Quest. IX. How many persons are there in the Godhead?

Answ. There be three Persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one, true, eternal God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory; although distinguished by their personal properties.

Quest. X. What are the personal properties of the three Persons in the Godhead?

Answ. It is proper to the Father to beget the Son, and to the Son to be begotten of the Father, and to the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father and the Son from all eternity.

Quest. XI. How doth it appear that the Son and the Holy Ghost are God equal with the Father?

Answ. The scriptures manifest, that the Son and the Holy Ghost are God equal with the Father; ascribing unto them such names, attributes, works, and worship, as are proper to God only.

In these three answers is contained the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, which is a subject of pure revelation;^[76] and, because it is so much contested in the age in which we live, we are obliged to be more large and particular, in laying down the reasons of our belief of it, and in our defence thereof, against those that deny it. It is a doctrine that has been defended by some of the most judicious writers, both in our own and other nations; whereof some have proved that it was maintained by the church in the purest ages thereof, which therefore renders it less necessary for us to enter into that part of the controversy; but we shall principally insist on it as founded on the sacred writings: and whereas others have rendered some parts of this doctrine more obscure, by confining themselves to the scholastic ways of speaking, we shall endeavour to avoid them, that so it may be better understood by private Christians; and the method we shall pursue in treating of it shall be,

I. To premise some things which are necessary to be considered, with relation to it in general.

II. We shall consider in what sense we are to understand the words Trinity, and Persons in the Godhead, and in what respect the divine Persons are said to be One.

III. We shall prove that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have distinct personal properties, and therefore that we have sufficient reason to call them Persons, in the Godhead, as they are in the first of these answers; and under this head shall consider what is generally understood by what is contained in the second of them, which respects the eternal generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost; and what cautions we are to use, lest, by mistaking the sense thereof, we be led into any error, derogatory to, or subversive of the doctrine of the Trinity; and also shall endeavour to explain those scriptures, which are generally brought to establish that doctrine.

IV. We shall endeavour to prove that these three Persons, especially the Son and Holy Ghost, are truly divine, or that they have all the perfections of the divine nature; and therefore that they are, in the most proper sense, the one only living and true God.^[77]

I. We shall premise some things which are necessary to be considered, with relation to the doctrine of the Trinity in general. And,

1. It is a doctrine of the highest importance, and necessary to be believed by all Christians, who pay a just deference to revealed religion. It may probably be reckoned an error in method to speak of the importance of this doctrine, before we attempt to prove the truth thereof: however, it is not altogether unjustifiable, since we address ourselves to those who believe it, hoping thereby to offer some farther conviction, or establishment, to their faith therein, as well as to others who deny it; we may therefore be allowed to consider it as an important doctrine, that we may be excited to a more diligent enquiry into the force of some of those arguments, which are generally brought in its defence.

Now to determine a doctrine to be of the highest importance, we must consider the belief thereof as connected with salvation, or subservient to that true religion, which is ordained by God, as a necessary means leading to it, without which we have no warrant to expect it: and such doctrines are sometimes called fundamental, as being the basis and foundation on which our hope is built. Here, I think, it will be allowed, by all whose sentiments do not savour of scepticism, that there are some doctrines of religion necessary to be believed to salvation. There are some, it is true, who plead for the innocency of error, or, at least, of those who are sincere enquirers after truth, who, in the end, will appear to have been very remote from it, as though their endeavours would entitle them to salvation, without the knowledge of those things, which others conclude to be necessarily subservient to it. All that we shall say concerning this is, that it is not the sincerity of our enquiries after important truths, but the success thereof, that is to be regarded in this, as well as other means, that are to be used to obtain so valuable an end. We may as well suppose that our sincere endeavours to obtain many of those graces that accompany salvation, such as faith, love to God, and evangelical obedience, will supply, or atone for, the want of them; as assert that our unsuccessful enquiries after the great doctrines of religion will excuse our ignorance thereof; especially when we consider, that blindness of mind, as well as hardness of heart; is included among those spiritual judgments, which are the consequence of our fallen state; and also that God displays the sovereignty of his grace as much, in leading the soul into all necessary truth, as he does in any other things that relate to salvation. However, it is not our business to determine the final state of men; or how far they make advances to, or recede from, the knowledge of such important doctrines; or what will be the issue thereof; but rather to desire of God, that so far as we, or others, are destitute of this privilege, he would grant us and them repentance, to the acknowledgment of the truth, 1 Tim. ii. 25. And here we cannot but observe, that the question relating to important or fundamental articles of faith is not whether any doctrines may be so called? but what those doctrines are: in determining of which, many make provision for their own particular scheme of doctrine: and accordingly some, as the Papists in particular, assert several doctrines to be fundamental, without scripture warrant; yea, such as are directly contrary thereunto; and others allow no doctrine to be so, but what will, if adhered to, open a door of salvation to all mankind, and these set aside the necessity of divine revelation; and others, who desire not to run such lengths, will allow, that some scripture-doctrines are necessary to be believed to salvation: but these are only such as may include those who are in their way of thinking; thus they who deny the doctrine of the Trinity, are obliged in conformity to their own sentiments, to deny also that it is an important article of faith. These may justly demand a convincing proof of the truth thereof, before they believe it to be of any importance, especially to themselves; and therefore it would be a vain thing to tell them, that the belief thereof is connected with salvation; or that it is necessary, inasmuch as divine worship is so, which supposes the belief of the divinity of the Persons, whom we adore; without first proving that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are divine Persons: and it would be as little to their edification to say that there are several doctrines necessary to be believed; such as that of Christ’s satisfaction, and our justification, depending thereon, and that of regeneration and sanctification, as the effects of the divine power of the Holy Ghost; all which suppose the belief of their being divine Persons; unless we first give some convincing proof of the truth of these doctrines, which are supposed to stand or fall with it; for it would be immediately replied, that one is false, and consequently far from being of any importance; therefore so is the other.

But inasmuch as we reserve the consideration of these things to their proper place; we shall only observe at present, that there are some who do not appear to deny the doctrine of the Trinity, but rather the importance of it; and express themselves with very great indifference about it, and blame all attempts to defend it, as needless, or litigious, as though it were only a contest about words: thus they say, though we hold it ourselves, others who deny it, may have as much to say in defence of their own cause as we have, and therefore that these disputes ought to be wholly laid aside. Now, with respect to these, what we have hinted, concerning the importance of this doctrine, may not be altogether misapplied; therefore we have taken occasion to mention it in this place, that we may not be supposed to plead a cause which is not worth defending, as though the doctrine of the Trinity were no other than an empty speculation; but as that which we are bound to esteem a doctrine of the highest importance.

