Sir,—As I have already said, I did not think it convenient to go into this matter, but since it is pressed I will state that the Canopus was sent from St. Vincent to join Admiral Cradock’s flag on September 4th, as soon as the possibility of the arrival of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on the West Coast of South America could be taken into account. On October 12th Admiral Cradock telegraphed to the Admiralty that the indications showed the possibility of Dresden, Leipzig, and Nürnberg joining Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; and that he had ordered Canopus to Falkland Islands, where he intended to concentrate and avoid division of forces; and on October 14th the Admiralty approved specifically by telegram Admiral Cradock’s proposed concentration of Good Hope, Monmouth, Canopus, Glasgow, and Otranto for combined operations. The squadron thus formed was amply strong enough to defeat the enemy if attacked by them. It was not fast enough to force an engagement; but in view of the uncertainty as to which part of the world the enemy’s squadron would appear in, it was not possible at that time to provide another strong fast ship at that particular point.

Admiral Cradock was an experienced and fearless officer, and we are of opinion that feeling that he could not bring the enemy immediately to action as long as he kept with the Canopus, he decided to attack them with his fast ships alone, in the belief that even if he himself were destroyed in the action, he would inflict damage upon them which in the circumstances would be irreparable, and lead to their certain subsequent destruction. This was not an unreasonable hope; and though the Admiralty have no responsibility for Admiral Cradock’s decision they consider that it was inspired by the highest devotion, and in harmony with the spirit and traditions of the British Navy.

We had now to meet the new situation. Our combinations, such as they were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral von Spee, now in temporary command of South American waters, possessed a wide choice of alternatives. He might turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the mystery tactics which had been so baffling to us. He might steam northward up the West Coast of South America and make for the Panama Canal. In this case he would run a chance of being brought to battle by the Anglo-Japanese Squadron which was moving southward. But of course he might not fall in with them, or, if he did, he could avoid battle owing to his superior speed. He might come round to the East Coast and interrupt the main trade route. If he did this he must be prepared to fight Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very even and hazardous combat. Admiral Stoddart had against the two armoured German ships three armoured ships, of which the Defence, a later and a better ship than either of the Germans, mounted four 9·2–inch and ten 7·5–inch guns, and was one of our most powerful armoured-cruiser class. Lastly, he might cross the Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way, and arrive unexpectedly on the South African coast. Here he would find the Union Government’s expedition against the German colony in full progress and his arrival would have been most unwelcome. General Botha and General Smuts, having suppressed the rebellion, were about to resume in a critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West Africa, and a stream of transports would soon be flowing with the expedition and its supplies from Cape Town to Luderitz Bay. Subsequently or alternatively to this intrusion, Admiral von Spee might steam up the African coast and strike at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cameroons, which was quite without means of defending itself against him.

All these unpleasant possibilities had to be faced by us. We had to prepare again at each of many points against a sudden blow; and, great as were our resources, the strain upon them became enormous. The first step was to restore the situation in South American waters. This would certainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of the Staff, written an hour after I had read the first news of the disaster, will show the possibilities which existed. It will be seen that in this grave need my mind immediately turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet which, joined with the Defence, Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent, would give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority.

1. How far is it, and how long would it take Dartmouth and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas, Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if they started this afternoon with all dispatch?

2. How long would it take—

(a) Kent to reach Rio and Abrolhos?

(b) Australia (1) without, and (2) with Montcalm to reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also Idzumo and Newcastle to reach them?

(c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace Australia at Fiji?

(d) Defence, Carnarvon and Cornwall respectively to reach Punta Arenas?

(e) Invincible to reach Abrolhos, Rio, Punta Arenas?

(f) Hizen and Asama to reach Galapagos or Esquimalt?^[85]

But I found Lord Fisher in a bolder mood. He would take two battle-cruisers from the Grand Fleet for the South American station. More than that, and much more questionable, he would take a third—the Princess Royal—for Halifax and later for the West Indies in case von Spee came through the Panama Canal. There never was any doubt what ought to be sent. The question was what could be spared. We measured up our strength in home waters anxiously, observing that the Tiger was about to join the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron, that the new battleships Benbow, Empress of India and Queen Elizabeth were practically ready. We sent forthwith the following order to the Commander-in-Chief:—

Order Invincible and Inflexible to fill up with coal at once and proceed to Berehaven with all dispatch. They are urgently needed for foreign service. Admiral and Flag-Captain Invincible to transfer to New Zealand. Captain New Zealand to Invincible. Tiger has been ordered to join you with all dispatch. Give her necessary orders.

