contractor got only about twenty per cent. as much work out of them as did the American superintendents. In Cuba a change to American methods and implements, and from oxen to mules as draft animals, has reduced the cost of plowing from $97.50 and $76.50 a caballeria (33 1-3 acres), in two specific instances, to $39.16 and $24 respectively. There is reason to believe that in all industries this factor of supervision and administration counts for as much in Cuba as it does elsewhere. If so, a large part of the relative inefficiency of the Cuban must be charged off to poor management and a wasteful industrial system.

When regularly employed the Cuban works long hours. A chart of the street-railway traffic of Habana shows that during the shorter days of the year the registered number of passengers carried per hour in the whole city is nearly one-half the maximum by 6 A.M., and that it reaches its maximum at just 6 P.M. Considering only those lines running into the city from suburbs occupied by the working classes, the traffic before 6 A.M. is nearly or quite two-thirds the maximum. For most of these men, therefore, twelve hours, with the noon rest deducted, is the usual term of daily labor. On the plantations the eleven-hour day is still the rule. In riding through the country at earliest dawn one sees workers already in the fields. The independent country laborer usually protracts his noon-day rest until the heat of the day is over, and some of the apparent idleness of Cuba is due to the fact that the hours of work are divided by this interval of repose.

In some trades the men work slowly or short hours in order to limit production. Where payment is by piece-work, as in the cigar factories, they do so at their own expense. But this is usually during the slack season, and the motive is to keep as many men as possible employed.

One weakness of the working people of Cuba may be charged in part to indolence, but it is equally due to their love of pleasure and excitement, and to a feeling of irresponsibility as to the future so characteristic of tropical nations. Unless pressed by necessity, the Cuban takes frequent vacations. This is his form of dissipation, his way of going on a spree. The excitement of strong drink does not appeal to him as much as the gentler attractions of more protracted recreations. He is often a gambler, he delights in music and dances and in the little festivals of his neighborhood; he regards scrupulously all the observances of the Church that give promises of sufficient entertainment, especially those of a gala-day character. Weddings and christenings and funerals are important events in his calendar. By dint of a close and constant study of the situation he can usually find a valid excuse for indulging in the relaxations of leisure whenever it is not absolutely necessary for him to labor for his support.

The Cuban is therefore neither thrifty nor frugal. As a workman he responds only to the incentive of necessity. The Spanish laborer in Cuba usually works with the aim of accumulating a competency; not so the Cuban. The one produces and consumes little; the other produces only what he may consume. The Spanish laborer has few and simple ideals, but they are fixed and permanent; the Cuban stores a new fancy in his head every few days, and forgets it. He becomes impassioned over a carnival mask or a polka-dot tie; a month later it has passed out of his remembrance.

This is one principal reason why employers so greatly prefer the Spaniards in their service; they are not necessarily more honest, more active, or more intelligent, but they can be depended upon.

The Cubans are not criminally inclined. Under Spanish rule there were four times as many Spaniards as native whites in the prisons of Cuba in proportion to the total number of inhabitants of each nation in the Island. The Chinese and Spaniards both showed a larger percentage of criminals than the native Cubans of either race. Among the higher class Cubans, especially in the remoter towns, there are many evidences of physical degeneracy due to close intermarriage. Little scrawny men with big bony hands and almost no head at all, are characteristic of this class. But this type is not usually found among the rural or laboring population.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF CUBA

