Expeditions against the German Colonies—The Imperial Reinforcements—The Admiralty at Full Strain—General situation in the Outer Seas—The Price of Concentration at Home—The Königsberg and the Emden in the Indian Ocean—The Convoy System—General situation in the Pacific—British dispositions—Japan Declares War on Germany—Overwhelming Forces of the Allies—Difficulty of their Task—Fox and Geese—Problem of Admiral von Spee—Limitations on his Action—Plight of Cruisers without Bases—Tell-tale Coal—The Admiralty Problem—The Capture of Samoa—The great Australasian Convoy—The Capture of New Guinea—Depredations of the Emden—Concentration against the Emden—Public Dissatisfaction on Admiralty Statement—Sailing of the Australasian Convoy to Colombo—The Canadians cross the Atlantic—First Imperial Concentration Complete.

On an August morning, behold the curious sight of a British Cabinet of respectable Liberal politicians sitting down deliberately and with malice aforethought to plan the seizure of the German colonies in every part of the world! A month before, with what horror and disgust would most of those present have averted their minds from such ideas! But our sea communications depended largely upon the prompt denial of these bases or refuges to the German cruisers; and further, with Belgium already largely overrun by the German armies, every one felt that we must lose no time in taking hostages for her eventual liberation. Accordingly, with maps and pencils, the whole world was surveyed, six separate expeditions were approved in principle and remitted to the Staffs for study and execution. An enterprising Captain had already on the outbreak of war invaded the German colony of Togoland. We now proposed, in conjunction with the French, to attack the Cameroons—a much more serious undertaking. General Botha had already declared his intention of invading German South-West Africa. The New Zealand and Australian Governments wished at once to seize Samoa and the German possessions in the Pacific. An Anglo-Indian expedition was authorised for the attack of German East Africa. The Staff work in preparation for the military side of this last expedition was by no means perfect, and resulted in a serious rebuff. The transportation of the expeditionary forces simultaneously in all these different directions while the seas were still scoured by the German cruisers threw another set of responsibilities upon the Admiralty.

From the middle of September onwards we began to be at our fullest strain. The great map of the world which covered one whole wall of the War Room now presented a remarkable appearance. As many as twenty separate enterprises and undertakings dependent entirely upon sea power were proceeding simultaneously in different parts of the globe.^[52] Apart from the expeditions set forth above, the enormous business of convoying from all parts of the Empire the troops needed for France, and of replacing them in some cases with Territorials from home, lay heavy upon us. It was soon to be augmented.

It had been easy to set on foot the organisation of the three Naval Brigades and other Divisional troops for the Royal Naval Division; but at a very early stage I found the creation of the artillery beyond any resources of which I could dispose. We could, and did, order a hundred field guns in the United States, but the training, mounting and equipping of the artillerymen could not and ought not to be undertaken apart from the main preparation of the Army. My military staff officer, Major Ollivant, at this stage had a very good idea which provoked immediately far-reaching consequences. He advised me to ask Lord Kitchener for a dozen British batteries from India to form the artillery of the Royal Naval Division, letting India have Territorial batteries in exchange. I put this to Lord Kitchener the same afternoon. He seemed tremendously struck by the idea. What would the Cabinet say? he asked. If the Government of India refused, could the Cabinet overrule them? Would they? Would I support him in the matter? And so on. I had to leave that night for the North to visit the Fleet, which was lying in Loch Ewe, on the west coast of Scotland. Forty-eight hours later, when I returned, I visited Lord Kitchener and asked him how matters were progressing. He beamed with delight. ‘Not only,’ he said, ‘am I going to take twelve batteries, but thirty-one; and not only am I going to take batteries, I am going to take battalions. I am going to take thirty-nine battalions: I am going to send them Territorial divisions instead—three Territorial divisions. You must get the transports ready at once.’ After we had gloated over this prospect of succouring our struggling front, I observed that I could now count on the twelve batteries for the Royal Naval Division. ‘Not one,’ he said. ‘I am going to take them all myself’; and he rubbed his hands together with every sign of glee. So the Naval Division was left again in the cold and had to go forward as infantry only.

