From Gibraltar General Lawson went to Minorca, which he reached on the 10th July, after a tedious passage of nineteen days. Here he landed his men to await the return of Sir R. Abercromby, who had at first started for Genoa, with all the troops he could collect from Minorca and elsewhere. While on the passage, however, Sir Ralph received a message from the Admiral, Lord Keith, informing him that the Austrians had evacuated Italy. He therefore diverted his course to Leghorn, where he remained a week, and then went on to Malta. When the citadel of Valetta in that island was given up by the French in September, and Malta passed into the hands of the English, General Lawson followed Sir Ralph, and the expedition to Egypt was in that island finally organized.

During this time the English force in the Mediterranean had been increased by the arrival of a body of 4000 men, under Lord Dalhousie, from Belleisle, where they had at first been intended to act. This reinforcement, with others Cust. which followed, brought Sir R. Abercromby’s force up to 17,489 men before it finally left Malta; and an additional force of 6000 men, under Sir David Baird, was expected to meet them from India. The story of the Expedition after leaving Malta will be told in General Lawson’s own words. But, in passing, it may be stated that Minorca was the residence at this time of Colonel Cuppage of the Artillery, whose correspondence with the Deputy Adjutant-General reveals the fact that he was allowed a power over the Royal Artillery in the Mediterranean of a very extensive and unusual description. As a rule, as little power as possible was allowed to commanding officers on out-stations; the movements of officers especially were carefully regulated from England; but Colonel Cuppage evidently had the power, and exercised it, of transferring officers and men from companies, even belonging to different battalions,—of appointing officers to the bomb service in the Mediterranean, and of disembarking others already appointed; and, in a word, of exercising unlimited control over that part of the Regiment which came within the area of his command. This is mentioned because such control, however advisable, was rarely exercised by the Board, which was jealous of anything approaching independence in those under its orders;—and it is impossible to avoid expressing surprise that a system which succeeded so admirably on this occasion did not receive further trial. The fact of Minorca being the residence of the Commanding Officer of Artillery must not be construed as implying that the old Ordnance Establishment and Train, which disappeared with the capitulation of Port Mahon in 1782, had been revived. His residence there was almost accidental, and mainly on account of its convenience,—previous to the capture of Malta,—as a rallying point for the naval and military forces in the Mediterranean.

One instance must be given, before entering upon General Lawson’s narrative, to show how infamously the arrangements of the civil branch of the Ordnance were often conducted, after a campaign had been undertaken, and how scandalously the shortcomings of the civil were left to be expiated by the military branch. These instances will be frequent as this work proceeds, and they are reproduced with a double and deliberate purpose: first, to show under what difficulties our armies obtained their successes; and second, to remind those who are ever ready to criticise the slightest shortcoming of the same description in the present day, that in our older campaigns, whose glories are remembered when their blunders are forgotten, the faults which are deprecated so loudly to-day existed in an appalling degree.

Major Cookson’s company was the first of General Lawson’s force to leave Portsmouth. The earliest report of its movements is a letter written by Major Cookson from the Island of Houat, where he found 132 of the 6th Battalion, making, with his own company, a total force of Artillery amounting to 227 of all ranks. With characteristic energy, he commenced, after landing his company, to improve and strengthen his position. The reader will be good enough to remember that Major Cookson’s company was one of those, on the equipment of which the Board had expended unusual energy; and had felt such confidence in the omniscience of their civil officials, that they would not even reply to the hints and prayers of the officers of Artillery, who were most deeply interested. Doubtless, then, everything will be found as it should be. Yet let us hear what Major Cookson reports: Major Cookson, from I. of Houat, 24 June, 1800. “I have only a moment to tell you how very much distressed I am; and how much the Service is retarded for want of a Clerk of Stores who understands his duty. There is a man here who calls himself Conductor of Stores, but he is very far from being adequate to the situation, being, in the first place, incapable of writing.... I have 16 pieces of ordnance under my charge (10 6-pounders and 6 howitzers), all of which I had to complete to 100 rounds each, on board of the different vessels they were in, and to mount them ready to land in a chasse-marée, which was cut down and prepared for the purpose, and which I got done in two days; since which I have been obliged to land some here, and to put others from the ‘Diadem’ and ‘Inconstant’ on board the ‘John’ ordnance ship, and into boats. Conceive, then, how much I must have been in want of conductors and clerks of stores! On board the ‘John,’ when in a hurry for completing the ammunition, we were much annoyed to find 12-pounder flannel cartridges for the 5½-inch howitzers, and other like mistakes; however, I set the women to work and got over that difficulty and many others.... All the camp equipage for the officers and men whom I brought out is deficient; do, pray, therefore, send me out the camp equipage for my company ... with a hospital and laboratory tent, as soon as you possibly can; as also camp-kettles, canteens, and haversacks. The whole of the men have been uncommonly harassed for some days past.”

This is a charming picture of official foresight, and one which we shall find painted again and again in the succeeding pages of English story. Blind to the fact that the men, who were to use them, were also the best judges of the things required and— “Being too blind to have desire to see,”
the civil branch of the Ordnance too often reasoned à priori—evolved out of its own consciousness certain ill-defined wants, which the troops might possibly have—and, with many blunders and shortcomings, endeavoured to meet them. And then, with monotonous recurrence, came a pitiful struggle to maintain its own dignity in the face of incessant failure.