If the economic development of Cuba holds little promise for the people of the country, they have even less to look for in the political prospect. The period of self-government following freedom from the Spanish yoke has been marked by utter failure to meet the demands and the responsibilities of the situation. The Palma administration, ushered in with the highest hopes and the utmost encouragement, was tainted with corruption and cut short by revolution. The present regime can not boast even that weak element of honesty and ability that its predecessor possessed. To quote La Lucha, of Habana, which was the official organ of the Gomez party, the present condition is characterized by “intranquillity in the country, uneasiness in the towns and cities, hatreds, fears, and absolute lack of confidence in the future.... Our rulers refuse to be convinced that they are not the owners, but simply the administrators of the public wealth.” Insurrection has been staved off on several occasions by means of the strong arm or the greased palm. As the year 1911 approaches its close, the rumblings of revolution are heard in many different parts of the Island at the same time. These are not to be taken as popular indications of resentment against bad government,—the Cubans are used to that. They are the organized preparations of the “outs” to unseat the “ins.” Such disturbances are natural incidents of a situation which is controlled by professional politicians. There are in Cuba no political parties based on principle. Instead there are a number of cliques, each headed by a leader who holds his followers by promises of patronage in case of success. Experience has taught that the bullet is more effective than the ballot in Cuban politics. A few shots fired at the moon displaced the Palma government. To quote again from La Lucha: “In Cuba nothing can resist the slightest armed movement, because the first subversive cry raised in our fields is, and ever will be, the death knell of our political state.” The Administration can not place dependence upon the military forces. The keenest rivalry and the bitterest feeling exist between the rural guard and the regular army. In case of a civil war, these bodies would surely take opposite sides, and neither has any sentiment of loyalty to the flag, or allegiance to the government. The chief influence to which they would be amenable is the will of their respective commanders, who are politicians and aim to employ the forces under them as political instruments. The most effective defence of the President is found in placating his enemies by substantial concessions, but this method has naturally created fresh opponents with an appetite for sops, and the Chief Executive finds himself well-nigh at the end of his resources.

A country may be greatly prosperous and the mass of its people be miserable in the extreme. Mexico is an example in point. Cuba is another.

Throughout the hardships and hazards of the war of independence the insurrectos were supported by the belief that American enlistment in their cause, upon which they counted for success, would be followed by an era of permanent prosperity for the masses. The man who bore the brunt of the fighting, buoyed by these high hopes, realizes now that he was exploited by a handful of his own countrymen and deserted by his expected saviour. The desertion was repeated after the need for protection had been emphasized and the exploitation continues in an aggravated form.

On the guajiro falls most heavily the burden of supporting the most expensive and extravagant government in the world. This because that government dare not bear too hardly with taxation upon the great corporations and wealthy property owners. An important part of the game of finesse which is necessary to the life of any administration in Cuba consists in keeping in the good graces of the money interests, for it is in the power of these to stop the fat grazing in the political pastures by forcing American reoccupation, and even perhaps annexation.

So we have one of the most striking of the many anomalies in the Cuban system of administration,—the customs duties. Here, in a country with no industries to protect, the tariff exaction is at the rate of $12 per head. In the United States it is no more than $3.50, while in other countries it is considerably less. At first hand the importer pays this tax, but, of course, it ultimately falls upon the consumer. And, as

more than half the importations of the Island are foodstuffs or articles of clothing, it necessarily follows that the masses discharge the great bulk of the customs duties. At the same time large tracts of land that are held by their wealthy owners at high figures are exempted from taxation entirely.

Is it any wonder that the peasant groans under the load? It is true that he works intermittently and loafs unnecessarily, but that is no good reason why his last dollar should be squeezed out of him, and, if he earned more, he would probably invite heavier taxation. He has no encouragement to exert himself beyond the needs of the present hour. He is probably occupying land that he may be required to vacate to-morrow. He can find no better market for his produce than the precarious one of the adjacent village. Enterprise is an invitation to the spoilers of the capital and the petty officials of his locality. If you should ask his candid opinion, it would be that conditions are no better than they were under Spain, and perhaps not quite as good. You may attempt to relieve his depression by a reminder of his splendid independence. He will not understand what you are talking about, although he is far from being a dullard. He fought in the wars of independence because he was assured that success would mean a full stomach and perchance the ownership of a scrap of land. It resulted in neither and, unless restrained by scepticism, he would fight again, under any banner, for the same promise. Independence per se is of no more value to him than a cocoanut husk. He can not eat it and it will not buy calico for his woman.

The only class of Cubans that is waxing fat and living in contentment is that composed of the office-holders,—the professional politicians. They toil not, but they reap with prodigious assiduity. They fill easy jobs on extravagant salaries and try to persuade the country that they are performing extremely difficult and important tasks. Their sole interest and concern is to fill their pockets with as little exertion as need be. The welfare of the people is a matter of no consideration to them. The only fly in their ointment is the fact that they can not all be in office at the same time, and so the “ins” are disturbed by the uncomfortable knowledge that the “outs” are constantly scheming to oust them.