This new development involved a heavy addition to our convoy work, and the situation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans must now be examined by the reader.

When war began the Germans had the following cruisers on foreign stations: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nürnberg, Leipzig (China); Königsberg (East Africa and Indian Ocean); Dresden, Karlsruhe (West Indies). All these ships were fast and modern, and every one of them did us serious injury before they were destroyed. There were also several gunboats: Geier, Planet, Komet, Nusa and Eber, none of which could be ignored. In addition, we expected that the Germans would try to send to sea upwards of forty fast armed merchantmen to prey on commerce. Our arrangements were, however, as has been narrated, successful in preventing all but five from leaving harbour. Of these five the largest, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, was sunk by the Highflyer (Captain Buller) on August 26: the Cap Trafalgar was sunk on September 14 by the British armed merchant cruiser Carmania (Captain Noel Grant) after a brilliant action between these two naked ships; and the three others took refuge and were interned in neutral harbours some months later. Our dispositions for preventing a cruiser and commerce-raider attack upon our trade were from the outset very largely successful, and in the few months with which this volume deals, every one of the enemy ships was reduced to complete inactivity, sunk or pinned in port.

Nevertheless, it is a fair criticism that we ought to have had more fast cruisers in foreign waters, and in particular that we ought to have matched every one of the German cruisers with a faster ship as it was our intention to do.^[53] The Karlsruhe in the West Indies gave a chance to our hunting vessels at the outbreak of war, and the Königsberg in the Indian Ocean was sighted a few days earlier. But our ships were not fast enough to bring the former to action or keep in close contact with the latter till war was declared. As will be seen, nearly every one of these German cruisers took its prey before being caught, not only of merchant ships but of ships of war. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the Monmouth and Good Hope, the Königsberg surprised and destroyed the Pegasus, and the Emden sank the Russian cruiser Zemchug and the French destroyer Mousquet. Certainly they did their duty well.

The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the outbreak of war was to be as strong as possible in home waters in order to fight a decisive battle with the whole German Navy. To this end the foreign stations were cut down to the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light cruisers and the whole of my administration had been occupied in building as many of them as possible. None, of the Arethusas had, however yet reached the Fleet. We therefore grudged every light cruiser removed from home waters, feeling that the Fleet would be tactically incomplete without its sea cavalry. The principle of first things first, and of concentrating in a decisive theatre against the enemy’s main power, had governed everything, and had led to delay in meeting an important and well-recognised subsidiary requirement. The inconvenience in other parts of the globe had to be faced. It was serious.

Nowhere did this inconvenience show itself more than in the Indian Ocean. After being sighted and making off on the 31st of July, the Königsberg became a serious preoccupation on all movements of troops and trade. Another fast German cruiser, the Emden, which on the outbreak of war was on the China station, also appeared in the middle of September in Indian waters, and being handled with enterprise and audacity began to inflict numerous and serious losses upon our mercantile marine. These events produced consequences.

By the end of August we had already collected the bulk of the 7th Division from all the fortresses and garrisons of the Empire. During September the two British Indian divisions with additional cavalry (in all nearly 50,000 men) were already crossing the Indian Ocean. On top of this came the plans for exchanging practically all the British infantry and artillery in India for Territorial batteries and battalions, and the formation of the 27th, 28th and 29th Divisions of regular troops. The New Zealand contingent must be escorted to Australia and there, with 25,000 Australians, await convoys to Europe. Meanwhile the leading troops of the Canadian Army, about 25,000 strong, had to be brought across the Atlantic. All this was of course additional to the main situation in the North Sea and to the continued flow of drafts, reinforcements and supplies across the Channel. Meanwhile the enemy’s Fleet remained intact, waiting, as we might think, its moment to strike; and his cruisers continued to prey upon the seas. To strengthen our cruiser forces we had already armed and commissioned twenty-four liners as auxiliary cruisers, and had armed defensively fifty-four merchantmen. Another forty suitable vessels were in preparation. In order to lighten the strain in the Indian Ocean and to liberate our light cruisers for their proper work of hunting down the enemy, I proposed the employment of our old battleships (Canopus class) as escorts to convoys.

