The action of history would not fail to solve the conflict, but this was only possible if Prussia entered energetically on this action; and thus we see Bismarck, the man at the helm, steering the Prussian vessel of State, undismayed by the daily attacks of the Progressists, through shallows and rocks, firmly and safely towards open water, on which, driven by the breath of God into history, it was to fly in full sail towards the sunrise of victory.

Immediately after assuming the Ministry, in December, 1862, Bismarck entered upon negotiations with Austria. If Austria could decide upon the dismissal of that enemy of Prussian policy, Schwarzenberg, and give Prussia her proper position in Germany and thus insure the same to Germany as her right. Bismarck was prepared to enter into a coalition with Austria; but if Austria could not rise to such a policy, Prussia was determined alone to give the coup de grace to the unhealthy, troubled state of things which lay like an Alp on German life, thus terminate the unnatural hesitation, and create for Germany a new and healthy body corporate.

With perfect frankness, as was his peculiar wont, Bismarck explained himself to Austria. The latter was at this time engaged with the project of the so-called delegations to the Bund, i.e., with a reform which was no reform, but an entirely meaningless absurdity, not even an apparent something.

In the famous circular dispatch of the 24th of January, 1863, Bismarck says:—

“In order to bring about a better understanding of the two Courts, I took the initiative in the form of negotiations with Count Karolyi, in which I brought the following considerations under the notice of the Imperial Ambassador. According to my convictions, our relations to Austria must unavoidably change for the better or the worse. It is the sincere wish of the Royal Government that the former alternative should arise; but if we should not be met by the Imperial Cabinet with the necessary advances as we could desire, it will be necessary for us to contemplate the other alternative, and prepare for it accordingly.

“I have reminded Count Karolyi that, during the decennial period preceding the events of 1848, there had been a tacit understanding between the two high Powers, by virtue of which Austria was insured the support of Prussia on European questions, and, on the other hand, allowed us to exercise an influence in Germany, unfettered by the opposition of Austria, as manifested by the formation of the Customs Union. By these arrangements the German Diet rejoiced in a degree of internal unity and outward dignity, which has not since then been reached. I have not alluded to the question as to whose error it was that analogous relations were not re-established on the reconstitution of the Diet, as I was concerned, not with recriminations for the past, but with a practical development of the present time. In the latter we find, in those very States with which Prussia, by her geographical position, is interested in maintaining special friendly relations, an opposing influence, promoted by the Imperial Cabinet, with signal results. I put it strongly to Count Karolyi, that Austria in this manner might, perhaps, win the sympathies of the governments of those States, but would estrange from herself those of Prussia, to the detriment of the common interests of the Diet. The Imperial Ambassador consoled himself with the certainty that, in the event of any war dangerous to Austria, the two greater powers would, under any circumstances, be found together again as allies.

“In this assumption, according to my view, there exists a dangerous error, which may, perhaps, not become apparent until the decisive moment, with a fatal clearness for both Cabinets, and I therefore besought Count Karolyi urgently to use all his powers to contradict this in Vienna. I pointed out that already, in the last Italian war, the alliance had not been so valuable to Austria as it might have been if the two powers had not, during the preceding eight years, contended with each other in the field of German politics, in a manner only conclusively advantageous to a third party, and so undermined all mutual confidence. Nevertheless, the fact that Prussia did not seek for any advantage in consequence of the difficulties of Austria in 1859, but rather armed to assist Austria in need, clearly shows the results of the former more intimate relations. But should these last not be renewed and revivified, Prussia would, under similar circumstances, be as little debarred from contracting an alliance with an antagonist of Austria, as, under opposite circumstances, from forming a faithful and firm alliance with Austria, against common enemies. I, at least, as I did not conceal from Count Karolyi, under such circumstances could never advise my gracious Sovereign to neutrality. Austria is free to choose whether she prefers to continue her present anti-Prussian policy, with the leverage of the coalition of the Central States, or would seek an honest union with Prussia. That the latter may be the result, is my most sincere desire. This can, however, only be obtained by the abandonment of Austria’s inimical policy at the German Courts.