That the response to Major Cookson’s appeal was not wholly satisfactory may be gathered from the following extract from a subsequent letter:—“Conceive,” he wrote, “their sending me a common soldiers’ tent for the sick, and five horsemen’s tents without their poles, which to obtain here would be impossible, as all the men-of-war have expended already every inch of wood that could be spared. You will see by the return that we have 50 men ill, and, I am sorry to say, several of them dangerously so.”

It is a relief to turn, now, to the words of a man eminently capable of removing the difficulties with which he was surrounded.

“The Expedition, under the orders of Admiral Lord Keith and General Abercromby, proceeded from the Island of Malta on the 21st December, 1800, arrived at Marmorice Bay, in Asia Minor, on the New Year’s Day following, and remained there, waiting the co-operation of the Turks (being the time of their Ramadan), until the 20th February. During this period every measure was taken the situation admitted of to lessen the numerous difficulties expected to be met with in Egypt,—such as a dangerous shore to land upon—a country destitute of wood, water, or roads—where (as the Commander-in-Chief informed the General Officers, assembled by order) nothing was to be looked for but a wild waste of desert, and obstacles which the most unremitting exertions had only a chance of surmounting, independent of a formidable opposition from the French troops.

“Under these ideas, and the battering train (originally designed against Belleisle only) having joined the army very indifferently provided indeed for such an uncommon, arduous enterprise, no time could be lost. All the artificers were landed, and strong working parties sent into the woods to cut down timber for making additional spars, skids, and various-sized rollers, to form gangways for landing the heavy ordnance upon, assisting them over deep sandy beaches, and in crossing the canals formed for conveying the rising waters of the Nile into the towns and cultivated spots of the country.

“The generally acknowledged difficulty of travelling by wheeled carriages in Egypt induced the trial of a number of contrivances to lessen that evil also, the first of which were a kind of litters,... termed ‘horse-barrows.’ No wood growing in this country proper for such purposes, rendered it necessary to dig saw-pits, in order to cut the pine timber into long scantling (16 feet in length, and about 4 inches square), something near the shape of a common hand-barrow, preserving the grain as entire as possible. Two movable cross-bars, which are secured by two small bolts, keep these shafts at a proper interval, to admit a horse at each end between them. Each horse or mule had a small cart saddle with girth, back-band, breastplate, and crupper, and a halter for leading it by. These barrows were particularly useful for narrow paths and the trenches of an attack, or for conveying any individual weight too heavy for a single horse, such as a small piece of ordnance, standing carriage, large casks of provisions, &c. (The powder and ammunition expended at the attack of Aboukir Castle were mostly conveyed from the landing-place to the batteries in this manner.) Besides these single barrows, a design was formed for double ones, consisting of three shafts, to be carried by four horses in pairs; and also others upon a still larger scale for camels, but neither time nor materials admitted of their being put into immediate execution. A very considerable number of carrying-poles, about 9 feet long each, were formed out of the small-sized trees, to which rope-slings were added, for the soldiers to convey kegs of musket-ball cartridges, ammunition-boxes, or royal mortars with.

“A number of horses were purchased at Constantinople on the part of the English Government, and sent to Marmorice, for remounting the Light Dragoons, and those rejected by them were turned over to the Artillery service. Such poor undersized animals as they were rendered it absolutely necessary not only to take the harness entirely to pieces, in order to bring it anything near fitting them, but also to lay aside all the heavy parts, such as neck-collars, chain-traces, curb-bits, &c., and replace them with light leather breast-collars, rope-traces, and pads formed out of the waggon harness, a great part of which, fortunately, was not likely to be otherwise called for.

“About 130 horses being thus completed with harness, some light pieces—guns and howitzers—were landed, and a small park formed, in order to drill them to the draught. Every reform possible was made to lighten the travelling of the ordnance, and it was very much wished to have exchanged the limber-shafts for poles also, on account of their weight, as well as other considerations; but no proper wood could then be procured—even at the Island of Rhodes—for the purpose. The clock-trailed light 6-pounder carriages had ten horses allotted to each for draught; but the framed ones required twelve when going over heavy sand or shingle.

“A few of the most useful horse-artillery manœuvres were also practised here, it being the Commander-in-Chiefs intention to establish some pieces on that principle whenever horses could be procured for it. Drivers were also very much wanted, several of those which came out originally with the battering train having, with their officer, returned, in a very unaccountable manner, from Lisbon to England, after the attempt on Cadiz.

“The following considerations were submitted to the Commander-in-Chief at Marmorice Bay, on 10th Jan., 1801:—

“1st. As the passage of the fleet to the coast of Egypt may probably be short, it is humbly proposed to have the light field-pieces of the first division of troops conveyed from hence on the decks of the ships of war, so as to be at once lowered down altogether into the boats, having their Artillery detachments along with them, without the necessity of any other preparation after coming to anchor.

“2nd. The ordnance ships, in which the other pieces next for landing are aboard, to be conducted and stationed by the agent himself (the masters alone not being sufficient at such a crisis) as near to the shore as safety will admit. And it will be necessary, on account of the crowded manner in which they were loaded in England (being taken upon freight), to have light vessels alongside of them to receive the water-casks, and articles not immediately wanted, in clearing away to those sought for.

“3rd. Small vessels or decked boats, with field ammunition and musket-ball cartridges, will be required (particularly if the coast proves shallow) still nearer in shore, and to be stationed opposite the centre of attack immediately after the landing of the first division of the troops, distinguished by Ordnance Jacks. In order to furnish the most speedy supply possible, a number of hand-carts and carrying-poles may be thrown on shore from these boats, for the soldiers to take off any ammunition wanting, until the horses can be landed.