The peasant has entirely lost whatever faith he may have had in the politician. The man who pulled the chestnuts out of the fire is growing impatient of supporting a lot of unnecessary office-holders. The peasant is supine to a shameful degree, but there is a limit to his forbearance, and it has almost been reached. He is ripe to serve the purposes of any agitators—any one who will offer a fair prospect of changed conditions.

But, be it well understood, this unrest and dissatisfaction are the outcome of basic causes. They can only be remedied by radical reformation of the economic and political state of the country. And such reformation is not to be expected from any native source. Cuba’s salvation depends upon guidance and aid from without, or, if not that, from the foreign element within her borders. This fact has become so obvious that even the organs of the politicians admit it. All classes, save the numerically smallest, are weary and disgusted with the condition of things. They can find no remedy at the polls. If the present administration is ejected, it is sure to be followed by another as bad, or worse.

When it comes to a consideration of the best means to relieve Cuba’s distress, the factors in the matter are found to be so complex, and the opinions on the subject so diverse, that it is extremely difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion. One point, at least, almost all students of the situation are agreed upon, and that is that the United States fell very short of affording the Cubans the assistance in rehabilitating themselves that they had a right to expect, and that the hasty manner in which they were left to their own resources is mainly responsible for the confusion that has existed ever since.

If the Cuban has not an actual ineptitude for exercising the functions of government, he must be disqualified by utter inexperience. The brief period of autonomy is hardly worth considering in this respect. Before the present century only a very small proportion of the population had ever exercised the elementary political function of voting. Under Spain the affairs of the country were regulated to the smallest detail by the national authority, which extended its paternal supervision to matters affecting the private life of the individual. For instance, regulations for the conduct of the bull-ring and the cock-pit emanated from the captain-general, and under his instructions the petty officers were constituted censors of the morals of private citizens, with power to punish offenders.

Another equally serious disqualification is to be found in the large proportion of illiterates in Cuba. These comprise more than half the total population. The great majority of them are campesinos, rustics. Nevertheless, it is to the country districts that we must look for the best thought and the greatest influence in future political movements. City dwellers are prone to act and think in mass, to be led by the crowd and to be unduly influenced by the press. The guajiro, who owns a little patch of ground, but is utterly lacking in education, is a safer and more valuable political unit than the average citizen of Habana.

Order was established and a workable form of government framed in Cuba by the United States, but its action in leaving this machinery entirely under the control of an inexperienced and immature people was like placing a razor in the hands of a child. The needs of the Island were sacrificed to the political exigencies of its protector. This is a fact that will hardly admit of dispute. The leading Cuban papers and the most representative citizens of the country declared unequivocally that the people were not prepared nor qualified to assume the responsibility of self-government. Governor Magoon, in a report which was suppressed, made similar representations to his superiors in Washington. Nevertheless, thirteen months after the transfer of the Island from Spain to the United States, President Roosevelt ordered that withdrawal should take place one year later and “under no circumstances and for no reason” should our occupancy be extended beyond the date set, which happened to be just before the assembling of the presidential conventions. We committed our first injustice to the country and made our first mistake in the treatment of it by that hasty and premature abandonment. We have already paid a heavy price for the blunder and Cuba has suffered severely from the effects of it. But our responsibility still exists and the task remains to be performed. There is no possibility of avoidance. Sooner or later we must take the work of Cuba’s regeneration in hand seriously and carry it out thoroughly. How this shall be done is difficult of conjecture.