“Count Karolyi replied that the Imperial House could not relinquish her traditional influences on the German Governments. I denied the existence of any such tradition by pointing out that Hanover and Hesse had, for a hundred years—from the commencement of the Seven Years’ War—been principally guided by Prussian influences; and that, at the epoch of Prince Metternich, the same States had also been guided from Vienna, specially in the interest of the understanding between Prussia and Austria; consequently that the assumed tradition of the Austrian Imperial House dated only from the time of Prince Schwarzenberg, and the system to which it pertained has not hitherto shown itself conducive to the consolidation of the German Confederation. I laid stress upon the fact that, on my arrival in Frankfurt, in 1851, after circumstantial conversations with Prince Metternich, then residing at Johannisberg, I had anticipated that Austria herself would see the wisdom of a policy which would obtain us a position in the German Confederation, consonant with the interest of Prussia to throw all her strength into the common cause. Instead of that, Austria has striven to embitter and impede our position in the German Confederation, and, in point of fact, to force us to seek for allies in other directions. The whole treatment of Prussia on the part of the Vienna Cabinet seems to rest upon the assumption that we, more than any other State, are fully exposed to foreign attacks, against which we need foreign assistance, and that hence we are bound to put up with contemptuous treatment from those States from whom we expect aid. The task of a Prussian Government, having the interests of the Royal House and of the country at heart, would therefore be, to prove the erroneousness of this assumption by deeds, if words and aspirations are neglected.

“Our dissatisfaction with the condition of things in the Confederation has received fresh aliment during the last few months, from the obstinacy with which the German Governments more closely allied with Austria have offensively stood out against Prussia on the delegate question. Before 1848 it had been unheard of that questions of any magnitude should have been introduced in the Confederation, without the concurrence of the two great Powers previously being secured. Even in cases where the opposition had come from the less powerful States, as in the matter of the South German fortresses, it had been preferred to allow objects of such importance and urgency to remain unfulfilled for years, rather than seek to overcome opposition by means of a majority. At the present day, however, the opposition of Prussia, not only to a proposal in itself, but in reference to its unconstitutionality, is treated as an incident undeserving of notice, by which no one should be prevented from pursuing a given progress in a deliberately chosen course. I urged upon Count Karolyi to communicate the contents of the preceding conference to Count Rechberg with the utmost accuracy, although in a confidential sense, expressing at the same time my conviction that the wounds sustained by our mutual relations can only be healed by unreserved sincerity.

“The second conversation took place on the 13th of December of last year, a few days after the former, in consequence of a dispatch of the Royal Ambassador at the Federal Diet. I visited Count Karolyi in order to draw his attention to the serious state of things at the Diet, and did not conceal from him that the further advance of the majority in a course regarded by us as unconstitutional, would bring us into a position we could not accept, and that in the consequences of it we foresaw the violation of the Confederation; that Herr von Usedom had left the Freiherr von Kübeck and Baron von der Pfordten in scarcely any doubt as to the construction which we placed upon the matter, but had received replies to his intimations whence we could draw no inferences as to any wish for a compromise, as Freiherr von der Pfordten pressed strenuously for a speedy delivery of our minority vote.

“Upon this I objected that, under such circumstances, a feeling of our own dignity would not admit of our evading any longer the conflict induced by the other side, and that I had therefore telegraphed the Royal Ambassador to deposit his minority vote. I indicated that passing over the border of legitimate competency by resolutions of the majority, would be regarded by us as a breach of the federal treaties, and that we should mark our sense of the fact by the withdrawal of the Royal Ambassador to the Diet, without nominating any successor; and I drew attention to the practical consequences likely to ensue upon such a situation in a comparatively short time, as it would naturally occur that the activity of an assembly, in which, from just causes, we no longer took part, would be regarded by us as inauthoritative on the whole business sphere of the Diet.

...