“4th. The flat boats and launches of the ships of war are wished to be employed in carrying the field ordnance, &c., ashore, instead of transports’ long-boats, which (as was experienced at Cadiz), from their want of hands and general size, are quite inadequate to the business.

“5th. Planks, joined together lengthways by staples and cordage, may be necessary to travel the carriages upon over the heavy sands. The French, it is said, made use of raw hides in passing the deserts with their field-pieces. Perhaps lengths of rope, about 30 feet each, with narrow netting between to receive the wheels upon, might be found as useful, and, in our situation, more readily procured.

“6th. One thousand seamen, provided with drag-ropes or harness, will be required to assist in landing and drawing up the heavy ordnance and stores.

“7th. The mode of advancing into the country will depend upon the means of draught found there; but, at all events, if a strong detachment of seamen can be procured to remain with the Artillery, it will be highly beneficial to service.

“Agreeable to these representations, application was immediately made to Lord Keith, who consented to take aboard each of the line-of-battle ships two field-pieces, which were placed on the poops ready for lowering down into the launches all together. Twenty-five seamen and officers were allotted to each piece, with fifteen of the Artillery. These 350 were all the seamen his Lordship could spare out of the 1000 demanded. Two general rehearsals of landing were then practised: the guns got ashore very readily, and quicker than the troops could leap out of their boats. Each ship-of-war formed its own boat’s gangway; the best of them was made out of the fishing of a mast, which, being hollow, secured the wheels of the carriage from slipping, without side-pieces.”

Alterations made in Carronade Carriages.—“The moving of heavy ordnance over the deserts of Egypt the French thought impracticable, and attempted no larger calibre than 8-pounders or 12-pounders. Something more, however, seemed necessary for us to make trial of against an enemy so much more formidable than any they had had to contend with, independent of the ambition of superior resource. Upon comparing all circumstances together, it appeared likely that whatever works they might have raised in the interior of the country since their possession of it, could not be very solid ones, even if composed of masonry, for want of time to settle and the cement to harden sufficiently in such substances; and earth alone, in this climate, must soon crumble to dust or sand, and easily be destroyed by shells. From these considerations it was concluded that carronades might probably be found sufficiently powerful to breach them in either case at moderate distances, and be easily conveyed by the double horse or camel-barrow across the country if necessary. The circumstance being suggested to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and, at the same time, the means proposed of altering the carriages for this purpose without affecting their sea-service in the smallest degree, His Excellency communicated the idea to Lord Keith, who immediately ordered several of these 24-pounder carriages (though larger ones were wished for) ashore from the ships-of-war, to undergo the necessary alteration. This operation being soon executed, some trials of shot and shells were made there, and afterwards aboard the ‘Foudroyant,’ in presence of the Admiral and the General, and much approved of.”

For the information of the non-professional reader, it may here be mentioned that carronades are far lighter than guns of the same calibre. The details by which General Lawson describes, in his MSS., the modifications made by him to render the carronade-carriages suitable for his purpose, are illustrated by carefully-prepared diagrams, without which the description would hardly be intelligible. It may be stated briefly that, by certain additions to the carriage—which could easily be removed when again wanted on board ship—he produced something akin to the modern dwarf traversing platform, requiring little or no ground platform on which to be traversed. The navy officers who were present at the experiments expressed their opinion that the alteration would be very useful to their service also, for taking up posts occasionally ashore.

The MS. proceeds next to describe the arrangements made by General Lawson.

“Many mistakes, as well as loss of time, happening on service by the ammunition being sent into the field with the waggons accompanying the guns in the same state as lodged in the storehouses; that is, round shot, case shot, cartridges, and small stores, each article in separate packing-boxes, it was thought advisable, especially on this occasion, where the ammunition must be mostly carried on camels’ backs, to complete each individual box with a certain number of rounds (one fourth case), including small stores, and everything necessary to the firing of them. This was effected by only raising the round-shot packing-case about two inches higher, and the addition of a small board as a false bottom, which admitted of stowings as follows, viz., for light 6-pounders, 15 rounds and a extra case-shot; light 12-pounders, 8 rounds; medium 12-pounders, 7 rounds. For the royal howitzer ammunition, it was necessary to have two packing-boxes on this principle, viz., one containing 9 live shells and 1 case-shot; the other with 2 case-shot and all the articles for firing 12 rounds complete. This mode was found extremely useful in the field, and is strongly recommended for all immediate occasions of service, as no possible mistake can then happen, either from ignorance or neglect, in supplying the guns or limber-boxes with the utmost expedition.

“The ammunition for field-service was usually conveyed on camels’ backs, each carrying four of the altered 6-pounder packing-boxes, two on each side, in a sort of netted bag thrown over a pack-saddle; but, useful as these animals are generally for great weights, there are inconveniences attending them in this particular service; viz., when loaded (which, of course, must be daily repeated) they move very slowly, therefore quite unfit for Horse Artillery;—in order to load or unload, they must first be made to kneel down, which in an action they are not always inclined to, and sometimes become very refractory and unmanageable; also, whatever quantity of ammunition is required for the gun must always be taken equally from both sides at the same time, to preserve its equilibrium, &c.

“These reasons determined a trial of light carriages in their stead, first beginning with royal howitzer ammunition, it being the most dangerous and liable to injury. Some of the hand-carts were selected for this purpose, and, in order to travel the better, converted to curricles. The poles were accordingly lengthened, and cross-bars fixed to support them in front of the horses’ collars, much in the same manner as the 3-pounder carriages formerly used in the Horse Artillery, only more simplified. These carriages were drawn by four horses each, and went through all the marches of the army to and from Grand Cairo remarkably well, travelling very rapidly with 48 rounds of the howitzer ammunition completed for immediate service, as already mentioned.”

