Effect produced in England by the military successes of Prussia—Short service and the reserve system introduced—Abolition of army purchase—Abolition of the double rank in the Foot Guards—Substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign or Cornet—Manœuvres and summer drills—Changes in the drill-book—Illness and recovery of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales—Death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, and of Field-Marshal Sir W. Gomm—General Sir W. Codrington appointed Colonel of the Coldstream Guards—Death of Captains Hon. R. Campbell and R. Barton—Company training—Pirbright Camp established—Medical service in the Brigade—Change in the establishment of the Regiment—Death of Sir W. Codrington, and appointment of General Sir Thomas Steele as Colonel—Troubles in Ireland—Alarm in London—The Royal Military Chapel.

The wars that disturbed the Continent could not fail to rouse the serious attention of every thinking man in this country, and to make all look closely into the causes which had brought about very unexpected results. Englishmen were not surprised at the ease with which the great Germanic Powers overcame the resistance of Denmark, in 1864: nor yet, indeed, to see Austria driven from Lombardy when Napoleon III. set himself to the task, in 1859; because the alliance which we had contracted with the French in 1854, taught us to respect their army, and to believe they possessed a system and organization which placed them at the head of the military nations of Europe. But the struggles of 1866 and 1870-71 were of a very different nature. In the first case, we saw Prussia suddenly emerge from a small peace to a strong war establishment, strike swiftly and surely the minor States of Germany, and swoop down on Bohemia, where, meeting an enemy apparently worthy of her steel, and of about equal numerical strength to herself, she annihilated his forces in a few weeks, and obliged him to conclude a peace almost before he knew that fighting had commenced. In the second case, we again saw Prussia, in union this time with the smaller Germanic States, arm herself with even greater rapidity than before, concentrate her large armies on the frontier of France, invade the territories of her formidable rival, and lock up the bulk of the hostile forces in the fortress of Metz, while she captured the remainder at Sedan. These astounding successes occurred when scarcely two months had elapsed after the declaration of the war, and the course of hostilities was so favourable to the invader that, in less than seven months, France lay prostrate at the feet of Prussia, and was obliged to sue for terms of peace, humiliating to her national pride and derogatory to her great position in Europe.

No statesman could neglect to examine the causes of these stupendous events, and the institutions which had rendered them capable of realization: no soldier could abstain from studying the new conditions under which hostilities in the future must be conducted, and the numerous questions of warlike interest which modern science had introduced. It is not surprising that the Prussian system should speedily have become our model in the affairs relating to the army, and that the British nation should determine to make a searching inquiry into its military concerns.

It is not necessary to attempt to give a description of all the matters that claimed the earnest attention of the country at that time. Some of them did not affect the Coldstream, or did so only in a slight manner, and their discussion in this work may be omitted, or need receive but a passing notice. Among them, however, the two following should be mentioned: (1) the more efficient training of both Officers and men in their duties, and in the new system of tactics which had to be adopted in the field in consequence of the increased power of artillery, and of the great development of the fire of the breech-loader; and (2) the recruitment of the men, and the term of service during which they should remain with their corps.

We have seen that, as early as 1856, considerable interest had been taken in the first of these points, though it is also true that the reforms introduced were merely in their infancy, and had not by any means gone far enough. This was a natural result, because to effect a change of a salutary character, the expenditure of money is necessary, and public opinion must be moved before it can be obtained. The successes of Prussia had not then thrown light upon the requirements which a state of war in the present day exacts; and it was after these victories had been achieved, and not before, that the country acquired the faculty of realizing the advantages to be gained if all ranks are efficiently taught the details of the military profession.^[386] Later in this chapter, an occasion will present itself to refer to some of the methods undertaken to accomplish this object, and we now pass to the second point, which, having a peculiar interest of its own, exercises a special influence on the fortunes of every regiment that forms part of the army.

