‘Now mark me well—it is provided in the essence of things, that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary.’

Britain and Turkey—My correspondence with Djavid, 1911—Effect of requisitioning the Turkish battleships—Nominal transfer of the Goeben and the Breslau to Turkey—General Situation in the Balkans—Bulgaria the dominant factor—Venizelos offers a Greek alliance—Reasons against acceptance—My letter to Mr. Noel Buxton—Menacing attitude of Turkey—Possibilities of a Greek military attack upon Gallipoli—Difficulties of Greek intervention—Search for an army—Withdrawal of the British Naval Mission in Constantinople—Letter to Sir Edward Grey of September 23—Alternative considerations—Secret Turco-German treaty of August 2—The Turco-German attack on Russia—Ultimatum to Turkey and declaration of war—The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts of November 3—Impending Turkish attack upon Egypt—Naval concentration in the Canal—Repulse of the Turkish attack—Arrival of the Australians in Egypt—The prelude to the Dardanelles—General Survey of the War—The Great Strain—The Sudden Relief—The End of the Beginning.

It is now necessary to describe the circumstances attending the entry of Turkey into the war. In Turkey, as in Greece and all the Balkan States except Serbia, there were two violently conflicting parties—pro-German and pro-Entente. The assiduous courting of Turkey by Germany and the condonation of her most atrocious actions had given the Germans great advantages at Constantinople. In addition the profound instinct of the Turk was to be on the opposite side to his historic and tremendous enemy Russia. Britain, on the other hand, took no trouble to counteract these formidable tendencies. Large sections of the British Press and public denounced the Turk, often with justice, in unmeasured terms, and no foreign policy based on special relations with Turkey could have stood for a day in a Liberal House of Commons. Notwithstanding all this, British influence in Turkey rested on foundations so deep and ancient, and the impression produced upon the Turkish mind by her obviously disinterested course of action was so strong, that at any rate up till the beginning of 1914 she would have welcomed a British alliance. This was the wish not only of the old Turks but of the young Turks. When in the summer of 1909 I had visited Constantinople, I made the acquaintance of the Young Turk leaders and passed several days in the company of Djavid, Talaat and Halil. I also met at the German Manœuvres of 1910 Enver Pasha, with whom I established amicable relations. All these men seemed animated by a sincere desire to help their country to reform and revive, and I could not help feeling much sympathy for them in their difficulties.

In 1911, when Turkey was attacked by Italy and her Tripoli Province seized, I received the following letter from Djavid Bey written on behalf of his friends on the then all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress:—

My belief in your sincere friendship for Turkey and the Young Turks leads me to speak of a very important matter to-day.

After the Constitution in Turkey those that believed in the beginning of a close friendship between England and Turkey saw with regret the misunderstanding that prevented it. I need not speak of its different causes here. Only the true friends of England in Turkey never ceased from trying to remove it. The actual circumstances appear to be a good occasion for success. The attack of one of the Triple Alliance Powers on our territory has turned the public opinion greatly against the Triplice. The pro-English statesmen in Turkey and pro-Turkish statesmen in England could profit of this occasion.

Knowing and believing you to occupy an important and influential position among our friends in England, I will beg you to join our efforts using your influence in bringing out this friendship. Has the time arrived for a permanent alliance between the two countries? On what basis could it be attempted? Will you please write me your personal views on the matter? They will be considered entirely personal and unofficial. But I will consider myself happy if we can prepare a possible ground for official purposes.