Light 3-pounder Carriages altered for Cavalry.—“Our Cavalry, from their want of proper horses, being found very unequal to the capitally-mounted French dragoons, it became necessary to aid that defect by the attachment of Artillery. Four light 3-pounders (brought from Malta) were first prepared for this service. Their original mode of travelling with shafts and single line of draught was altered to a double one by cutting off the shafts of the limber at the cross-bar, and introducing a pole instead of them, together with other improvements. (For example, a block of wood was fixed by two bolts to the back of the axletree, and the iron pintail removed from the centre of it to this block to receive the trail of the carriage upon. This was done in order to make room for a 6-pounder ammunition-box, to be fixed crossways in the front. The old side-boxes belonging to the carriage being rejected entirely, their places furnished seats for two gunners. At small expense an ammunition-box, containing 8 rounds, was made to fit in between the cheeks of the gun-carriage, after the French manner. A copper tray or drawer was introduced under one of the gunners’ seats to contain the slowmatch, instead of carrying a lintstock.) Four or six horses, with two drivers (according to the ground), drew the carriage. These pieces were served by four Artillerymen, two on the carriage and two mounted on the off draught-horses. They went through the service to Grand Cairo, and travelled much better than was expected from the lowness of the limber-wheels, which defect there was no remedy for in Egypt.

“Four light 6-pounders upon block-trail carriages, with two royal howitzers, were also equipped (as nearly as the means would admit) for Horse Artillery service. Seven Artillerymen and three drivers, with ten horses, were allotted for the service of each piece, the gunners riding the horses in draught, but the non-commissioned officer mounted single for the purpose of advancing to examine roads, reconnoitring the enemy, &c. These block-trail carriages, from their lightness, short draught, and quick turning, passed over the inundation dykes and desert with great ease, while the framed carriages with more horses were attended with difficulty and delay, and once in the desert, were obliged to be left behind.

“The success of the curricle carts (for field ammunition) induced a trial if something might not be done with the waggons also, hitherto looked upon as out of all question, except the local duties of the park. Some of them were taken to pieces, and all the heaviest parts laid aside—that is, the bolsters, sides, and shafts. The bottoms were then contracted both in length and breadth, so as just to receive nine or ten of the altered packing-cases only. The hoops were lowered, and the painted covers made to fit exactly. Poles were used instead of shafts, and the usual swingle trees reduced fewer in number. The rejected parts being weighed, no less than six hundred pounds appeared saved in the draught by this simple operation, and a larger proportion of ammunition conveyed by it at the same time with less labour. The immense weight and bulk of the platform and devil carriages rendered them totally useless; some of these altered waggons were substituted as a light class of the former kind, by taking away the bottoms entirely, and fixing in their stead a couple of very strong planks to each, with an interval between them resembling the original. These light platform carriages proved very useful in withdrawing the ordnance and stores from our lines across very heavy sands for re-embarkation.”

The next subject treated of in the MS. is “Heavy weights raised without a Gin,” as follows:—

“The two-wheeled trench-cart (of which there were luckily a number on the Expedition) is a most useful little carriage for carrying articles of moderate bulk to a ton in weight; indeed, even so far as 10-inch iron mortar-beds of 23 cwt. were transported in them, but in these cases it was necessary, of course, to make use of a gin also. To obviate this circumstance and render the cart of more independent utility, an inclined plane was attached to the rear of it, and a small windlass fixed in the front, with a rope and iron block hooked to the weight, having rollers to ease the purchase, the weight being thus brought up on the cart by turning the windlass. By this simple means six men were sufficient to mount upon the cart, and deliver at a battery any article the strength of the axletree and wheels could bear, without making the appearance or drawing the attention of the enemy, which such large machines as devil carriages and sling carts constantly do, besides taking into consideration the vast difference, in point of weight, between these carriages in themselves. Another considerable advantage is that this contrivance is only occasionally applied, and the cart may be immediately worked in its original capacity.

“It being apprehended that extraordinary heavy weights might cause the low, narrow wheels of the trenched cart to sink so much into the sand as to retard the draught considerably, a contrivance was thought of to prevent this from happening, by occasionally increasing the breadth of the fellies. The staves of casks being strong, and of a favourable shape for the purpose, and still more valuable from their being easily procured at the Commissary-General’s store, it was proposed to cut them into lengths of seven or nine inches each piece, having two small iron staples fixed at an interval, the breadth of the felley. A rope equal in length to the circumference of the wheel is run through each of these lines of staples, secured so as not to slip out, but keep the staves parallel at one inch and a half asunder. They are then applied to the wheels, and fixed by small lashings to the spokes, to keep the whole from any alteration in travelling.”

Some Remarks on the foregoing Articles.

1st. “The original intention of the Expedition did not appear to have Egypt for its object, and for a considerable while was very inauspicious. In the first instance it proved too late to be any use to the Austrians in Italy, and afterwards became unsuccessful at Cadiz. Much time appeared to be lost before it reached the rendezvous at Marmorice Bay; and it was then thought by the Turks a very unseasonable part of the year for any attempt on the coast of Egypt, besides which it happened to be the time of their Ramadan, when no operations of any kind are undertaken by them. This last delay, however, although much regretted, turned out advantageous to the future proceedings of the army. Some useful arrangements were made then, besides the opportunity it gave of landing the sick after a long confinement on board ship, by which many recovered; and the Island of Rhodes, just in the neighbourhood, afforded hospitals for the remainder.”