Up to 1847 military service had been unlimited, and men who enlisted might be held to remain with the Colours for life.^[387] The system was not satisfactory, and a change was then made by which men contracted to serve for ten years only, with the power of remaining on eleven more, should they be permitted to do so, and, at the end of that period, to receive a pension. In 1867, the first term of service was raised from ten to twelve years, and soldiers were encouraged to continue their service for twenty-one years for pension.^[388] The advantage of having a reserve to fill up the ranks of the army in war time had, for some years, occupied the attention of the authorities, and, before 1867, two small attempts had been made to secure this object; but, though the principle was admitted, very little was done in this direction. The war of 1866, however, made the country realize the importance of a rapid mobilization; and the Prussians, having practically shown how, with a reserve at hand, they could, in a short space of time, convert a small peace establishment into a fully equipped army ready to take the field, we also desired to follow their example. In 1867, therefore, we strengthened the reserve; but, as a matter of fact, we still merely nibbled at the question, until 1870, when it at last received a more thorough consideration. In that year the Enlistment Act was passed, introducing “short service” and a more efficient reserve into the army.

By the new system, recruits enlist for twelve years, and engage to serve the whole time with the Colours, or part of the time with the Colours and the rest in the reserve, according to the conditions laid down by the Secretary of State. At first, it was proposed that the two periods should be equal; but this was soon modified to seven years in the ranks and five in the reserve, and in the Guards (since 1883) to three and nine, for such recruits who might prefer those terms. Hence, in the Brigade, men may now enlist for three or seven years with the Colours, and spend nine or five in the reserve; three-years men may, with the consent of their Commanding Officers, extend their service in the ranks to seven years, and from seven to twelve years, after which, still under the same conditions, they are able to re-engage for some years more up to twenty-one, with a view to obtain a pension.

Thus the present system is elastic, and has the merit of training a larger proportion of the population to the use of arms than was formerly the case; of enabling the nation to maintain a relatively small force in peace time, which can be rapidly expanded into an army when hostilities break out; and of reducing the pension list. It also increases the domestic comfort of the men, for it definitely disposes of the question of marriage of the rank and file, which, with long service, was difficult, indeed impossible, to solve. The practical utility of the plan has not yet been tested under the strain of war, and, until it has been so tried, it is manifestly premature to unduly praise it; nor are we yet in a position to judge whether the fighting material we now possess, is as well endowed with the fortitude, virtue, and cohesive force, which discipline bestows, as was the case in so eminent a degree in the past. We can point to this, however, that Continental nations who have tried their reserves in the field consider them to be fully equal to any other troops they have in their ranks; and we, too, have had experience of the noble qualities of comparatively untrained men in some very critical situations and emergencies. But, of one thing, at least, we may be sure: the reserve men will loyally come up when their presence is required. Englishmen have never failed to respond to the call of duty, and it is notorious, when even a fear arises that British interests may be attacked, how quickly the manhood of the country rises to the occasion, and offers to come forward to defend them. It cannot be forgotten that, in 1878, when the then existing reserve was called out, 13,684 men, out of a possible of 14,154, reported themselves; and, in 1882, when 11,642 reserve men were summoned, 11,032 appeared.^[389]

The Prussian model, upon which we based our army reform, was departed from in two important particulars. In one, the departure was fully acknowledged and thoroughly explained in public; but not so the other. In the first, we repudiated the idea of inflicting the evils and the tyranny of universal service upon the country, and deliberately declined to make the people liable to a blood tax, that wastes their wealth and attacks their liberty and independence. Our military forces, hence, are smaller than they would otherwise have been, and our means of mobilization less rapid than those which exist on the Continent, because our reserve men, living where and as they like, are not localized and controlled in the manner which obtains among the Powers of Europe. Nevertheless, we willingly gave up these advantages for the sake of preserving our freedom, so dear to the mind of every Englishman, and the foundation of our national prosperity. As we inhabit an island, and hold the command of the sea by an overwhelmingly powerful navy, there was no valid reason to press for any alteration in our time-honoured custom of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment.