A small number of men in this country, whose opinions on any subject command respect, believe that the best course will be found in leaving Cuba to work out her own difficulties without interference. The advocates of this laissez faire policy point to Mexico, the Argentine, and other Latin-American republics as shining examples of peoples who have independently worked out similar problems and have brought their countries through long periods of misery and disturbance to peaceful prosperity. But there are two strong objections to this policy. In the first place, the United States is pledged to the Cubans and the world at large to maintain order in the Island. No one who is familiar with conditions can believe that the Cubans are capable of carrying on a government for a period of five years without revolutionary eruptions. Is it conceivable that the people of the United States would allow their government to step in periodically to suppress disturbances and to step out promptly as soon as peace should be restored? It is safe to say, that the next occupation of Cuba by the United States, which can not be delayed many years, will last for a considerably longer period than did either of the preceding occupations. Then again, the situation in Cuba contains a very important element which destroys the applicability to it of the examples cited. During their formative stages Mexico, Argentina, and the other Latin-American countries contemplated were undeveloped and comparatively little foreign capital was invested in them. Cuba, on the contrary, is the scene of an advanced economic development. Almost the entire country belongs to aliens, who have billions of their money sunk in it. Is it at all probable that these persons and corporations would submit to the loss or deterioration of their property that would assuredly be involved in an independent government of Cuba by the Cubans? The monied interests form at present the most determined of the classes that look for a radical change in conditions. They know that trouble is constantly in the air and may take definite form at any moment.

What is the prospect of the Cubans working out an orderly and efficient government unaided? Up to the present, notwithstanding ample opportunity, there is not even the nucleus of a stable and rational political party in the country. The best men stand aloof, or find themselves hopelessly excluded from participation in public affairs. They complain, but their plaints are vague and indeterminate. All classes of Cubans, but one, are clamoring for a

change, but no class has put its hopes and wishes into definite utterance. The press is hardly more explicit in its demands and denunciations. The following quotation from the Unión Española, of Habana, affords a typical illustration:

“Political anarchy, by which the country is at present confronted, is daily growing greater. It would seem as though all the political elements had made an agreement to perturb, or rather to dissolve, the nation, for the tendency on all sides is to dissolution. It is time the true patriots sounded the alarm, and that politicians pause in their work of destruction, curbing bits, that the Cuban people may continue the ministering of its destinies and in the possession of self-government. It would be shameful, worse than shameful, criminal, that Cubans, drunk with sordid ambition and in petty strife for self-aggrandisement, should again wreck the republic, turning over this island to the covetous stranger to exploit it and lord over it.”

It is hardly possible to avoid the conviction that Cuba’s ultimate fate will be annexation to the United States, or some very similar state. The United States has on five different occasions emphatically and distinctly declared its intention to preserve the independence of Cuba. These formal and public announcements would make it difficult for any administration to countenance, and much more to take the initiative in, any movement tending to annexation. But several contingencies are conceivable which might make it possible for the United States to take Cuba into the federation with a good grace.

The result may be brought about by one of several causes, or by combination of them.

It is highly probable that abuse of political power, or revolution, will make American intervention again necessary before long. If the next occupation is not permanent, the one succeeding it is likely to be so. The people of America will tire of the trouble and expense of periodical correction of conditions in Cuba.

The property owning class in Cuba, native as well as foreign, is almost unanimously in favor of the annexation of the Island to the United States, and a majority of the resident Spaniards entertain the same sentiment. If this class should unite in action it would be irresistible. Should it form a political party, with annexation as its chief platform, it could overcome the professional politicians and control Congress. A majority of the peasantry would undoubtedly support such a party. The Island might thus pass in a legal manner by vote of the people.

The same result might be brought about by the monied interests deciding to buy the Congressional vote without going to the trouble and expense of creating a genuine majority in the Legislature.

If none of the suggested contingencies should come about, it is highly probable that Cuba will eventually come into the Union by a process somewhat similar to that which brought Hawaii under the flag. American interests and American citizens are constantly increasing in the Island. It is not difficult to imagine a coup d’état, resulting in a government in the hands of Americans.

If the desire of a majority of the Cubans were all that was necessary to bring about annexation, the matter might be accomplished without serious difficulty. There are, however, many obstacles in the way when the question is viewed from the standpoint of the other party to the transaction. The United States would derive important advantages from the possession of Cuba, but in several respects the American people would suffer by the arrangement.

At the outset a difficulty would arise as to the terms of admission. The most enthusiastic advocates of annexation among intelligent Cubans would not be willing to come under the American flag with anything less than the status and rights of a state. This attitude is easy to appreciate. Cuba’s population, wealth, resources, commerce, industries, and strategic position would fully justify her aspirations to the highest rank among America’s possessions. She would not be content with a territorial position, and the proposition, which has been advanced, that she should accept the indefinite status of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, is not worth a moment’s consideration.