I commended this matter promptly to Sir Edward Grey, but the danger of estranging Italy—apart from political considerations—made it impossible for him to authorize me to say more than the following:—

It is a great pleasure to me to receive your letter, the importance of which I fully recognize. So far as the present lamentable struggle is concerned, we have definitely declared our neutrality; and it is not to be expected that we shall alter a policy so gravely decided. My answer therefore to your question must be that at the present time we cannot enter upon new political relations. In the future the enormous interests which unite the two great Mussulman Powers should keep us in touch. That is our wish; the feeling of British public opinion, as you will have seen from recent manifestations of it, opposes no barrier to that wish, if only the Turkish Government will not alienate it by reverting to the oppressive methods of the old regime or seeking to disturb the British status quo as it now exists; and you and your friends, whom I remember to have met with so much pleasure, should bear in mind that England, almost alone among European States, seeks no territorial expansion, and that alone among them she retains the supremacy of the sea. We earnestly desire to revive and maintain our old friendship with Turkey, which while we retain that supremacy should be a friendship of value.

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter, which was due to the importance of its nature.

In the years which followed the Young Turks looked towards Germany, and here they were very powerfully swayed by their military instincts and training. They rightly regarded Germany as the leading military Power: many of them had received their military education in Berlin, and they were spellbound by the splendour and authority of Prussian organisation. They saw the Russian giant ever growing to the east and to the north. And if England stood aloof, where else could Turkey find protection except through the German sword? I do not see what else we could have expected. Therefore, from the very beginning of the war I hoped for nothing from Turkey and apprehended much.

The first events of the war obviously added to the tension between the two countries. We had found it necessary, as has been described, to requisition the two Turkish battleships which were building in British yards. The money for these ships had been largely raised by public subscription in Turkey, and their sequestration angered not only the Turkish Government but large numbers of patriotic Turks throughout the country. Moreover, in the struggles which ensued in Constantinople and in the Turkish Cabinet between the Turkish war party and those who favoured neutrality, this episode seemed to have weight.

I did my best, with the approval of the Cabinet, to allay the legitimate heartburnings of the Turkish Ministry of Marine. These efforts were seconded by Admiral Limpus, the Head of the British Naval Mission to Turkey, whose relations with the Turks were extremely good and whose mission had won much esteem. But with the arrival at the Dardanelles of the Goeben and the Breslau, a new and formidable complication arose. These two ships, which had presented themselves at the entrance to the Straits about 5 o’clock on the afternoon of August 10, were received by the Turkish authorities. They were piloted through a passage in the minefield and proceeded to Constantinople. The British Government had a right to assume that they would be interned and disarmed. In view of the delicacy of the situation, however, it was thought prudent to accept a less drastic solution. The following minutes tell their own tale.—

In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale or transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be allowed, provided that the transference is bona fide and permanent. The essential condition to insist on is that all the German officers and men of the crews of both ships must, without exception, be at once repatriated to Germany under parole not to serve again during the war. We cannot agree to any exceptions being made, whether of officers or skilled ratings, or of the ordinary crew. The British Embassy, assisted if necessary by the English Naval Mission, should assure themselves that all the Germans leave at once, and that the ships are definitely handed over to the Turkish Navy. In these circumstances, the Admiralty would allow the [British] Naval Mission to remain, as requested by the Grand Vizier. The Turks could also be informed that after the war is over, we should be quite ready in principle, and as far as we can now foresee, to transfer one or both of the two ships we have requisitioned to their flag, and that we are quite ready to negotiate with them at the present time in regard to payment of the sums due to Turkey.

The situation about Goeben and Breslau is extremely unsatisfactory. Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the German complements down to the last man has not taken place; probably the whole of the German crews are still on board, and it is admitted that ‘experts are to be retained.’ Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has been banished from the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and forbidden to go on board the two ex-Germans. As long as the Goeben and Breslau remain in this condition, and until we know that the whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have to keep two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed elsewhere, waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles. This is a situation which cannot continue indefinitely.

