Although Louis Philippe and Sébastiani repeatedly assured Lord Granville that there was no intention of accepting the crown for Nemours,[87] it was not until February 17 that the King officially received the members of the deputation and signified to them his refusal. The interval, between their arrival in Paris and their formal interview with Louis Philippe, appears to have been employed in vain attempts to induce them to pronounce themselves in favour of the Neapolitan prince. “We have tried to make them see,” wrote Sébastiani to Talleyrand, “the advantages which would accrue to all parties from the enthronement of Prince Charles of Naples.”[88] But, in the meantime, his letter to Bresson of February 1, in which he had declared that the French government could not adhere to the 11th and 12th protocols of the conference, had been published in the Belgian newspapers and had caused Palmerston to instruct Granville to demand an explanation. The ambassador was to point out that, “when a government sees fit to disavow the acts of its plenipotentiary, it should acquaint the parties with whom the engagement has been made of the fact, not, as in this case, communicate its disavowal to third parties.” Palmerston’s despatch concluded with the intimation that “His Majesty’s government had only allowed the conference to continue because it was convinced that satisfactory explanations would be forthcoming.” Instructions of a like nature were received by the Russian, the Prussian and the Austrian ambassadors.”[89]

Sébastiani, whilst pretending that Bresson had no authority to make public his letter, maintained that the London conference had no power to do more than mediate between the contending parties, and that France “could not be a member of a revised Holy Alliance which was to decide arbitrarily upon the affairs of nations.” Furthermore he declined to recall M. Bresson from Brussels, unless Lord Ponsonby were removed at the same time.[90] Fresh instances were soon forthcoming, however, of Bresson’s opposition to the decisions of the conference of which he was nominally the agent. Since the conclusion of the armistice between the Belgians and the Dutch, disputes had been frequent as to the infractions of its conditions. The Dutch, in violation of the terms imposed by the Powers, held the citadel of Antwerp and closed the navigation of the Scheldt, whilst, as a reprisal, the Belgians set up a blockade of Maëstricht. The conference had, in consequence, instructed its representatives at Brussels to warn the provisional government that, unless communications were opened between Maëstricht and the surrounding country, the Federal Diet would be invited to raise the blockade by force of arms. But M. Bresson, alleging as a reason for his conduct des motifs à lui personnels, declined to sign the note which Lord Ponsonby duly presented to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.[91] Lord Granville was in consequence directed to inform Sébastiani that the conference could no longer regard M. Bresson as its agent.[92] When the contents of Palmerston’s despatch were read out to him Sébastiani declared that he should retain him at Brussels as French minister.[93] This was, however, but an empty threat. Bresson, since Louis Philippe’s refusal to allow his son to be proclaimed King, was most unpleasantly situated towards the members of the national congress, to whom he had given the most positive assurances that, were Nemours to be elected, he would be permitted to accept the crown. It is very probable that in order to overcome the hesitation of his government he may deliberately have expressed exaggerated fears about the prospects of Leuchtenberg’s enthronement. The complete subsidence[94] of the agitation on behalf of the Bonapartist candidate certainly accords ill with the alarming reports about the strength of the movement in his favour which he had transmitted to Sébastiani. But it would appear that when he paid his visit to Paris, at the end of January, he was himself deceived by Louis Philippe, and that his promises to the Belgian deputies, that Nemours would accept the crown, were made under the honest impression that the King’s objection had been withdrawn. “You know the august mouth from which issued my last orders,” he wrote to Sébastiani on February 9. “You heard them. Do not fear, they shall remain hidden at the bottom of my heart. But I cannot go back upon my footsteps. I cannot be the agent of another change of policy. I must ask you to replace me. I can sacrifice my interests, not my honour.”[95] “The painful and difficult situation in which you are placed,” answered Sébastiani, “is well understood here, but the King does full justice to your conduct and to your zeal for his service.”[96]

On March 6 Bresson formally transmitted to London his resignation of the post of commissioner to the conference and returned to Paris, being replaced at Brussels, as the agent of the French government, by General Belliard. The rapid advancement which awaited him was to compensate him amply for the loss of this appointment. But it was not alone from foreign governments that Sébastiani received complaints about these proceedings at Brussels. Talleyrand expressed the greatest indignation at the ignorance in which he had been kept of the instructions sent to Bresson. The whole affair, he pointed out, had placed him in a false position with Palmerston and the ministers of the Powers, and had laid him open to the most injurious suspicions. It must appear either that he was unacquainted with the intentions of his government, or that he was in league with Bresson to deceive the conference.[97]

In the meantime, Paris had been the scene of disturbances which were to change completely the course of French policy. On February 14, the anniversary of the death of the Duc de Berri, the Carlists decided to hold a memorial service in the church of Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois. But the ceremony was interrupted by a mob, which had collected at the rumour that a portrait of the Duc de Bordeaux[98] had been crowned. The church and the palace of the archbishop were sacked, and much valuable and beautiful property was destroyed. The authorities made only the feeblest attempts to restrain the rioters, and cast the whole blame for the disorder upon the Carlists.[99] Moreover, as a concession to the rabble, all crosses were removed from in front of churches, the bust of Louis XVIII. was destroyed at the Louvre, and Louis Philippe even sanctioned the erasure of the lilies from his coat of arms. The indignation with which these despicable signs of weakness were greeted, soon convinced him, however, that he might with safety abandon his policy of truckling to the mob. For some time past, the hopes of all lovers of order had been centred in, Casimir Périer, as the one man capable of maintaining peace abroad, and of combating anarchy at home. Negotiations were accordingly begun, and, on March 14, the Moniteur announced that Laffitte had been replaced as President of the Council by Casimir Périer, who had, besides, assumed the duties of Minister of the Interior. With two exceptions the members of the new Cabinet had all held office in the Laffitte administration. But so little were the rules of the party system observed, that they were quite prepared to enter a government, formed upon principles diametrically opposed to those which had guided the policy of the former Cabinet. Casimir Périer was pledged to the stern repression of internal disorder, and to the maintenance of external peace. In addition, he had asked that the King should be absent from meetings of the Cabinet—request to which Louis Philippe had given a grudging and a qualified assent.[100]