The second departure from the Prussian organization seems to have been as carefully hidden from the public gaze as the other was ventilated and discussed. The system we chose to copy approached our own, in that the Sovereign was the direct and immediate Chief of the army, and from a purely military standpoint it is easy to perceive that such an arrangement—adopted moreover, by every great Power that has a Sovereign, and that aims at real military strength—is the best adapted to produce the most efficient results. Our reformers, however, completely ignored in this respect the model they announced they would follow, and as Englishmen have never been a military race properly so called, they scarcely saw or appreciated the change that was brought about, when the Supreme Command, still vested in the Crown, was exercised through the political channel of the Secretary of State (1870). The historian is bound to record this vitally important alteration in the constitution of the army—a change rendered desirable, perhaps, for reasons that are outside the scope of this work,—for, it affects and must affect the life of every regiment that composes it, and subjects many of the details of purely military interest and of the military profession, to the fluctuations and necessities of party strife.

Nor was it long before the army was made the victim of a political dispute. The war of 1870-71 had roused the people to fever heat, and army reform became the universal cry. Politicians, not gifted with military instincts or knowledge, soon led their followers into those points of the subject that best suited the interests of their party; and as the “abolition of purchase” offered just such an advantage in the parliamentary struggle then going on, it was eagerly seized upon as the most urgent question of the hour. It cannot be said that army reform was impossible without abolishing purchase, for every improvement introduced could have been as easily effected, whether purchase had been retained or not. But it is also true that the practice of buying and selling a commission was an anomaly quite indefensible in itself, which deserved to come to an end, and which was scarcely likely to survive for long. If so, its abolition, safeguarding the interests of all concerned by it, would have benefited the army more than can be said was the case, when it was achieved in 1871, and thereby increased the influence of the political party that carried it.

The purchase system had the disadvantage of checking the rise in their profession of men of very moderate fortune, who entered the infantry or cavalry;^[390] and this without doubt was an evil which required reformation, for it excluded from these branches of the army some whose service there might have been of value to the country. On the other hand, this defect was more theoretical than practical; and the system had the advantage of keeping up a flow of promotion, and of keeping down the pension list. It was not an arrangement by which any purchaser could buy his steps; to be allowed to spend money for this purpose was a privilege to which any conditions could be attached. So was it also a cheap means of keeping up the supply of Officers, for the sale of a commission was the only pecuniary reward that was expected, and Parliament was not asked to spend money to provide gratuities, retired pay, pensions, and the like, that now have to be given. Officers, in short, tendered security for their good behaviour, and proved their devotion to their profession by offering their service for a smaller return in the shape of pay than they now receive.

The Bill to do away with this system passed the House of Commons, and went in due course up the Lords, where it was read the first time. On the second reading, a demand was made for further information on the proposals that were then contemplated, and a resolution to that effect was carried. Thereupon a Royal Warrant, July 20, 1871, was immediately issued, which abolished purchase without the aid of Parliament, from the following 1st of November.

On October 31, 1871, another Royal Warrant was published, which contained two points that affected the Brigade: (1) it abolished what has been called the “double rank,” and (2) it substituted the new rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign in the infantry, and of Cornet in the cavalry, both of which had existed ever since the formation of the standing army.

The abolition of the “double rank” is of too recent a date, and concerns the Officers of the Brigade too intimately and personally, to be able easily to discuss it at the present moment. It will be time enough to do so at some future date, when war on a large scale has tested the quality of the modern army, when it has been practically shown where the military virtues are most plentifully to be found in it, and when we shall have emerged definitely from the transition state in which the reforms of 1871 has placed us. Guardsmen do recognise, and have for a long time recognised, that the advantage which the double rank conferred upon them was an anomaly which deserved to be swept away, for they have ever been anxious to possess no purely military privilege which the rest of their comrades did not enjoy, and have been eager to see removed anything that might savour of favouritism, or give cause for jealousy. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that the double rank was an institution which had obtained the sanction of two centuries, and that it was the survival of an ancient system which possessed some merit. In the infancy of the British army, shortly after the Restoration of King Charles II., brought about by General Monck and his Coldstreamers, there was much debate over the vexed question of “precedence of command.” This precedence, in some regiments, not all of them Guards regiments, was fixed, not by seniority of commission, but by seniority of corps, and this arrangement appears to have developed into the institution of the double rank for the Foot Guards, and of Brevet rank for all.^[391]