The Turkish position could only be judged in relation to the general situation in the Balkans; and this could not be understood unless the dominant facts of pre-war Balkan history were continually borne in mind. The first Balkan war saw Bulgaria triumphantly bearing the brunt of the attack on Turkey. While her armies were advancing on Constantinople against the best troops of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks and Serbians were overrunning the comparatively weakly-held regions of Thrace and Macedonia. The Bulgarians, having fought the greatest battles and sustained by far the heaviest losses, found themselves finally checked before Constantinople, and, turning round, beheld almost the whole of the conquered territory in the hands of their Allies. The destination of this territory had been regulated before the war by treaty between the four belligerent minor States. Adrianople had not however surrendered, and in obedience to the treaty the Serbians came to the aid of the Bulgarian forces, and played a prominent part in the capture of that fortress. Both the Serbians and the Greeks utilised the argument that the war had been prolonged through the need of reducing Adrianople as a ground for claiming to repudiate in important particulars the pre-war treaty, and meanwhile they retained occupation of all the conquered districts in their possession. The Bulgarians were quick to repay this claim with violence. They attacked the Greeks and Serbians, were defeated by the more numerous armies of these two Powers, and in the moment of extreme weakness and defeat were invaded from the other side by Roumania, who, having taken no part in the conflict, had intact armies to strike with. At the same time the Turks advanced in Thrace, and led by Enver Pasha recaptured Adrianople. Thus the end of the second Balkan war saw Bulgaria stripped not only of almost all her share of the territory conquered from the Turks (and this entirely divided between Greece and Serbia), but even her native province of the Dobroudja had been wrested from her by Roumania. The terrible cruelties and atrocities which had been perpetrated on both sides in the internecine struggle that followed the expulsion of the Turks had left a river of blood between the Greeks and Serbians on the one hand and the Bulgarians on the other.

It is possible that no nation ever contemplated its fortunes with more profound and desperate resolve than the Bulgarians at this juncture. All their sacrifices had been useless and worse than useless. All the fruits of their conquests had gone to aggrandise their rivals. They had been, as they considered, stabbed in the back and blackmailed by Roumania, to whom they had given no provocation of any kind. They saw the great Powers, England in the van, forbid the return of the Turk to Adrianople without offering the slightest attempt to make their words good. They saw not only Salonika, but even Kavala, seized by the Greeks. They saw large districts inhabited largely by the Bulgarian race newly liberated from the Turks pass under the yoke—to them scarcely less odious—of Serbians and Greeks. It was in these circumstances that the Bulgarian army, in the words of King Ferdinand, ‘furled its standards’ and retired to wait for better days.

This warlike and powerful Bulgaria, with its scheming King and its valiant peasant armies brooding over what seemed to them intolerable wrongs, was the dominant factor in the Balkans in 1914 and 1915.

On August 19, 1914, Monsieur Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Greece, with the approval which he had, astonishing to relate, obtained, of King Constantine, formally placed at the disposal of the Entente powers all the naval and military resources of Greece from the moment when they might be required. He added that this offer was made in a special sense to Great Britain with whose interests those of Greece were indissolubly bound. The resources of Greece, he said, were small, but she could dispose of 250,000 troops, and her navy and her ports might be of some use. This magnanimous offer, made as it was while all was so uncertain, and even before the main battle in France had been joined, greatly attracted me. No doubt on the one hand it was a serious thing to run the risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On the other hand, the Greek Army and Navy were solid factors; and a combination of the Greek armies and fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of settling the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and effective manner. The Gallipoli Peninsula was then only weakly occupied by Turkish troops, and the Greek General Staff were known to be ready with well-thought-out plans for its seizure. Moreover, it seemed to me that anyhow Turkey was drifting into war with us. Her conduct in regard to the Goeben and Breslau continued openly fraudulent. The presence of these two vessels themselves in German hands in the Sea of Marmora offered a means of putting decisive pressure on the neutrality party in Constantinople. If we were not going to secure honest Turkish neutrality, then let us, in the alternative, get the Christian States of the Balkans on our side. Could we not get them on our side? Could we not make a Balkan confederation of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania? Whatever happened, we ought not to fall between two stools.