The news that M. Casimir Périer had assumed office was received with feelings of intense relief at the Courts and in the Cabinets of Europe.[101] The new President of the Council belonged to a family of high repute in banking and commercial circles. Under the Restoration he had been an eloquent and much respected member of the Liberal party. Heinrich Heine, who disliked the French as keenly as he admired the English statesman, has declared that Casimir Périer strangely resembled George Canning in personal appearance. In both he perceived the same expression of “invalidity, over-excitement and lassitude.”[102] Sébastiani’s continued retention of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was also a subject for congratulation. In spite of his Corsican excitability, he had, upon the whole, won the confidence of the ministers with whom he had had business to transact. “The Dips,” wrote Lady Granville to her sister, “are all pleased that Sébastiani remains, he is decidedly pacific.”[103]

The state of affairs in Europe, at the time of the formation of Casimir Périer’s government, still bore a most disquieting appearance. At the beginning of February, 1831, General Diebitsch entered Poland at the head of a strong Russian army, and, on the 25th, there was fought at Grochov one of the fiercest battles of the century, with results rather favourable to the Poles. At the same time the Italian States were in a condition of acute discontent. The Duke of Modena had been compelled to invoke Austrian assistance against his revolted subjects, and, on February 5, the Carbonari raised the standard of rebellion at Bologna. The States of the Pope extended from the Latin coast across the Campagna to the marches of Ancona, and, spreading out into the plains of Romagna, were bounded by the Po. In the opinion of Chateaubriand,[104] who was ambassador at Rome in 1828, one of the chief defects of the Papal government lay in the fact that “old men appoint an old man, and he in turn makes none but old men cardinals.” This feature of the Pontifical rule seems to have attracted the attention of Charles Greville[105] when he visited Rome, in 1830. “The cardinals,” he records, “appear a wretched set of old twaddlers, all but about three in extreme decrepitude. On seeing them and knowing that the sovereign is elected by and from them, nobody can wonder that the country is so miserably governed.” But it was the doctrine that only ecclesiastics could administer a government of divine appointment which constituted the radical vice of the Papal system. Cardinals ruled over the four Legations of Romagna—Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli. Generally speaking, their administration was both bigoted and corrupt. The finances were constantly in a condition of hopeless confusion—a circumstance hardly to be wondered at, seeing that a prelate in charge of the Exchequer is said to have refused to study political economy, because some of the text books were upon the Index. The roads were bad, few in number, and infested with brigands. Taxation was light, but trade was hampered by customs barriers. An arbitrary and interfering police system was supplemented by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which still repressed heresy among Roman subjects, although it did not venture to meddle with foreigners. Lastly, it was estimated that not more than two per cent. of the population attended school.

Bologna was the most flourishing manufacturing town in the dominions of His Holiness, and Ancona the only port which could boast of a real trade. Probably it was because of their comparative prosperity that the people of Romagna were in a chronic state of unrest. The Pontifical troops, sent to suppress the insurrection, quickly proved their inability to carry out the task, and His Holiness appealed to Vienna for assistance. Sébastiani, so soon as he received intelligence that this request had been made, instructed Marshal Maison to warn Metternich that France could not consent to the entry of Austrian troops into the Papal States, and, on February 24, he informed Apponyi in Paris that, in accordance with its principle of non-intervention, the French government would regard the passage of the Piedmontese or Roman frontiers by an Imperial army as a declaration of war.[106] But Metternich had already sent off the Comte Athanase d’Otrante, a son of Fouché, the famous regicide and Minister of Police, to Paris, with documents to prove that the Italian insurrections were fomented by the Bonapartists. It was always in the power of Austria, he pointed out significantly, to put an end to the republican agitation in Italy, Spain, Germany or France, by simply allowing the Duc de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, to be proclaimed Emperor of the French.[107] It was perfectly true that the Bonapartes were concerned in the Italian revolutionary movement. Both Prince Charles and his brother Prince Louis Napoleon held commands in the rebel army at Civita Castellana. Without doubt this was a circumstance calculated to induce Louis Philippe to exercise the greatest caution. It was decided, accordingly, to despatch the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire to Rome to urge upon the Papal government the expediency of withdrawing from ecclesiastics the administration of the provincial affairs of Romagna, and of confiding the management of local business to the nobility and middle classes. Maison was to press the Cabinet of Vienna to join with France in persuading His Holiness to inaugurate these reforms, whilst in London Talleyrand was to seek to obtain the co-operation of the British government. Palmerston, who looked upon the condition of Italy as a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe, readily consented to instruct Sir Brooke Taylor, the British Minister at Florence, to proceed to Rome to take part in the conference.[108] Metternich agreed with equal alacrity to the French proposals. But it was not his policy to allow reforms of any kind to be introduced into Italy, and he was fully resolved that the deliberations should lead to no results of any consequence. “We risk nothing,” he wrote to Apponyi. . . . “Count Lützow[109] is a man of character, he knows what is practicable.”[110]

