the postscript of the letter, respecting some other unexpressed ground of his displeasure, with which the field officers must be familiar as a cause for his refusing to recommend them for reward. Was there not, in this piling of Pelion upon Ossa, some consciousness of the necessity of self-justification?

But these are merely striking self-contradictions and inconsistencies in style. It is when the truth of the statements made by the Duke in this letter is inquired into, that one stands astounded at the inaccuracy of his informants, and the hasty assumptions of the writer himself. The letter is so involved,—so confusing in its mixed references to the Artillery and to the army generally,—so laden with marvellous didactic sentences as to the propriety of writing a history of the battle of Waterloo,—that it is not always easy to ascertain the connection between argument and conclusion. So slovenly, indeed, is the style at the end of the letter, that it reads as if the whole army ran away! Let two sentences be reproduced: “The fact is, that the army that gained the battle of Waterloo was an entirely new one, with the exception of some of the old Spanish troops. Their inexperience occasioned the mistakes they committed, the rumours they circulated that all was destroyed, because they themselves ran away, and the mischiefs which ensued; but they behaved gallantly.” ... One rises from a perusal of these words with a bewildered feeling that gallant behaviour among troops is identical with running away;—and that the whole army, with the exception of some of the old Spanish troops, exhibited their gallantry in this singular manner. But, as the statement, that the army was entirely a new one, is used apparently in the first instance to account for the Artillery running off the field, it may be interesting to glance at the troops and brigades, whose inexperience seemed—in the Duke’s mind as he wrote—to have made their flight almost natural.

Of the eight troops of Horse Artillery present at the battle of Waterloo, five were the old tried troops of the Peninsula, whose gallant services had been recorded year after year by the Duke’s own hand: Sir Hew Ross’s, Sir Robert Gardiner’s, Colonel Webber Smith’s, Major Beane’s, and Major Bull’s. A sixth, Captain Whinyates’s, was the famous Rocket Troop of Leipsic; and of the other two, one had fought at Buenos Ayres, and the other in Walcheren. It was to one of these latter and more inexperienced troops, Captain Mercer’s, that the victory at one period of the day Battalion Records of the Royal Artillery. was due. With regard to the field brigades of this new army, it would seem that Major Rogers’s company had been engaged for two years past in the operations in Holland, and had been in the Walcheren Expedition previously; that Captain Sinclair’s brigade had been at Copenhagen, Corunna, and Walcheren; Captain Sandham’s at Copenhagen and Walcheren; Major Lloyd’s at Walcheren; and that Captain Bolton’s, the only brigade without war service, happened to be the one whose effect in breaking the head of the columns of the Imperial Guard has become historical,—and whose inexperience would therefore hardly appear to have been very detrimental. From this statement it is evident that the Artillery element in the Duke’s army at Waterloo was veteran, rather than new;—for, if the troops and brigades possessed such records as are given above, much more did the majority of the field and staff officers present deserve the title of veterans.

But the next inaccuracy is more unpardonable; and the informants of the Duke on the subject were guilty of errors for which there was no excuse. “In point of fact,” wrote the Duke, “I should have had no Artillery during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a reserve at the commencement.” Fortunately for the exposure of this grave inaccuracy, there is no point on which there is more full and official information both in Sir George Wood’s and other despatches, and more detailed notice in private correspondence, than on the subject of the Artillery reserves at Waterloo. As stated in the last chapter of this volume, it was composed of Sir Hew Ross’s and Major Beane’s troops of Horse Artillery, and Captain Sinclair’s Field Brigade. So far was this force from being kept in reserve, and being brought forward providentially at the end of the action to replace the runaways, that it was actually in action—every gun—almost at the commencement of the day, and suffered the heaviest losses before half-past one. By a happy coincidence, the Artillery, which must have been represented to the Duke as his reserve, is mentioned by Frazer’s Letters, p. 559. Sir Augustus Frazer: “Some time before this—i.e., the massing of the second line during the cavalry attacks—the Duke ordered me to bring up all the reserve Horse Artillery, which at that moment were Mercer’s and Bull’s troops.” But, instead of these troops being a reserve kept, as the Duke’s letter says, “from the commencement,”—they also had both been in action from the beginning of the day, and Bull’s troop had actually been sent to the Ibid. p. 557. centre of the second line “to refit and repair disabled carriages!”