2. We are next to consider what degree of knowledge of this doctrine is necessary to, or connected with salvation. It cannot be supposed that this includes in it the knowledge of every thing that is commonly laid down in those writings, wherein it is attempted to be explained; for when we speak of this, as a doctrine of the highest importance, we mean the scripture-doctrine of the Trinity. This is what we are to assent to, and to use our utmost endeavours to defend; but as for those explications, which are merely human, they are not to be reckoned of equal importance; especially every private Christian is not to be censured as a stranger to this doctrine, who cannot define personality in a scholastic way, or understand all the terms used in explaining it, or several modes of speaking, which some writers tenaciously adhere to; such as hypostasis, subsistence, consubstantiality, the modal distinction of the Persons in the Godhead, filiation, or the communication of the divine essence by generation, or its being farther communicated by procession; some of which rather embarrass the minds of men, than add any farther light to the sense of those scriptures, in which this doctrine is contained.

But when we consider how far the doctrine of the Trinity is to be known, and believed to salvation, we must not exclude the weakest Christian from a possibility of knowing it, by supposing it necessary for him to understand some hard words, which he doth not find in his Bible; and if he meets with them elsewhere, will not be much edified by them. That knowledge, therefore, which is necessary to salvation, is more plain and easy, and to be found in every part of scripture: accordingly, every Christian knows, that the word God signifies a being that has all those divine perfections, which are so frequently attributed to him therein, and are displayed and glorified in all his works of common providence and grace; and that this God is one. To which we may also add, that he learns from his Bible, and therefore firmly believes that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are possessed of these divine perfections, and consequently that they are this one God; and that they are distinguished, as we often find in scripture, by such characters and properties, which we generally call personal, and so apply the word Person to each of them, and conclude that the divine glory attributed to them is the same, though their personal properties, or characters, are distinct; which is the substance of what is contained in the first of those answers, under our present consideration. And he that believes this, need not entertain any doubt as though he wanted some ideas of this sacred doctrine, which are necessary to salvation; since such a degree of knowledge, attended with a firm belief thereof, is sufficient to warrant all those acts of divine worship, which we are obliged to ascribe to the Father, Son, and Spirit, and is consistent with all those other doctrines, which are founded on, or suppose the belief thereof, as was before observed under our last head.

3. We shall consider this doctrine as a great mystery, such as cannot be comprehended by a finite mind; and therefore we shall first enquire what we are to understand by the word Mystery, as it is used in scripture. This word sometimes denotes a doctrine’s having been kept secret, or, at least, revealed more obscurely, upon which account it was not so clearly known before; in which sense, the gospel is called, The mystery which hath been hid from ages, and from generations, but now is made manifest to his saints Col. i. 26. It was covered with the ceremonial law, as with a vail, which, many of the people, through the blindness of their minds, did not so fully understand; and accordingly, when persons are led into a farther degree of knowledge thereof, it is said, as our Saviour tells his disciples, that to them it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, Matt. xiii. 11. or when something is revealed in scripture, which the world was not in the least apprised of before; this is, by way of eminence, called a mystery, as the apostle says, speaking concerning the change that shall be passed on those that shall be found alive at the last day; Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.

But to this we may add, that there is also another idea affixed to the word Mystery, namely, that though it be revealed, yet it cannot be fully comprehended; and it is in this sense that we call the doctrine of the Trinity a Mystery. Both these ideas seem to be contained in the word, in some scriptures, particularly where the apostle says, Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which, from the beginning of the world, hath been hid in God, Eph. iii. 8, 9. where he speaks of the gospel, not only as hid, but unsearchable; and he speaks of the mystery of God, even the Father, and of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. ii. 3. where the word mystery seems to contain both these ideas; for few will deny, that the glory of the Father, who is here spoken of, as well as Christ, is incomprehensible by a finite mind; and if it be said, that the gospel is hereby intended, and so that the words ought to be rendered, in which are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; this must be supposed to be incomprehensible, as well as formerly less known, otherwise this character of it would be too great.

But suppose the word Mystery were always used to signify a doctrine, not before revealed, without the other idea of its being incomprehensible contained in it; this would not overthrow our argument in general, since we can prove it to be incomprehensible from other arguments, which we shall endeavour to do.

And that we may prepare our way for this, let it be considered, that there are some finite things, which we cannot now comprehend, by reason of the imperfection of our present state, which are not incomprehensible in themselves. How little do we know of some things, which may be called mysteries in nature; such as the reason of the growth and variety of colours and shapes of plants; the various instinct of brute creatures; yea, how little do we know comparatively of ourselves, the nature of our souls, any otherwise, than as it is observed by their actions, and the effects they produce; the reason of their union with our bodies, or of their acting by them, as the inspired writer observes; so that it may well be said, Thou knowest not the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things, Eccles. xi. 5. and Elihu, together with some of the other wonderful works of nature, which he challengeth Job to give an account of, speaks of this in particular. Dost thou know how thy garments are warm, when he quieteth the earth, by the south wind? Job xxxvii. 17, &c. which not only signifies that we cannot account for the winds producing heat or cold, as blowing from various quarters of heaven; but that we know not the reason of the vital heat, which is preserved for so many years, in the bodies of men, the inseparable concomitant and sign of life; or what gives the first motion to the blood and spirits, or fits the organized body to perform its various functions. These things cannot be comprehended by us.