But the good effect of Metternich’s consent to confer with the Powers, upon the condition of affairs, in the Papal States, was dispelled by a false report which reached Paris of the conclusion of a treaty between Austria and His Holiness. This news was followed, on March 18, by the intelligence that an Imperial army had entered Bologna. War, Sébastiani informed Granville, was now inevitable. Nevertheless, in the evening, when the ambassador read over to him the account of their conversation which he proposed to send to London, he suggested that the words “war was very probable” should be substituted for his statement that “war was inevitable.”[111] For the next fortnight the situation continued to wear a most critical appearance. At a Cabinet Council, held on March 28, it was resolved to demand the evacuation of the Papal States, and to ask the Chambers for a vote of credit, to enable the King to mobilize the army. Casimir Périer,[112] however, reassured Lord Granville by telling him that the Austrians would assuredly have crushed the insurrection in Romagna before Maison’s instructions could reach Vienna, and that the message to the Chambers, far from being a measure calculated to bring about war, would, on the contrary, assist the King to preserve peace. Were the government to appear indifferent to the entry of the Austrians into the Papal States, the military party would at once raise the cry that ministers wanted peace at any price. Louis Philippe himself expressed to the British ambassador the greatest confidence that hostilities would be avoided. The preservation of the temporal power of the Pope, he went on to tell him, was a cardinal feature of French policy. Five or six millions of his subjects professed the Roman Catholic religion,[113] and he was determined to remain upon good terms with the head of the Church.[114] The King of Prussia, Lord Granville was satisfied, was resolved to take no part in the struggle, should the Austrian intervention in Italy lead to a collision with France.[115] Heytesbury, on the other hand, reported that Nicholas, although the cholera was raging in Russia and notwithstanding that he had still the Polish war upon his hands, had announced his determination “to bring the whole force of his Empire to the assistance of his Austrian ally.”[116] But Metternich, in the meanwhile, had empowered Apponyi to declare that no treaty had been concluded, and to support his statement by the production of a copy of His Holiness’ appeal for help to the Emperor Francis. Moreover, he promised that the Legations should be evacuated “as soon as they should have been purged of the Carbonari vermin with which they were infested.”[117] In effect the Austrians experienced little difficulty in dispersing the insurgents and in restoring a semblance of tranquillity in the disturbed districts, whilst at Rome His Holiness undertook to initiate certain reforms, in accordance with the spirit of the proposals which the western Powers urged him to adopt. By July 17 the complete withdrawal of the Imperial troops from the territories of the Pope had been carried out.

The effect of Casimir Périer’s assumption of office upon the course of the Belgian negotiations was soon apparent. Nothing more was heard of the candidature of Prince Charles of Naples. “As a member of the elder branch of the Bourbons, France,” wrote Sébastiani, “would reject him with indignation.”[118] Under these circumstances the French government decided to exert its influence in favour of Leopold of Coburg, although his enthronement, Louis Philippe assured Lord Granville, would not be well received in France. He will be looked upon as an English viceroy, but, insinuated the King, the nation could be reconciled to the choice of this prince, were it possible to announce that those portions of her northern territory, of which she had been deprived by the treaties of 1815, were to be restored to France.[119]

Leopold, the youngest son of Francis Duke of Coburg, was born in 1790. On May 2, 1816, he married the only daughter of George IV., the Princess Charlotte, who died the following year, five hours after giving birth to a dead child. As a widower, the Prince continued to live in England in enjoyment of the pension of £50,000 a year which Parliament had settled upon him for life. In 1829 he was chosen by the Powers for the throne of Greece, but, after signifying his acceptation of the crown, he saw fit to change his mind, alleging that the frontiers, which the conference purposed to impose upon the new State, were regarded as unsatisfactory by the Greek nation. There would appear to have been good reasons for his withdrawal, but it, nevertheless, caused the greatest annoyance to the Tories who were then in office. The Whigs, although less bitter against the Marquis Peu-à-Peu, as George IV. nicknamed him, had certainly no very high opinion of his ability to fill a difficult position.[120] It was clear, however, that all hope must be abandoned of inducing the Belgians to accept the Prince of Orange for their King. This Prince had been spending the winter in London where, according to Greville, “he made a great fool of himself and destroyed any sympathy there might have been for his political misfortunes.”[121] In the words of Talleyrand, Palmerston was, in consequence, prepared to accept “sans chaleur,”[122] the candidature of Leopold of Coburg, whilst maintaining that, before electing their Sovereign, the Belgians must adhere to the 11th and 12th protocols, which laid down the conditions under which their country was to be separated from Holland.[123]

On April 17 Talleyrand was in a position to announce to the conference that France now gave her unqualified assent to the proposed terms of separation. On this occasion it was resolved, at the suggestion of the French plenipotentiary, that, should Belgium decline to adhere to the conditions in question, which the King of the Netherlands had accepted, all relations should be broken off between the five Powers and the Belgian authorities. To prove the satisfaction which this changed attitude on the part of the French government afforded them the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain met, and recorded their agreement to the principle of the destruction of the barrier fortresses, the protocol of this conference of the four Powers being communicated in confidence to Talleyrand.[124]

The question of the nature of the coercion which should be applied to the Belgians, should they persist in laying claim to Luxemburg, was not easy of solution. The Grand Duchy formed part of the Germanic Confederation, and therefore it should have devolved upon the Federal Diet to take the steps required for restoring the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands. Sébastiani, however, deprecated the idea of employing German troops for the purpose of enforcing the decisions of the conference. But on the understanding that both the strength of the contingent, which was to enter Belgium, and the date on which the military operations were to begin should be settled by the five Powers, the French government withdrew its objections.[125] Prince Leopold, at the same time, informed the members of the deputation, who had come to London to offer him the crown of Belgium, that he could not listen to their proposals, until the national congress should have accepted the conditions of the 11th and 12th protocols. No persuasion could move him from this resolution which met with the full approval of the British government. Talleyrand, however, as a compromise appears to have suggested the plan of proposing to the King of the Netherlands the cession of the province of Luxemburg, without the fortress, in return for a pecuniary indemnity.[126] This solution of the difficulty was considered so practicable by Lord Ponsonby that, upon his own responsibility, he left Brussels and journeyed to London to urge its adoption. The conference, in consequence of his representations, agreed to open negotiations with the King of the Netherlands for the purchase of Luxemburg and for “so much of the province of Limburg as would connect Maëstricht with North Brabant.”[127] But when June 1, the date which had been assigned as that on which the Belgians must signify their agreement to les bases de separation, went by without a favourable answer having been received from Brussels, the conference withdrew Ponsonby and decided to resort to measures of coercion. The action of the national congress, in electing Prince Leopold King of the Belgians on June 4, had no effect upon the decision of the Powers. “It has been used,” wrote Palmerston, “as a fresh opportunity for putting forward pretensions to portions of the territory of the King of Holland and by implication, at least, of repeating their determination to gain possession of them by force.”[128]