“A few days after this I was confidentially informed that the Imperial Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg (Count Thun) was about to return to his post by way of Berlin, and would confer with me upon the pending question. When he arrived, I did not hesitate, despite the recently named lamentable experiences of an endeavor to meet his communications—made for the purpose of some understanding—in the most straightforward manner. I therefore declared myself ready to enter upon different projects, agreed between us, for the settlement of the Frankfurt difficulties.... On this Count Thun proposed to me that an interview between Count Rechberg and myself should be arranged, with a view of a further discussion of the matter. I declared myself ready to meet him, but in the next few days received from Count Karolyi confidential communications, according to which, Count Rechberg anticipated, before our interview, the declaration of my adhesion to the reform project in the Diet, regarding which, in my opinion, it was necessary to have longer and more minute negotiations. As the time extending up to the 22d of December was too short for these, I presumed that it was only possible to employ the proposed conference for the consideration of previous and binding treaties.... As Count Rechberg hereupon declared that Austria could not give up the further negotiation of the project in reference to the assembly of delegates without some assured equivalent, the interview until this time has not taken place.”

Clearly as it is here stated, so it happened with all negotiations. Prussia ever sought to go hand-in-hand with Austria, but Austria ever evaded the opportunity. She alleged that it was her intention to pursue her German policy alone, in her solitary path—the way of Schwarzenberg—which was to lead, over the entire insignificance of Germany, to the humiliation and oppression of Prussia. Of course Prussia then had no other alternative than to follow its own mission its own way. To this period belongs the conclusion of the Prusso-Russian treaty on the common measures to be pursued for the suppression of the Polish insurrection. This Convention, by which the friendly relations of Prussia and Russia were confirmed, has been frequently and unintentionally misinterpreted. The internal meaning of this, and its reaction, require some further explanation which it is not desirable at present to give.[45]

The diplomatic campaign, which the other Powers commenced at the instance of the Convention, it is well known, had no result, and was lost in the sands.

But the saddest figure in this business was played by the party of progress, who, in their blind zeal, had seized upon the Convention, on the plea that Prussia by this would become nothing higher than an outpost of Russia. The idea of such a baseless absurdity—had it been so—would have been laughable, if it had not been too sad to see that the opposition to Prussia abroad had again been instigated by an allied party in the actual Prussian camp. This, however, unfortunately was doomed to be frequently repeated on later occasions.

In the summer of 1863 Bismarck had accompanied his King to Carlsbad, and thence to Gastein, when Austria emerged with her new and useless projects of reorganization, in which there was a tinge and tendency of the inoperative Federal principle, as opposed to Prussian Unionistic efforts. King William received the invitation to the Congress of Princes at Gastein, and the Emperor Francis Joseph himself personally handed him a minute memorial on these projects of reform. This contained, although of course it was not acknowledged by Austria, very little more than the project of delegates long since opposed by Prussia, and which in no way could content the pretensions of Prussia or the wants of the German people.

King William, who had gone with his Premier from Gastein, by way of Munich and Stuttgart, to Baden-Baden, declined to attend the Princes’ Congress at Frankfurt, which was then put up upon the scene with skill worthy of recognition, even with taste, but had not the slightest result, although the princes present at it had accepted the fundamental principles of the Austrian project.

And how came it that this illustrious princely congress should have departed to Orcus without any lamentation, so that in only a few weeks no one ever mentioned it again? Simply because Prussia had taken no part in it.

In Vienna it had been thought that Prussia would have been carried away by it. When that proved unsuccessful, withdrawal was thought undesirable, and every one had to learn, by bitter experience, that nothing was possible in Germany without Prussia. Prussia, as usual, had been undervalued, and thus it was revenged; but, nevertheless, Prussia continued to be slightly esteemed, and the vengeance was to be still greater.

At the present time, the simplest eyes can see that the rivalry of Prussia and Austria was now first coming into public sight, ere it was possible to think of any reconstruction of Germany. Austria had declined all the propositions of Prussia, which aimed essentially at a peaceable separation of Austria from the German Federation, and led to a federal union of the newly constructed union, under the leadership of Prussia, with Austria, but had replied with the Reform Act, containing within itself a nullification of Prussia. Austria, and the Central States allied with her, had given Prussia the alternatives of unconditional submission, immediate nullification, or the exclusion of herself from the new Federation.