2nd. “All the field ordnance, which had been landed at Ferrol with Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney’s army, and afterwards joined General Sir Ralph Abercromby, were re-embarked there in so disorderly a manner that no one piece was found fit for immediate service. This circumstance will for ever unfortunately occur, unless the direction of the business is left entirely to the Artillery Corps, whether navy boats and ships of war or those of the Ordnance only receive them. It cannot be expected that the navy officers are in the first place fully acquainted with the real importance of keeping all the parts of such carriages, ammunition-boxes, &c., exactly sorted together, or that they can bestow much consideration on the subject, hurried as they generally are upon such occasions.”

3rd. “The turning over only rejected horses from the Dragoons to the Artillery services was not so well judged as might be expected. It would have been fortunate (the best of theirs bearing no comparison with the French cavalry) to have rendered the movement of the Ordnance more effectual; as it was, both corps remained insufficient; the effects of which were fully experienced in the action of the 13th March, when, had only a part of the number of pieces then in the field been very well horsed, the fate of Alexandria (it is more than probable) might have been decided on that day. The French, on the other hand, constantly applied the very prime of their strong horses (those belonging to the officers not excepted) to the draught of their ordnance, which were chiefly on the Horse Artillery establishment, with 8-pounder guns and 6-inch howitzers, opposed to light 6-pounders and royals only.”

4th. “The disembarking of ordnance, unless in the instance of field-pieces let down into the boats ready mounted from ships of war, however regularly performed, is always liable to some confusion. This principally arises from the parts of the same natures of carriages not corresponding so correctly as they might do, particularly in the diameters of the wheels and arms of the axletrees, which should likewise be as general throughout the whole as possible. The waggons and carts being frequently made by contract, are very defective in these points, even to the fitting of their head and tail-boards; and, trifling as this may appear to a workman at home, it often occasions delays of consequence to the service, or credit of those concerned in it abroad. No nation, in point of economy alone, requires so much attention to the construction and solid stowage of its military carriages and stores as Great Britain does, on account of their frequent embarkations, the expenses of which in the course of a war are prodigiously great.”

5th. “The considerations submitted to the Commander-in-Chief respecting the first landing of the ordnance and stores, were much approved, and happily executed with great despatch, notwithstanding some very serious impediments, arising from the manner of loading the ships by freight (carrying as much as possible without order), instead of being regularly assorted. The embarking troops also on board such ships is always attended with, not only great inconvenience, but considerable damage, from the quantity of water necessary to carry for them, the waste and leakage of which injures the carriages and stores considerably underneath, besides the difficulty it occasions of getting at them when required for service. In the preparations for landing at Cadiz, seventy tons of water were obliged to be first removed from one ship only. Great inconveniences were also found from the magnitude of some of the ships, which could not be brought within some miles of the shore. They should for such services never exceed 600 tons, and a moderate draught of water.”

6th. “Carronades might certainly be employed in the land service to considerable advantage in many situations, particularly on the flanks or firing over the parapets of fortifications and for field-works in general. It would also be very well worth while to have some experiments tried with them in breaching walls and earthworks. The common objection made to their shortness injuring the embrasures has more of imagination than reality in it. They may be advanced the extent of any gun mounted upon a travelling carriage, and much farther than the largest garrison howitzer, with less explosion of powder. If their present carriages are found to recoil too far, it is easily checked by only laying a few filled sand-bags upon them, and in the rear, as was practised in Egypt with perfect success; or it may be checked by small iron wedges with chains, placed to receive the fore-trucks upon.”

7th. “The arrangement made of the spare field-ammunition on the passage from Marmorice Bay to the coast of Egypt was very fortunate, as it proved impossible to have carried any quantity forward otherwise, for want of conveyance, excepting a few camels taken from the enemy on the first landing in Aboukir Bay.”

8th. “The 3-pounder light guns, patched up as they were, gave considerable confidence to the Dragoons. This calibre might be rendered very useful to Cavalry in general by an increase of dimensions, to 4½ feet in length, and about 4 cwt. in weight, with carriages upon a quick travelling construction, not overloaded with ammunition, which our service is rather liable to.

“Foreigners frequently observe the singularity of shafts being preferred in the British Artillery carriages to poles, made use of by all other nations as being simpler, lighter, and cheaper; added to which the experience of having travelled over the most difficult features of Europe, and ground of every description with them, fully evinces their perfect sufficiency. A strong instance of the inconvenience of shafts occurred to us at Rahmanich: just as one of the 6-pounders was limbering up, the shaft-horse was killed by the enemy; much time was lost in clearing the carriage from him, and the harness being also damaged, rendered it difficult to apply another in his place.

“In the marching of the 12-pounders to Grand Cairo (drawn by oxen with a horse in the shafts) the want of double or travelling trunnion-boxes was much regretted. Some few carriages were formerly so constructed for the Horse Artillery, but why discontinued remains unknown, as they are undoubtedly very advantageous to a heavy draught or indifferent horses.

“In moving the 24-pounder guns across the country from the first position near Cairo (where a bridge of boats to communicate with the Grand Vizier’s army was thrown over the Nile) for the attack of Gizeh, the axletrees of the sling-carts giving way, the medium 12-pounder carriages were appropriated to this purpose, the trench-carts carrying the mortars, standing carriages, &c.”

9th. “No carriage appears to want reform more than the common Artillery waggon. There is too much of it merely for carrying ammunition, and it is too narrow for baggage or bulky stores. In the alterations made for the proposed arrangement of spare ammunition, the boxes will require for hard roads to be more securely fixed than was necessary for travelling in Egypt.”