But, as the moment approached for setting in motion General Hinüber’s Federal corps d’armée, the French government evinced symptoms of alarm. Sébastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in his power to discover some less objectionable method of terminating the difficulty. The King and his ministers, he assured him, placed their entire trust in his wisdom and vast experience.[129] Casimir Périer impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be powerless to restrain the army, were the Prussians and the Dutch to attack the Belgians “ranged under the tricolour.” “Sufficient allowance,” he pleaded, “was not made for the weakness of a government sprung from a revolution.”[130] Talleyrand, however, reported that, in spite of his efforts and of those of Prince Leopold to make the Belgians listen to reason, they refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a keen desire to bring on a general war, whilst the Tsar Nicholas was not sorry that the attention of the western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the Low Countries. In England men’s minds were concentrated exclusively upon the Reform Bill, and the knowledge that France and Great Britain were confronted by grave domestic problems undoubtedly encouraged the Belgians to defy the conference. Under these circumstances, his favourite scheme, the partition of the country, appeared to him the only practicable solution of the question. But on this occasion the idea of acquiring some part of Belgium offered no attractions to the French government. “We are disposed to think,” answered Sébastiani, “that any partition would recall that of Poland, and would not be popular.”[131]

The determination of the Powers to impose by force of arms the terms of the protocols of January 20 and 27 was, however, growing weaker. In their desire to avoid a general war they agreed to depart from a decision, which they had once pronounced to be irrevocable. The event was to prove that by this concession they had sensibly increased the danger of that armed conflict between the nations, which they were so anxious to avert. At the sitting of the conference, on June 26, the plenipotentiaries, “in the interests of the general peace,” affixed their signatures to a protocol of eighteen articles for acceptance by Holland and Belgium.[132] The altered conditions, although they did not fulfil all their aspirations, were far more favourable to the Belgians than the terms of the former bases de séparation. The most important modification consisted in a provision for maintaining a status quo in Luxemburg, pending the negotiations which were to be carried out between Belgium, on the one hand, and Holland and the Germanic Confederation, on the other. Prince Leopold, when the protocol of the eighteen articles was laid before him, agreed to accept the crown provided, always, that the national congress could be brought to assent to the new conditions which it set forth. After several stormy debates in the assembly this stipulation was complied with, and on July 11, a deputation arrived in London to conduct the King to Belgium.

Leopold had been assured that, even should the King of the Netherlands decline to accept the eighteen articles, the Powers would none the less recognize him as the Sovereign of Belgium. But, when the refusal of King William was known in London, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia and Russia declared that their respective governments had decided to withhold their recognition of him. Leopold, however, wisely determined to adhere to his resolution and to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of France and Great Britain. Before finally leaving London he informed Lord Grey of his intention to renounce his English pension. Claremont was to be kept up and all his debts were to be paid, but, when these conditions had been fulfilled, his trustees would pay the balance of his annuity into the English exchequer. His decision to act in this manner was quickened, without doubt, by learning that in the House of Lords, Londonderry, an Opposition peer, purposed to raise the question of his retention of his English pension.[133]

During the month of July an affair of some delicacy was amicably settled between the Cabinets of London and Paris. For some time past the government of M. Périer had been trying to obtain redress for the indignities to which French subjects, especially those suspected of affiliation to masonic lodges, were exposed in Portugal. Palmerston admitted the justice of the French complaints and raised no objections when it was proposed to send a fleet to Lisbon to demand satisfaction.[134] On July 8, accordingly, Admiral Roussin forced the entrance to the Tagus and ranged his squadron within gunshot of the quays of Lisbon. The Portuguese government, under these circumstances, was compelled to accede to the demands which the admiral had been instructed to make, and the French fleet, shortly afterwards, withdrew, carrying off with it, however, several Portuguese vessels of war. But, although the affair gave rise to no complications between England and France, it was seized upon by an embittered Opposition in London, as an opportunity for denouncing the failure of the government to protect England’s “most ancient ally.”[135]

The refusal of the King of the Netherlands to accept the new conditions of separation, as defined in the protocol of the eighteen articles, was communicated to the conference by the Dutch minister, Verstolk. The despatch, dated July 12, 1831, concluded with the menace that, “were any Prince to accept the crown of Belgium without having acceded to les bases de séparation as laid down in the protocol of January 20, he would be regarded as in a state of war with His Majesty and as his enemy.”[136] The representatives of the Powers appear to have treated these ominous words very lightly. An intimation was conveyed to the Hague that hostilities must not break out afresh, but no active measures were taken to prevent a rupture of the peace. It was soon evident, however, that the King was fully resolved to put his threat into execution. On August 1, Chassé, the Dutch general commanding the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice and gave notice that hostilities would begin on the 4th. Leopold at once appealed for help to France and England, and then placed himself at the head of a wing of his army upon the Scheldt. But the retreat of General Daine, commanding the Belgian division upon the Meuse, who abandoned his positions without firing a shot, compelled the King to fall back to Louvain. Here he made his dispositions for withstanding the Dutch inroad, but, in spite of the gallant example which he set his men, his army, at the first contact with the enemy, fled in wild confusion. In the meantime, however, Marshal Gérard had entered Belgium in command of 50,000 French troops, and, when Leopold was upon the point of being surrounded, Sir Robert Adair, the British minister at Brussels, prevailed upon the Prince of Orange to suspend hostilities. The Dutch, shortly afterwards, began their retreat closely followed by the French, and, by August 20, the last of the invaders had evacuated the territory of Belgium.