Prussia, with quiet dignity, perfected this act of self-exclusion; and, lo! matters did not go on, and the Viennese Reform Act was a blank.

In his report to the King’s Majesty of the 15th of September, 1863, and in the Royal reply to the members of the Princes’ Congress on the 22d of the same month, Bismarck promulgated a series of “preliminary conditions” as to the part Prussia might take in further negotiations.

He demanded—1. The “veto of Prussia and Austria at least upon every federal war not undertaken in resistance of an attack upon federal territory;” 2. The “entire equality of Prussia with Austria in the presidency and government of federal concerns;” and 3. “A national representation, not to consist of delegates, but of directly chosen representatives, in the ratio of the populations of single States, the powers of which, in resolution, should, in any case, be more extensive than those in the project for the Frankfurt Reform Act.” As a plea for this condition he especially insisted, in his report to the King, that “the interests and requirements of the Prussian people were essentially and indissolubly identical with those of the German people, wherever this element attained its true construction and value; Prussia never need fear to be drawn into any policy adverse to her own interests.” Besides these three points, he also maintained that the “German sovereigns” were bound either “to learn the opinion of the nation itself by the means of chosen representatives, or to adduce the constitutional sanction of the Diets of each individual State.”

But that Bismarck had fully understood the final and actual ends of the Austro-Central policy, may be seen from the following sentence of his report to the King’s Majesty:—

“In the entirely remarkable attitude observed by Austria in this transaction, it is impossible to avoid the impression that apparently the Imperial Austrian Cabinet from the commencement contemplated, not the co-operation of Prussia in the common enterprise, but the realization of a separate federation as an end, already visible in the first propositions of the 3d of August, in case that Prussia would not join in the Austrian plans.”

There can be no doubt that Bismarck, by his firm attitude towards the Congress of Princes and the Austro-Central policy, has not only saved the future of Prussia, but also that of Germany. At that time people were so confused and dazzled that it was not at all seen. The small fights in the Chamber had robbed people of any understanding of the great things there accomplished. Bismarck was plainly of opinion that war was imminent, as may be clearly read from the report on which he founded the dissolution of the Electoral Chamber of the Diet. It is here said:—“On the basis of the German Federal Constitution attempts have come to light, the unmistakable object of which is to set down such a power of the Prussian State in Germany and in Europe, which forms a well-earned heritage of the glorious history of our fathers, and which the Prussian people has not at any time resolved to allow to be alienated from it. Under these circumstances, it will be a necessity for his Majesty’s subjects at the same time to give expression to the fact, at the forthcoming elections, that no political difference of opinion is so deeply rooted in our country that, in the face of an attempt to bring down the independence and dignity of Prussia, the unity of the nation and its unalterable fidelity to the governing house can be shaken.”

Perhaps they in the camp of Austria and its allies reckoned on—decidedly they believed in—war; and war certainly came at the time, but in a remarkable way, not between Prussia and Austria, but, to the inexpressible surprise of the world, Prussia and Austria, hand-in-hand as allies, took the field against Denmark.

It is utterly impossible clearly to state how Bismarck succeeded in inducing Austria to enter upon this war, how he managed to get their old rival to draw the sword for Prussia’s interest, in exact contradiction to her entire previous policy. It is quite true to say that the energetic initiative of Bismarck carried away Austria with him, but the matter does not grow at all clearer for that. It is also not inexact, most certainly, to affirm that Austrian diplomacy might assert that she was obliged to join, in order to watch over Prussia and bridle her; but it was by no means false when the Viennese exclaimed, “That Bismarck drags us by the halter!” when Austria went into Holstein, to Schleswig, to Jütland, in the interest of Prussia and Germany. No doubt the magic of Austria’s burning desire to retrieve the Imperial army’s lost prestige, after the misfortune of 1859, contributed to this political wonder—the desire of hanging fresh laurels on the black and yellow standard. Such a crown the warriors of Austria honestly won there in the North. Perhaps the circumstance that the Emperor of Austria always felt a friendly feeling towards Bismarck personally, had additional influence; and there might be a not altogether groundless feeling in existence that the conservative policy of Bismarck was not unlikely in some way to exert a favorable influence in Austria. It is said that on one occasion the Emperor Francis Joseph involuntarily exclaimed, when Bismarck was severely blamed in his presence, “Ah! if I but had him!”

