That facility of intercourse creates commerce, and commerce carries with it civilization, is an axiom founded on universal experience.

Where seeming exceptions to it are found, they may be traced to the blind selfishness of human legislation, counteracting the natural laws established by the all-wise and beneficent Governor of the universe.

A project, therefore, which, by severing two continents, proposes to change the whole course of commerce and communication between the eastern and western worlds, and approximate by many thousand miles the knowledge and industry of the west to the ignorance and barbarism of the east, presents considerations of a nature to excite the imagination, and to awaken some of our best feelings in its favour.

In dealing with it, the writer, however, purposes to limit himself to a strictly practical view of the subject. He will state his facts with accuracy,—place every circumstance, whether for or against the undertaking, as far as his information enables him to judge, impartially before the reader,—and thus leave him to form his own opinion as to the practicability of accomplishing the contemplated enterprise, and of its utility should it be accomplished.

The writer deems it proper to add, that the matter was some time since submitted by him to the consideration of Her Majesty’s Government, and that the extract from M. Linant’s Survey of the Isthmus, herein given, appears in the “Commercial Tariffs, Regulations, &c., of Foreign Countries, part 10, presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, 14th July, 1843,” being part of those valuable compilations, for which it is well known the country is indebted to the talents and industry of Mr. Macgregor, of the Board of Trade.

Physical practicability of the Enterprise.

The improvement of our communication with the East has been, for some time past, an object of much public solicitude, and in proportion to the progress made in its developement, its importance becomes more and more manifest. The establishment of a steam communication with India, &c., viâ the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, although as yet only in its infancy, has already been productive of considerable benefit, both to Great Britain and her Oriental dependencies.

But, although the steam communication presents a greatly improved means of transit by this route for passengers and letters, it cannot, except in a comparatively very limited degree, be made available for the general purposes of commerce. The transport of all articles of merchandize of moderate value, compared to their bulk or weight, must, from the small stowage-room afforded by steam vessels, and the expense of the transit across Egypt, continue to be effected by means of sailing vessels navigating by the long and circuitous route round the Cape of Good Hope.

The principal object, therefore, of the contemplated Canal, would be to open a shorter route between Europe and the East, which could be availed of by sailing as well as by steam vessels, and thus serve the general purposes of commercial intercourse.

Previously to proceeding to treat of the practicability of opening such a canal, it may be proper to explain how it has fallen to my lot to deal with this subject:—

In the year 1841, I visited Egypt. While there, my attention was, among other matters, directed to the question which has so frequently been mooted, although never hitherto, I think, satisfactorily treated, viz. the practicability of re-opening the ancient Canal through the Isthmus of Suez, said to have once joined the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

In following up this object, I became acquainted with M. Adolphe Linant, of Cairo, a French Civil Engineer, of considerable reputation, and who has been in the employ of the Pacha of Egypt, for, I believe, upwards of twenty years.

I found that M. Linant had devoted a great deal of time and labour to the practical investigation of this subject, had recently completed an elaborate survey of the Isthmus, and was in possession of much detailed information derived from a personal examination of the localities through which the proposed Canal would have to be cut. Under certain conditions I induced him to furnish me with a memoir on the subject, accompanied by a manuscript map of his Survey of the Isthmus of Suez, and of Lower Egypt, in which the site of the ancient and track of the proposed Canal are laid down with great minuteness. In short, the map, now in my possession, which is on a large scale, contains a far more complete view of Lower Egypt than any hitherto executed.

Political Arrangements.

The co-operation, or, at least, the concurrence of the Pacha of Egypt would be indispensable.

Having suggested the expediency of the interposition of one or more of the European powers to remove any political impediments which might stand in the way of this enterprise, it appears necessary to take a brief view of the interest which they would each have in promoting it.

Great Britain, from the vast extent of her commerce and political connections with the East, would, undoubtedly, derive the greatest advantage from it; but most of the other nations of Europe would derive benefit in proportion to the extent of their commerce; and those, having ports in the Mediterranean and Levant, or indeed anywhere nearer to the proposed communication than the ports of Great Britain, would gain more in proportion.

Holland, next to Great Britain, would, from the extent of her trade with the East, have a direct interest in the accomplishment of the proposed enterprise. Her commerce would be improved, and her political connection with her extensive colonies of Java, &c., would be much strengthened by it.

France would derive most important benefits. It would create almost a new commerce for her, in which, through her ports in the Mediterranean, she would have the advantage over us in importing direct the indigo, &c., of India, of which she requires such large quantities for the use of her manufactories, while the shorter route which would be opened to India, &c., would give a stimulus to her exports.

Austria, there is every reason to believe, would give a cordial support to the undertaking. She is making active and judicious efforts to extend and improve her commerce; and there is little doubt of her co-operation in promoting an undertaking so well calculated to further her views in that respect. The merchants of Trieste have been the first to avail themselves of an arrangement which the writer of this succeeded about two years since in effecting with the Pacha of Egypt, by which he agreed to relinquish the high rate of transit duties in Egypt, imposed by the treaties with the Porte, and to substitute as low a rate of duty as would admit of the transit through Egypt of goods to and from India, &c. Under this arrangement, two cargoes of India produce have been already brought from Bengal to Suez in sailing vessels, thence transported across Egypt to Alexandria, whence they were brought to Trieste.