But if we speak of that which is infinite, we must conclude it to be incomprehensible, not only because of the imperfection of our present state, but because, as has been before observed, of the infinite disproportion that there is between the object and our finite capacities. In this respect we have before shewn that the perfections of the divine nature cannot be comprehended, such as the immensity, eternity, omnipresence, and simplicity of God; yet we are to believe that he is thus infinitely perfect. And it seems equally reasonable to suppose the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible; for the mutual relation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, to each other, and their distinct personality, are not the result of the divine will; these are personal perfections, and therefore they are necessary, and their glory infinite, as well as that of his essential perfections; and if we are bound to believe one to be incomprehensible, why should we not as well suppose the other to be so? or if there are some things which the light of nature gives us some ideas of, concerning which we are notwithstanding bound to confess that we know but little of them, for the reason but now mentioned, why should it be thought strange, that this doctrine, though the subject of pure revelation, should be equally incomprehensible? This consequence appears so evident, that some of them, who deny the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible, do not stick to deny the perfections of the divine nature to be so, when they maintain that there is nothing which is the object of faith but what may be comprehended by us, which is to run such lengths in the defence of their cause, as no one who hath the least degree of that humility, which becomes a finite creature, should venture to do. But they proceed yet farther, as the cause they defend seems to require it, and say, that every doctrine which we cannot comprehend is to be rejected by us, as though our understandings were to set bounds to the truth and credibility of all things.

This, I think, is the true state of the question about mysteries in Christianity: it is not whether the word Mystery is never used in scripture to signify what is incomprehensible; for if that could be sufficiently proved, which I think hath not yet been done, we would assert the doctrine of the Trinity to be more than a mystery, namely, an incomprehensible doctrine; and the proof thereof seems absolutely necessary, since the Antitrinitarians, and some of them with an air of insult, conclude this to be our last resort, which we betake ourselves to when they have beaten us out of all our other strong holds; and therefore we may suppose, that this would be opposed with the greatest warmth, but I do not find that it has hitherto been overthrown: and indeed when they call it one of our most plausible pretences, as though we laid the whole stress of the controversy upon it, it might be expected that it should be attacked with stronger arguments than it generally is. Sometimes they bend their force principally against the sense of the word Mystery; and here they talk not only with an air of insult, but profaneness, when they compare it with the abominable mysteries of the heathen, which were not to be divulged to any but those of them who were in the secret; and the doctrine of the Trinity, and that of transubstantiation, are compared together, so that they are to be reckoned equally mysterious, that is, according to their application of the word, absurd and nonsensical. And this way of arguing has so far prevailed among them, that no one must apply the word to any doctrines of religion without exposing himself to scorn and ridicule; but this will do no service to their cause, nor prejudice to our doctrine, in the opinion of those who enquire into the truth thereof, with that seriousness and impartiality, that the importance of the doctrine calls for.^[78]

The question therefore in controversy is; whether any doctrines of religion may be deemed incomprehensible, that is, such as we can have no adequate ideas of, because of the disproportion between them and our finite minds? and whether the incommunicable perfections of God are not to be reckoned among these incomprehensible doctrines? if they are not, then it will be reasonable to demand that every thing relating to them be particularly accounted for, and reduced to the standard of a finite capacity; and if this cannot be done, but some things must be allowed to be incomprehensible in religion, then it will be farther enquired, Why should the doctrine of the Trinity be rejected, because we cannot account for every thing that relates to the personal glory of God, any more than we can for those things that respect his essential glory? or may not some things, that are matter of pure revelation, be supposed to exceed our capacities, and yet we be bound to believe them, as well as other things which appear to be true, and at the same time, incomprehensible, by the light of nature? But, that we may enter a little more particularly into this argument, we shall consider the most material objections that are brought against it, and what may be replied to them.

Object. 1. It is objected that we take up with the bare sound of words, without any manner of ideas affixed to them. And,

2. That it is unbecoming the divine wisdom and goodness to suppose that God should give a revelation, and demand our belief thereof, as necessary to salvation, when, at the same time, it is impossible for our understandings to yield an assent to it, since nothing that is unintelligible can be the object of faith.

3. That practical religion is designed to be promoted in the world hereby, and therefore the will of man must follow the dictates of the understanding, and not blindly embrace, and be conversant about we know not what, which is to act unbecoming our own character as intelligent creatures.

4. That the design of divine revelation is to improve our understandings, and render our ideas of things more clear, and not to entangle and perplex them.

Answ. 1. As to our using words without ideas, there is no Christian, that I know of, who thinks there is any religion in the sound of words, or that it is sufficient for us to take up with the word Trinity, or Persons in the Godhead, without determining, in some measure, what we understand thereby. We will therefore allow that faith supposes some ideas of the object, namely, that we have some knowledge of what we believe it to be: now our knowledge of things admits of various degrees; some of which we only know that they are what they are determined, or proved to be; if we proceed farther in our enquiries, and would know how every thing is to be accounted for, that may justly be affirmed concerning them, here our ideas are at a stand; yet this is not in the least inconsistent with the belief of what we conclude them to be. For the illustrating of which, let it be considered that we believe that God’s eternity is without succession, his immensity without extension; this we know and believe, because to assert the contrary would be to ascribe imperfection to him. In this respect, our faith extends as far as our ideas: but as for what exceeds them, we are bound to believe that there is something in God, which exceeds the reach of a finite mind, though we cannot comprehend, or fully describe it, as though it was not infinite. And to apply this to the doctrine of the Trinity; it is one thing, to say that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have the perfections of the divine nature attributed to them in scripture, as well as distinct personal characters and properties, and because the Godhead is but one, that therefore these three are one, which we firmly believe, inasmuch as it is so clearly revealed in scripture; and another thing, to say, that we can fully describe all the properties of their divine personality, which, though we cannot do, yet we believe that they subsist in an incomprehensible manner. And while we compare them with finite persons, as we do the perfections of God with those of the creature, we separate from the one, as well as the other, whatever savours of imperfection.

2. As to the unintelligibleness of divine revelation, and its being unbecoming the wisdom and goodness of God to communicate those doctrines that are so, it may be replied, that we must distinguish between the rendering a doctrine, which would be otherwise easy to be understood, unintelligible, by the perplexity or difficulty of the style in which it is delivered, and the imparting a doctrine which none can comprehend; the former of these cannot be charged on any part of scripture, and it is only a revelation, which is liable to such a charge, that could be reckoned inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God. As to the latter, the design of revelation is not to make us comprehend what is in itself incomprehensible: as, for instance, God did not design, when he made known his perfections in his word, to give us such a perfect discovery of himself, that we might be said hereby to find him out unto perfection, or that we should know as much of his glory as is possible to be known, or as much as he knows of it himself; for that is to suppose the understanding of man infinitely more perfect than it is. Whatever is received, is received in proportion to the measure of that which contains it; the whole ocean can communicate no more water than what will fill the vessel, that is to contain it. Thus the infinite perfections of God being such as cannot be contained in a finite mind, we are not to suppose that our comprehending them was the design of divine revelation; God, indeed, designed hereby that we should apprehend some things of himself, namely, as much as should be subservient to the great ends of religion; but not so much as might be inconsistent with our humble confession, that we are but of yesterday, and know, comparatively, nothing, Job viii. 9.