Sir Edward Grey, however, after very anxious consideration, moved the Cabinet to decline Monsieur Venizelos’ proposal, as he feared, no doubt with weighty reasons, that an alliance with Greece meant immediate war with Turkey and possibly Bulgaria. He feared that it might jeopardise Greece without our being able to protect her. He was anxious above all things not to foster a Greek enterprise against Constantinople in such a way as to give offence to Russia. And, lastly, he hoped that Sir Louis Mallet, who was in close and intimate relations with the Grand Vizier and the leaders of the Turkish neutrality party in Constantinople, would after all be able to keep the peace. Certainly nothing could exceed the skill and perseverance with which the British Ambassador laboured. It followed from this that we should maintain the very handsome offer we had made in common with France and Russia at the outbreak of the war to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire in return for her faithful neutrality. I naturally conformed to the Cabinet decision, but with increasing misgivings. I still continued to work and hope for a Balkan confederation. I gave the following letter, of which the Foreign Secretary approved, to Mr. Noel Buxton, who was starting for a propaganda tour in the Balkans. Of course in view of our decision about Turkey, it could refer only to the common interests of these States against Austria.

It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of the Balkan States that they should act together. This is the hour when the metal can be cast into the mould. It is only by reclaiming from Austria territories which belong naturally to the Balkan races that the means can be provided to satisfy the legitimate needs and aspirations of all the Balkan States. Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way by which any Balkan State can expand except by internecine war. But the application of the principle of nationality to the Southern Provinces of Austria will produce results so advantageous to the Balkan States that the memory and the consequences of former quarrels could be assuaged for ever.

The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong enough to play an effective part in the destinies of Europe, must be the common dream of all their peoples. The result of this war is not doubtful. Sooner or later, Germany will be starved and beaten. Austria will be resolved into its component parts. England has always won in the end; and Russia is unconquerable. England has been the friend of every Christian State in the Balkans during all their years of struggle and suffering. She has no interests of her own to seek in the Balkan Peninsula. But with her wealth and power she will promote and aid every step which is taken to build up a strong union of the Christian peoples, like that which triumphed in the first Balkan War. By acting together in unity and good faith the Balkan States can now play a decisive part, and gain advantages which may never again be offered. By disunion they will simply condemn themselves to tear each other’s throats without profit or reward, and left to themselves will play an utterly futile part in the destinies of the world.

I want you to make your friends in Greece and in Bulgaria realise the brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now presents itself, and to assure them that England’s might and perseverance will not be withheld from any righteous effort to secure the strength and union of the Balkan peoples.

In the early days of September it seemed highly probable that Turkey, under the influence of the German advance on Paris, would make war upon us and upon Greece whatever we did. I began immediately to prepare for the event.

I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers from Admiralty should meet two officers from the Director of Military Operations Department of the War Office to-day to examine and work out a plan for the seizure by means of a Greek army of adequate strength of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea of Marmora.

In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary directions, as the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war on us at any moment.

The meeting can take place either here or at the War Office as soon as you can arrange with our Chief of Staff. I will myself explain verbally to the Committee the subject on which his Majesty’s Government desire information.

The Director of Military Operations, General Callwell, replied on the 3rd, on behalf of the General Staff, that the operation of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula would be an extremely difficult one. Sixty thousand men would be required, thirty thousand of whom should be landed in the first instance, should gain as much ground as possible, should prepare landing stages, and hold their own for a week while the transports returned to Greece for the second thirty thousand. On this basis the operation was considered feasible. These estimates were not excessive, and the Greeks could certainly provide a considerably larger force if necessary.

Thereupon I telegraphed, with the approval of the Foreign Office, to Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of our naval mission to Greece, as follows:—

In event of war with Turkey, with England and Greece as Allies, Admiralty consider it essential, as a Staff precaution, that the question of the right war policy to be followed should be examined, in consultation with Greek General and Naval Staff, leaving political probabilities to be decided by respective Governments.