The Chamber of Commerce of that port are, it is well known, anxious to extend their trade with the East in this direction; and it is stated, that a proposal was, a short time since, made by some Austrian capitalists to the Pacha, for opening a Canal through the Isthmus.

Greece would obtain a decided benefit by it. Her numerous small vessels would be well adapted for trading with the ports of Africa and Arabia in the Red Sea, and they would soon be seen covering these coasts.

Italy, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the minor northern states, and even America, would all participate more or less in the improved route for eastern commerce, and, taking a just view of their own interests, would hail it as a benefit.

Even Russia, although possessed of an over-land communication with Central Asia, India, and China, would gain an advantage by the Canal, as she could open a maritime intercourse with the east through her ports in the Black Sea, which would be less costly, and susceptible of greater extension than a land transit.

It hence appears, that all the European powers would have an interest, more or less, in promoting this enterprise; and there appears to be reasonable grounds for concluding, that if requested by one or more of the first-rate powers, either to undertake the work himself, or permit it to be undertaken by private capitalists, under such an arrangement as would connect his name with it, and secure to himself and his descendants a pecuniary benefit from it, as already suggested, Mehemet Ali would be induced to co-operate in it.

The guardianship of such a passage between Europe and the East, would serve to enhance the importance of his political position, and to strengthen those relations of mutual interest between the ruler of Egypt, and the communities of Europe, which would form the most efficacious guarantee for the continuance of the Government of Egypt in the family of Mehemet Ali.

The association of his name with so magnificent an enterprise, would, I consider, be another powerful motive to a man so ardently imbued with the love of fame.

Should a firman or other formal act from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, in his character of sovereign of the soil, be deemed requisite for securing a permanent and indisputable right to make and keep open the Canal, I should suggest that point being left to the management of the Pacha, who, I have some reason to think, would obtain it much more easily and promptly than if it were attempted through the medium of European diplomacy.

Advantages of navigating by the canal route, as compared with the route by the Cape of Good Hope.

Before entering on a comparison of these two routes with regard to their navigation by sailing vessels, it may be well to consider what advantages the contemplated Canal would afford in facilitating the steam communication with the East viâ Egypt and the Red Sea, commonly, though very erroneously, denominated “the Overland Route.”

In order to make this properly understood, it will be necessary to give a brief account of the present arrangements for the transit through Egypt of the mails, passengers, and packages, to and from India, China, &c.

It is, no doubt, generally known, that this communication is carried on by the steamers of a private Company, which ply monthly between Southampton and Alexandria, touching at Gibraltar and Malta, and by smaller steamers belonging to the East India Company, which ply monthly between Bombay and Suez, chiefly for the purpose of conveying the mails. The private Company have now also placed two steam ships, the “Hindostan,” and the “Bentinck,” of 1800 tons, and 520 horse power each, to ply between Suez and Calcutta, touching at Aden, Ceylon, and Madras. The vessels of that Company, both on this side of Egypt, as well as on the other side, convey goods as well as passengers, and the mails; but the East India Company’s vessels plying between Suez and Bombay, do not receive goods, and have but limited, and comparatively inferior accommodations for passengers.

The mails, passengers, and packages, are, of course, disembarked from the steamers coming from England at Alexandria, and are re-embarked at Suez in the steamers proceeding to India on the outward route, and vice versâ on the homeward route.

It now remains to show how their transit across Egypt, between Alexandria on the Mediterranean, and Suez on the Red Sea, is effected, with the present cost of it, in order to estimate how far it would be improved by the contemplated Canal communication.

I shall now proceed to consider what advantages the Canal would present to sailing vessels navigating between Europe and the East.

This is, of course, assuming the navigation by the Mediterranean and Red Sea route to be of equal facility with the Cape route. And I shall now endeavour to examine this part of the question with the accuracy which its importance demands.

The first point which presents itself in this consideration, is the influence of the monsoons, or periodical winds, which prevail throughout the Indian Seas, and in the southern part of the Red Sea.

The south-west monsoon, which blows much stronger than the north-east monsoon, prevails in the Indian Ocean, between the east coast of Africa and the coasts of India, &c., from May until October, blowing with the greatest force during the months of June, July, and August.

The north-east monsoon prevails from October to May, but is of much less force than the south-west monsoon.

In order to estimate the difficulties or advantages of these periodical winds, to a sailing vessel navigating by the Red Sea, as compared with the route by the Cape of Good Hope, we must, for vessels bound to or from the most important commercial ports in India—the Presidencies of Madras and Bengal, as also Ceylon, Singapore, Java, China, &c., suppose her placed at a point a few degrees to the southward of Ceylon from or to which she would have to proceed, whether navigating by the Cape of Good Hope, or by the Red Sea route.

Now, it is well known, that from this position a vessel steering for the coast of Africa towards Cape Guardafui (the southern extremity of the Gulf of Aden), and thence to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb (the entrance of the Red Sea), would carry the wind a-beam, and could therefore make her passage to or from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the given point to the southward of Ceylon, during the whole of the south-west monsoon.