And this is applicable, not only to the essential, but the personal, glory of God, Who hath ascended into heaven, or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what is his Son’s name, if thou canst tell? Prov. xxx. 4. Our Saviour, indeed, speaks of his having ascended into heaven, John iii. 13. as having a comprehensive knowledge of all divine truths; but this he affirms concerning himself as a divine person, exclusively of all creatures.

Moreover, when it is said, in this objection, that God makes the comprehensive knowledge of these things a term of salvation, this we must take leave to deny; and we need not add any more as to that head, since we have already considered what degree of knowledge is necessary thereunto, namely, such as is subservient to religion, which teaches us to adore what we apprehend to be the object thereof, though we cannot comprehend it.

As to that part of the objection, that which is unintelligible, is not the object of faith, we must distinguish before we grant or deny it; therefore, since the object of faith is some proposition laid down, it is one thing to say that a proposition cannot be assented to, when we have no ideas of what is affirmed or denied in it; and another thing to say that it is not believed, when we have ideas of several things contained therein, of which some are affirmed, and others denied; as, for instance, when we say God is an infinite Spirit, there is a positive idea contained in that proposition, or some things affirmed therein, viz. that he is able to put forth actions suitable to an intelligent being; and there is something denied concerning him, to wit, his being corporeal; and in concluding him to be an infinite Spirit, we deny that they are limits of his understanding; all this we may truly be said to understand and believe: but if we proceed farther, and enquire what it is to have such an understanding, or will? this is not a proposition, and consequently not the object of faith, as well as exceeds the reach of our understanding. So as to the doctrine of the Trinity, when we affirm that there is one God, and that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have all the perfections of the Godhead; and that these perfections, and the personality of each of them, are infinitely greater than what can be found in the creature, this we yield our assent to; but if it be enquired how far does God herein exceed all the ideas which we have of finite perfections, or personality, here our understandings are at a loss; but so far as this does not contain the form of a proposition, it cannot, according to our common acceptation of the word, be said to be the object of faith.

3. As to what concerns practical religion, the ideas we have of things subservient to it are of two sorts; either such as engage our obedience, or excite our adoration and admiration: as to the former of these, we know what we are commanded to do; what it is to act, as becomes those who are subject to a divine person, though we cannot comprehend those infinite perfections, which lay us under the highest obligation to obey him: as to the latter, the incomprehensibleness of the divine personality, or perfections, has a direct tendency to excite our admiration, and the infiniteness thereof our adoration. And, since all religion may be reduced to these two heads, the subject matter of divine revelation is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it tends to promote it. Things commanded are not, as such, incomprehensible, as was but now observed, and therefore not inconsistent with that obedience, or subjection, which is contained in one branch thereof; and things incomprehensible do not contain the form of a command, but rather excite our admiration, and therefore they are not only consistent with, but adapted to promote the other branch thereof. Is it not an instance of religion to adore and magnify God, when we behold the display of his perfections in his works? And is he less to be adored, or admired, because we cannot comprehend them? Or should we not rather look upon them with a greater degree of astonishment, than if they did not exceed the reach of a finite mind? Must a person be able to measure the water of the ocean, or number all the particles of matter that are contained in the world; or can our ideas be no ways directed to shew forth the Creator’s praise? Or must we be able to account for every thing that is a mystery in nature; or can we not improve it to promote some of the ends of practical religion, that we are engaged to thereby? May we not say, with wonder, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches? Psal. civ. 24. So when we behold the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, as displayed in the work of redemption, or as contained in scripture, which is therein said to be an instance of his manifold wisdom, Eph. iii. 10. should we not admire it the more, inasmuch as it is, as the apostle calls it, unsearchable? Therefore practical religion, as founded on divine revelation, is not, in all the branches thereof, inconsistent with the incomprehensibleness of those things, which are, some in one respect, and others in another, the objects thereof.

And as to what is farther contained in this objection, concerning the will’s following the dictates of the understanding, and practical religion’s being seated therein, I own, that we must first know what we are to do in matters of religion, before we can act; thus we must first know what it is to worship, love, and obey, the Father, Son, and Spirit, as also that these three divine persons are the object of worship, love, and obedience, and then the will follows the dictates of the understanding; but it is one thing to know these things, and another thing to be able to comprehend the divine, essential, or personal glory, which belongs to them, and is the foundation of these acts of religious worship.

4. As to what is farther objected, concerning the design of divine revelation’s being to improve our understanding; or, as it is sometimes expressed, that it is an improvement upon the light of nature; this seems to have a double aspect, or tendency, viz. to advance, or depreciate, divine revelation.

1. If we take it in the former view, we freely own,

(1.) That it is a very great improvement upon the light of nature, and that, either as we are led hereby, not only into the knowledge of many things which could not be discovered by it, namely, the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, and that infinite satisfaction which was given by him to the justice of God, in order to our discharge from condemnation, as also that communion which believers have with the Father, Son, and Spirit; and therefore, since the light of nature gives us no discovery of these doctrines, divine revelation, and particularly the gospel, makes a very great addition to those ideas which we are led into by the light of nature. It is true, they both take their rise from God, yet one excels the other, as much as the light of the sun does that of a star; and is, as the Psalmist says, when comparing them together, perfect, converting the soul; and sure, making wise the simple, Psal. xix. 7.