Now, it seems evident that the object in view, when these things were arranged, was to maintain efficiency in the army; to keep up a flow of promotion; and to prevent Officers from ranking low down in the army list, when, by length of service or for other reasons, it was desirable that they should rise with others in their profession. The regimental system, being the basis of military advancement, then, as it is now, it is obvious that unless some such means were adopted to accelerate the promotion of an Officer, who belonged to a corps where men were unwilling to leave the service, no efforts on his part could secure his rise. Nor can it be forgotten that promotion stagnates in proportion as Officers generally are attached to their profession and to their corps,—that is, in not the least distinguished regiments of the army; and if the regimental system have any value (and that it has a value is evident, while the promoters of army reform showed their opinion of it by retaining it), it becomes clear that relief is most required in those regiments where duty is well performed, and where a high standard of military efficiency is maintained. The principle laid down was neither unwise nor unfair; and if in the case of the Foot Guards it was applied with too generous a hand, it must still be remembered that this was done, not less on account of their services in the field, than by reason of the position they occupied in the army.

The sudden abolition of the double rank in 1871, put the Foot Guards in a worse position than if it had never existed; but they still have the honour of occupying a unique position in the army, for, while before 1871 they held the first place, after that date they sank immediately down to the lowest place in their profession. The following table will illustrate this fact:—

The substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign led to some curious results. By the rules established in October, 1871, a Commission as a Sub-Lieutenant might be given to a successful candidate who had passed certain examinations; and in order to qualify for the rank of Lieutenant, a Sub-Lieutenant was required to serve satisfactorily for twelve months in a regiment, and after such service to go through a course of study, and to pass a professional examination, fixed from time to time by the Secretary of State.

The position of the new Officer was unprecedented, and no one at first knew exactly what he was. Accordingly, on March 5, 1872, we find that he was forbidden to present himself before his Sovereign, because he was “not positively confirmed as a Commissioned Officer;” but then, on the 21st of May following, he was stated to be a “regularly Commissioned Officer, and, when qualified by a knowledge of his work, he was eligible for Courts-Martial and all other military duties performed by Subaltern Officers;” and at last, February 24, 1873, it was announced that he would be received at Court. The trials of the aspirant to serve in Her Majesty’s army did not end here. The new civilian chief who assumed the direction of every military detail, determined that the stage of initiation into the most glorious profession the world has produced should be thorny, painful, and difficult. The Sub-Lieutenant, just as he emerged from school and opened the first and brightest page of a happy youth, was allowed to spend a year full of liberty among his new companions in arms, and to enjoy to the uttermost the sweets of life as they unfolded themselves before his vivid imagination. But the bright holiday was brief, and when it ended, the hapless lad was to experience a very different treatment. The year of enjoyment was over, and, giving up his freedom, he was sent back to the rigid discipline of school, (in this case even more severe than that to which he had been accustomed in his boyhood). Here he was tutored, controlled, corrected, and crammed. The power of a Secretary of State is great; but, just as he cannot make water run uphill, so can he not alter the ardent character of a young English gentleman, and the latter, we regret to say, rebelled at the indignities heaped upon him! Solemn indeed were the warnings which his sympathetic military superiors gave him. But they did more than this, for they persuaded the political chief to avoid running counter to human nature, and the rule was changed, and a more rational one substituted for it. The Sub-Lieutenant went first to school, and then he joined his Regiment.