10th. “The inclined plane, or purchase for raising weights upon the trench-carts, might prove very useful, upon a larger scale, for mounting or dismounting heavy ordnance without being obliged to make use of a gin, which not only requires a number of men to work, and a carriage to convey it to a battery, but when fixed there becomes a considerable object to the enemy besieged. This proposed machine being quite free from all these inconveniences makes it extremely well worth while to try the experiment for such occasions.”

11th. “If the mode mentioned of preventing narrow wheels from sinking in deep sandy situations should have the appearance of possessing more fancy than judgment, it must be placed to the variety of obstacles which hourly presented themselves in Egypt, and called for every assistance the mind could catch at to surmount. And still perhaps the idea may lead to something useful even in a northern climate, passing over snow, &c.”

12th. ... “The extraordinary heavy weights of the iron mortars and beds proved a great embarrassment without any peculiar advantage derived from them. Indeed, where no considerable extent of range is required—as is the case in most attacks—brass mortars mounted upon proportional iron beds seem in general much preferable, at least under 13 inches in diameter....”

13th. “Flat boats are the best and most useful conveyance for troops, and ordnance, possible; every means, therefore, should be employed to preserve them from injury. Though apparently slight, it is surprising what they can bear. In moving the stores up Lake Etcho, for the attack of Fort Julian, some of them were dragged three miles over sand and mudbank. The battering-pieces for this service were obliged to be landed on the open sea-beach, and conveyed four miles across the deserts and swamps to their batteries. These laborious and difficult operations were frequently repeated during the expedition. Upwards of thirty 24-pounders were disembarked from the ordnance ships, conveyed by boats up Aboukir Lake, and landed near the head of it for the attack of Alexandria. From thence twenty were returned to the ships in Aboukir Bay, conveyed to the mouth of the western branch of the Nile, disembarked and taken over that dangerous bar by sea-jerms, landed at Fort St. Julian, re-embarked there in river-jerms, in order to proceed up the Nile. Several were landed within four miles of Grand Cairo, and conveyed from thence twelve miles across the country, for the attack of Gizeh;—returned back after the surrender of Cairo by the same route, and exactly in like manner to Alexandria;—relanded there for further operations of attacks carrying on both on the eastern and western side of it,—the capitulation of which concluding the campaign, they were again conveyed to the ships in Aboukir Bay.

“Besides the articles already detailed, numerous minute circumstances happened in the course of the campaign, which necessity continually urged the imagination to provide against. Every movement by land or water was attended with infinite labour and difficulties; added to which the violent heat of the sun, and shocks received by passing over the formidable cracks it occasioned in the ground (annually overflowed by the Nile) on the march to Cairo operated so powerfully on the carriages, as to require perpetual attention and daily repair—without the most common materials for such occasions, either of wood or iron, to be found in the country.

“N.B. The oxen drew very well upon common ground, but in deep sand they generally became restive. The large-sized mules were excellent in draught when well-disposed; but, from their natural obstinacy, it was found best to intermix them with horses.”

N.B.—Besides the above, the French were allowed to embark 50 field-pieces from Cairo, and 10 from Alexandria.

The extremely interesting notes just quoted, although relating more to questions of matériel than personnel, still give a clear idea of the difficulties attending the movements of the Artillery in Egypt, the overcoming of which was no less honourable, if, indeed, not more so, than their marked courage in the field. In alluding to the latter, a very brief sketch of the campaign will suffice.

On the morning of the 8th March, 1801, the English army disembarked in Aboukir Bay under a heavy fire, and drove back the French with a loss of five guns. On the 13th the severe action known as the affair of Nicopolis took place, in which the French were again defeated, but not Cust. without a loss to the English of 1300, killed and wounded. The siege of Aboukir Castle followed, the bombardment Browne. being conducted by Major Cookson, and it surrendered on the 19th. On the 21st, the memorable battle of Alexandria was fought,—memorable not merely for its victorious result, but also for the irreparable loss which the English army suffered in the death of Sir R. Abercromby. The conduct of the Artillery in the battle attracted great attention; the Stewart’s ‘Highlanders of Scotland.’ precision of their fire was strongly commended, and, but for the wretched animals with which the guns were horsed, an advance of the army might have then taken place, which would have ensured the immediate fall of Alexandria. Browne. Lieutenants H. Sturgeon, J. G. Burslem, and D. Campbell, of the Royal Artillery, were wounded. The battle had been waged mainly on the right of the English army, and before the end of the day the ammunition of both Artillery and Cavalry on the English right was all but exhausted, so much so that “on an attempt of the French to advance anew against this flank, the soldiers of the 28th actually Cust. pelted them with stones.” Unfortunately for the modern Artilleryman, General Lawson was a very bad correspondent during the war; and when the student commences anxiously to search for his despatches to the Ordnance, he finds, Colonel Macleod to General Lawson. instead, indignant remonstrances addressed to the gallant General for his silence. He was so occupied with overcoming the natural difficulties of the expedition, that he had no time for writing; and he valued no words of commendation, which were spoken with regard to his services, so much as those referring to the chief engineer and himself, which formed part of a despatch written by General Hutchinson, ‘London Gazette,’ 22 October, 1801. the successor of Sir R. Abercromby:—“The skill and perseverance of those two officers have overcome difficulties which at first appeared almost insurmountable.”