Admiralty give you permission to do this, should you be approached by the Greek Government. In principle, the Admiralty views are as follows:

In order to provide unquestionable and decisive superiority over the German and Turkish vessels, the Greek Fleet would be offered, as reinforcements, a squadron and flotilla, and the whole of the combined Fleets would be placed under your command, with the Indomitable as your Flagship. Should circumstances demand it, you would be reinforced with any class of vessel necessary and to any extent.

In order that the right and obvious method of attack upon Turkey (viz. by striking immediately at the heart) may be carried out, the Greek Army would, under superiority of sea predominance, have to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula, thus opening the Dardanelles and enabling the Anglo-Greek Fleet, in the Sea of Marmora, to fight and sink the Turco-German ships, and from there the whole situation can be dominated, in combination with the Black Sea Fleet of the Russians and their military forces.

The Admiralty desire that, in consultation with you, the Greek Naval and Military Experts should immediately examine this enterprise, and that you should report fully by telegraph to the Admiralty what are the general views of the Greek Government upon it, and what, in their opinion, would be the force required to carry it out, assuming that safe transportation is assured. Should we provide the necessary transports, or in what time and to what extent could Greece do so? Have they any alternative suggestions?

The Rear-Admiral’s reply reached me through the Foreign Office on the 9th.

The Greek General Staff have been consulted on the subject of your telegram, and I agree with them in their opinion that, if Bulgaria does not attack Greece, the latter can take Gallipoli with force at their disposal. Greece will not trust Bulgaria unless she at the same time attacks Turkey with all her force. They will not accept Bulgaria’s guarantee to remain neutral.

Subject to above conditions, plan for taking Dardanelles Straits is ready.

Greece can provide necessary transports for troops. A British squadron of two battle cruisers, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers and flotilla of destroyers will be needed to assist. General Staff and myself originally formulated this plan, but operation has become greater since Turkey has mobilised and obtained German ships.

He mentioned as an alternative the region of Alexandretta.

On September 6 Monsieur Venizelos told our Minister in Athens that he was not afraid of a single-handed attack from Turkey by land as the Greek General Staff were confident of being able to deal with it. The Greek Government had received from Sofia positive assurances of definite neutrality, but did not trust them. They would, however, be satisfied with a formal protest by the Bulgarian Government against a violation of Bulgarian territory by Turkish troops proceeding to attack Greece. If, however, Bulgaria joined Turkey while Serbia was occupied with Austria, the situation would be critical. On this I pointed out to the Foreign Secretary on the same date that a Russian Army Corps could easily be brought from Archangel, from Vladivostok, or with Japanese consent from Port Arthur to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula. ‘The price to be paid in taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy, but there would be no more war with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 men and sea power—that is the end of the Turkish menace.’

But it was easier to look for armies than to find them. Sir Edward Grey replied by sending me a telegram that had been received that very morning from Petrograd stating that in view of the very large number of German troops which were being transferred from the Western to the Eastern theatre, Russia was calling up every available man from Asia and the Caucasus, and was only leaving one Army Corps in the latter. Greece would therefore, according to the Petrograd telegram, have to bear the brunt of the war single-handed unless she could placate Bulgaria by territorial concessions. He added on the back of my note, ‘You will see from the telegram from St. Petersburg that Russia can give no help against Turkey. I do not like the prospect in the Mediterranean at all, unless there is some turn of the tide in France.’

It is only by faithful study of this problem that its immense difficulties are portrayed. Lest it should be thought that I underrated the gravity of a war with Turkey, it must be remembered that I had convinced myself that Turkey would attack us sooner or later, and that I was also proceeding on the belief that the German invasion of France would be brought to a standstill. Both these assumptions proved true. I do not claim that my view was the wisest, but only to expose it to historical judgment. The policy emerging from such a view would of course at this juncture have offered Cyprus to Greece in compensation for her offering Kavala to Bulgaria. It would have put the most extreme pressure on Serbia to make concessions to Bulgaria in Monastir. Whether these measures would have succeeded at this time I do not pronounce.