(2.) That when the same truths are discovered by the light of nature, and by divine revelation, the latter tends very much to improve our ideas: thus when the light of nature leads us into the knowledge of the being and perfections of God, his wisdom, power, and goodness, as illustrated in the works of nature and providence, we have not so clear ideas thereof, as we receive from the additional discoveries of them in divine revelation; and in this respect one does not cloud or darken those ideas which the other gives. But neither of these are designed by those who bring this objection against the doctrine of the Trinity: therefore we must suppose,

2. That they intend hereby to depreciate divine revelation, and then the sense thereof is this; that though the light of nature leads mankind into such a degree of the knowledge of divine truths, as is sufficient, in its kind to salvation; so that they, who are destitute of divine revelation, may thereby understand the terms of acceptance with God, and the way which, if duly improved, would lead to heaven; yet God was pleased to give some farther discovery of the same things by his word, and, in this sense, the one is only an improvement upon the other, as it makes the same truths, which were known, in some degree, without it more clear, and frees them from those corruptions, or false glosses, which the perverse reasonings of men have set upon them; whereas we, by insisting on inexplicable mysteries, which we pretend to be founded on divine revelation, though, in reality, they are not contained in it, cloud and darken that light, and so make the way of salvation more difficult, than it would otherwise be; and this certainly tends to depreciate divine revelation, how plausible soever the words, at first view, may appear to be; for it supposes those doctrines but now mentioned, and many others of the like nature, not necessary to salvation; so that this objection takes its first rise from the Deists, however it may be applied, by the Anti-trinitarians, in militating against the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, since it is principally designed to overthrow this doctrine, by supposing it to be unintelligible, and consequently, according to their method of reasoning, in no sense the object of faith, the only reply which need be made to it is, that the discoveries of the glory of God, by the light of nature, are, in some respects, as incomprehensible as the doctrine of the Trinity; which we are not, for that reason, obliged to disbelieve, or reject; and therefore there is no advantage gained against our argument, by supposing that the light of nature contains a discovery of truths, plain, easy, and intelligible by all, in the full extent thereof, and that the doctrine of the Trinity is otherwise, and consequently must not be contained in divine revelation, and, as such, cannot be defended by us.

4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason, though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of nature. And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them, and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn; therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,

(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason.

(2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so.

(3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or any other doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.

(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd, because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that a contradictory proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be equally true.^[80]

(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This appears, inasmuch as we do not say that the three Persons in the Godhead are one Person, or that the one divine Being is three divine Beings.

Object. But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God; so, that the Father is Eternal, the Son is Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal, yet there are not three Eternals, but one Eternal; and the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty, yet are there not three Almighties, but one Almighty. This they suppose, though without ground, to be a plain contradiction.

Answ. But to this it may be replied, that when we say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are God, we do not say they are distinct Gods, for the distinction between them respects their personality, not their deity: and when we assert that they are all Eternal, or Almighty, we do not suppose that their duration, or power, are distinct; and the same may be said of all other divine perfections that are attributed to them, the perfections are the same in all of them, though the persons are distinct. So that the charge of Tritheism lies in a narrow compass: they say that there is one divine Being, so do we; and to this they add, that this divine Being is a divine person, since existence and personality are the same; therefore, if there are more divine Persons, there must be more Gods; this consequence they maintain, but we deny. But how do they prove it? The proof amounts to no more than this; that there is no instance in finite things, when we speak of angels or men, to whom alone personality can be applied, of any distinct persons, but at the same time their beings are distinct; therefore it must be so with respect to the divine persons. This we are bound to deny, since our ideas of personality and existence are not the same; therefore, how inseparable soever they may be in what respects creatures, we may have distinct ideas of them, when we speak of the divine being and personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Here it will, doubtless, be demanded, that we determine wherein the difference consists; or, in particular, since every distinct finite person is a distinct being, what there is in the divine personality, that should exclude the Father, Son, and Spirit, from being distinct beings, because distinct persons; so that when we conclude that there is a small or faint resemblance between divine and human personality, we must be able to comprehend, and fully to describe, that infinite disproportion that is between them, or else must be charged with using words without any manner of ideas annexed to them, and so our cause must fall to the ground. If, indeed, the divine personality were finite, like that of the creature, then it might be required that a finite mind should account for it: but since it is not so, but incomprehensible, we are bound to believe what we cannot comprehend.

But have we no ideas at all of the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit? To this we may answer; that we have finite ideas thereof, and more than these we have not of any of the divine perfections. We are taught, by scripture, to say that they are distinct persons; and we know what those personal characters, or properties, from whence our ideas take their rise, signify, when applied to men; but, at the same time, abstract, in our thoughts, every thing from them that argues imperfection; or, in short, our conceptions hereof proceed in the same way, as when we think of any of the perfections of the divine nature: these, as well as the divine personality, are equally incomprehensible; yet, while we say they are infinitely more than can be in any creature, we, notwithstanding, retain such ideas of them, as tend to answer those ends of religion, which suppose that we apprehend something of them that is conducive hereunto. We are now to consider,

(3.) The use of reason in proving or defending the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrines of pure revelation. They could not, indeed, have been at first discovered by reason, nor can every thing that is revealed be comprehended by it, yet our reason is not to be laid aside as useless; therefore some call it a servant to faith. Thus revelation discovers what doctrines we are to believe, demands our assent to them, and reason offers a convincing proof that we are under an indispensable obligation to give it: it proves the doctrine to be true, and such as is worthy of God, as it is derived from him, the fountain of truth and wisdom; and this office of reason, or the subserviency thereof to our faith, is certainly necessary, since what is false cannot be the object of faith in general; and nothing unworthy of God can be the matter of divine revelation, nor consequently the object of a divine faith.

Now, in order to reason’s judging of the truth of things, it first considers the sense of words; what ideas are designed to be conveyed thereby, and whether they are contrary to the common sense of mankind; and if it appears that they are not, it proceeds to enquire into those evidences that may give conviction, and enforce our belief thereof; and leads us into the nature of the truths revealed, receives them as instamped with the authority of God, and considers them as agreeable to his perfections, and farther leads us into his design of revealing them, and what we are to infer from them; and in doing this it connects things together, observes the dependence of one thing on another, what is the importance thereof, and how they are to be improved to answer the best purposes.

Now this may be applied particularly to the doctrine of the Trinity; for it contains in it no absurdity contradictory to reason, as has been already proved; and the evidences on which our faith herein is founded will be farther considered, when we prove it to be a scripture doctrine, by the express words thereof, agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, or by just consequences deduced from it; by which it will farther appear, that it is necessary for us to use our reason in stating those doctrines, which are neither founded on, nor can be comprehended by it.