The arrival of a Turkish division, 6000 strong, to support him, on the 3rd April, 1801, induced General Hutchinson, who succeeded Sir R. Abercromby in the command, to carry the war farther up the Nile, instead of waiting before Alexandria. He commenced with some detached operations: Rosetta surrendered on the 8th, and Fort St. Julian, after Browne’s ‘England’s Artillerymen.’ a bombardment, on the 19th. “On the 18th April a mortar battery, erected against Fort St. Julian, under the direction of Captains Lemoine and Duncan, fired some shells with remarkable accuracy: one of them pitched on the centre of the roof, and tore away the flagstaff and colours, which the French never dared to erect again.”

The great events of the campaign were the surrender of Cairo on the 28th June, 1801, and of Alexandria on the 2nd September. It was during the march on Cairo that the ingenuity and endurance of the Royal Artillery were most severely tried. Other writers have borne testimony—in glowing, but not exaggerated terms—to the gallantry of the other arms of the service in this campaign; and it must not be assumed that the necessary allusions to a particular corps in a work like this imply any assertion of superiority; such conduct would be at once unjust, and subversive of the main purpose of this history. There are regiments, the very mention of whose names brings instinctively to the hearer’s memory the brave story of Egypt; but, where all were brave, the special professional duties of Artillerymen obtained for those, who served in that capacity, opportunities of displaying energy and ingenuity which were denied to others. There have been campaigns where the exertions of the Infantry have dwarfed those of the other arms; there have been occasions—sung by poets, and boasted of with just pride by all Englishmen—when the honour of England was entrusted to her Cavalry, and was brought back with redoubled lustre; it is, therefore, in no spirit of depreciation of the other arms that the services of the Artillery are especially pointed out, during a campaign where the hardest work was not in battle, and in a work which hopes to hand down to their successors the merits of those who, in Egypt, were responsible for their Regiment’s reputation. It is with such a hope that words like the following, referring to the siege Stewart’s ‘Highlanders of Scotland.’ of Alexandria, are reproduced:—“The proceedings against Alexandria showed to what a pitch of perfection the British Artillery had arrived. The battery on the Greenhill opened at six o’clock on the morning of the 26th August, and before mid-day the enemy were completely silenced, their batteries destroyed, and their guns withdrawn. On the west of Alexandria, the tower of Marabout was bombarded from a battery commanded by Captain Curry,9 of the Royal Artillery. The first shot struck the tower, four feet from the ground; every succeeding shot struck the same spot; and in this manner he continued, never missing his mark, till a large hole was in a manner completely bored through, when the building fell, and, filling up the surrounding ditch, the place was instantly surrendered.”

At the surrender of Cairo no fewer than 13,754 French were present, and were allowed to evacuate Egypt; and at Alexandria, where General Menou, the French Commander, Cust. was stationed,—11,000 French soldiers, exclusive of civilians, surrendered to the English. In a campaign which lasted only from March to September, the power of the French in Egypt, and even their presence, disappeared. Prior to the capitulation of General Menou, he made a strong effort to drive the English from before Alexandria. This took place on the 22nd August, and in the general orders issued after the engagement the following words appeared:—“The brunt of the day fell on the Artillery, under the command of Major Cookson, and the advance corps, who used every exertion, and showed much discipline.” It is also mentioned by a Browne, author of ‘England’s Artillerymen.’ writer often quoted in these pages, whose industry becomes more and more apparent the more his work is studied, that “the celerity with which the guns at the siege of Alexandria had been brought up was a remarkable instance of zeal, as they had to be carried over almost inaccessible rocks.”

Two events occurred during the campaign, which deserve mention. A contingent of troops arrived from India under Sir David Baird, including some of the East India Company’s Artillery. The first instalment arrived on the 10th June, and was present at the surrender of Cairo by the French; and Sir David, with the main body, arrived in sufficient time to witness the successful termination of the siege of Alexandria, and with it the conclusion of the war.

The second event involves some explanation. In 1798 a detachment of the Royal Artillery was ordered to Turkey to assist in the instruction and organization of the Turkish Artillery, and in the strengthening of their fortifications. The officer in command was Brigadier-General Koehler, who had as a subaltern attracted attention during the great Siege of Gibraltar, and who had been almost continuously employed on the Staff of the army since that time. The Artillery officers who accompanied him were Majors Hope and Fead, Captain Martin Leake, and Assistant-Surgeon Wittman. The duties of these officers, as far as can be learned from the correspondence which is extant, were of a somewhat motley order,—embracing artillery, engineering, archæology, and military organization. Their travels in Turkey, Greece, Syria, and Egypt were very extensive; and if we may judge from a quaint manuscript in the Royal Artillery Record Office, describing a journey made by them to Jerusalem, they must have travelled as royal personages. General Koehler died on the 29th December, 1800, of a malignant fever, which had carried off his wife and many of his detachment; and the regret and positive grief, which were felt by English and Turks alike, were strongly expressed Major Hope, R.A., to D. A. General, January 1801. in Major Hope’s reports to England. After his death, Major Hope, with the remainder of the detachment, accompanied the Grand Vizier and the Turkish contingent, which went to Egypt to swell the English forces, and earned well-deserved praise before Cairo, where the union between them and the latter took place. Major Hope’s abilities as an Artilleryman received favourable mention from the Grand Vizier. After the conclusion of the campaign, Captain Leake obtained special employment in the Turkish dominions, and that he attained no mean position in the scientific and literary world may be gathered from the Obituary notice of Lieut.-Col. W. M. Leake, R.A., in Address of the President of the Royal Geographical Society, May 1860. following obituary notice:—“On the 6th January, 1860, Colonel Leake passed from us, after a short and sudden illness. His intellect never weakened; his energies scarcely relaxed, notwithstanding the weight of eighty-three years. The Greek minister, at his own desire, followed him to the grave, expressing thereby the gratitude of his country to one who had spared no effort on behalf of the Greek nationality, and had done so much by his works towards elucidating the remarkable features of the land of Greece, and the scenes of her glorious history. In him we have lost not only a scholar and an antiquary, but one other link (when so few survived) that connected us to the politics, the literature, and the society of the foregone generation.”