I also telegraphed personally to Sir John Jellicoe as follows:—

From all reports received through German sources, we fear Cradock has been caught or has engaged with only Monmouth and Good Hope armoured ships against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Probably both British vessels sunk. Position of Canopus critical and fate of Glasgow and Otranto uncertain.

Proximity of concentrated German squadron of 5 good ships will threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London. Essential recover control.

First Sea Lord requires Invincible and Inflexible for this purpose.

Sturdee goes Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific.

Oliver, Chief of Staff. Bartolomé, Naval Secretary.

Apparently we had not at this stage decided finally to send the Princess Royal. Sir John Jellicoe rose to the occasion and parted with his two battle-cruisers without a word. They were ordered to steam by the West Coast to Devonport to fit themselves for their southern voyage. Our plans for the second clutch at von Spee were now conceived as follows^[86]:—

(1) Should he break across the Pacific; he would be dealt with by the very superior Japanese 1st Southern Squadron, based on Suva to cover Australia and New Zealand, and composed as follows:—Kurama (battleship), Tsukuba and Ikoma (battle-cruisers), Chikuma and Yahagi (light cruisers). At Suva also were the Montcalm and Encounter. Another strong Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on the Caroline Islands.

(2) To meet him, should he proceed up the West Coast of South America, an Anglo-Japanese Squadron, comprising Australia (from Fiji), Hizen, Idzumo, Newcastle, was to be formed off the North American Coast.

(3) Should he come round on to the East Coast, Defence, Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent were ordered to concentrate off Montevideo, together with Canopus, Glasgow and Bristol, and not seek action till joined by Invincible and Inflexible, thereafter sending the Defence to South Africa.

(4) Should he approach the Cape station, he would be awaited by Defence and also Minotaur (released from the Australian convoy, after we knew of von Spee’s arrival in South American waters), together with the old battleship Albion, and Weymouth, Dartmouth, Astræa and Hyacinth, light cruisers: the Union Expedition being postponed for 14 days.

(5) Should he come through the Panama Canal, he would meet the Princess Royal, as well as the Berwick and Lancaster, of the West Indian Squadron, and the French Conde.

(6) Cameroons were warned to be ready to take their shipping up the river beyond his reach.

(7) Should he endeavour to work homewards across the South Atlantic, he would come into the area of a new squadron under Admiral de Robeck to be formed near the Cape de Verde Islands, comprising the old battleship Vengeance, the strong armoured cruisers Warrior and Black Prince and the Donegal, Highflyer, and later Cumberland.

Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two of which were armoured, it was necessary to employ nearly thirty, including twenty-one armoured ships, the most part of superior metal, and this took no account of the powerful Japanese Squadrons, and of French ships or of armed merchant cruisers, the last-named effective for scouting.

I telegraphed to the Japanese Admiralty as follows:—

In consequence of unsuccessful action off Chili and definite location of German squadron, we have ordered concentration off Montevideo of Defence, Kent, Carnarvon and Cornwall. These will be joined with all dispatch by Invincible and Inflexible battle-cruisers from England, and Dartmouth light cruiser from East Africa, and remainder of defeated squadron from Chili. This assures the South Atlantic situation. We now desire assistance of Japan in making equally thorough arrangements on Pacific side. We propose for your consideration and friendly advice the following:—Newcastle and Idzumo to go south in company to San Clemente Island off San Diego, California, there to meet Hizen from Honolulu. Meanwhile Asama will be able to effect internment or destruction of Geier. We also propose to move Australia battle-cruiser from Fiji to Fanning Island. By the time these moves are complete, probably by November 17, we may know more of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau movements and a further concentration of Australia and Asama with Hizen, Idzumo and Newcastle will be possible either at San Clemente or further to the south, further movements depending on the enemy.

We should also like a Japanese squadron to advance to Fiji to take the place of the Australia and so guard Australia and New Zealand in case the Germans return.