As the north-east monsoon blows in an exactly opposite direction to the south-west monsoon, and is much more moderate, a sailing vessel could make good her course between the Red Sea and the same point south of Ceylon, equally well as in the south-west monsoon, and therefore during the whole year could effect this part of the passage with tolerable certainty.

Vessels proceeding to or from Bombay would have to arrange their passages to suit the monsoons. Sailing from England, or other places in Europe, so as to have the south-west monsoon in their favour; and sailing from Bombay for Europe so as to have the north-east monsoon in their favour.

It hence appears that the monsoons present no particular difficulties in the voyage between India, &c. and the entrance of the Red Sea, more than in the ordinary route by the Cape of Good Hope; but that, on the contrary, for ships trading with the eastern and most important parts of Hindostan, and to Ceylon, Malacca, Singapore, Java, China, &c. this part of the voyage would be made with more certainty than an equal distance in the Indian Ocean, of a voyage by the Cape of Good Hope route.

The Red Sea Passage.

The length of the Red Sea from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to Suez is 1200 miles, its medium breadth about 150 miles, and its direction nearly N. N. W. and S. S. E.

Its coasts on either side are fringed with coral rocks, which render it dangerous in navigating it to approach near its shores.

In the southern part of it, say from the latitude of Jidda to Bab-el-Mandeb, being about one-half of its whole length, the southerly monsoon predominates nearly two-thirds of the year, commencing in October and ending in May or June. The northerly winds then set in, and continue about four months, say June, July, August, and September.

Outside the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden, the wind generally prevails from the eastward for six months, say, from October to May, and from the westward during the other part of the year.

In the northern part of the sea, from Jidda to Suez, but more particularly near to Suez, the prevailing winds for nine months of the year are northerly, and in the months of June, July, and August, it is very difficult for sailing vessels to beat up to Suez. In this part of the Red Sea southerly breezes are at all times but of short duration.

The best time for vessels to sail from Suez for India, &c. is therefore about the end of August, which will enable them to clear the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb in September, before the easterly winds commence in the Gulf outside.

From all these facts it will appear,

1st. That the passage between India, &c., and the Gulf of Aden, may be made with ordinary facility by sailing vessels.

2nd. That some delay would be experienced by sailing vessels in the Gulf of Aden during certain portions of the year, whether bound to or from India; and also by vessels coming from India, in the northern part of the Red Sea, during the greater part of the year.

Against these difficulties in the Red Sea route must, however, be set off the delays by calms and contrary winds, between the trades experienced by vessels navigating by the Cape route. In order to ascertain how nearly they may balance each other, and consequently whether a saving of time in navigating by the Mediterranean and Red Sea, proportionate to the shorter distance, as compared with the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, might be effected, I would beg leave to submit the following questions to the consideration of experienced nautical men.

1st. Is the navigation by a sailing vessel, between England and Pelusium, say 3000 miles, of equal facility as a similar distance from England on the Cape route?

2nd. Is the navigation to or from the given point, to the southward of Ceylon and Cape Guardafui, more certain than that of an equal distance between the same point and the Cape of Good Hope?

3rd. Would the impediments in the navigation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, already pointed out, be greater or less than those experienced from calms and contrary winds between the trades in navigating by the Cape of Good Hope route? And, assuming that the answer to the second query should be in favour of the Red Sea route, would that gain set off against the difficulties of navigating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and reduce the latter to a par with the impediments between the trades just alluded to?

4th. Would not the nature of the coast of Egypt, at the embouchure of the Canal in the Mediterranean, present considerable difficulty and danger to sailing vessels approaching it for the purpose of seeking the Canal entrance? The coast, it is well known, for a distance of upwards of 150 miles to the eastward, as well as to the westward of the Canal entrance, is destitute of any sheltered anchorage, is exceedingly low, and not easily discoverable until within a short distance of it, and very shallow at a distance of two leagues from the shore. A good light on the pier or breakwater might obviate some of the danger, but still it is to be apprehended, that sailing vessels approaching this part of the coast, with the wind strong from the north and north-west, and which is very prevalent, would incur considerable risk of getting embayed and being driven ashore.

If the result of this investigation should be such as to place the difficulties and facilities of each route on a par, it will then follow that a gain in time of from four to six weeks would be effected in navigating to or from India, &c. by the proposed Canal, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope route.

Before concluding this part of the subject, I think it well to advert to another objection which may possibly be raised against the Canal passage, namely, the difficulty of tracking a vessel of heavy burthen through the Canal, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, against a current of three to four miles an hour, which would be the velocity of the stream constantly flowing from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

To this may be answered, that the same northerly winds which prevail as already stated, for the greater part of the year, in the upper or northern part of the Red Sea, also blow across the Isthmus, and consequently the vessel would be for the most part able to stem the current by using her sails. In default of this, a sufficient number of dromedaries would track a vessel of almost any size, or posts placed along the banks of the Canal for warping would effect the object on occasions, which would be of but rare occurrence, of a failure of wind.