5. We are now to consider from whence the doctrine of the Trinity is to be deduced, or where we are to search for that knowledge thereof, which we are to acquiesce in. And here it must be observed, that it cannot be learnt from the light of nature, for then we should certainly be able to behold some traces or footsteps thereof in the works of creation and providence, that so this might be understood thereby, as well as the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as the cause is known by its effect; but we should never have known that God made all things by his essential word, without whom nothing was made, that was made, as the evangelist speaks, John i. 3. had we not received this doctrine from divine revelation: likewise, we should never have known that the Spirit, as a distinct Person from the Father, created all things, and performed several other works, by which his personal glory is demonstrated, had we not received the account which we have thereof from scripture. The light of nature could discover to us, indeed, that God, who is a Spirit, or incorporeal Being, has produced many effects worthy of himself; but we could not have known hereby, that the word Spirit signifies a distinct person, which we are beholden to divine revelation for.

And as for the work of our redemption, in which, more than in all the other divine works, the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is demonstrated, we could have known as little of that by the light of nature, as we do the persons to whom it is attributed. But I am sensible that it will be objected to this,

Object. 1. That our first parents knew the doctrine of the Trinity as soon as they were created, otherwise they could not have given that distinct glory to the Persons in the Godhead that is due to them; and if we are required, not only to worship the divine Being, but to worship the Father, Son, and Spirit; and, if this worship is due from us, as creatures, and not merely as fallen and redeemed; then it will follow from hence, that our first parents must know the doctrine of the Trinity: but this they did not know by divine revelation; therefore they knew it by the light of nature.

Answ. We will allow every thing contained in this objection, excepting that they did not know this by divine revelation; for certainly they had some ideas conveyed this way at first, otherwise they could not have known any thing that related to instituted worship, which, it is plain, they did. And shall it be reckoned any absurdity to suppose that they received this doctrine of the Trinity by divine revelation, though we have no particular account thereof, in that short history which Moses gives us of things relating to the state of innocency? It is therefore sufficient to our purpose, to suppose that it was agreeable to the wisdom and goodness of God to make known to them this important truth, and consequently that he did so, though not by the light of nature.

Object. 2. It is farther objected, that the heathen knew something of the doctrine of the Trinity, as appears by their writings, though they were unacquainted with scripture. To support this objection, they refer to several mystical expressions in the works of Plato, which seem to look that way, when he speaks of three principles; one whereof he calls goodness, or a being that is good; the second he calls his word, or reason; and the third a spirit, which diffuses its influence throughout the whole system of beings, and calls him sometimes the soul of the world; and in other places, he speaks of them as having a distinct sovereignty.^[81] And he supposes the first of these to be the cause of things most great and excellent; the second, the cause of things of an inferior nature; the third, of things yet more inferior; and some of his followers plainly call them three hypostases; and sometimes, Father, Word, and Spirit.

Answ. The account which Plato and his followers seem to have given of the doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have been taken from the light of nature, and therefore this makes nothing to the objection. We have sufficient ground to conclude that Plato travelled into Egypt, with a design to make improvements in knowledge; and some suppose, that there he saw some translation of a part of the Bible into Greek,^[82] more ancient than that which is commonly attributed to the LXX, which was not compiled till an hundred years after his time. But whether he did this, or no, is uncertain: it is true, he used several expressions, which are contained in the books of Moses, and took the plan of his laws from thence; upon which account some have called him a second Moses, speaking Greek: but whether he received his notions more immediately from scripture, or by conversation with the Jews, of whom a great number settled in Egypt, after Gedaliah’s death, is not material; however, it is sufficiently evident, that he had not all of them, in a way of reasoning, from the light of nature: and as for his followers, such as Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, and others, they lived in those ages, when Christianity prevailed in the world, though none of them pretended to be Christians; and one of them was the most inveterate enemy to Christianity that lived; yet these might well be supposed to make their master Plato speak several things, as to this mystery, which he never intended, were it only to persuade the Christians to believe that he was not inferior to Moses, or any other recorded in scripture.

Thus having answered the objections, we shall take leave to consider how unwarily some divines, who have defended the doctrine of the Trinity, have not only asserted that Plato understood a great a deal of it, but have made use of this, as an answer to the Anti-trinitarian objection before mentioned, that the doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible; and they have taken a great deal of pleasure in accounting for this doctrine in such a way as these philosophers have done:^[83] and some of them have taken notice of a few dark hints, which they have met with in some of the poetical fictions, and from thence concluded that there was something of the Trinity known, even by the Heathen in general: thus when the word three is mentioned by them, and applied to some things, which they relate concerning their gods; or when they speak of gods delighting in an unequal number, or in the number three. But this is too gross to be particularly mentioned, lest it should give us an unbecoming idea of this divine mystery, or of those who have better arguments than these to defend it.

The reflection which I would make on this is, that what they call an advantage to the doctrine has been certainly very detrimental to it; and, as a late learned divine observes, has tended only to pervert the simplicity of the Christian faith with mixtures of philosophy and vain deceit.^[84] And I doubt not but the apostle had an eye to this, among other corruptions, which they who were attached to the Heathen philosophy began to bring into their scheme of divinity, and would notoriously do in after ages, which he purposely fences against, when he says, Beware, lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ, Col. ii. 8. And this corruption so much prevailed, that it has given occasion to some of the Anti-trinitarians, to reproach the doctrine of the Trinity, as though it were a system of Platonism. And it is their being too fond of using Plato’s words, in explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, that has given occasion to some of the fathers to be suspected, as though they were less favourable to the scripture account thereof; by which means the adversaries have laid claim to them as their own; and produced some unwary expressions out of Justin Martyr, and others, supposing them to be in the Arian scheme, who, in other parts of their writings, appear to be remote from it.^[85]

And this leads us to consider the method which some divines have taken, in using similitudes to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, which, at best, tend only to illustrate, and not to prove a doctrine: and we can hardly make use of this method of illustrating this doctrine, without conveying some ideas, which are unbecoming, if not subversive thereof; and while we pretend to explain that which is in itself inexplicable, we do no service to the truth.

I shall here give a short specimen of this matter, that hereby we may see how some have unwarily weakened the cause which they have been maintaining. Some have taken a similitude from three of the divine perfections, viz. that there are three invisibles of God; power, wisdom, and goodness. Power creates, wisdom governs, and goodness conserves; and so they have gone on to explain this doctrine, till they had almost given it into the hands of the Sabellians: and, indeed, they might have instanced in more divine perfections than three, had it been to their purpose.