With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it is now known that Emden is the only enemy ship at large. We therefore hope that the Japanese squadrons and vessels not involved in the eastward movement will draw westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies in order to block every exit and deny every place of shelter up to the 90th meridian of east longitude.

British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search of Emden the following light cruisers:—Weymouth, Gloucester, Yarmouth, Melbourne, Sydney, and the armoured cruiser Hampshire and Russian cruiser Askold. These ships will be ready by the middle of November. Thus by concerted action between the Allied fleets the Emden should be speedily run down.

Secret and Private.

‘Japanese Admiralty give their consent generally to strategical scheme proposed and beg to withdraw the proposal of November 6, put forward through Admiral Oguri to the British War Staff. Measures will be taken in vicinity of Sumatra and Dutch East Indies as asked. First Southern Squadron will be dispatched to Fiji, but Japanese Admiralty think that it may be necessary for them to extend their sphere of operations to the Marquesas Islands. With reference to the movements of the Hizen and Asama, Japanese Admiralty will carry out your wishes as far as possible, bearing in mind necessity of watching the Geier until her (? disposition) is settled, but the Hizen will be dispatched at once.

‘With reference to the Hizen, Asama and Idzumo, Japanese Admiralty request British Admiralty to make arrangements necessary for their supply of coal, etc.’

Meanwhile it had been necessary to provide, as far as possible, for the safety of the surviving ships of Admiral Cradock’s squadron and to move the reinforcing ships.

Urgent. Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all dispatch and communicate via Rio. It is intended you shall join Admiral Stoddart’s squadron.

In view of reported sinking of Good Hope and Monmouth by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off Coronel, November 1, armoured ships on S.E. Coast America must concentrate at once. Carnarvon, Cornwall should join Defence off Montevideo. Canopus, Glasgow, Otranto have been ordered if possible to join you there. Kent from Sierra Leone also has been ordered to join your flag via Abrolhos. Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely come on to the Rio trade route. Reinforcements will meet you shortly from England.

Acknowledge.

In view of reported sinking of Good Hope and Monmouth by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on 1st November you should make the best of your way to join Defence near Montevideo. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by superior force.

If attacked, however, Admiralty is confident ship will in all circumstances be fought to the last as imperative to damage enemy whatever may be consequences.

You should make the best of your way to join Defence near Montevideo. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by superior force.

German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers should be concealed in unfrequented harbours. Be ready to destroy supplies useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on enemy ships being sighted. Acknowledge.

In a few days we learned that her continuous fast steaming had led to boiler troubles in the Canopus, and we had to direct her to the Falklands.

You are to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor the ship so that the entrance is commanded by your guns. Extemporise mines outside entrance. Send down your topmasts and be prepared for bombardment from outside the harbour. Stimulate the Governor to organise all local forces and make determined defence. Arrange observation stations on shore, by which your fire on ships outside can be directed. Land guns or use boats’ torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before she reaches the Narrows. No objection to your grounding ship to obtain a good berth.

Should Glasgow be able to get sufficient start of enemy to avoid capture, send her on to the River Plate; if not, moor her inside Canopus.

Repair your defects and wait orders.^[87]

The strain upon British naval resources in the outer seas, apart from the main theatre of naval operations, was now at its maximum and may be partially appreciated from the following approximate enumerations:—

Combination against von Spee, 30 ships.

In search of the Emden and Königsberg, 8 ships.

General protection of trade by vessels other than the above, 40 ships.

Convoy duty in the Indian Ocean, 8 ships.

Blockade of the Turco-German fleet at the Dardanelles, 3 ships.

Defence of Egypt, 2 ships.

Miscellaneous minor tasks, 11 ships.

Total, 102 ships of all classes.

We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel of any sort or kind which could be made to play any useful part. But we were soon to have relief.