Besides employing these old battleships on convoy, we had also at the end of August sent three others abroad as rallying points for our cruisers in case a German heavy cruiser should break out: thus the Glory was sent to Halifax, the Albion to Gibraltar and the Canopus to the Cape de Verde station. Naval history afforded numerous good examples of the use of a protective battleship to give security and defensive superiority to a cruiser force—to serve, in fact, as a floating fortress round which the faster vessels could manœuvre, and on which they could fall back. These battleships also gave protection to the colliers and supply ships at the various oceanic bases, without which all our cruiser system would have broken down. The reader will see the system further applied as the war advances.

At the beginning of September I decided that the whole convoy system in the Indian Ocean must be put on a regular basis.

There is no use in our sending escorts which are weaker than the enemy’s ship from which attack is to be apprehended. Armed merchant cruisers can in no case be counted on except as an additional reinforcement. Single troopships may be escorted by one war vessel, if that vessel is stronger than the Königsberg. No convoys of transports are to go across the Indian Ocean or Red Sea unless escorted by at least two war vessels, one of which must be stronger than the Königsberg. In large convoys of over six vessels a third, and in very large convoys a fourth, warship should be added. Military needs must give way to the limitations of escort. Six ships, including the Fox, are available; and it ought to be possible to organise fortnightly if not 12–day convoys from Bombay.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, should be directed to submit, by telegraph, a scheme for such convoys. All transports which may want convoy must be held over till the next is ready.

In order to accelerate the despatch of the third Division from India to France, and the seven battalions to German East Africa, it is proposed that the transports now conveying the Territorial Division to Egypt shall go on to Bombay. It has also been decided to exchange thirty-one batteries of [British] Indian regular artillery for service in Europe with an equal number of Territorial batteries which are to embark shortly from home. The ships carrying the Territorial batteries will also go on to Bombay and be available as additional transport.

Please concert these measures with the War Office. It is most important that these double convoys each way should hit off our fortnightly escorts which are the governing consideration.

Pray let me have a scheme showing how all this movement can be fitted in with the greatest speed and smoothness.

In addition to the 2 Divisions now coming from India and the expedition for German East Africa, we must expect the following:—

(a) A third Indian Division.

(b) 31 batteries of field artillery from India, to be exchanged for an equal amount of Territorial artillery from home.

(c) 39 battalions of British infantry from India, to be exchanged for an equal number of Territorial battalions from home.

(d) As many more Indian troops as India in these circumstances finds it convenient to despatch.

(e) Reinforcements to make good wastage of Indian troops in the field.

These later movements are not all finally settled and approved, but it is certain that from now till Christmas we shall require to maintain regular fortnightly convoys. We cannot delay till then the work of hunting down Königsberg and Emden by our own fast cruisers, nor can we keep these vessels employed indefinitely on duties for which they are unsuited. It is necessary that 3 old battleships, including Ocean from Gibraltar, should proceed at once to the East Indies Station to relieve, as they arrive, first Dartmouth and Chatham, and next Black Prince. Minerva should go on to India with the transports she is now escorting to Egypt, and the East Indies convoy force should be as follows:—

Suez: 2 Majestics^[54] and Minerva.

Bombay: 1 Majestic, Swiftsure, and Fox.

These escorts should sail every fortnight to exchange transports at the rendezvous 500 miles east of Aden. Modern ships would be released for other duties as these came on the spot.

(2) In the Mediterranean the French should be asked to supply 4 old battleships and 2 old armoured cruisers for convoy duty between Marseilles and Port Said, and asked to arrange fortnightly sailings via Malta to fit in with the Indian convoy service. We will escort all transports from England to Malta at times which will enable the French convoys to take them up en route.

(3) The force at the Dardanelles must be raised to a strength sufficient to fight the Turco-German fleet. As soon, therefore, as the French escort becomes available, Indomitable should join Indefatigable. Defence should also be ordered there from Malta. Weymouth should come home. The four destroyers from the Canal should rejoin their flotilla at the Dardanelles.