It had been an easy matter to bring the actual hostilities to a close, but the Dutch raid had none the less created precisely that situation which British diplomacy had always striven to avoid. The French were now in complete possession of Belgium. Palmerston, indeed, strongly suspected them of having instigated the King of the Netherlands to break the peace. Sir Richard Bagot, the British ambassador at the Hague, inclined to the belief that a secret understanding existed between the Dutch and French governments. “Talleyrand,” wrote Palmerston in a private letter to Granville, “proposed to me some time ago that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, cry out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians, cover Belgium with troops and settle everything as we choose.” “It would seem,” reported Granville, “that the King of Holland rather expected from the French government approbation than opposition to his invasion.”[137] It is not improbable that the Cabinet of the Hague may have been led to believe that a rupture of the armistice would meet with approval in Paris. But, in order to have furthered French designs, it should have taken place at an earlier date. Talleyrand’s proposal to Palmerston, it is clear, must have been made in June, when he was telling Sébastiani that he could devise no other plan for settling the question of Belgium but that of partition. Once Leopold had been enthroned, however, he knew full well that no British government could acquiesce in the appropriation by France of any portion of his kingdom. The Dutch invasion, which might have served French policy, had it occurred whilst matters were still unsettled in Belgium, became simply an embarrassment and a certain cause of discord between France and England, after Leopold’s arrival at Brussels.[138] Talleyrand, therefore, who regarded the maintenance of cordial relations between the two countries as an object of far higher importance that any extension of French frontiers into Belgium, strove by all means in his power to second the efforts of the British government to bring the French occupation to a close as speedily as possible. But, whilst Palmerston attributed to French intrigues the Dutch attack upon Belgium, he himself was suspected by Stockmar[139] of having known of the King of Holland’s plans and of having connived at the invasion. A few weeks later, however, when in London upon a confidential mission, Leopold’s trusted counsellor satisfied himself that Palmerston was wholly innocent of any double dealing in the affair.

Casimir Périer had been on the point of resigning, in consequence of the defeat of the ministerial candidate for the post of President of the Chamber, when the news reached Paris of the Dutch inroad into Belgium. This new development at once caused him to change his plans and to decide to remain in office. Talleyrand was instructed to explain in London that it was only the necessity for immediate action which had induced the French government to order a French corps to enter Belgium, without previous consultation with the Powers. Lord Granville, at the same time, was informed that, upon the withdrawal of the Dutch, the French troops would return to France.[140] The news of the French intervention in Belgium aroused great excitement in London. The funds fell, and Palmerston was sharply questioned upon the matter in the House.[141] Ministers, however, reassured by the accounts of the intentions of the French government transmitted by Granville, took a cheerful view of the situation.[142] At a sitting of the conference, on August 6, Talleyrand announced that Marshal Gérard’s occupation of Belgium would cease directly the Dutch should evacuate the country. On this same occasion it was agreed that the scope of the French operations should be decided by the conference and that, under no circumstances, should they be extended to the right bank of the Meuse. It was further resolved that siege should not be laid to either Maëstricht or Venlo, on account of their proximity to the Prussian frontier.[143]

But, when the Dutch withdrew and the French showed no disposition to follow their example, the affair began to assume a very different complexion. Sébastiani, changing his ground completely, declared that Marshal Gérard’s occupation must continue until the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace between Holland and Belgium. In the Chamber, Soult, the Minister of War, stated explicitly that the retreat of the Dutch did not entail the evacuation of Belgium by the French army. The unfavourable impression created by these words was not removed by Casimir Périer’s promise to Lord Granville, that he would say something from the tribune calculated to diminish the importance of the Marshal’s pronouncement. Sébastiani’s conversations with the British ambassador, and the reports forwarded by Adair from Brussels made it too clear that the French government purposed to avail itself of the presence of its troops in Belgium for coming to a separate agreement with King Leopold, respecting the immediate destruction of the frontier fortresses. This was an arrangement which the Cabinet of Lord Grey was determined to oppose, even to the point of war.[144]

Talleyrand, as was his invariable practise in these disputes between France and England, left no stone unturned to dissuade his government from embarking upon a course of conduct destined inevitably to revive the old rivalry between the two countries. Were France to break her word and to retain her troops in Belgium, he was convinced that Lord Grey and his colleagues would be driven from office and their successors would be men far less well disposed towards France. Palmerston, he wrote, was assailed by questions in the House and must before long make some definite statement. Sébastiani, in reply, expressed regret for the difficulties by which Lord Grey was beset, but maintained that the French government, were it to allow the army to return home empty handed, would be confronted by a still more unpleasant situation. Talleyrand, however, might announce that, in consequence of the retirement of the Dutch, 20,000 of Marshal Gérard’s troops would be recalled and that the remaining 30,000 would be concentrated at Nivelle.[145] The news of this partial evacuation caused much satisfaction in London, but none the less Palmerston, on August 17, instructed Lord Granville formally to demand the complete withdrawal of the French army corps. He was directed to remind the French government of its pledges and to point out that, by the protocol of April 17, the four Powers had agreed to the principle of the destruction of the frontier fortresses, “the satisfactory execution of which arrangement could only be impeded by any measures having the appearance of making the protracted occupation of Belgium by the French army bear upon it. . . .” He was to speak “in terms of friendship and goodwill, enforcing at the same time the just expectations of His Majesty with firmness and decision.”[146]