Again, others have explained this doctrine by some resemblance which they apprehend to be of it in man; and so they speak of the soul as a principle of a threefold life, rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Others speak of three causes concurring to produce the same effect; such as the efficient, constitutive and final cause. Others have taken their similitude from inanimate things; as the sun, in which there is light, heat, and motion, which are inseparably connected together, and tend to produce the same effects.

Moreover, others illustrate it by a similitude, taken from a fountain, in which there is the spring in the bowels of the earth, the water bubbling out of the earth, and the stream diffusing itself in a perpetual course, receiving all it communicates from the fountain. I am sorry there is occasion to caution any against this method of explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. But these, and many other similitudes of the like nature, we find in the writings of some, who consider not what a handle they give to the common enemy. There are, indeed, in most of them, three things, which are said, in different respects, to be one; but we may observe, that all these similitudes, and others of the like nature, brought to illustrate this doctrine, lead us to think of the whole divided into those parts, of which they consist, whereof they take notice of the number three; or they speak of three properties of the same thing; and if their wit and fancy saw it needful to speak of more than three, the same method of illustrating would serve their purpose, as much as it does the end for which they bring it. Therefore I would conclude this head, by using the words of God to Job, Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Job xxxviii. 2. Who are these, that, by pretending to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity by similitudes, do that, which, though very foreign to their design, tends to pervert it?

6. We shall now consider what general rules may be observed for our understanding those scriptures, on which our faith, with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, is founded; and since it is a doctrine of pure revelation, as has been before observed, we must keep close to scripture, even to the words thereof, where they are express and distinct, as to this matter; and to consequences deduced from it, so far as they are just, and self-evident; and, at the same time, while we are sensible that we cannot comprehend this mystery, we must take care that we pretend not to be wise above what is revealed. Now there are some rules, which may be of use to us, in our enquiries into the sense of scripture concerning this doctrine; as,

(1.) We must not suppose that the words of scripture, relating thereunto, are to be taken in a sense, which can be known by none but criticks, as though it were designed only for them to understand; or that the unlearned part of the world should be left in the dark, or led astray, as to several things contained in this important doctrine. Thus we are not to suppose that we are at a loss as to the proper sense of the word God; or could hardly know how to direct our faith and worship, founded thereon, without the help of criticism; or, for want of being acquainted with some distinctions, concerning one that may be called God by nature, or the supreme God, and others who may be called gods by office, or subordinate gods, we should be led to ascribe divine honour where it is not due; or else we must be able to distinguish also concerning worship, and, instead of honouring the Son as we honour the Father, must give him an inferior kind of divine worship, short of what is due to the Father. This we have no scripture warrant for; neither are we led by the scriptures to have any notion of a middle being between God and the creature, or one that is not properly God, so as the Father is, and yet more than a creature, as though there were a medium between finite and infinite; neither are we led, by scripture, to conceive of any being, that has an eternal duration, whose eternity is supposed to be before time, and yet not the same with the eternal duration of the Father. These things we shall have occasion to mention in their proper place, and therefore need make no farther use of them at present, but only to observe, from hence, how intelligible the scripture would be in what relates to this doctrine, if the words thereof had not a plain and determinate sense; but we must make use of these methods of reasoning, if we would arrive to the meaning thereof.

(2.) If some divine perfections are attributed in scripture to the Son and Spirit, all the perfections of the divine nature, may, by a just consequence from thence, be proved to belong to them, by reason of the simplicity and unity thereof: therefore, if we can prove, from scripture, that they have some perfections ascribed to them, which, I hope, it will not be a difficult matter to do, we are not to suppose that our argument is defective, or that the doctrine of the Trinity is not sufficiently maintained, if we cannot produce a scripture to prove every perfection of the divine nature to be ascribed to them.

(3.) When any thing is mentioned in scripture, concerning our Saviour, or the Holy Spirit, which argues an inferiority to the Father, this is to be understood consistently with other scriptures, which speak of their having the same divine nature; since scripture does not, in the least, contradict itself; and how this may be done, will be farther considered under a following head.

(4.) If we have sufficient arguments to convince us of the truth of this doctrine, our faith ought not to be shaken, though we cannot fully understand the sense of some scriptures, which are brought to support the contrary; not that we are to suppose that the scripture gives countenance to two opposite doctrines: but a person may be fully satisfied concerning the sense of those scriptures that contain the doctrine of the Trinity, and yet not be supposed perfectly to understand the meaning of every word or phrase used in scripture, or of some particular texts, which are sometimes brought to support the contrary doctrine; so that objections may be brought, which he is not able readily to reply to. Shall he therefore deny the truth, because he cannot remove all the difficulties that seem to lie in the way of it? That would be to part with it at too easy a rate, which, when he has done, he will find greater difficulties attending the contrary scheme of doctrine. Do they object, that we believe things contrary to reason, because we assert the incomprehensibleness of divine mysteries? or that we are Tritheists, because we believe that there are three Persons in the Godhead, and cannot exactly determine the difference between divine and human personality? We could, on the other hand, point at some difficulties, that they cannot easily surmount. What shall we think of the head of giving divine worship to our Saviour, when, at the same time, they deny him to have those perfections, that denominate him God in the same sense as the Father is so called? The Socinians found it very difficult, when the matter was disputed among themselves, to reconcile their practice with their sentiments, when they worshipped him, whose Deity they denied. And the Arians will find that this objection equally affects their scheme; and it will be no less difficult for them to reconcile Christ’s character, as Redeemer, Governor of the world, Judge of quick and dead, with their low ideas of him, when denying his proper Deity. These things we only mention occasionally at present, that it may not be thought that the doctrine of the Trinity is exposed to greater difficulties than the contrary doctrine, to the end that they who are not furnished with all those qualifications, which are necessary for its defence, may not reckon those arguments, by which they have been convinced of the truth thereof, less valid, because they are not able, at present, to answer all the objections that may be brought against them.