Already on October 30 news had reached us that the Königsberg had been discovered hiding in the Rufigi River in German East Africa, and it was instantly possible to mark her down with two ships of equal value and liberate the others. On November 9 far finer news arrived. The reader will remember for what purposes the Sydney and Melbourne had been attached to the great Australian convoy which was now crossing the Indian Ocean. On the 8th, the Sydney, cruising ahead of the convoy, took in a message from the wireless station at Cocos Island that a strange ship was entering the Bay. Thereafter, silence from Cocos Island. Thereupon the large cruiser Ibuki increased her speed, displayed the war flag of Japan and demanded permission from the British Officer in command of the convoy to pursue and attack the enemy. But the convoy could not divest itself of this powerful protection and the coveted task was accorded to the Sydney. At 9 o’clock she sighted the Emden and the first sea fight in the history of the Australian Navy began. It could have only one ending. In a hundred minutes the Emden was stranded, a flaming mass of twisted metal, and the whole of the Indian Ocean was absolutely safe and free.

In consideration of all the harm this ship had done us without offending against humanity or the laws of sea war as we conceived them, we telegraphed:—

‘Captain, officers and crew of Emden appear to be entitled to all the honours of war. Unless you know of any reason to the contrary, Captain and officers should be permitted to retain swords

These martial courtesies were, however, churlishly repaid.

The clearance of the Indian Ocean liberated all those vessels which had been searching for the Emden and the Königsberg. Nothing could now harm the Australian convoy. Most of its escort vanished. The Emden and the Königsberg were accounted for, and von Spee was on the other side of the globe. The Minotaur had already been ordered with all speed to the Cape. All the other vessels went through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, where their presence was very welcome in view of the impending Turkish invasion of Egypt.

Meanwhile the Invincible and Inflexible had reached Devonport. We had decided that Admiral Sturdee on vacating the position of chief of the staff should hoist his flag in the Invincible, should take command on the South American station, and should assume general control of all the operations against von Spee. We were in the highest impatience to get him and his ships away. Once vessels fall into dockyard hands, a hundred needs manifest themselves.

On November 9, when Lord Fisher was in my room, the following message was put on my table:—

The Admiral Superintendent, Devonport, reports that the earliest possible date for completion of Invincible and Inflexible is midnight 13th November.

I immediately expressed great discontent with the dockyard delays and asked, ‘Shall I give him a prog?’ or words to that effect. Fisher took up the telegram. As soon as he saw it he exclaimed, ‘Friday the 13th. What a day to choose!’ I then wrote and signed the following order, which as it was the direct cause of the battle of the Falklands may be reproduced in facsimile.^[88]

The ships sailed accordingly and in the nick of time. They coaled on November 26 at Abrolhos, where they joined and absorbed Admiral Stoddart’s squadron (Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow, Bristol and Orama) and despatched Defence to the Cape, and without ever coming in sight of land or using their wireless they reached Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, on the night of Dec. 7. Here they found the Canopus in the lagoon, prepared to defend herself and the colony in accordance with the Admiralty instructions. They immediately began to coal.

After his victory at Coronel, Admiral von Spee comported himself with the dignity of a brave gentleman. He put aside the fervent acclamations of the German colony of Valparaiso and spoke no word of triumph over the dead. He was under no delusion as to his own danger. He said of the flowers which were presented to him, ‘They will do for my funeral.’ Generally, his behaviour would lead us to suppose that the inability of the Germans to pick up any British survivors was not due to want of humanity; and this view has been accepted by the British navy.

After a few days at Valparaiso he and his ships vanished again into the blue. We do not know what were the reasons which led him to raid the Falkland Islands, nor what his further plans would have been in the event of success. Presumably he hoped to destroy this unfortified British coaling base and so make his own position in South American waters less precarious. At any rate, at noon on December 6 he set off to the eastward from the Straits of Magellan with his five ships; and about 8 o’clock on December 8 his leading ship (the Gneisenau) was in sight of the main harbour of the Falklands. A few minutes later a terrible apparition broke upon German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory, sharply visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. One glance was enough. They meant certain death.^[89] The day was beautifully fine and from the tops the horizon extended thirty or forty miles in every direction. There was no hope for victory. There was no chance of escape. A month before, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a similar experience.

At 5 o’clock that afternoon I was working in my room at the Admiralty when Admiral Oliver entered with the following telegram. It was from the Governor of the Falkland Islands and ran as follows:—

‘Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his ships and is now in action with Admiral Sturdee’s whole fleet, which was coaling.’