If, however, Bismarck thus led Austria to the North as the ally of Prussia, and thus prevented interferences from other quarters, he also created new difficulties for himself in the sequence of events, which were to assume far higher proportions than they usually assumed. He knew very well that, after the victory over Denmark, the old quarrel with Austria would break out again—must break out again; nor could he have omitted to see that a victorious war, carried on in conjunction with Austria, could not fail mightily to increase all kinds of sympathies possessed by Austria in the army, and in conservative Prussia. The deep abhorrence against any rupture with Austria which Bismarck had to combat in his own camp, emerged still more into light after the war in a more animated way, and rendered his position more difficult from day to day. All the traditions of glorious alliance of the great period of the War of Freedom had become revivified in the hut as in the palace, and they possessed real power; for it is an unquestionable fact that Austria would be the best ally for Prussia from that moment when it determines to allow Prussia to take her proper position in Germany without malice or envy. It was the destiny of Germany that Austria could not resolve to give Prussia what was Prussia’s right; Bismarck’s great political task, however, was to compel the surrender from Austria of that which is the meed of Prussia and Germany.

That, however, to which we have alluded, could only become of value after victory. In the beginning of the Danish campaign it passed only as a fresh breeze through the sultry political atmosphere of Prussia. The Progressist party certainly continued in their inimical position, but the people themselves began to see daylight; those minds not entirely blinded by political passion gradually obtained some glimpse of the meaning of Bismarck. The cannon storm of Missunde had awakened Prussian patriotism; Prussia had never been deaf when the royal trumpet sounded to battle, and the Prussian heart has ever stirred when the eagle standards have been unfolded. This should, however, be attributed to the advantage of the Minister whose policy led to the battle-field and the victory.[46]

When Prince Frederick Charles had planted Prussia’s standard victoriously on the walls of Düppel in April, 1864, King William himself went to the North to honor his brave warriors. On this triumphant progress Bismarck accompanied him, and there he might have learnt that he was no longer the universally hated Minister-President, but that this victory had greatly increased the number of those who honored him.

In the summer of the same year he accompanied his royal master to Carlsbad, and at this time he put the new companionship of Austria to a severe trial. Saxon and Hanoverian troops then held the Duchy of Holstein in the name of the German Confederation. It is fortunate for us that we need not enter any farther upon the terrible Schleswig-Holstein question. Bismarck considered it necessary to remove the Saxons and Hanoverians from the Duchies, which Prussia and Austria had won with the sword, and that at the peace of Vienna had been ceded to Prussia and Austria by Denmark. By the removal of the troops of the Central States the matter was much simplified, and the question brought a step nearer to solution. It was to be expected that Austria, considering her secret treaties with the Central States, would receive this step with very evil grace; but Bismarck put it into execution, and on the Austrian side it was allowed to be carried out, although the press was enraged at it—of which Bismarck, who went from Carlsbad through Prague to Vienna, and then to Gastein, was well aware on his journey.

From Gastein Bismarck returned in the King’s train, at the invitation of the Emperor of Austria, to Vienna, where he took a share in the great hunting-parties in the wild park, and had reason to congratulate himself on his skill. On this visit he was received with great distinction by the Emperor Francis Joseph, and received from him the Exalted Order of St. Stephen.

From Vienna he accompanied the King to Baden, and then went to his peaceful Reinfeld in Pomerania, but returned again to Baden before going to Biarritz, where he took sea-baths up till November. After a short stay in Paris he returned to Berlin. Here he resumed his old battle with the party of progress, whose hatred against the Minister-President, as may be very readily understood, grew more intense as he showed himself the more distinguished and greater.