On August 23 the conference decided to impose an armistice upon the Dutch and Belgians, to expire on October 10.[147] The French government, however, declared that a mere undertaking by the King of the Netherlands, not to begin hostilities afresh, could not provide a guarantee for the maintenance of peace of sufficient weight to permit of the complete withdrawal of the French army. General Baudrand, moreover, was sent to London with a letter from Louis Philippe to Talleyrand, in which the King expressed his displeasure with his action in signing a document of that nature. Baudrand during his stay in England had interviews both with Grey and Palmerston.[148] He appears to have expatiated upon the outcry which would be raised in the Chamber, were France to gain neither moral nor material advantages, in return for the expense to which she had been put by her intervention in aid of the King of the Belgians. Palmerston assured him that his colleagues and himself were sincerely anxious that M. Casimir Périer should remain in office, but, he added pointedly, “when to keep in a ministry of peace it became necessary to comply with the demands of the party which was for war, it was problematical what decree of advantage was thereby to be acquired.”[149] Talleyrand appears to have been little moved by the censure passed upon him. He contended that he had acted for the best, and that no fears need be entertained that the Dutch would again attack Belgium. At the same time he continued to urge the necessity of bringing the occupation of Belgium to a close. “There is more real anxiety over here than I have yet seen,” he wrote on August 27. “People are all talking of an interview between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Grey.” A few days later he again pleaded earnestly for evacuation, suggesting that the withdrawal of the troops might be carried out so slowly that some portion of them should still be in Belgium, at the expiration of the armistice.[150]

In the meantime General La Tour-Maubourg had arrived at Brussels, on August 18, furnished with the draft of a treaty which he was to conclude with the Belgian government for the destruction of the barrier fortresses. In the first instance it was probably intended to keep his mission a secret, but different counsels seem to have prevailed, and, a few days after his departure, Sébastiani informed Granville of the reason of this officer’s journey to Brussels. France, he told the British ambassador, claimed the right to negotiate with regard to the fortresses and it was hoped that powers would be given to Sir Robert Adair to act with La Tour-Maubourg in the matter. This request, when in due course Granville transmitted it to London, was refused. Palmerston, in a long interview with Talleyrand, had already declared, in the most uncompromising language, that the pretensions of the French government to have a voice in determining the fate of these fortresses, erected at the expense of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, could not be entertained.[151] Immediately on hearing of La Tour-Maubourg’s arrival at Brussels Sir Robert Adair, guessing the object of his mission, sought an audience with Leopold. Both to the King and to Meulinäer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he asserted emphatically that his government could never admit that the withdrawal of Gérard’s troops could be made to depend upon the conclusion of an arrangement between France and Belgium, respecting the fortresses.[152]

Leopold was in a most difficult situation. Although he had invoked the assistance of France and England the moment the Dutch had announced their intention of beginning hostilities, he had only invited Marshal Gérard actually to cross the frontier when the misconduct of General Daine had seriously compromised his position.[153] He appears to have greatly distrusted the intentions of the French and to have proposed that England should occupy Antwerp in the name of the five Powers. Three days later, however, he desired Sir Robert Adair to consider this suggestion as withdrawn, stating that he was satisfied with Belliard’s assurances that the French would withdraw, as soon as the Dutch should have effected their retreat.[154] After the retirement of the Prince of Orange he was pressed, on the one side, by Sir Robert Adair to declare that he no longer required the presence of the French for his protection, whilst, on the other hand, General Belliard urged him no less vigorously to invite Marshal Gérard to remain in Belgium. Without doubt he was in a most cruel dilemma. He had no army worthy of the name, and was at the mercy of the Dutch should they return to the attack. Moreover, he had every reason to apprehend that the Republican and Orangist factions would regard the disturbed condition, to which the invasion had reduced the country, as a favourable opportunity for putting their designs into execution. Against the external and internal perils by which he was threatened he could only look for active assistance to the French. England was very jealous of French intervention in the Low Countries, but he had no grounds for supposing that Lord Grey would stir a finger to defend him from a rebellion of his subjects. The British government, indeed, had declined to send the fleet to the mouth of the Scheldt. The desire to afford the French no pretext for remaining in Belgium undoubtedly dictated this refusal, which nevertheless increased Stockmar’s distrust of Palmerston’s policy. Adair soon discovered that, in his endeavours to obtain the speedy departure of the French, he could expect no assistance from Leopold. He could discern, he reported, no sense of shame nor of humiliation in the attitude of ministers or of the people generally. They appeared to regard the presence of Marshal Gérard’s troops simply as a means of extorting better terms from the Dutch.[155]

When Palmerston was informed of La Tour-Maubourg’s mission he at once directed Adair to remonstrate against any separate negotiation between France and Belgium, on the question of the fortresses. But his first interview with Meulinäer, after the receipt of his instructions, convinced Adair that “this delicate matter had already proceeded so far that no choice was left to him except to object in toto to every sort of communication on the subject.” A solution of the difficulty was discovered, however, in a suggestion, brought forward by the British minister, that “the King of the Belgians should declare to the King of the French, through M. de La Tour-Maubourg, that he was taking measures, in concert with Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, for the demolition of some of the fortresses erected since 1815.” A few days later Adair was informed that General Goblet would be despatched to London to negotiate a convention, whilst Leopold, on September 8, affixed his signature to a document, wherein he undertook to instruct his plenipotentiary to act in accordance with the wishes of the French government in the matter of the selection of the fortresses to be dismantled.[156]