By September 9 the behaviour of the Turks about the Goeben and the Breslau had become so openly defiant that it became necessary to withdraw the British Naval Mission, who were exposed to daily insolences at the hands of the Germans and of the Turkish war party. It was my intention to appoint the head of the mission, Rear-Admiral Limpus, to command the squadron watching the Dardanelles, and orders were sent definitely to that effect. This project was not, however, pursued, it being thought that it would be unduly provocative to employ on this station the very officer who had just ceased to be the teacher of the Turkish Fleet. No doubt this was a weighty argument, but in bowing to it we lost the advantages of having at this fateful spot the Admiral who of all others knew the Turks, and knew the Dardanelles with all its possibilities. It was a small link in a long chain. Delay was caused and I had to make fresh arrangements.

On September 21, I telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Carden, who was in charge of the Malta Dockyard:—

Assume command of the squadron off Dardanelles. Your sole duty is to sink Goeben and Breslau, no matter what flag they fly, if they come out of Dardanelles. We are not at war with Turkey but the German Admiral Souchon is now Commander-in-Chief Turkish Navy and Germans are controlling and largely manning it. Turks have been told that any Turkish ships which come out with Goeben and Breslau will be equally attacked by us. You are authorised to act accordingly without further declaration or parley. You must deal at your discretion with any minor Turkish war vessel which may come out alone from Dardanelles, either ordering her back or allowing her to proceed as you may think fit, remembering that we do not want to pick a quarrel with Turkey unless her hostile intention is clear.

Indomitable will be diverted from convoy off Crete and ordered to join your squadron. French Commander-in-Chief has been requested to send 2 battle ships of Patrie class to reinforce your flag.

The victory of the Marne, although afterwards discounted by adverse events, checked the developments in the Near East. Turkey was steadied for the moment, and her attitude towards Greece became less menacing. This however produced a corresponding cooling at Athens about joining in the European war. From the middle of September the conditions throughout the Balkans had declined again from crisis into suspense. They remained however fundamentally vicious.

I continued increasingly to press as opportunity served for a policy of uniting the Balkan States without reference to what might happen in Turkey.

On September 23 I wrote to Sir Edward Grey as follows:—

I must write you a line about Turkey.... We are suffering very seriously from Turkish hostility. Our whole Mediterranean Fleet is tied to the Dardanelles. We are daily trying to buy Turkish neutrality by promises and concessions. Meanwhile the German grip on Turkey tightens, and all preparations for war go steadily forward. But all this would in itself be of minor consequence but for the fact that in our attempt to placate Turkey we are crippling our policy in the Balkans. I am not suggesting that we should take aggressive action against Turkey or declare war on her ourselves, but we ought from now to make our arrangements with the Balkan States, particularly Bulgaria, without regard to the interests or integrity of Turkey. The Bulgarians ought to regain the Turkish territory they lost in the second Balkan War, and we ought to tell them that if they join with Roumania, Greece, and Serbia in the attack upon Austria and Germany, the Allied Powers will see that they get this territory at the peace. We always said that Adrianople should never fall back into Turkish hands, and the strongest possible remonstrances were addressed to the Porte by you at the time. There is therefore nothing wrong or inconsistent in our adopting this position. If we win the war, we shall be quite strong enough to secure this territory for Bulgaria, and Turkey’s conduct to us with repeated breaches of neutrality would release us from any need of considering her European interests. Like you, I sympathise deeply with Mallet in the futile and thankless task on which he is engaged. I do not know what the result will be, but I am sure it is not worth while sacrificing the bold and decisive alternative of throwing in our lot frankly with the Christian States of the Balkans to get the kind of neutrality which the Turks have been giving us, and for which we are even asked to pay and be grateful. The whole tone of the telegrams from Roumania and Bulgaria is hopeful. I do most earnestly beg you not to be diverted from the highway of sound policy in this part of the world, both during the war and at the settlement, by wanderings into the labyrinth of Turkish duplicity and intrigue. All I am asking is that the interests and integrity of Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.