It is to be considered also, that as the beds of the Bitter Lakes and of the Lake Timsah, would form two very extensive basins in the course of the Canal, nearly half-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, these would become halting places or inland ports, and here steam tugs would no doubt, among other accessories, be found, should the Canal ever become a general channel of intercourse.

From the Red Sea to the Mediterranean the vessel would, of course, be carried along by the stream.

General Observations as to the Political, Commercial, and Moral Benefits which would be derived from the Accomplishment of the Undertaking.

In a political point of view, the facilities which the Canal passage, combined with steam navigation, would afford to Great Britain, as regards the government of her Indian empire and dependencies, are almost incalculable.

From Malta troops could be placed in Bombay in three weeks; in Ceylon and Madras in four weeks; and in Calcutta in five weeks. And by means of the frequent intermediate coast communication in India, which the extended and comprehensive plan of steam navigation anticipated to result from the opening of the Canal passage would afford, troops and stores could be rapidly moved from one station to another.

Let any military man compare this with the present mode of effecting similar operations. The long sea voyage by the Cape of Good Hope, of four or five months, in a sailing vessel;—the men worn out, and requiring almost as many months more after debarkation, to recruit their health and strength, so as to be fit for active duty;—the length of time, and great fatigue, in moving between distant military stations;—and I think he will admit, that India might, with the facility alluded to, be efficiently governed with one-half the number of European troop which is now required. The facility for despatching ships of war, and stores of all kinds, to or from India, &c., need only be glanced at to be at once appreciated. The stability of British power in India would be thus increased, while the cost of maintaining it would be considerably diminished.

To estimate the importance of the proposed communication in a commercial point of view, it is necessary to take into consideration the extent of the field of operations for commerce, which the vast and populous regions of the East present. India contains 100,000,000 of subjects of the British Crown, and there are 50,000,000 of adjacent tributaries and allies; in all, 150,000,000 in the Peninsula of Hindostan, exclusive of the island of Ceylon. Little has as yet been done to stimulate the people to improve their resources and ameliorate their condition and habits; but of late years more attention has been directed to these objects, and the trade with British India has been rapidly on the increase.

China contains, it is estimated, not less than 350,000,000 of inhabitants, said to be inclined to industry, and to be peculiarly addicted to traffic. A timid and jealous system of government has for ages hermetically sealed, as it were, this vast country and population from intercourse with the rest of the world. British valour has now removed the barrier, and opened this almost new world to European commerce.

Let us suppose that the people of India and China should, from improved intercourse, require to the extent of one shilling per annum, for each individual, in value of British manufacture or produce. Even this seemingly insignificant amount would produce an annual increase of 25,000,000 in our exports. The opening of the Canal route would tend greatly to facilitate our intercourse with the 500,000,000 of people who inhabit India and China, and hence its commercial importance must be sufficiently obvious.

The application of steam power to the purposes of navigation, is doubtless one of those mechanical discoveries destined to effect a great moral revolution in the human mind throughout the world. The printing press has contributed, in an immense degree, to the progress of civilization, by furnishing a means for the spread of thought. But it seems scarcely to admit of a question, that the power of steam, applied to navigation, will exercise a more extensive, a more rapid, and a more efficacious influence in accelerating the civilization of the world than even the printing press.

Five hundred millions of human beings inhabiting Hindostan and China remain to this day enslaved by debasing superstitions, and sunk in mental darkness and delusion. What a field is here opening to the Christian philanthropist! To aid in the removal of ignorance and superstition by the diffusion of useful knowledge, and an enlightened religion; to plant industry and the arts where indolence and barbarism have hitherto prevailed, are noble efforts, tending no less to elevate those who engage in them, than the object of their exertions. The opening of the proposed communication would obviously subserve the promotion of such objects, and therefore can scarcely fail to excite an interest in the mind of every sincere well-wisher to his fellow creatures.

The preceding statement and observations will, I trust, be sufficient to show that the object of which they treat is, at least, of sufficient importance to warrant an effort being made to ascertain, in the manner suggested, whether it be practicable or not, and if found practicable, whether, and in what manner, the Pacha of Egypt would be disposed to concur or co-operate in it. If the information and suggestions therein given should lead to such a result, the chief object of their publication will be attained.

APPENDIX.
No. VIII.
OPINION OF CAPTAIN JAMES VETCH, R.E.