After this “elegantly” conducted war—which was at once an experiment on the newly reorganized army and the needle-gun, and had roused the patriotically warlike, i.e., the real, spirit of Prussia, the King invested his Minister-President with the highest mark of honor Prussia can bestow—the Exalted Order of the Black Eagle. Among those who felt obliged epistolarily to congratulate Bismarck on this well-earned distinction, was his former preceptor, the Director, Dr. Bonnell. One evening Bismarck called on him personally to thank him; he sat pleasantly chatting with Bonnell’s family at the tea-table. In his decisive manner he related a great deal about Biarritz, where he had enjoyed himself thoroughly; lightly alluded to the numerous threatening letters and warnings of assassination with which he had been incommoded, but which he despised, as no political party had ever yet received any benefit from murder. He then related a dream which he had had in Biarritz. In this dream he thought he ascended a mountain path which continually grew narrower, until he found himself before a wall of rock, and beside him a deep abyss. For an instant he paused, thinking whether he should retrace his steps; but he then made up his mind and struck the wall with his cane, on which it immediately disappeared, and his road was free again. After talking of many things in old and new times, he rose and said, “I must go now, or my wife will be uneasy again.”

“Dreams are seems,” says the proverb, but perhaps not always, and at the present time every one knows what the wall was which vanished before Bismarck’s blow.

The following year, 1865, arrived. By the Vienna peace of the 30th October, 1864, the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig were ceded to Prussia and Austria—that is to say, they had returned whither they belonged, to Germany. This was, however, especially the result of the daring and skillful policy of Bismarck, for such a conquest was quite against the intention and desire of Austria. It was necessary now to deal with this acquisition, and it soon appeared that Austria was about to substitute, in place of the great national policy of Bismarck, the ultimate end of which was very openly expressed—to have a German Confederation under the leadership of Prussia—the wretched detail of a new Schleswig-Holstein minor state. No doubt that in such a policy Austria only thought of contravening Bismarck’s German policy—of rendering the realization of the Bismarck thought of union an impossibility. Nor was it remarkable that the Central States did not support the policy of Bismarck, as they would certainly have to sacrifice a part of that sovereignty they had so recently acquired to the nation, if Bismarck’s policy should prove victorious. These sovereigns could not determine to recede to the position they had so long held as German Princes of the Empire; they desired to assert their apparent sovereignty, and they were unable to perceive, that in case Austria should prevail, they would become Austria’s vassals at the expense of the German nation—at the price of Germany’s future. It was in vain that Bismarck exerted himself at the Federation, as well as at the German Courts, to introduce more healthy opinions—he could not get forward; and the continually abrupter forms in which Austria acted in the conquered Duchies, admitted of no doubt on his part that the Viennese politicians, with the whole of their partisans in Germany, were determined to force Prussia to submission; to the abandonment of her saving union policy, to the acceptance of the Austrian Federation—in fact, to her humiliation and dependence.

It was sad enough that Austria, in her inimical action, also reckoned upon the internal conflict in Prussia, which was the more zealously stimulated, in proportion as it became clear to the party of progress that the heart of the nation was more and more turning to the statesman who fought his victories, to the greater fame of Prussia and happiness of Germany, upon a field whither they were unable to follow him—upon the field of honor and of deeds. Of what use in the end was it, that they succeeded in victoriously maintaining, by their high-spiced speeches, a majority in the Chamber against the Ministry—that they embittered the daily life of Bismarck and the other Ministers—and rendered their labors more disagreeable, if this Ministry, despite of all, went victoriously on in the world’s history?—and that Bismarck, though he might not get the votes of the majority, won the hearts of the people?

We have no doubt that Bismarck, in the summer of 1865, already believed the hour of the great battle between Prussia and Austria to have arrived, and that he was determined to stand up manfully for his sound policy, and with this conviction we arrive at a great riddle—the episode of Gastein.

Bismarck had accompanied the King, in the summer of 1865, to Carlsbad, thence to Gastein and Salzburg, and so to the Emperor of Austria at Ischl.