But in Paris the ambassadors of the four Powers had protested formally against the protracted occupation of Belgium by a French army. Palmerston, in forwarding to Granville a memorandum of the points he was to urge in his conference with Sébastiani, directed that this document “was not to be handed to that minister as a note, but that it was to be read to him confidentially . . . a course which has been adopted out of delicacy, and under the conviction that we shall hear in a few days that the French government has, of its own accord, given orders for the evacuation of Belgium.”[157] These representations obtained the desired effect. At Brussels Leopold suddenly discovered that the presence of Marshal Gérard’s soldiers were no longer necessary for his safety.[158] The announcement in the Moniteur, of September 15, of the ministerial decision to recall the army from Belgium was the signal for a violent outburst in the newspapers against the poltroonery of the government, in yielding to the dictation of the conference.[159] In London satisfaction at the French withdrawal was marred by the publication of a long list of officers, appointed by Marshal Soult, to inspect and organize the Belgian army. This circumstance was seized upon by the Opposition as an opportunity for attacking the foreign policy of the government. The Reform Bill was before the House of Lords and party spirit was running high. “King Leopold’s intention to employ French officers in his army,”declared Lord Londonderry, “was more prejudicial to his independence than the retention of 12,000 French troops in Belgium.” His Lordship then proceeded to review Talleyrand’s career, and to asperse his conduct, under the various régimes which he had served, with a virulence of language which has never since been used in that dignified assembly about the ambassador of a friendly Power. “There was a flirtation,” he asserted amidst much laughter, “going on between the government and France which he thought most improper. . . . To see ministers running to consult with that individual (Talleyrand) was creating a disgust which he thought most natural.” The Duke of Wellington, however, spoke up strongly for Talleyrand. In the many transactions upon which they had been engaged together, he assured the House that the Prince had always conducted himself with honour and uprightness. “He believed that no man’s public and private character had been so much maligned as that of that illustrious individual.”[160] Talleyrand was deeply moved by the Duke’s conduct on this occasion. “He was especially grateful to him,” he told Lord Alvanley, who the next day found him perusing an account of the debate, “because he was the only public man in the world who had ever said a good word for him.”[161]

Following closely upon the announcement that the French government had agreed to evacuate Belgium came the intelligence of the defeat of the Poles and of the entry of the Russians into Warsaw. The news was the signal for the outbreak of disturbances in Paris. Sébastiani’s famous statement to the Chamber “l’ordre règne à Varsovie,” was denounced with indignation by the demagogues. Both he and Casimir Périer were surrounded by a furious mob upon the Place Vendôme, and were for a time in no little danger. The rioters interrupted the performances at the theatres, crying out that all places of amusement must be closed on a day of mourning. The marked reluctance of the national guards to act against their fellow-citizens imparted a serious aspect to the situation. But the regular troops retained their discipline and dispersed the rabble.[162] At the first outbreak of the rebellion in Poland the French government had sought to induce England to join with it in a proposal to mediate between the Emperor and his revolted subjects. Talleyrand, however, who was always disposed to create difficulties for Russia, was obliged to report regretfully that British ministers were extremely averse to embarking upon any diplomatic action calculated to add to the Tsar’s embarrassments.[163]

In March, 1831, a false report had reached London and Paris of the total defeat of the Poles, whereupon Sébastiani again instructed Talleyrand to urge, in the most pressing language, the British government to unite with France in insisting upon the humane treatment of the rebels. Palmerston, believing the insurrection to be at an end, readily promised to direct Lord Heytesbury to support the representations upon their behalf which the Duc de Mortemart had been enjoined to make at St. Petersburg.[164] Heytesbury, accordingly, intimated to Count Nesselrode that, were any measures to be adopted towards Poland at variance with existing engagements, both Great Britain and France would be under the necessity of remonstrating formally. The Kingdom of Poland, it should be remembered, had been constituted in 1815 under the guarantee of the five Powers, and it was, in consequence, possible to contend, with some show of reason, that all of them were equally concerned in the maintenance of the liberties conceded to the Poles, under the terms of the Vienna treaty. Heytesbury’s conversations with Count Nesselrode convinced him, however, that, although the letter of that agreement might be observed, the Polish constitution would be virtually abolished. But, in reporting the nature of the intentions by which he conceived the Russian government to be animated, the able and experienced diplomatist who then represented Great Britain at St. Petersburg was at pains to point out the difficulties of the Tsar’s position. In Russia there was a strong public opinion which even the autocratic Nicholas could not afford to disregard. Were former conditions to be restored in Poland, and were the authors of the cold-blooded assassinations at Warsaw to be permitted to escape unpunished, great indignation would be aroused throughout the Empire. His representations had been well received, but he was plainly allowed to see how deeply the St. Petersburg Cabinet regretted the existence of the close understanding between France and England, which his action had revealed. He could perceive clearly from the demeanour of his Austrian and Prussian colleagues that neither the Court of Vienna nor of Berlin would be disposed to interfere upon behalf of the Poles. France not Russia, he pointed out, was now looked upon as an object of common danger.[165]