OPINION OF CAPTAIN JAMES VETCH, R.E.[7]

A good deal is alleged by those trading from Britain to the East Indies against the policy of any part of the British nation lending patronage to such an undertaking, which, it is presumed, would benefit the countries bordering the Mediterranean more than our own; though, if the canal in question would be the means of most materially shortening the distance between the two most important portions of the British Empire, little doubt can be entertained of the benefit conferred on the extensive commerce of the two countries, even though some other nations would receive a greater proportional advantage in the accomplishment of the measure; and though the commerce of other nations might increase in a greater ratio than the British, still all would participate in facilities to be obtained; and in the case of war arising, it is but too obvious, that the power possessing a naval superiority has the means of closing such a channel of commerce to its enemies, by stationing cruisers at each extremity. So much may be urged with a view of removing the prejudice of British interests against the measure; but it will readily be believed, that if the British fail to patronize the undertaking, other nations and powers will do so shortly: and it is therefore manifest, if British subjects were chiefly concerned in advancing the capital, and in executing and managing this great work, it would be vastly more for the benefit of Britain, than if any other nation or Government lent their resources. But undertake it who may, it is most probable, that both the funds and the energies of execution will come from this country; and it is too probable, that if the measure is executed by any other parties than British, the work will be upon a cheaper and less effective plan of navigation, permitting only small craft to navigate, unfit for British commerce in the East, though sufficient for the small traders in the Mediterranean, who would consequently, in such a case, reap the entire benefit. I am decidedly of opinion, that British capital and British energy would alone execute the work in a truly useful and permanent style. But the measure is daily becoming so much more obvious as one of practical facility, that it cannot long be postponed in some shape or another.

The conclusions may now be recapitulated in general terms:—

1st. That a ship canal between the two Seas, which contemplates an extended commerce between the countries of Europe and the Indian Ocean, should be free from the effects of all fluctuating causes, arising from inundations or floods, &c.

2nd. That it should be a measure irrespective of the commerce of Egypt and the Nile, or rather that it could not combine these objects in the same measure, with any good results; though it would be the means of greatly improving the commerce of Egypt by accessory measures.

3rd. That the mean fall from the level of the Red Sea to that of the Mediterranean (say thirty feet) is sufficient to keep the artificial channel clean, if the fall be properly economised; and also that it would be able to preserve its mouth in the Bay of Pelusium in a navigable state at all seasons.

4th. That a navigation of still water with locks could not be long maintained with advantage, under all the circumstances of the case.

5th. That a broad and deep stream like that of the Dardanelles could not be produced by natural operations, assisted slightly by art; but that the attempt would be pregnant with mischief in some quarters, and result in disappointment.

6th. That a direct and perfectly controllable channel, of a uniform size and shape and incline, would be the safest and most appropriate undertaking of which the circumstances permit, and under the imperfect information we possess.

It must, however, be confessed, that no definitive opinion can be given, or very satisfactory estimates assumed, until a new and detailed survey, having the express objects in view, is completed, comprehending the necessary levellings and borings and maritime surveys of the ports at the termini of the Canal.

With respect to the land survey, were all the necessary persons and means duly prepared to commence operations in the beginning of October, it is probable the investigation might be completed in the beginning of the following May, and a true solution given to this great geographical, commercial, and engineering question.

As mankind multiply and make progress in arts and civilization, new wants arise, and the ingenuity and industry of man is taxed to discover new sources of wealth, maintenance, and occupation: and we find, under the dispensations of an all-wise Providence, that at suitable seasons resources are unveiled which have been long provided but concealed until the fit occasion presents itself. Amongst the numerous administrations of the same wise and merciful design, it is not unreasonable to believe that the completion of navigable channels across the Isthmuses of Suez and Darien are enterprises amongst the events designed to minister to the growing wants and improvement of the human race.

In the preceding pages an endeavour has been made to show the superiority of a direct communication between the two Seas (which would provide for the speedy passage of large ships at all seasons), over a communication partly through the medium of the Nile, which would be interrupted in the dry season, and prove tedious at all times; and it now remains to say a few words on the comparative value of railways.

Railways, under present circumstances, would expedite the transmission of passengers by the steam ships across the Desert, and might be useful in the transmission of light and valuable goods between the Nile and the Red Sea; but it must be greatly doubted if a sufficient traffic could thereby arise to pay the construction and maintenance of eighty miles of railway between Cairo and Suez. On the other hand, were it contemplated to construct a railway between the bay of Tineh and Suez, the cost, including the improvement of the harbours at either terminus, would nearly equal the expense of the proposed Canal; but the means of keeping the terminal harbours deep and clean would be foregone from want of means of scourage; and to the expense of the railway would have to be added the expense of unloading and reloading the cargoes of each shipment; so that it is manifest that a railway direct between the two Seas could stand no competition with the proposed Canal, which, besides its value as a commercial channel, would facilitate the steam navigation with India in the highest degree, by permitting the steamers to make a continuous voyage; and by permitting supplies of coals being sent direct to Suez and Aden, &c., the detention of steamers at Suez and Alexandria would be avoided, four or five days would be gained in the transmission of passengers and mails, and the expenditure in the price of coals would be much reduced.

The Author again acknowledges his obligations to the able statements of Mr. Maclaren’s paper of 1825, connected with this subject, and now quotes that author’s opinions and those of the writer in the Foreign Quarterly Review of 1836, as to the feasibility of the proposed measure:—

“Yet it is certain that the project must not only have been practicable but easy, since it was accomplished in early times by men who were unprovided with many of those resources which modern art supplies. In fact, when the ground is explored the supposed difficulties vanish, and we discover that Nature has furnished such singular and unexpected facilities for establishing a water communication between the two Seas, that she has left little for man to do to complete her work.”—Maclaren, Jamieson’s Journal, 1825, p. 274.