Judged in afterlight these views can hardly be contested. I have never swerved from them; but the reader should understand the other arguments by which the Cabinet was ruled. The loyal desire not to spread the war to regions still uncursed; the dangers in India of a British quarrel with Turkey; our awful military weakness in 1914; Lord Kitchener’s expressed wish to keep the East as quiet as possible till the two Indian Divisions were safely through the Suez Canal; the difficulties of winning the support of Greece, and particularly of King Constantine, without exciting the suspicion and jealousies of Russia about Constantinople; and, lastly, the doubts—admittedly substantial—whether Bulgaria and King Ferdinand could ever, in the absence of substantial military successes in the main theatres or strong local intervention by Allied forces in the Balkans, be detached from the Teutonic system.

When I talked these questions over at the time with Sir Edward Grey it was upon this last argument that he was most inclined to dwell. ‘Until Bulgaria believes that Germany is not going to win the war, she will not be moved by any promises of other people’s territory which we may make her.’ The swift overrunning of Northern France by the German armies, the withdrawal of the French Government to Bordeaux, the fall of Antwerp, the tremendous victories of Hindenburg over the Russians, were events all of which dominated the Bulgarian equally with the Turkish mind. England, without an army, with not a soldier to spare, without even a rifle to send, with only her Navy and her money, counted for little in the Near East. Russian claims to Constantinople directly crossed the ambitions both of King Ferdinand and of King Constantine. In all the Balkans only one clairvoyant eye, only the genius of Venizelos, discerned the fundamental moral issues of the struggle, measured justly the relative powers of the mighty combatants, and appraised at their true value both the victories of the German Army, and the Sea Power under which were slowly gathering the latent but inexhaustible resources of the British Empire.

So the Allies continued to wait and hope at Constantinople, and the days slipped swiftly by.

Not till long after did we learn the blasting secret which would have destroyed all British and Russian doubts. Already in the crisis of July the leaders of the Young Turk party had been in vital negotiation with the Germans, and on August 2 an alliance had been signed between Germany and Turkey. Thus all this time we were deceived. Whether anything that it was in our power to do could have averted the evils must always remain a disputed question; but that the evils were not averted is certain. In the end we had all the evils of both courses and the advantages of no course. We were forced into a war with Turkey which ultimately became of enormous magnitude. Greece was thrown into inextricable confusion. Serbia was overrun. Bulgaria, joining hands with her recent enemies the Turks, became our foe. And Roumania, when she finally came in isolated upon the allied side, suffered the direst vengeance at German hands. A more fearful series of tragedies has scarcely ever darkened the melancholy page of history.

It must not be thought that the action of Turkey was inspired solely by treachery and duplicity. Two parties were struggling for mastery in the capital, but in view of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on August 2, there could have been no doubt about the final outcome. Moreover, in the Goeben and Breslau, to say nothing of the Turkish Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force the Turkish Government to adhere to the covenants which they had entered into on her behalf. By the middle of October we learnt that Turkish preparations to invade Egypt were actually being made. We learned also from a secret source, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had received solemn assurances from Enver that Turkey would enter the war against the Entente at an early date. At the end of October, our outposts beyond the Suez Canal had to be withdrawn in face of gathering Turkish forces; and finally, about October 27, the Breslau, with the Turkish cruiser Hamidieh and a division of destroyers, followed by the Goeben, steamed into the Black Sea, and on the 29th and 30th bombarded the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, sank a Russian transport, raided the harbour of Odessa, torpedoed a gunboat, and, lastly, practically destroyed Novorossisk, its oil tanks and all the shipping in the port.