It is pleasant now to leave these matters, and to turn once more to the solid and effective improvements that were introduced about this time. In 1871, manœuvres on an extended scale were, for the first time, held in England, when a successful endeavour was made to conduct operations which should, as far as possible, imitate those that have to be undertaken in war time. Aldershot and its neighbourhood was selected for these exercises, and they lasted for about seven weeks, commencing early in August until the end of September. The Guards Brigade present, was formed of the 1st Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards. Next year similar manœuvres took place in Salisbury Plain, which were even more successful than those of the year before. They lasted about a month, beginning in the middle of August, and were attended by the 3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusilier Guards. In this year, also, Regimental transport was introduced, and, in June, one Non-commissioned officer and twenty men of the battalions just mentioned were sent to Woolwich to be trained as drivers. In 1873, parties of the same strength, from the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Coldstream, again proceeded to Woolwich for a similar course, this time under the command of a Subaltern Officer from each Regiment, and manœuvres, lasting a month, took place at Cannock Chase, in Staffordshire. The two Battalions, above mentioned, formed the Guards Brigade upon that occasion, each made up into eight companies (25 Officers, 641 Non-commissioned officers and men, exclusive of the Regimental transport detachment). With this year the mimic war undertaken to exercise every part of the army, the fighting units as well as the transport, commissariat, medical services, etc., came to an end: manœuvres cost money, and the recollection of the great struggle between France and Germany was beginning to fade from the memory of those whose privilege it is to pay taxes and return members of Parliament. Henceforward summer drills were substituted for the larger and more instructive operations.

Concurrently with these reforms, and, indeed, during a longer period than is above indicated, the drill-book was often revised, and a system of tactics introduced, calculated to satisfy the conditions under which troops have to move when opposed to modern arms of precision. The space allowed to each man in the ranks has been increased, the rigid structure of the British line has given way to a looser formation, and, greater independence of individual action being deemed desirable, the intelligence of the private soldier has been raised and cultivated. The principles of the science of tactics remain constant, but the system adopted necessarily varies as new weapons are invented; the problem before us, therefore, was how to apply the principles to modern conditions. Our forefathers resolved the question satisfactorily, as far as their generation was concerned. They inculcated a stiff and rigid discipline into the British army, and they endowed the rank and file with a moral stamina sufficient to enable them to maintain themselves on the field of battle in line, and thus develop to the fullest extent the fire of their muskets. Our enemies, not so highly trained, could only fight in column; and, hence, in no small degree, our victories and their defeats. That the closest attention has been unremittingly given to this great problem, all know already; but, as we have not yet had the experience of a great war under new conditions, the results of our labours are not yet practically tested.

It will be remembered that the Prince of Wales fell grievously ill in the end of 1870, and that, hoping against hope, it appeared only too likely that the august patient could not recover. The whole of the English people, at home and abroad, were deeply agitated with anxiety for the life of His Royal Highness, and great was the joy, sincerely felt and universally expressed, when it pleased Providence to spare him to the country, and to raise him up again in vigour and in health and strength. Full of gratitude for this signal favour, the Queen commanded a thanksgiving service to be held in St. Paul’s Cathedral, and proceeded there, accompanied by His Royal Highness and the Royal Family (February 27, 1871). It need scarcely be said that all classes of Her Majesty’s loyal subjects eagerly seized this opportunity of joining their prayers to those of their Sovereign and of the Princess of Wales, and, as the Royal procession moved to the Cathedral, the people made a demonstration of sympathy, which showed how acutely they had felt the danger as long as it existed, and how great was their happiness now that it was past. The army was fully represented at this ceremony; small deputations from every regiment in the British Isles had assigned to them a place in St. Paul’s. The Brigade lined the streets; the 1st Coldstream, occupying a portion of Oxford Street, near the Marble Arch, represented the Regiment, as the 2nd Battalion was then at Windsor.

In the summer of 1873, the Shah of Persia visited England (June 18th) and remained for a few days. It was the first time that the Monarch of this distant Asiatic kingdom had ever come to Europe, and his reception in this country was conducted on a scale of much magnificence. There were, as usual, numerous Guards of Honour, the streets were lined by the Brigade when he entered the Metropolis, and a review was held at Windsor on the 24th, at which the whole of the London Battalions were present, the public duties being found by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. The Shah was also taken to the Tower on the 25th, when the 2nd Coldstream, being quartered there, received him with two Guards of Honour.

The marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh to a Princess of Russia, the only daughter of the Tsar Alexander II., and grand-daughter of our late antagonist, Nicholas I., took place at St. Petersburg early in 1874, and was an event of some importance and novelty; for never before had the reigning Houses of England and Russia been directly united by the close ties of a family alliance. The marriage was looked upon as a happy augury for the future, and strong expectations were entertained that any past estrangement between the two countries might henceforth cease, to the benefit, it was hoped, of both. On the occasion of the public entry of Their Royal Highnesses, March 12th, a warm welcome awaited them on the part of the people; the streets were lined by the Brigade, both Battalions of the Regiment being present. In the following May, the Tsar came to England, and proceeded first to Windsor (13th) for two days, and was received by the 1st Coldstream, who were stationed there. When His Majesty went to Guildhall, on the 18th, the streets were again lined by the Brigade, and next day a review in his honour was held at Aldershot, attended by the four West-End Battalions.

It may be interesting to note that the power, then vested in the Colonel of the Regiment, to reduce a Non-commissioned officer summarily to the ranks was exercised, in 1874, for the last time:—

In the same year, the Coldstream lost a distinguished Officer, Surgeon-Major Wyatt, whose report, on many important Regimental details connected with the struggle in the Crimea, has been frequently consulted in the preparation of the account given of the war in this work. The event stands thus recorded in Regimental Orders, and requires no further comment on our part:—

The two Battalions were both represented at the funeral, the 1st finding the firing party, and the 2nd the escort.

But this was not the only loss that the Regiment had to experience about this time, for a greater cause for mourning was in store for them, when their veteran Colonel, Sir William Gomm, died, March 15, 1875, in full vigour of an unimpaired intellect, though more than ninety years of age. Having entered the army as Ensign, in the year 1794, at an early age, this distinguished Officer had served his Sovereign for more than eighty years, and thus the last link which connected us with the past glories of the great wars of the French Revolution was severed. The Lieutenant-Colonel only expressed the universal feeling of sorrow that prevailed in the Coldstream, when he issued the following short sympathetic order upon this melancholy event:—

The Bands and drums of the Brigade ceased to play while the Coldstream was in mourning, until after the funeral, which took place at Rotherhithe, and was not accompanied by any military display; but all available Officers of the Regiment were, of course, present upon so sad an occasion.

General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., the late Commander of the Forces in the Crimea, now succeeded as Colonel of the Coldstream, and issued an address to the Regiment:—

From 1871, as we have seen, there had been but one Lieutenant-Colonel and one Major in the Coldstream, the former being in command of the Regiment and of one Battalion, the latter having the command of the other Battalion. In 1875, however, the original establishment of one Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors was restored, and Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle (son of a former well-known and distinguished Coldstream Officer), being promoted Major to fill up the vacancy, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion (April 28th). The reason for this change was that the Lieutenant-Colonels of Guards Regiments were to be employed, in addition to the command of their own Regiments, in the capacity of Brigadiers of the metropolitan Volunteer Corps, which were then incorporated into three separate brigades. In order to discharge these duties, Regimental Adjutants were shortly afterwards (1881) also appointed, and these Officers, besides performing the ordinary work attached to that position (carried out up to this date by a Battalion Adjutant), acted as Brigade-Majors of the Volunteer brigades so created. Captain and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Digby was the first Regimental Adjutant of the Coldstream.

Just before Colonel Goodlake, V.C., left the service (August 7, 1875), Colonel Fremantle was transferred to the command of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Hon. William Feilding succeeded the former Officer as Major Commanding the 1st Battalion. On September 5, 1877, Colonel Hon. Percy Feilding, C.B. retired upon half-pay, and the Lieutenant-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Fremantle, who was replaced in the command of the 2nd Battalion by Colonel FitzRoy. Only a few days later, Colonel William Feilding also went on half-pay (September 29th), and Colonel Julian Hall, promoted Major, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion.