We had had so many unpleasant surprises that these last words sent a shiver up my spine. Had we been taken by surprise and, in spite of all our superiority, mauled, unready, at anchor? ‘Can it mean that?’ I said to the Chief of the Staff. ‘I hope not,’ was all he said. I could see that my suggestion, though I hardly meant it seriously, had disquieted him. Two hours later, however, the door opened again, and this time the countenance of the stern and sombre Oliver wore something which closely resembled a grin. ‘It’s all right, sir; they are all at the bottom.’ And with one exception so they were.

When the leading German ships were sighted far away on the distant horizon, Admiral Sturdee and his squadron were indeed coaling. From the intelligence he had received he had convinced himself that the Germans were at Valparaiso, and he intended to sail the next day in the hopes of doubling the Horn before the enemy could do so. More than two hours passed after the enemy first came in sight before he could raise steam and get under way. The first shots were fired by the 12–inch guns of the Canopus from her stationary position on the mudbanks of the inner harbour. The Gneisenau had continued to approach until she saw the fatal tripods, whereupon she immediately turned round and, followed by one of her light cruisers, made off at full speed to join her main body. In a few moments the whole of the German squadron was steaming off in a westerly direction with all possible speed. At 10 o’clock, the Kent, Carnarvon and Glasgow having already sailed, Admiral Sturdee came out of the harbour in the Invincible, followed by the Inflexible and Cornwall; while the light cruisers, one of whom (the Bristol) had her engines actually opened up, hurried on after as fast as possible.

The whole five ships of the German squadron were now visible, hull down on the horizon about fifteen miles away. The order was given for general chase, but later on, having the day before him, the Admiral regulated the speeds, the battle-cruisers maintaining only about 20 knots. This, however, was quite sufficient to overhaul the Germans, who after their long sojourn in the Pacific without docking were not able to steam more than 18 knots in company. Even so, the Leipzig began to lag behind, and shortly before 1 o’clock, the Inflexible opened fire upon her at 16,000 yards. Confronted with having his ships devoured one by one, von Spee took a decision which was certainly in accordance with the best traditions of the sea. Signalling to his light cruisers to make their escape to the South American coast, he turned with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to face his pursuers. The action which followed was on the British side uneventful. The German Admiral endeavoured more than once to close to ranges at which his powerful secondary armament of 5·9’s could play their part. The British held off just far enough to make this fire ineffective and pounded their enemy with their 12–inch guns. At this long range, however, it took a considerable time and much ammunition to achieve the destruction of the German cruisers. The Scharnhorst, with the Admiral and all hands, sank at 4.17 p.m., her last signal to her consort being to save herself. Gneisenau continued to fight against hopeless odds with the utmost fortitude until 6 o’clock when, being in a completely disabled condition, she opened her sea-cocks and vanished, with her flag still flying, beneath the icy waters of the ocean. The British ships rushing to the spot and lowering every available boat were able only to save 200 Germans, many of whom died the next day from the shock of the cold water. When both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had sunk, the Inflexible had only thirty and the Invincible only twenty-two rounds left for each of their 12–inch guns.

Meanwhile, the other British cruisers had each selected one of the flying German light vessels, and a series of chases ensued. The Kent (Captain Allen) overtook and sunk the Nürnberg by an effort of steaming which surpassed all previous records and even, it is stated, her designed speed. The Nürnberg refused to surrender, and as she foundered by the head, the victors could see a group of men on her uplifted stern waving to the last the German flag. The Leipzig was finished off by the Glasgow and the Cornwall. The Dresden alone for the time made good her escape. She was hunted down and destroyed three months later in the roadstead of Mas-a-Fuera.

Thus came to an end the German cruiser warfare in the outer seas. With the exception of the Karlsruhe, of which nothing had been heard for some time and which we now know was sunk by an internal explosion on November 4, and the Dresden soon to be hunted down, no German ships of war remained on any of the oceans of the world. It had taken four months from the beginning of the war to achieve this result. Its consequences were far-reaching, and affected simultaneously our position in every part of the globe. The strain was everywhere relaxed. All our enterprises, whether of war or commerce, proceeded in every theatre without the slightest hindrance. Within twenty-four hours orders were sent to a score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the first time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses of ships of certain classes, of trained men and of naval supplies of all kinds, and were in a position to use them to the best advantage. The public, though gratified by the annihilating character of the victory, was quite unconscious of its immense importance to the whole naval situation.