(4) In view of the above, I agree that Fox should remain with the Indian convoy and that Dartmouth should take the three transports to Mombassa, afterwards hunting Königsberg.

(5) The whole of this should be co-ordinated and worked out into a regular time-table of sailings, to which the military must adhere, sending more or less transports, according to their convenience. It must be clearly understood that no intermediate sailings are possible.

The position in the Pacific was also complicated.

When I went to the Admiralty at the end of 1911, arrangements were made to form the China squadron of the Defence, the Minotaur, and an armoured cruiser of the County class. These two first-named ships were in themselves a very satisfactory disposition against the powerful German armoured cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were approximately equal to the Germans in modernity, size and speed, but of heavier metal, firing a broadside of 2,520 pounds as against 1,725 pounds of their rivals.

But as time passed and the pressure upon us grew more severe, we had in 1913 to bring one of these ships (Defence) back to the Mediterranean. In order to fill the gap with the least possible inroad upon our home strength, Prince Louis being First Sea Lord, we devised a frugal scheme by which the Triumph—one of the two battleships which had been built for and bought from Chili to prevent their falling into Russian hands at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War—was made to serve as a depot ship manned on mobilisation from the crews of the river gunboats on the Yangtse and the West River. Her sister (the Swiftsure) shortly afterwards became the flagship in the East Indies. These two ships had the good speed for battleships of their date of 20·1 knots. They carried four 10–inch and no less than fourteen 7·5–inch guns. They were not heavily armoured, and according to our ideas they were a compromise between the battleship and the armoured cruiser. Differing in conception at many points from the standard types of the Royal Navy, these vessels did not fit homogeneously into any of our battle squadrons, and were conveniently employed on special duties. Without the Triumph Admiral Jerram’s squadron (Minotaur and Hampshire with the light cruiser Yarmouth) would on the outbreak of war have had little or no margin, though the Minotaur was the strongest of all our armoured cruisers. But once the Triumph was mobilised, our superiority, except in speed, was overwhelming, and we could afford to see how greater matters went at home before deciding whether to reinforce the China station or not.

In the first hours of the crisis, my thoughts had turned to the China station. As early as the 28th July I proposed to the First Sea Lord the discreet mobilisation of the Triumph and the concentration of the China squadron upon her; and this was accordingly effected in good time. Five thousand miles to the southward was the Australian squadron, consisting of the battle-cruiser Australia, and the two excellent modern light cruisers Sydney and Melbourne. The Australia by herself could, of course, defeat the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, though by running different ways one of the pair could have escaped destruction. Our last look round the oceans before the fateful signal, left us therefore in no immediate anxiety about the Pacific.

On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers Montcalm and Dupleix and the Russian light cruisers Askold and Zemchug, in the Far East, were placed under British command, thus sensibly increasing our predominance. A few days later an event of the greatest importance occurred. The attitude of Japan towards Germany suddenly became one of fierce menace. No clause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty entitled us to invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became evident before the war had lasted a week that the Japanese nation had not forgotten the circumstances and influences under which they had been forced, at the end of the Chinese War, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in the Far East. On the 15th, Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding within seven days the unconditional surrender of the German naval base Tsing Tau [Kiaochau], couching this demand in the very phrases in which nineteen years before they had been summoned to leave Port Arthur at the instance of Germany. In reply the German Emperor commanded his servants to resist to the end; and here, as almost in every other place where Germans found themselves isolated in the face of overwhelming force, he was obeyed with constancy.

The advent of Japan into the war enabled us to use our China squadron to better advantage in other theatres. The Newcastle was ordered across the Pacific, where our two old sloops (the Algerine and Shearwater) were in jeopardy from the German light cruiser Leipzig. The Triumph was sent to participate with a small British contingent in the Japanese attack upon the fortress of Tsing Tau. General arrangements were made by the British and Japanese Admiralties whereby responsibility for the whole of the Northern Pacific, except the Canadian Coast, was assumed by Japan.