French sympathy for the Poles was so keen that, in July, Talleyrand was again instructed to invite the English government to join with France in proposing “a mediation in the bloody struggle raging in Poland.” Palmerston, in reply, appears to have suggested that the French government should set forth its views upon the matter in writing. Talleyrand, accordingly, transmitted this request and, at the same time, begged Sébastiani to remember, when framing his proposals, that “he was dealing with cold-blooded people and that it would be well therefore to avoid the use of emotional language.” But, on July 22, Palmerston informed him that the Cabinet could not entertain the suggestion of addressing to Russia any demand for a cessation of hostilities, nor was he able to report better success when, in September, whilst the Belgian difficulty was at its height, he was once more directed to approach the British government upon the subject of Poland. “No party in the Parliament,” he wrote, “was in favour of intervention, and the newspapers merely spoke of the Poles in sympathetic language.”[166] Heytesbury, who at St. Petersburg was in a position to judge correctly of the national resentment which any attempt at foreign interference in Polish affairs would create, strove to convince his government of the unwisdom of impairing the good relations of Russia and England by raising a question in which no British interests were involved. Remonstrances, he was prepared to admit, might effect an improvement in the condition of the people of the Kingdom of Poland. But, even under these circumstances, the sum of human misery, which the rebellion must entail, would not be lessened, inasmuch as the revolted Russo-Polish provinces, not included in the Kingdom, would be treated with increased severity.[167]

But, with the complete suppression of the insurrection, Lord Grey and his colleagues assumed a more sympathetic attitude towards the vanquished Poles. In a closely reasoned despatch Palmerston, on November 23, formulated the arguments which Heytesbury was instructed to press upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The most important passage in this long document was that in which the interpretation was set forth which the English government placed upon the wording of the treaty of Vienna. The futility of the plea that no specific constitution had been guaranteed to Poland, a contention which Heytesbury had warned his chief the Russian government would certainly set up, was clearly exposed. “Surely,” wrote Palmerston, “it was no forced construction of the meaning of the treaty to consider the constitution, which the Emperor had given, as existing under the sanction of the treaty.” The constitution contained no clause reserving to the Sovereign the right of modifying its provisions. The action of the Poles in declaring themselves separated from Russia could not be held to absolve the Emperor from adhering to his compact. “Wrongs committed by one side,” he concluded, “were not to be punished by the commission of wrongs on the other.”[168]

Heytesbury, after prefacing his disagreeable task of communicating these instructions by assurances that his government was only desirous of tendering friendly advice to a former ally, proceeded to read out to Count Nesselrode Lord Palmerston’s despatch. “The Count,” he reported, “listened with great attention and in silence, but his silence was not the silence of assent.” The Russian Chancellor expressed his regret that the British government should have seen fit to make representations of this nature, notwithstanding the intimation, conveyed to it by Prince Lieven, that the Tsar could not admit of foreign interference in the Polish question. The official answer of the Imperial Cabinet was in due course communicated to Palmerston by the Russian ambassador. As Heytesbury had foreseen, Nicholas, “strong in the support of Austria and Prussia and in the unanimous approbation of the Russian nation,”[169] refused to adopt the interpretation of the treaty which it was desired to place upon it in London and in Paris.

In the meantime, important progress had been made towards a settlement of the Belgian question. At the end of August, Baron Stockmar, Leopold’s confidential adviser, proceeded to London to watch over his interests in conjunction with Van de Weyer, the Belgian minister at the Court of St. James’. Stockmar realized speedily that the Belgians would have to suffer for the defeat inflicted upon them by the Dutch. In the treaty of peace and separation, which the conference was resolved must be concluded without delay, they could not hope to obtain the favourable terms conceded to them in the convention of the eighteen articles. Should they refuse to agree to the necessary concessions, Palmerston warned him that the conference would be broken up, and the King of Holland would be left free to fight out his quarrel with Leopold. Stockmar, however, continually impressed upon his master that this was a threat which he could safely afford to disregard. The French had always considered the union of Holland and Belgium and the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a diplomatic combination directed against them. Public opinion in France might, therefore, be depended upon to compel the government to resist any attempt on the part of the Dutch to reconstitute the kingdom by force of arms. But, although he admitted that Leopold could only expect active assistance from France, Stockmar strongly deprecated the idea of using French intervention as a means of intimidating the conference. Such a course, he was convinced, would simply incline the four Powers to lean all the more towards Holland. Lords Grey and Palmerston were well disposed, but they had to reckon with national sentiment, which was more favourable to “England’s ancient allies,” the Dutch, than to the Belgians. Nevertheless, although the British government might be unable to render him practical assistance, Leopold, Stockmar considered, should strive to gain its moral support. The prolonged occupation of Belgium by the French was to be deplored, because it engendered the suspicion in London that the King was over-anxious to place himself under the protection of France. In order effectually to put a check upon both Dutch and French intrigues Leopold, in Stockmar’s opinion, would be well advised to propose for the hand of a daughter of Louis Philippe.

After the French evacuation Stockmar urged unceasingly the necessity of a speedy conclusion of a definite treaty of peace. Russia, he pointed out, was no longer distracted by the Polish rebellion, and the sympathies of the Tsar were entirely with the King of the Netherlands. This was a circumstance bound to have a considerable influence upon the policy of the Courts of Berlin and of Vienna. It was of the highest importance, therefore, that Leopold should bring his ministers and the Chambers to recognize that the conditions of separation, set forth in the protocol of the eighteen articles, could no longer be obtained, and that only those stipulations should be insisted upon which were essential to the independent existence of Belgium. As Stockmar had foreseen, the new treaty, known as that of the twenty-four articles, which the conference proceeded to frame, imposed harsher terms upon Belgium than those contained in the protocol of June 26. That part of the province of Limburg which lay upon the right bank of the Meuse was now assigned to Holland, and Belgium was called upon to contribute an increased share of the public debt of the two countries. In other respects also the Belgians had to suffer for their military inferiority to the Dutch. Nevertheless, when all efforts to induce the conference to modify its terms had proved useless, Stockmar, scouting the notion of abdication, counselled Leopold to agree to them. “Let the King,” he wrote, “cry aloud against the injustice which has been done him . . . Let him show that he went to Belgium under perfectly different conditions . . . Let the Belgian ministry cry out equally loud. But in the meantime let everything be done to induce the Chambers to accept the treaty.”