Despite official figures to the contrary, it is the conviction of many who have had the best possible opportunities for judging, that a large majority of the native population of Cuba have negro blood in their veins. Practically one hundred per cent. of the people profess the Roman Catholic faith and Spanish is the mother tongue of the same proportion. Would the American nation agree to the construction of a sister state out of such material?

The admission to the United States of Cuba’s products free of duty would constitute a serious menace to Louisiana’s chief industry and to the growing beet sugar industry of our northwestern territory. The fruit growers of California and Florida would suffer from competition with products raised by cheaper labor, and to a less extent the tobacco growers of Virginia and Kentucky would feel the same pressure.

As to the advantages that Cuba would enjoy from annexation, there can be no question. The most obvious and pronounced would be the assurance of good government, perpetual peace within her borders, an incalculably better administration than the present at one-third of its cost, free trade with the United States, and a market there for all her products and purchases.

Perhaps Cuba might approximate closely to the enjoyment of these benefits under an arrangement which could be effected with much less difficulty than annexation. A permanent protectorate, if introduced with the usual methods of soothing and placating the protected, would probably solve Cuba’s difficulties more effectually than any other plan at present practicable. Out of such a state, Cuba might at some future date become a member of the Union by a gradual process of evolution. There is, of course, the objection to such an arrangement that it would impair the independence which we have promised to maintain, but when both parties to an agreement are willing to waive its terms there should be no obstruction to cancelling it. Furthermore, if such a protectorate should be established it will no doubt grow out of a presumptively temporary occupation. The process would be something like that which has resulted in England’s established control over Egypt. When the British occupation of that country occurred the administration under Gladstone declared positively that Great Britain would retire as soon as her work should be done. She has now, however, no thought of ever doing so. Her control of the country is undoubtedly a great benefit to the people, and the world at large would regret her relinquishment of it. Our Government is acting in a similar manner in its treatment of the Filipinos. No statesman in the country now contemplates the independence of those people as within the bounds of probability.

Under a protectorate it would be possible for the United States to insure to the Cubans a considerable measure of the benefits that would accrue to them from annexation, without entailing upon this country the disadvantages which would follow the latter measure.

CHAPTER IX

CUBA’S SUGAR INDUSTRY

years. We now dispose of eighty pounds of sugar annually for every soul in our population, while twenty years ago the average was little more than fifty pounds. This consumption takes no account of the large quantity of confections, especially chocolate, imported into the country in a manufactured condition. Only in Great Britain are the figures higher than with us. There they rise to one hundred pounds. Denmark comes next with seventy-five pounds, then Switzerland, with sixty. Thrifty Germany, which produces the largest beet crop in the world, and in fact controls the world’s sugar market, uses very little of the commodity itself. Its per capita consumption is only forty-two pounds, being about the same as that of Holland. Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Servia, each consumes less than ten pounds of sugar per head of its population, the poverty of their peoples doubtless accounting in the main for the small figures.

Sugar in some form has been used by the inhabitants of the globe from the earliest times. Until the fifteenth century before Christ, the chief source of supply was honey. It was at about that time that the value of cultivating the wild sugar cane was discovered in India, and it is probable that the first manufacture of sugar in any manner should be credited to that country. For many centuries, only the raw juice was expressed, until about 700 B.C. the employment of fire in concentrating it came into use. From India the art spread rapidly among the ancient nations, but did not reach Western Europe until several centuries later. Columbus carried sugar cane from the Canary Islands to the West Indies, whence it extended to the mainland, and thus, in a progress of three thousand years, encircled the earth.

The production of sugar in the New World became so great within a century after its introduction, that the importers of Europe turned to it for the supply which they had formerly received from the Orient. Spain, Italy, and Egypt, large producers of sugar at that time, could not meet the competition with the American output, and soon ceased to cultivate cane commercially. Free land and slave labor enabled the planters of the West Indies to sell sugar at lower figures, with larger profit, than could the growers of any other part of the world.