The table following sets forth the rival forces in the western Pacific at the outbreak of war. Even without the ships employed by Japan or the great Japanese reserves which lay behind them, the superior strength of the Allies was overwhelming. But the game the two sides had to play was by no means as unequal as it looked. It was indeed the old game of Fox and Geese. The two powerful German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with their two light cruisers, formed a modern squadron fast and formidable in character. Our battle-cruiser Australia could catch them and could fight them single-handed. The Minotaur and the Hampshire could just catch them and, as we held, could fight them with good prospects of success; but it would be a hard fought action. If the Triumph were added to Minotaur and Hampshire, there was no risk at all in the fight but almost insuperable difficulty in bringing the enemy to action. Among the light cruisers, the Yarmouth, Melbourne, Sydney and the Japanese Chikuma could both catch and kill Emden or Nürnberg. Of our older light cruisers Fox and Encounter could have fought Emden or Nürnberg with a chance of killing or at least of crippling them before being killed: but neither was fast enough to catch them. Our remaining cruisers could only be used in combination with stronger vessels. With our forces aided by two French and two Russian ships and by the Japanese to the extent which will be described, the Admiralty had to protect all the expeditions, convoys and trade in the Pacific. To wit—

The New Zealand convoy to Australia.

The Australian and New Zealand convoy from Australia to Europe.

The convoy of the British Far Eastern garrisons to Europe.

The convoy of Indian troops to relieve our Far Eastern garrisons.

The expedition to Samoa.

The expedition to New Guinea.

All these were in addition to the general trade, which continued uninterruptedly.

Admiral von Spee, the German Commander in the Pacific, had therefore no lack of objectives. He had only to hide and to strike. The vastness of the Pacific and its multitude of islands offered him their shelter, and, once he had vanished, who should say where he would reappear? On the other hand, there were considerable checks on his action and a limit, certain though indefinite, to the life of his squadron. With the blockade of Tsing Tau he was cut from his only base on that side of the world. He had no means of docking his ships or executing any serious repairs, whether necessitated by battle or steaming. The wear and tear on modern ships is considerable, and difficulties multiply with every month out of dock. To steam at full speed or at high speed for any length of time on any quest was to use up his life rapidly. He was a cut flower in a vase; fair to see, yet bound to die, and to die very soon if the water was not constantly renewed. Moreover, the process of getting coal was one of extraordinary difficulty and peril. The extensive organisation of the Admiralty kept the closest watch in every port on every ton of coal and every likely collier. The purchase of coal and the movement of a collier were tell-tale traces which might well lay the pursuers on his track. His own safety and his power to embarrass us alike depended upon the uncertainty of his movements. But this uncertainty might be betrayed at any moment by the movement of colliers or by the interception of wireless messages. Yet how could colliers be brought to the necessary rendezvous without wireless messages? There existed in the Pacific only five German wireless stations, Yap, Apia, Nauru, Rabaul, Angaur, all of which were destroyed by us within two months of the outbreak of war. After that there remained only the wireless on board the German ships, with which it was very dangerous to breathe a word into the ether. Such was the situation of Admiral von Spee.

The problem of the Admiralty was also delicate and complex. All our enterprises lay simultaneously under the shadow of a serious potential danger. You could make scare schemes which showed that von Spee might turn up with his whole squadron almost anywhere. On the other hand, we could not possibly be strong enough every day everywhere to meet him. We had, therefore, either to balance probabilities and run risks, or reduce our movements and affairs to very narrow limits. Absolute security meant something very like absolute paralysis; yet fierce would have been the outcry attendant either upon stagnation or disaster. We decided deliberately to carry on our affairs and to take the risk. After all, the oceans were as wide for us as for von Spee. The map of the world in the Admiralty War Room measured 20 feet by 30. Being a seaman’s map, its centre was filled by the greatest mass of water on the globe: the enormous areas of the Pacific filled upwards of 300 square feet. On this map the head of an ordinary veil-pin represented the full view to be obtained from the masts of a ship on a clear day. There was certainly plenty of room for ships to miss one another.