The deepest veil of secrecy still covers the events which there took place; it is true the historian, A. Schmidt,[47] assures us that already, on the 15th of July, Bismarck, at Carlsbad, had said to the French Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, the Duc de Grammont, that he considered war between Prussia and Austria to be unavoidable—even that it had become a necessity. But this is unquestionably untrue—as untrue as the further statement of the same historian, that Bismarck, on the 23d July, said openly to the Prime Minister of the King of Bavaria, the Freiherr von der Pfordten, that “in his firm opinion war between Prussia and Austria was very likely and close at hand. It was a question, as the matter appeared to him, of a duel between Austria and Prussia only. The rest of Germany might stand by and contemplate this duel as passive spectators. Prussia had never contemplated, and even now did not think of extending its power beyond the line of the Maine. The settlement of the controversy would not long have to be awaited. One blow—one pitched battle—and Prussia would be in the position to dictate conditions. The most urgent need of the Central States was to range themselves on her side. Neutrality, even that of Saxon soil, would be observed by Prussia. A localization of the war, and that localization confined to Silesia, was not only determined, but, according to the already ascertained opinions of the most competent military authorities, it was possible. The Central States, in addition to this, by the proclamation of neutrality, were an additional means towards securing this centralization of the war. Bavaria ought, however, to weigh well the fact that she was the natural heir of the position of Austria in South Germany.”

What Bismarck really might have said to Freiherr von der Pfordten is not recognizable in this acceptation at all.

On the 14th of August the treaty of Gastein was concluded, which divided the co-domination of Prussia and Austria in Holstein and Schleswig. This treaty compelled Austria to leave the Central States a second time in an ambiguous position; the Central States might have learned from the fact how little really was cared for them at Vienna. This knowledge they had dearly to pay for a year later!

What could have induced Bismarck to conclude this truce—for the treaty of Gastein was nothing else? Who can positively say? To the present time it is an enigma not yet solved. Did military exigencies influence the matter? was the season too far advanced? did European politics stand in the way? or the unconcluded negotiations with Italy? was there a threat of intervention on the other side? had the old sympathies for Austria in Prussia, so greatly stimulated by the recent common campaign, to be respected? did King William follow up the old traditional partiality for Austria? did the King and his Minister wish to give Austria a last term of grace, hoping that Viennese politics might change at the twelfth hour? or did the purchase of the Duchy of Lauenburg afford any loophole of escape?

Perhaps all these questions should be answered in the affirmative. As a matter of fact, the treaty became a last experiment, as to whether it was possible for Prussia to go hand-in-hand with Austria. It must not, however, be forgotten that this much-deprecated treaty was very favorable to Prussia. Despite the co-domination, Prussia already, by geographical position, remained master in the Duchies, and was always stronger.

From Austria, Bismarck went with the King, by way of Munich and Frankfurt, to the Rhine, visited Baden-Baden and Homburg, attended the great review in the province of Saxony, near Merseburg, and then set out for the Duchy of Lauenburg, the special Minister of which he is, and finally sought for recreation at Biarritz.

On the 15th September, 1865, he was raised to the rank of a Prussian Count.

A short time after he had returned to Berlin by way of Paris he was taken ill, and remained an invalid throughout the winter, although he carried on business during the whole time with his accustomed energy.

To this period belongs a little episode, which we should not mention at all, did it not show very thoroughly how idle it is to trust rumor, and had, on the other hand, given Bismarck an opportunity to write a letter to his old friend André von Roman, which soon appeared in the Berlin newspapers. A photographer at Gastein had issued a picture of Count Bismarck, and beside him the royal singer, Pauline Lucca. At this conjunction many friends of Bismarck were very angry; all sorts of nonsense was talked on the matter, and at last M. André felt himself compelled to write to Bismarck about it. Bismarck thus replied:—

Although this letter may have become public by an indiscretion which, under other circumstances, we should have deplored, we openly declare here that we do not regret the publication; and our readers will be of our opinion, without its being necessary to say more on the subject, or to qualify the contents of the letter.

We will close this chapter with some letters of Bismarck, written by him in his summer journeys of 1863, ’4, and ’5, when chiefly in attendance on the King, to his family, and generally to his wife.