On the 16th November, 1801, an order was issued for the withdrawal of the companies from Egypt, under which Captain Beevor’s company of the 3rd Battalion, and Captain Cookson’s, Major Sprowle’s, and Captain Wood’s of the 5th, returned to England; and Major Borthwick’s, Captain Lemoine’s, and Captain Adye’s proceeded to Gibraltar. Major Borthwick remained in command of his company during the war, although, by the records of the 2nd Battalion, to which it belonged, Captain Mudge had been posted to it some time previously, an appointment which must have been subsequently cancelled, doubtless owing to his being employed by Government on the Trigonometrical Survey of Great Britain. In this occupation he was engaged during the greater part of his life, and his admirable conduct of the survey procured for him numerous literary and scientific distinctions.

Among the officers of artillery who received special mention for their services in Egypt, besides General Lawson, Kane’s List. were Major Cookson, who, in addition to receiving high praise in general orders and despatches, was appointed, on the 29th October, 1801, commandant of the ancient Pharos Castle and of all the Artillery in Egypt, and was presented with a gold medal by the Grand Vizier; Captains Lemoine, A. Duncan, and S. G. Adye. Major Thompson, who had received brevet rank of Colonel during the war, died of wounds received on the 9th May, 1801, near Ramanieh; and it should be mentioned that General Lawson himself was severely wounded at the battle of Alexandria.

By General orders of 31st October and 1st November, 1803, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the various companies which had served in Egypt were permitted to wear the “Sphynx,” with the word “Egypt” on their regimental caps; but the distinction was a personal one, and not to be perpetuated in the companies. In regiments of the Line the distinction is perpetuated by emblazonment on their colours. Although, however, the decoration itself was but personal, the traditions of the deeds which it commemorated are the inheritance of the batteries, whose predecessors fought under the shadow of the Pyramids. Let them treasure the memories of gallantry and of difficulties overcome, and in the hours of their own toils and dangers let them “remember Egypt.”

Note.—Detachments of two, if not three companies, in addition to those named above, were present in Egypt, and will be found mentioned in the tables in Volume i.

CHAPTER VII.
To 1803.

So many important events will demand detailed notice presently, that this chapter must be confined to a bare statement of facts, necessary to keep the chain of the Regimental history complete. The circumstances, under which the Royal Irish Artillery was incorporated as the 7th Vol. i. pp. 163 & 417. Battalion of the Regiment, have already been mentioned. No sooner had the amalgamation taken place, than a questionable step was taken by the authorities at the Ordnance: they ordered the 5th Battalion to proceed to Ireland, and relieve the 7th; and the six companies of the 7th Battalion, which were serving in their native land, were promptly shipped off to the West Indies to relieve the companies of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battalions. This instant use of the new battalion to garrison an unpleasant station can hardly have had a conciliatory effect; and doubtless the sudden and unpleasant change of quarters awakened occasional doubts as to the value of the Union—in a military point of view,—if not occasional mental growlings on the subject of “Justice to Ireland,” among those who had to exchange the pleasures of Dublin for the disadvantages of the tropics. Be this as it may, in 1802 the new battalion was ordered to the West Indies.

The arrangements of the Board for the reliefs of the companies at this time reveal a very distinct attempt to secure, as far as possible, that companies of the same battalion should serve on the same station. For example, it was decided that, in 1803, the whole of the companies at Gibraltar should belong to the 6th Battalion; that the 1st and 2nd Battalions should be collected in England; the 5th in Ireland; and that the detached commands, and the wants of Canada should be supplied by the 3rd and 4th Battalions. The scheme was marred by an occasional company of a battalion, which it was hoped to concentrate, being found to be at the Cape of Good Hope, or Ceylon; but the effort was honestly made, and with the best intentions. That it utterly failed during the tempest of war, which was so soon and so long to rage, was not the fault of those who hoped to produce a very different state of affairs; but the result of inevitable causes. The American War had proved the inconvenience of a battalion’s head-quarters being on the scene of hostilities: the lesson was accepted, and the various head-quarters were located at Woolwich; and therefore, the fact having been once admitted that the necessary control could be exercised, at a distance, over an individual company, all ideas of symmetry had to yield to necessity: and whencesoever a company could be most readily obtained, from that station it was taken, irrespective of the battalion to which it belonged. The test of a system frequently does not occur until the system must vanish before it; and this was the case in the wars between 1807 and 1815, which proved most satisfactorily that the official dreams of the Ordnance in 1802 and 1803 were not worth the paper on which they were written. Out of the web which was so honestly spun, the company, in time of war, made its inevitable escape, and asserted yet again its right to be called the Artillery unit.

On the signing of the Treaty of Peace, at Amiens, on the 27th March, 1802, immediate reductions were ordered in the military forces of England. In the Royal Artillery they took the form of reductions in the strength of the companies; and the following was the scheme, approved by the Master General, on the recommendation of Colonel Macleod. The short-lived amity between the French and English Governments did not admit of the reductions being altogether carried out; but it is interesting to see how they were proposed to be conducted.