The Regiment then stood thus (December, 1877):—

Colonel.—General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B.

Lieut.-Colonel.—Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle.

Majors.—Colonels G. FitzRoy; Julian Hall.

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Lord W. Seymour (Staff); E. Burnell; FitzRoy Fremantle; (Mounted).

F. Manningham-Buller; G. FitzRoy Smyth; H. R. Eyre; J. B. Sterling; C. D. Thomas; Viscount de Vesci; Hon. F. Wellesley; R. S. Hall; W. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Aldenburg-Bentinck; Hon. L. Dawnay; Hon. E. Digby; Hon. H. Corry; R. Follett.

Lieutenants.—Captain Hon. E. Boscawen (Adjutant); Major R. Goff; Captains Waller Otway; H. Bruce; Amelius Lockwood; Hon. R. Campbell (Adjutant); Hon. G. Bertie; F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; Hon. M. Stapleton; R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; Cyril Fortescue; F. Manley; R. Barton; F. Arkwright; L. MacKinnon (I. of M.); Lieutenants V. Dawson (I. of M.); Hon. E. Dawnay; Hon. H. Monck; Lord D. Gordon; A. FitzRoy; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg; A. Codrington; Hon. H. Legge; J. Gladstone; D. Dawson; C. Brand; Hon. F. Lambton; Hon. G. Gore; H. Stopford; Hon. H. Gough; Hon. A. Henniker-Major; Lord Sandhurst; A. Clarke-Jervoise; G. V. Boyle; Viscount Lambton; Hon. A. Dawson; Hon. H. Amherst.

Sub-Lieutenant.—H. Surtees.

2nd Lieutenants.—Edgar Vincent; W. Corbet.

Quartermasters.—J. Birch; W. Reynolds.

Surgeon-Major.—C. V. Cay, M.D. Battalion-Surgeon.—Surgeon-Major C. Read.

Surgeons.—A. Myers; J. Whipple, M.D.; J. Magill, M.D.

Solicitor.—R. Broughton, Esq.

As the aspect of affairs in Ireland had improved, and as the disturbances that distracted the people had entirely ceased, it was found unnecessary to continue to keep a Guards Battalion any longer in Dublin. At the spring change of quarters of the year 1876, therefore, the Battalion there was not replaced, and the occupation of Shorncliffe camp was again resumed as the out-quarter of the Brigade. The 1st Coldstream accordingly went there at that time, and lost then, with sincere regret, an Officer of much merit in Quartermaster Falconer, who, having been in that position ever since 1853, left the Regiment in 1876. This excellent Officer was born in the town of Coldstream; he had been present with the Battalion during the whole of the war with Russia, and had gained for himself, during his long period of service in the Regiment, the sincere respect and the hearty good will of all ranks.

Major-General Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar retired from the command of the Brigade of Guards, and was succeeded by Major-General F. Stephenson, C.B., August 1, 1876, who retained that appointment until July 31, 1879, when Major-General G. Higginson C.B., replaced him.

A second change was made in the course of this century in the title of the Scots Fusilier Guards, and on April 4, 1877, it was promulgated for general information that this Regiment would in future be designated by the name of Scots Guards.