On this the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople immediately demanded his passports; and the British Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m. on October 30, after reciting its many griefs against the Turks, especially their invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and their misconduct about the Goeben, sent an ultimatum requiring repudiation of these acts and the dismissal of the German Military and Naval Missions within 12 hours. The Admiralty conformed to this decision by telegraphing to all Admirals concerned as follows:—

Orders sent Ambassador Constantinople 8.15 p.m. 30th October to present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of 12 hours. Do not yourself commence hostilities without further orders.

Add to Vice-Admiral Carden (Indefatigable).

You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very shortly.

Russia declared war on Turkey at the expiry of the ultimatum; and the British and French Ambassadors, in company with their Russian colleague, left Constantinople on November 1—the same day on which at the other end of the world the battle of Coronel was being fought. Naval orders to commence hostilities were sent, in concert with the Foreign Office, in conformity with the expiry of the ultimatum.

‘Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowledge.’

On November 1 two of our destroyers, entering the Gulf of Smyrna, destroyed a large armed Turkish yacht which was lying by the jetty carrying mines; and late that same day Admiral Carden was instructed to bombard the outer Dardanelles forts at long range on the earliest suitable occasion. This bombardment was carried out on the morning of November 3. The two British battle-cruisers, firing from a range beyond that of the Turkish guns, shelled the batteries on the European side at Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles. The French battleships fired at the Asiatic batteries at Kum Kali and Orkanieh. About eighty rounds were fired altogether, resulting in considerable damage to the Turkish forts, and in several hundred casualties to the Turks and Germans who manned them.

The reasons for this demonstration have been greatly canvassed. They were simple though not important. A British squadron had for months been waiting outside the Dardanelles. War had been declared with Turkey. It was natural that fire should be opened upon the enemy as it would be on the fronts of hostile armies. It was necessary to know accurately the effective ranges of the Turkish guns and the conditions under which the entrance to the blockaded port could be approached. It has been stated that this bombardment was an imprudent act, as it was bound to put the Turks on their guard and lead them to strengthen their defences at the Dardanelles. At the Admiralty we did not think it would have this effect: nor were we wrong. When, three and a half months later (February 19, 1915), Admiral Carden again bombarded these same forts, the Gallipoli Peninsula was totally unprepared for defence, and was still weakly occupied; and small parties of Marines were able to make their way unopposed into the shattered forts and a considerable distance beyond them. That no harm was done can therefore be plainly proved. On the other hand, valuable data were obtained.

We had now to provide against the impending Turkish attack upon Egypt. The First Cruiser Squadron, comprising the Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh and Warrior, had been either employed on escort duties at sea or on guard at Alexandria or Port Said. Even before the news of Coronel had reached us, the increasing strain upon our resources had made it necessary to replace these fine ships by older smaller vessels. They were now urgently required to form a combat squadron near the Cap de Verde Islands as part of the second general combination against von Spee. They were also promised to the Commander-in-Chief for the Grand Fleet at the earliest possible moment thereafter. We should have been hard pressed in these circumstances to find a new and satisfactory naval force for the defence of the Canal against the now imminent Turkish attack. The discovery and blocking in of the Königsberg on 31st October liberated two out of the three vessels searching for her. But this was not enough. The destruction of the Emden on the 9th November was an event of a very different order. It afforded us immediate relief, and relief exactly where we required it. The Indian Ocean was now clear. The battleship Swiftsure from the East Indian station was at once ordered to the Canal. Of the fast cruisers that had been searching for the Emden, the Gloucester, Melbourne, Sydney, Hampshire and Yarmouth were immediately brought homewards through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. I felt that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies must come himself to the new scene of danger.

Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should rejoin your flagship Swiftsure at Port Said by the quickest route at once. Gloucester can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult with General Officer Commanding, Egypt, and work hand in hand with him and with the British authorities.... The following ships will be at your disposal in the Red Sea: Swiftsure, Minerva, Doris, Proserpine ... and eight torpedo-boats from Malta. Measures are also being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use in the Canal. Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other duties of your command, namely convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your absence in Egyptian waters.

A few days earlier I had minuted:—