“Were European civilization and a regular Government permanently re-established in Egypt, the undertaking would be found not only practicable but easy; so great, in fact, are the facilities which the ground presents, that though the Canal (taking the magnitude of its section into account) would certainly be the largest that exists, the expense would be considerably less than that of some small works of the same kind executed in the west of Europe.”—Ibid. p. 290.

“There is little doubt that if the French had remained in Egypt, and especially with Napoleon at the head of the Government, they would have carried their project (of canals) into effect. The expense, compared with the magnificent result, is so trifling, that the wonder is that it has not been carried into effect before now, either by a company having the support of Mahommed Pacha, or by the Pacha on his own account.”—Foreign Quarterly Review, 1836, p. 362.

“A glance at the map which accompanies the Topographical Survey of the French engineers is quite sufficient to demonstrate with what facility and at what moderate expense a ship’s canal might be constructed from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.”—Ibid. p. 368.

APPENDIX.
No. IX.
ARTICLE FROM THE MONITEUR.

FROM THE MONITEUR,
(THE OFFICIAL PAPER OF FRANCE,)
6th July, 1855.
THE CUTTING OF THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ.

This undertaking, one of the grandest and most useful of the age, has for some time attracted a considerable share of public attention. There is but one opinion as to its immense results, but the question of the track has been a subject of discussion, which, in the absence of authentic documents and an exact knowledge of the localities, may mislead public opinion.

Two tracks have been proposed: one direct, which is to unite the two Seas by a Canal in a straight line from Suez to Pelusium; the other indirect, which, starting from Suez, joins the Nile below Cairo, and terminates at the port of Alexandria.

In the eyes of all who are acquainted with Egypt the direct track alone appears practicable, the indirect track however has recently found its advocates in some European journals; the following particulars, collected on the spot, will enlighten public opinion upon this point.

In the first place there is a difference of length between the two tracks, which is not unimportant. The direct track being the shortest, would certainly not, of itself, be sufficient to give it the preference, especially if the other were both most economical and most advantageous; but it appears that besides having the advantage of being much shorter, the direct track also has the recommendations of being more economical, more advantageous, and more easy of execution.

1st. The indirect Canal has to cross the Nile, and this condition is almost impossible to be carried out. The crossings of rivers are attended, as is well known, with difficulties, even when there is only a draught of water of 2 to 3 met.: what would they be for a Canal which is to be 8 met. deep? And even one of the most decided partisans of the indirect track has not hesitated to declare frankly, considering this immense obstacle, which alarms but does not discourage him: “that the maintenance of such a depth presents difficulties which have never been surmounted nor even attempted.” It is true that at first the help of the barrage was reckoned upon in risking the crossing of the river; but this barrage can only serve at the low waters during four or five months of the year, at the time when the lands are irrigated to prepare for the summer crops; the reserved waters of the Nile will never, even at their maximum, be more than 4 to 4½ met., which is very far from 8 met. Above the barrage, at the point where the ships are to cross, the breadth is 2000 met. and if a transverse channel were dug there, how could it be prevented from filling with alluvium and mud? During the increase of the waters, how could a current of five miles an hour, be crossed by sailing vessels against the wind blowing from the east and south?

Against this formidable obstacle to the crossing which cannot be avoided, an expedient not less surprising, and still more impracticable, has been devised; the barrage is set aside, the employment of it being too hazardous, and the Nile is to be crossed by a bridge Canal. But can we form an idea of a Canal 8 met. deep crossing a river like the Nile above the barrage? According to the very calculations of those who propose such schemes, there would be required 1,213,147 met. cub. of water per diem to supply the upper basin, and as this enormous quantity of water would have to be raised thirty metres above the level of the two Seas; the engines required for this purpose must represent 5620 horse power by calculation, corresponding to 6000 horse power in those to be provided; not to speak of the obstacles that such a colossal work would oppose to the ordinary navigation, it would be an expense upon that point only of 50 to 60,000,000 francs. And the bridge Canal after all these sacrifices, would not be more firm or more durable than any construction of that kind. And moreover for this super elevation of level there would be required ten locks in addition to the fourteen already on the line.

2nd. The indirect Canal will be detrimental to the Canal works, so necessary to Lower Egypt, and will partly interfere with that admirable hydraulic system, which is at once the pride and the fertilization of the country. It will be in vain to make circuits to avoid the branchings of the network; as the termination is to be at the port of Alexandria, it will be absolutely necessary to pass between the Mahmoudieh Canal and Lake Mareotis; and then the flow of all the waters into the Lake which is destined to receive them will be prevented. Passing through the Lake, as the railway does, seas of mire will be met with, so much dreaded on the Pelusiac coast. It has already been necessary to raise again and again the embankment of the railway which was disappearing in the Lake, and for three years it has been necessary to labour unceasingly at the repairs which are continually required; what will it be when a dyke must be constructed at least 6000 metres in length, to heights of 7 to 8 metres, without knowing where to procure the necessary earth for these embankments?