During the period under review, from 1871-1885, the country was engaged in some minor wars. An expedition to Ashanti took place 1873-1874; hostilities were undertaken on the North-West frontiers of India, notably in Afghanistan, to keep out the influence of Russia, which we feared, and to counteract the rapid advance of her forces towards our borders; and operations were conducted against various native tribes in South Africa, principally against the Zulus, and against the Transvaal Republic in the same quarter of the world. In none of these were the Coldstream employed;^[395] but some of the Officers of the Regiment were engaged in them in different capacities, and of them three lost their lives. Lieutenant Hon. Alfred Charteris, Aide-de-camp to the General Commanding the Ashanti expedition (Sir Garnet Wolseley), was attacked by fever, contracted in that unhealthy climate, and died, deeply regretted, on board ship when on his way home. The other two, Captains Hon. Ronald Campbell and Robert Barton, fell the same day in South Africa, on March 28, 1879. The high estimation in which these two brave Officers were held by their brothers in the Regiment, and the promise they gave of future distinction, have never been forgotten by their companions; their loss is still mourned, and their memory is preserved and cherished, for they recall to the mind of those who knew them the type and embodiment of the Coldstream Officer. Of the details of their services it is not necessary to say more than this, that Captain Campbell, Chief Staff Officer to Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., (now General Sir Evelyn Wood), lost his life while performing an act of daring gallantry, for which, had he lived, he would have received the Victoria Cross; an Officer and a soldier who followed him (Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th Regiment), and who fortunately escaped unhurt, were both awarded that high order of military merit. Captain Barton, in command of the Frontier Light Horse, was also killed in the same neighbourhood. In Colonel Wood’s despatch, the following sentences are worthy of record in these pages.

The grave outlook of foreign affairs in the spring of 1878, when Russia, after a successful war with Turkey, forced a disastrous treaty upon the Sultan (treaty of San Stefano), led many to think that England would again become involved in further hostilities in the East, and for a time there was serious anxiety on the subject. But, warned by the Crimea, we were hardly inclined to embark in another quarrel with the Tsar. A European Congress then assembled in Berlin to modify the Treaty of San Stefano, and to conclude a new international agreement, known as the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). As a demonstration, and indeed also to take advantage of the opportunity to test the system introduced into the army by short service, the reserves were called up in April, and, as we have already seen, the summons to attend was well responded to by the men. The Coldstream reserves were posted to the 2nd Battalion. The three Guards Battalions first on the roster for active service (viz. the 2nd Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 1st Scots Guards), each selected thirty-two men to go to Aldershot to be trained as stretcher-bearers. The Regimental transport was re-organized, and proceeded later to Aldershot with the Battalions above-mentioned, to take part in the summer drills; shortly after which (September 11th) its establishment was fixed at one Officer, one sergeant, six drivers, three waggons, and one small-arm ammunition cart. Later (January 25, 1879), this transport was kept together as one corps, and the three Officers took it in turn, for four months at a time, to have it in charge.

The efforts to extend and improve the training of Officers and men, which have been already alluded to, were still continued, and in 1883, it was ordered that Company Commanders should give personal attention to the subject, and be responsible for the efficiency of the men placed under their immediate command. Before this date, however, the Brigade had already availed themselves of the advantages which Pirbright offered for some of these purposes. A Guards camp having been opened for musketry in 1881, it was soon utilized as a place where practical instruction in military exercises (other than ordinary drill), could be given by the Company Officers. In April, 1882, Commanding Officers were enjoined to carry out a series of minor tactical operations in conjunction with the course of musketry practice, and to examine their Battalions by companies, and by double companies, in outpost duty, attack formation, shelter-trench exercise, etc. The Battalions were also to stay at Pirbright for fourteen days, five to be devoted to minor tactics, four to preliminary drill, and five to musketry. Afterwards, they remained a longer time in camp, and were thus enabled to all their company training there, besides their musketry.^[397]

Following the example set us by Continental armies, we added sectional and field firing to the course of target practice which was annually carried out, and increased the number of rounds to be expended by the trained soldier from 100 to 150 (1882). Musketry had received considerable attention from the authorities, and it was held imperative that the men should not only be able individually to shoot with accuracy, but that they should also be trained to fire together, under conditions that prevail in the field, and against objects similar to those which present themselves to the aim of troops in war time. A Siege Operations Committee having been appointed to conduct experiments at Dungeness early in 1880, a detachment of the 1st Coldstream, then at Shorncliffe, was told off to assist them in their labours. The following Brigade Order (March 11, 1880) relates to this service:—