As has been stated, the British China squadron mobilised and concentrated at Hong-Kong, and the Australian Navy at Sydney. Admiral von Spee was at Ponape in the Caroline Islands when Great Britain declared war upon Germany. From Hong-Kong and Sydney to Ponape the distances were each about 2,750 miles. Although Japan had not yet entered the war, the German Admiral did not attempt to return to Kiaochau, as this might have involved immediate battle with the British China Squadron. He proceeded only as far as the Ladrone Islands (German), where the Emden from Kiaochau, escorting his supply ships, met him on August 12. He sent the Emden into the Indian Ocean to prey on commerce and turned himself eastward towards the Marshall Islands. On August 22 he detached the Nürnberg to Honolulu to obtain information and send messages, to cut the cable between Canada and New Zealand, and to rejoin him at Christmas Island on September 8. Here he was in the very centre of the Pacific.

The Admiralty knew nothing of these movements beyond a report that he was coaling at the Caroline Islands on August 9. Thereafter he vanished completely from our view. We could know nothing for certain. The theory of the Admiralty Staff, however, endorsed by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who was making a special and profound study of this theatre, was that he would go to the Marshall Islands and thereafter would most probably work across to the west coast of South America, or double the Horn on his way back to Europe. This theory, and the intricate reasoning by which it was supported, proved to be correct. In the main, though we could by no means trust ourselves to it and always expected unpleasant surprises, it was our dominant hypothesis. It is on this basis that the operations in the Pacific should be studied.

As early as August 2 the New Zealand Government—ever in the van of the Empire—had convinced themselves that war was inevitable, and had already made proposals for raising forces and striking at the enemy. The Operations Division of the War Staff proposed in consequence the capture of Samoa and the destruction of the wireless station there; and this was recommended to me by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff as a feasible operation. By August 8 New Zealand telegraphed that if a naval escort could be furnished the expedition to attack Samoa could start on August 11. The staff concurred in this, holding that the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were adequately covered by the Australian squadron. I assented the same day. It was arranged that the expedition should meet the battle-cruiser Australia and the French cruiser Montcalm at or on the way to Noumea.

Another expedition from Australia to attack German New Guinea had also been organised by the Government of the Commonwealth. The uncertainty about the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau invested all movements in those waters with a certain hazardous delicacy. It was thought, however, that the light cruisers Melbourne^[57] and Sydney could convoy the Commonwealth New Guinea expedition northward, keeping inside the Barrier Reef, and that before they came out into open waters the New Guinea convoy could be joined by Australia and Montcalm, who would by then have completed the escort of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa. We thought it above all things important that these expeditions, once they had landed and taken possession of the German colonies, should be self-sufficing, and that no weak warships should be left in the harbours to support them. Any such vessels, apart from the difficulty of sparing them, would be an easy prey for the two large German cruisers.

Samoa was occupied on the 30th August. The wireless station at Nauru was destroyed on the 10th September. The Australian contingent was picked up by the battle-cruiser Australia on September 9 and arrived at Rabaul safely two days later.

We had now to provide for the Australian convoy to Europe which was due to leave Sydney on September 27 for Port Adelaide, where they would be joined by the New Zealand contingent and its own escort as well as by the ‘Australian Fleet’ (Australia, Sydney and Melbourne) as soon as they were free from the New Guinea expedition. Our original proposal for the escort of the Australian Army was, therefore, Australia, Sydney and Melbourne, with the small cruisers from New Zealand. To cover the Commonwealth during the absence of all her Fleet, it was arranged that the Minotaur, together with the Japanese Ibuki and Chikuma, should come south to New Britain Islands.

In the middle of September the New Zealand contingent was due to sail for Adelaide. The Australia and her consorts were still delayed in New Guinea, where some delay was caused by the German resistance. Great anxiety was felt in New Zealand at the prospect of throwing their contingent across to Australia with no better escort than the two P class cruisers. They pointed out the dangers from the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which on September 14 had been reported off Samoa. The Admiralty view was that it was most improbable the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could know of the contemplated New Zealand expedition, still less of the date of its sailing; that in order to deliver an attack in New Zealand waters they would have to steam far from their coaling bases north of the Equator, and would indeed have to be accompanied by their colliers, greatly reducing their speed and hampering their movements. In these circumstances the Admiralty foresaw but little danger to the New Zealand convoy in the first part of their voyage, were unable to provide further protection for this stage, and expressed the opinion that the risk should be accepted. To this decision the New Zealand Government bowed on September 21, and it was settled that the New Zealand convoy should sail on the 25th. Meanwhile, however, renewed exploits by the Emden in the Bay of Bengal created a natural feeling of alarm in the mind of the New Zealand and Australian public; and without prejudice to our original view, we decided to make arrangements to remove these apprehensions.