3rd. The indirect Canal cannot terminate in the port of Alexandria without causing still greater confusion there than it causes in the Canal works. In the first place the port of Alexandria is not immutable, as has been supposed. It has not escaped the action of the ground swell, which has choked it with sand to a good third of its extent. The part of the port which has been selected is frequently agitated by the north-west winds, and the surf is then so violent in rough weather, that even small craft dare not approach it. The rock is found there at a small depth below the sea, and as it would be necessary to extend the dykes of the Canal to 250 metres into the harbour, to obtain a draught of water of 7 met., 50 to 8 met., the rock would have to be excavated under the water. Add to this that in this direction all the grand magazines and all the Government works would be encountered; there is not the least free space between the railway and the Mahmoudieh canal. But let us suppose all these difficulties overcome, there are others which the Canal raises, and which it multiplies the more it is employed. The port of Alexandria, the only military port of Egypt, is then besieged by hundreds of merchant vessels, and by the sailors of the whole of Europe. Let there be a contrary wind ever so slight, or some requisite repairs to the locks, and that the movement is arrested, just fancy the impediment, without taking into account the political dangers of such an accumulation. Moreover it is not only at Alexandria that this intolerable inconvenience would arise; it might happen, in consequence of accidents easily to be foreseen but impossible to be prevented, that Egypt should see all on a sudden 8 to 10,000 foreign sailors stationed on a point of her territory, because the forty vessels at least which traverse it every day have been forcibly detained at some part of the passage during twenty or five and twenty days consecutively.

To these conclusive reasons, it would not be difficult to add others; but these must be sufficient to warn unbiassed minds against the indirect passage.

The inconveniences, or rather the impossibilities of the indirect track, become more striking when compared with the conditions of the direct track and its incontestable advantages.

1st. To begin with, the direct track is only about one third the length of the other. That would be 400 kilometres long, and the direct track is only 155, which would be reduced to 120, as will be seen. Near about the middle of the Isthmus, the Bitter Lakes are met with, which give 18 kilometres of navigation ready made, and not requiring a single turn of the shovel, as the Viceroy’s engineers say, and 18 kilometres in addition are three parts excavated by nature itself; 120 kilometres therefore remain, that is to say, 30 leagues at the most.

2nd. The direct track is the easiest. There are only two salient points in the entire Isthmus that it is necessary to traverse by partly turning them; one, the Serapeum, which, according to the levels checked in 1853, is 16 met., 5950 high; and the other El Guisr, which is 11 met., 6300. With the depth of the Canal, this would make a cutting of 20 or at most 24 metres at some points. There is certainly nothing in such a work to terrify our engineers.

3rd. The direct track is the most natural. The Isthmus is traversed by a longitudinal depression, formed by the meeting of the two plains descending with an imperceptible slope, the one from Egypt, the other from the frontier hills of Asia. The Bitter Lakes, filled with the waters of the Arabian Gulf by the action of the tides only, may easily form a reservoir which, with a surface of 280,000,000 square metres by a rise of 2 metres of moving waters, would not receive less than 560,000,000 cubic metres, for the service of the Canal, below the water line at the level of the two Seas. Lake Timsah, situated at about an equal distance from Suez and Pelusium, is like an inland port where ships can be revictualled and repaired. Moreover, by another favour of nature, towards Lake Timsah a second not less remarkable hollow abuts perpendicularly on the longitudinal depression, it is that of the Wady-Tomilat (the fertile Goshen of the Bible). This hollow still receives the overflowings of the Nile for a great part of its length, and forms the natural track of a communication starting from the river and joining, at the central part of the Isthmus, the line of maritime navigation which would be established between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

4th. The direct track is the most useful. It serves at the same time the interests of commerce in general and the political interests of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. It will require but little to maintain it, and as there will be very few works of art, navigation will not be exposed to those interruptions which it would have to dread on the indirect track.

To these evident advantages of the direct track, to these relative facilities which had attracted the attention of the sovereigns of Egypt, of Amrou and Mustapha III. for example (see Lebeau, Histoire du Bas-Empire, tom. XII. p. 490, and the Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs, pts. III. and IV.), before attracting that of the nineteenth century, there is but one objection, and it is this:—

It is impossible, they say, for large ships to approach Pelusium; and the direct Canal is chimerical, because it cannot open into the Mediterranean.

This oft-repeated objection is but specious, and cannot stand before an examination of the facts. The entrance to Pelusium is certainly a difficult and costly work, but it is perfectly practicable, and engineers have overcome very different obstacles with resources much inferior to those now at their command.

It is well in the first place that it should be known that the level of the two Seas, excepting the difference of the tides, which are pretty high at the south in the Red Sea, and almost nothing at the north in the Mediterranean, is perceptibly the same. The commission of 1799 had found for the Arabian Gulf an elevation of 9 met. 90; but its labours, performed in the midst of all the dangers and disturbances of war, had not been verified, and the genius of Laplace resting upon accurate theoretical views, had formally denied the possibility of such a depression within a distance of scarcely thirty leagues. Afterwards, towards 1840, some English officers had proved by the barometer and the boiling water process that there was no difference of level; and in 1843, Prince Metternich, having been informed of these labours, sent instructions to Egypt to induce Mehemet Ali to interest himself in the grand undertaking of the cutting of the Isthmus: his dispatch is still in the Archives of the Austrian Consulate at Alexandria. In 1847 a commission of French engineers, sent out by M. Paulin Talabot under the direction of the learned M. Bourdaloue, and assisted by Egyptian engineers directed by M. Linant, chief engineer to the Viceroy, put the fact beyond all question, and M. Paulin Talabot had the honour of stating it in a memorial that has become famous. Our Academy of Sciences bestirred itself for the honour of the ancient Egyptian commission. M. Sabatier, Consul general of France, asked the Viceroy for a fresh verification, which M. Linant was charged to undertake in 1853, and which confirmed, saying an insignificant variation, the labours of 1847.