The importance of this inaccuracy in the letter cannot be overrated. If the Artillery, which the Duke admits having had at the end of the day, was not the reserve, which he had kept in hand,—and it certainly was not,—what was it? The asserted flight of the gunners with their limbers and ammunition hangs upon the truth, or otherwise, of there having been reserves in hand to replace them. But the fact of these reserves having been in action from the beginning of the day is incontestable; and is proved by the correspondence of Sir Hew Ross, who commanded one of the reserve troops, as well as by the official and semi-official correspondence of others. It is possible that the arrival of Sir Robert Gardiner’s troop, with Vivian’s and Vandeleur’s brigades, from the left of the line, at the end of the day, may have deceived the Duke’s informant, and led him to imagine that it was fresh Artillery from the reserve. That it was not so, however, but merely moved with the division to which it was attached, is a matter of fact; and at no time in the day was this troop ever in reserve. Therefore, in a vital point, the Duke’s letter is unquestionably inaccurate.

The next statement in the letter, which demands scrutiny is the following: “The Artillery was placed with orders not to engage with artillery, but to fire only when bodies of troops came under their fire. It was very difficult to get them to obey this order.” Sir John Bloomfield, who was on Sir George Wood’s staff, carried this order to all the troops and brigades, and is confident that, with one exception, it was rigidly obeyed. He remembers that the Duke saw a French gun struck by a shot from one of the English batteries,—and, under the impression that it came from Captain Sandham’s brigade, he sent orders to have that officer placed in arrest. This was not done, some satisfactory explanation having been given,—relieving Captain Sandham of the disobedience. Singularly enough, the offender was never discovered, until, in 1870, with the publication of General Mercer’s Diary, came the confession of the crime. ‘Mercer’s Diary,’ vol. i. p. 301. “About this time, being impatient of standing idle, and annoyed by the batteries on the Nivelle road, I ventured to commit a folly, for which I should have paid dearly had our Duke chanced to be in our part of the field. I ventured to disobey orders, and open a slow, deliberate fire at the battery, thinking, with my 9-pounders, soon to silence his 4-pounders.” As Captain Mercer’s troop was placed near Sandham’s brigade at this time, it is evident that this occurrence, and that mentioned by Sir John Bloomfield, are identical. Sir John, whose duties carried him to all parts of the field, and whose recollection of the day is as clear as possible, asserts positively, that in no other instance was the order disobeyed; and it will be seen from accounts, both French and English, to be quoted hereafter, that the order to fire upon bodies of troops approaching was literally obeyed with the most marked results. Was it, then, quite worthy of the Duke of Wellington to reason from the particular to the general, and to visit the disobedience of one officer Colonel Gardiner, R.H.A. upon a whole corps? As has been well said by the son of one of the bravest Artillery officers on the field, Sir Robert Gardiner: “If a Regiment of Infantry had run away, and all the others had behaved splendidly,—would the whole arm have been similarly condemned? Would it not have been more just to reward those who deserved it?”

The mention of reward suggests the next amazing inconsistency in the Duke’s letter,—and makes it almost certain that it was written on receiving some subsequent information from another source,—not from his personal observation. In this letter, dated six months after the battle, he wrote: “It would not do to reward a corps under such circumstances;” and again: “The field officers know the reason I have not to recommend them for a favour.” How are these sentences to be reconciled with the following extract from the ‘London Gazette,’ which immediately followed the battle, and was issued while all its details must have been fresh in the Duke’s recollection?

“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has further been pleased to nominate and appoint the undermentioned officers to be Companions of the said most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, upon the recommendation of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, for their services in the battles fought upon the 16th and 18th of June last:”

This list includes the very field officers of whom the Duke wrote afterwards, “They know the reason I have not to recommend them for a favour.” Was it no favour to be recommended for the Order of the Bath?

Again: “It would not do,” wrote the Duke in December, 1815, “to recommend a corps under such circumstances.” Let the reader glance at the following picture of an unrewarded corps.

Out of thirteen troops and brigades, with the requisite staff, the following officers obtained rewards, in addition to the nine appointments to the Order of the Bath, quoted above. It must be remembered that the number eligible excluded subalterns, and was further reduced by the death of Majors Beane, Lloyd, Ramsay, Cairnes, and Captain Bolton.

Brevet promotion, for service at Waterloo:

Brevet promotion for services at Waterloo was also conferred in January 1819 on

At the request, also, of the Duke of Wellington, Sir George Wood obtained permission to accept a knighthood of the Order of Maria Theresa, from the Emperor of Austria; and, a few days later, the Order of St. Wladimir, from the Emperor of Russia.