OF THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS

By Immanuel Kant

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

Translated With Introduction And Notes
By J. H. Bernard, D.D., D.C.L. Bishop Of Ossory

Editor's Introduction		xi
Preface		1
Introduction		7
I.	Of the division of Philosophy	7
II.	Of the realm of Philosophy in general	11
III.	Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole	14
IV.	Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori	17
V.	The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement	20
VI.	Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature	27
VII.	Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature	30
VIII.	Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature	35
IX.	Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement	39
First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement		43
First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement		45
First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful		45
First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality		45
§ ?1.	The judgement of taste is aesthetical	45
§ ?2.	The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested	46
§ ?3.	The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest	48
§ ?4.	The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest	50
§ ?5.	Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction	53
Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity		55
§ ?6.	The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction	55
§ ?7.	Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic	57
§ ?8.	The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective	59
§ ?9.	Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object	63
Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein		67
§ 10.	Of purposiveness in general	67
§ 11.	The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)	69
§ 12.	The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds	70
§ 13.	The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion	72
§ 14.	Elucidation by means of examples	73
§ 15.	The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection	77
§ 16.	The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure	81
§ 17.	Of the Ideal of Beauty	84
Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object		91
§ 18.	What the modality in a judgement of taste is	91
§ 19.	The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned	92
§ 20.	The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense	92
§ 21.	Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?	93
§ 22.	The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense	94
General remark on the first section of the Analytic		96
Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime		101
§ 23.	Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime	101
§ 24.	Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime	105
A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime		106
§ 25.	Explanation of the term "Sublime"	106
§ 26.	Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime	110
§ 27.	Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime	119
B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature		123
§ 28.	Of Nature regarded as Might	123
§ 29.	Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature	130
General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement		132
Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements		150
§ 30.	The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful	150
§ 31.	Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste	152
§ 32.	First peculiarity of the judgement of taste	154
§ 33.	Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste	157
§ 34.	There is no objective principle of taste possible	159
§ 35.	The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general	161
§ 36.	Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste	162
§ 37.	What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste	164
§ 38.	Deduction of judgements of taste	165
§ 39.	Of the communicability of a sensation	167
§ 40.	Of taste as a kind of sensus communis	169
§ 41.	Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful	173
§ 42.	Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful	176
§ 43.	Of Art in general	183
§ 44.	Of beautiful Art	185
§ 45.	Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature	187
§ 46.	Beautiful art is the art of genius	188
§ 47.	Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius	190
§ 48.	Of the relation of Genius to Taste	193
§ 49.	Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius	197
§ 50.	Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art	205
§ 51.	Of the division of the beautiful arts	206
§ 52.	Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product	214
§ 53.	Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts	215
§ 54.	Remark	220
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement		229
§ 55.		229
§ 56.	Representation of the antinomy of Taste	230
§ 57.	Solution of the antinomy of Taste	231
§ 58.	Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement	241
§ 59.	Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality	248
§ 60.	Appendix:—Of the method of Taste	253
Second Part.—Critique of the Teleological Judgement		257
§ 61.	Of the objective purposiveness of Nature	259
First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement		262
§ 62.	Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material	262
§ 63.	Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature	268
§ 64.	Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes	272
§ 65.	Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings	275
§ 66.	Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings	280
§ 67.	Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes	282
§ 68.	Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science	287
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement		292
§ 69.	What is an antinomy of the Judgement?	292
§ 70.	Representation of this antinomy	293
§ 71.	Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy	296
§ 72.	Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature	298
§ 73.	None of the above systems give what they pretend	302
§ 74.	The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable	306
§ 75.	The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement	309
§ 76.	Remark	313
§ 77.	Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible	319
§ 78.	Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature	326
Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement		334
§ 79.	Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature	334
§ 80.	Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose	336
§ 81.	Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product	342
§ 82.	Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings	346
§ 83.	Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system	352
§ 84.	Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself	359
§ 85.	Of Physico-theology	362
§ 86.	Of Ethico-theology	370
§ 87.	Of the moral proof of the Being of God	377
§ 88.	Limitation of the validity of the moral proof	384
§ 89.	Of the use of the moral argument	392
§ 90.	Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God	395
§ 91.	Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith	403
General remark on Teleology		414

PERPETUAL PEACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

By Immanuel Kant

1795

Translated With Introduction And Notes By M. Campbell Smith

PAGE
PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA	v
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION	1
PERPETUAL PEACE	106
FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES	107
SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES	117
FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE	143
SECOND SUPPLEMENT-A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE	158
APPENDIX I.-ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE	161
APPENDIX II.-CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT	184
INDEX	197