So that the considerable super-elevation of the Red Sea cannot be reckoned on for facilitating the approaches from the Mediterranean at the other extremity of the Canal; there is only the difference of the tides.

As a depth of 7 met. 50 to 8 met. is not found before Pelusium or Tineh, but at a distance of 6000 met. into the sea, it is assumed that it is practically impossible to prolong the jetty of the Canal to that distance, because the waters are but liquid mud, and that clouds of earth would interfere with the progress of the vessels and the solidity of the works.

This is a complete mistake.

Because Herodotus has said, that the Delta is a present from the Nile, his inaccurate assertion has been repeated without verifying it, and his metaphor has passed for an incontestable truth. But it is an absolute fact, and it is only necessary to ask those who have been at Pelusium, that the water there is as limpid as at Alexandria or Jaffa. The banks of travelling mud seen by Admiral Sir Sidney Smith have no more reality than the present from the Nile, and for the twenty years that these coasts have been traversed in every direction by steam boats, no one has ever met again with those muddy banks. The truth is, that the waters of the Nile, which, at the time of the inundation are distinguished for more than ten leagues into the sea, carry far out into the Mediterranean and deposit in its depths, the masses of earthy matter which they hold in suspension (near 1/8000) which do not reappear on the coasts but in imperceptible quantities; the truth is, that a handful of sand may be taken up from the sea beach, at Pelusium, without finding the least particle of mud. The Viceroy’s engineers have proved that the coast, from El-Arish to Tripoli, is pure sand, and the soundings taken along the shore give the same result. Far from the Nile forming accretions at Pelusium, it is an axiom now admitted by science that the muddy or sandy deposits observed at the mouths of rivers are entirely owing to matters brought by the tide. The rivers have no part therein; and the excellent observations made by most able hydrographers at the bay of Mount St. Michael, at the mouths of the Scheld, the Meuse, the Rhine, the Yssel, have superabundantly proved it. The accumulations of sand at Pelusium and Suez, like the whole Isthmus, have been formed by the maritime deposits of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The thorough investigation of the motion of the waves has demonstrated that the bars of rivers are due to the ground swell alone. The Nile, therefore, has no influence upon the approaches to Pelusium, as Herodotus supposed, and as is still the common opinion; and this is so true, that for 20 kilometres above its mouth there are accretions of mud, while below there is nothing but sand. Finally the accumulations of sand are more considerable in proportion as the waters of the river are less abundant.

Setting aside from the question the hypothetical assertions, it remains therefore incontestable that the only difficulty at Pelusium, is the length of the jetties in the sea. Pelusium, with its ruins, is at the same point where Strabo saw it, where the Egyptian commission saw it, which found the twenty stadia of the Greek geographer between the shore and the town quite correct. But are jetties of a league and a half into the sea possible, or are they indeed a work that cannot be executed? The answer to this question is easy: a hundred years ago, the Hollanders, not so rich and not so skillful as we are now, although quite as bold, erected at the Cape, in the bay of the Lion, at a depth of 16 met., in spite of the most frightful tempests, a dyke of 8000 metres, that is, a work of at least four times the extent of that required for the entrance of the Canal at Pelusium.

As for the harbour of Suez, the work there would be comparatively trifling because it is sheltered from all the winds, excepting that from the south-east, and ships keep the sea there very well, as is proved by the English Magazine corvette, moored there for two years, without sustaining any damage.

What is to be deduced from these observations?—That it is possible to make a canal 100 metres wide from Suez to Pelusium, with a draught of water of 8 met., below low water in the Mediterranean, with parapets, towing path, &c. and available for the passage of screw and paddle frigates, and vessels of 1000 to 1500 tons burthen, and that this canal, following the straight line between the two Seas is the only practicable one, as it will be one of the grandest and most useful works ever performed by man.

To conclude, this track is the only one that the prince who now rules in Egypt will allow. Well informed himself in nautical arts and sciences, the inheritor of the policy of Mehemet Ali, which he approves while he practises, he has declared in dictating his own terms for the firman of concession, that he would have the shortest and least expensive track, and one that would be available for the largest ships. It is not in the scheme of an inland canal that the real junction of the two Seas consists; the indirect canal cuts through Egypt, and not the Isthmus; its extent is not only tripled, but the cost of execution and maintenance are enormous, and the existence of a canal constructed upon these conditions would be always uncertain and precarious while the direct track, which unites so many advantages, has none of these drawbacks.

Hôte.