(5.) The weight of several arguments, taken from scripture, to prove this doctrine, is to be considered, as well as the arguments themselves; we do not pretend that every one of them is equally conclusive; there are some, which are oftentimes brought to support it, which we can lay no great stress upon, and therefore shall omit to mention them, among other arguments brought to that purpose, lest we should give occasion to the adversary to insult, or conclude that we take any thing for an argument that has been brought as such to prove this doctrine. Therefore we will not pretend to prove, or peremptorily to determine, that the doctrine of the Trinity is contained in those words of the Psalmist, Psal. xxxiii. 6. By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the Hosts of them by the breath of his mouth. Nor will we pretend to prove this doctrine from the threefold repetition of the word Jehovah, in the form of benediction to be used by the high priest, Numb. vi. 24, 25, 26. The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace. Nor do we lay any stress on the three-fold repetition of the word Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of Hosts, Isa. vi. 3. though we shall shew, in its proper place, that there are several things in this chapter, which prove this doctrine. However, if at any time, together with arguments that are more conclusive, we bring some that are less so; this use may be made of it, to shew how the scripture way of speaking is consistent therewith in those places that do not so directly prove it. This we thought proper to mention, because it is a very common thing for those, who cannot answer the most weighty arguments that are brought to support a doctrine, to bend their greatest force against those which have the least strength; and then to triumph, as though they had gained the victory, when they have only done it in what respects that which is less material.

II. We shall now consider in what sense we are to understand the words Trinity and Persons in the Godhead; and in what respect the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are said to be one. It is true, the word Trinity is not to be found in scripture, but what we understand by it is plainly contained therein; therefore we use the word, as agreeable thereunto: thus we read of the three that bear record in heaven, viz. the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and that these three are one, 1 John v. 7. These three here mentioned are Persons, because they are described by personal characters; and we shall take occasion elsewhere, when we prove the Deity of the Son and Spirit, to consider their being one, that is, having the same divine nature, which we shall therefore wave at present, being only considering the sense of words commonly used by us in treating of this doctrine. All contending parties, however they have explained the word Trinity, according to their different ways of thinking, have notwithstanding, in compliance with custom, used the word, and so far explained it, as that we might understand that they intend hereby three, who are, in some respect one, though some have not cared to use the word Person; or if they have, it is without the most known and proper idea contained in it. Thus the Sabellians, whenever they use the word, intend nothing by it, but three relations, which may be attributed to the same Person; as when the same Person may be called a father, a son, and a brother, in different respects; or as when he that, at one time, sustains the person of a judge, may, at another time, sustain that of an advocate: this is what some call a Trinity of names; and they might as well have declined to use the words altogether, as to explain them in this sense.

Again, the Arians use the word Person; but these have run into another extreme, inasmuch as that, whilst they avoid Sabellianism, they would lay themselves open to the charge of Tritheism, did they not deny the proper Deity of the Son and Spirit; for they suppose that every distinct Person is a distinct being, agreeable to the sense of personality, when applied to men; but this, as has been before considered, is to be abstracted from the idea of personality, when applied to the Persons in the Godhead. These also understand the oneness of these divine Persons, in a sense agreeable to their own scheme, and different from ours, and therefore they speak of them as one in will, consent, or design, in which respect God and the creature may be said to be one: accordingly Arius, and his adherents, in the council at Nice, refused to allow that the divine persons were Ὁμοουσιοι consubstantial, and, with a great many evasions and subterfuges, attempted to conceal their sentiments: all that they could be brought to own was, that the Son was Ὁμοιος, or Ὁμοιουσιος, which amounts to no more than this, that whatever likeness there may be, in some respects, yet he has not the same proper divine nature with the Father and Holy Ghost.

Which leads us to consider the sense in which it is generally used by those who defend what we think to be the scripture-doctrine of the Trinity. There are some, it is true, both among ancient and modern writers, that attempt to explain what they mean by the word Person, who are so unhappy as to leave the sense thereof more dark than they found it, when they have given a definition thereof, agreeable to what is used by metaphysicians and schoolmen, to this effect, that it is a suppositum, endowed with reason; or that it is one entire, individual, incommunicable, rational subsistence: and when they define Personality, some tell us, that it is a positive mode of a being terminating and compleating its substantial nature, and giving incommunicability to it, which words need to be explained more than the thing defined thereby. And here I cannot but take notice of that warm debate which there was between the Greek and Latin church about the words Hypostasis and Persona; the Latin, concluding that the word Hypostasis signified substance or essence, thought, that to assert that there were three divine Hypostases, was to say that there were three Gods: On the other hand, the Greek church thought that the word Person did not sufficiently guard against the Sabellian notion of the same individual being sustaining three relations; whereupon each part of the church was ready to brand the other with heresy, till by a free and mutual conference, in a synod at Alexandria, A. D. 362. they made it appear, that it was but a mere contention about the grammatical sense of a word; and then it was allowed, by men of temper on both sides, that either of the two words might be indifferently used.^[86] But what signifies the use of them, when perplexed with the scholastic explications thereof? This has given occasion to some, whose sentiments have been very remote as to the doctrine of the Trinity, to express themselves with some dislike; on the one hand, the Socinians, and some among the Remonstrants, who made very great advances toward their scheme, viz. Curcellæus, Episcopius, and others,^[87] have complained of clouding this doctrine with hard words; and the complaint is not altogether groundless, though it may be their design herein was to substitute such words in the room of them, as would make the remedy worse than the disease. On the other hand, some, who have embraced the doctrine of the Trinity, would not have liked its advocates the worse, had they chose to have defended it in a more plain intelligible manner. Thus Calvin himself wishes, that some words, which are so warmly opposed and defended on each side, were altogether laid aside, and buried, provided that such might be retained as express our faith in the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit, being the one God, but distinguished by their personal properties.^[88] And this is that plain sense of the word, which I shall make use of, in what I shall farther attempt to lay down in the defence thereof. And accordingly,

1. We never call any thing a person that is not endowed with understanding and will; and therefore the most glorious inanimate creatures, either in heaven or earth, whatever excellencies they have, or how useful soever they are to the world, they are not persons. Thus, when the sun is described as though it were a person, and is compared to a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race, Psal. xix. 5. the words are never understood in any other but a metaphorical sense; so Behemoth and the Leviathan, mentioned in Job, being no other than brute creatures, are described with personal characters, in the same figurative way of speaking; therefore we suppose a person to have an understanding and will.

2. Whenever I, thou, or he, are applied to such a subject, they always connote a person; I, a person speaking; thou, a person spoken to; and he, or him, a person spoken of; and when such modes of speaking are sometimes applied to things that are destitute of reason, or to any moral virtues or principles of acting, which, from the nature of the thing, cannot be denominated persons, such expressions are very easily understood in a figurative sense, which may without any difficulty be distinguished from the proper one, whereby those who are so described are denominated persons.