On the 24th news arrived that the New Guinea expedition had successfully overcome all opposition, and we then determined on the following change of plans, viz. Minotaur and Ibuki to go to Wellington and escort the New Zealanders to Adelaide, while Australia and Montcalm, after convoying the auxiliaries and weak warships back from New Guinea to within the shelter of the Barrier Reef, should hunt for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the Marshall Islands, whither it seemed probable they were proceeding. This decision altered the composition of the escort of the Australian convoy, and their protection across the Pacific and Indian Oceans was to an important extent confided to a vessel which flew the war flag of Japan. This historic fact should be an additional bond of goodwill among the friendly and allied nations who dwell in the Pacific.

Meanwhile the depredations of the Emden in the Bay of Bengal continued. On the 22nd she appeared off Madras, bombarded the Burma Company’s oil tanks, and threw a few shells into the town before she was driven off by the batteries. This episode, following on the disturbance of the Calcutta-Colombo trade route and the numerous and almost daily sinkings of merchant ships in the Bay of Bengal, created widespread alarm, and on October 1 I sent the following minute to the First Sea Lord, proposing, inter alia, a concentration on a large scale in Indian waters against the Emden. This concentration would comprise Hampshire, Yarmouth, Sydney, Melbourne, Chikuma (Japan), Zemchug and Askold (Russian), Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel—a total of ten—and was capable of being fully effective in about a month.

Three transports, empty but fitted for carrying cavalry, are delayed in Calcutta through fear of Emden. This involves delaying transport of artillery and part of a cavalry division from Bombay. The Cabinet took a serious view, and pressed for special convoy. Have you any ship? I should be very sorry to interrupt the offensive operations against Emden for the sake of convoying three empty transports. I was inclined to recommend that the three should put to sea at night with lights out and steer wide of the track. It is 100 to 1 that they would get round safely, and a 1,000 to 1 that two out of the three would get round safely. Let me have your proposals at once. It is clear that the transports have got to go.^[58]

Now that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have been located in the Society Islands there is no need for Melbourne and Sydney to remain in Australasian waters. Sydney should immediately be ordered to join Hampshire, Yarmouth and Chikuma in the Emden hunt, and Melbourne should come there with the Australasian convoy. As soon as Zemchug and Askold have finished with their convoy, they should return and join Hampshire. This will give seven ships searching for Emden and avoid the necessity of moving one of the three Light Cruisers now hunting Königsberg. Numbers are everything, and the extirpation of these pests is a most important object.

What is the use of Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel in New Zealand waters after the convoy has started? There is nothing but the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to be considered, and they are sufficiently dealt with by—

(1)

Australia.

 

Montcalm.

(2)

First Japanese Squadron.

(3)

Second Japanese Squadron.

On the other hand, these three vessels, together with Pioneer, would be good for searching for Emden in company with the faster and more powerful ships. I propose, therefore, that they should accompany the Australian and New Zealand convoys home to Indian waters, and should then join up with the seven Cruisers which will then be under Hampshire in hunting Emden, making a total of ten vessels available a month from now. The necessary arrangements to enable them, in spite of their limited fuel capacity, to get to Colombo can easily be made. In the event of Emden being captured before this concentration is complete, all these vessels should be sent to assist in the hunt for Königsberg, or, conversely, if Königsberg is caught, the three Light Cruisers should turn over to the Emden. It is no use stirring about the oceans with two or three ships. When we have got Cruiser sweeps of 8 or 10 vessels ten or fifteen miles apart there will be some good prospect of utilising information as to the whereabouts of the Emden in such a way as to bring her to action. Such large and decisive measures are much the cheapest and most satisfactory in the end.