To-day sugar is produced under the most diversified conditions and in the most scattered regions. In many countries, such as India, Malaysia, and the Philippines, cane is raised and sugar manufactured by the crudest processes, with the cheapest labor. The product is low grade and the extraction small. In other countries, such as Hawaii and Cuba, the most improved methods are employed, and skilled labor engaged at high wages.

The competition between cane-producing countries is so great that a moderate advantage gained by one will sometimes destroy the industry of another. Such was the case when our reciprocal tariff arrangement with Cuba resulted in closing the mills of Jamaica. In recent years the keenest rivalry has existed between cane and beet sugar. At first the latter had great difficulty in forcing a place for itself in the world’s markets, but with government subsidies, improvement in cultivation, and economies in manufacture, it gradually became an irresistible competitor of cane. During the past fifteen years beet sugar has come to the front with great strides, and now it divides the world’s consumption with the cane product.

Cuba produces considerably more than one-fourth of the entire cane sugar of the world, devoting two million acres to the crop. More than four-fifths of this area is in the provinces of Santa Clara, Matanzas and Oriente. The Island’s output in recent years has been about 11,500,000 tons a year, yielding somewhat more than 1,000,000 tons of refined sugar. Enormous as is this production, it falls far short of the quantity that could be produced if larger areas of the available suitable land were put under cultivation and if such scientific and intensive methods as prevail in some other countries were employed.

Sugar cane was probably first grown in Cuba some time about the middle of the sixteenth century, under the encouragement of a royal bounty. The industry made but slow progress during the next two and a half centuries. In 1850, the sugar production of the Island had reached approximately 300,000 tons. Since then it has steadily increased, the million mark having been attained in 1894. During the latter half of the nineteenth century a tendency to centralization set in. Previous to that period the crop had been raised on a large number of small plantations, each working entirely independently. In 1880 began the movement toward the establishment of “centrals” for

the performance of the extractive operations. There are now nearly two hundred of these buildings in the Island. At the same time the combination of small plantations resulted in a decrease in numbers with an increase in average size.

The million ton mark gained in 1894 was upheld in the following year, but in 1896 the war was in full blast, and the year’s output was barely more than 225,000 tons.

During the last war of independence the sugar plantations throughout Cuba were either utterly ruined, or severely damaged. Since the war, the industry has been resuscitated by the investment of vast amounts of money, the erection of modern buildings, and the installation of the latest types of machinery. As a considerable proportion of this investment was American money, American methods have been extensively introduced. The result of all this is a complete reformation of the industry in all its branches. There is, nevertheless, room for further improvement, especially in the field. A better quality of cane might be secured by intelligent selection, and the invention of a harvester would result in a great economy.

The latter-day sugar plantation is a very extensive establishment and costs from five hundred thousand dollars to several millions. One of the largest and most complete in Cuba is that called the Central Preston, belonging to the Nipe Bay Company, and situated on Nipe Bay. The factory, according to the latest method, is erected close to the wharves at Punta Tabaco. Thence the cane lands extend inland and along the shore for twenty-five miles.

The present grinding capacity of three thousand eight hundred tons of cane a day is shortly to be increased to five thousand tons, when the factory will be the largest in the world.

The main building, entirely of steel construction, has a frontage of 312 feet and a depth of 234 feet on one side and 330 feet on the other. Separate buildings are devoted to carpenter shops, machine shops, foundry, refrigerating and ice plants.

Besides the usual full equipment of pumps, juice heaters, clarifiers, filter presses, etc., the factory installation includes ten 600 horsepower vertical water tube boilers with bagasse burning furnaces, automatically fed by bagasse carriers and the latest improved type of furnace feeders; two tandems of 36 inch × 84 inch nine-roll mills, with crushers, each tandem of mills being driven by one 32 inch × 60 inch Corliss engine and each crusher by one 20 inch × 42 inch Corliss engine. Two Lillie Quadruple Effects, each of a capacity to evaporate 600,000 gallons, reversible both as to vapor and liquor. Four 14 inch steel vacuum pans, each equipped with its own vacuum pump and condenser. For the injection water, three-stage direct connected centrifugal pumps are used, one of which is a reserve, throwing 3,500 gallons of water per minute. Twenty-two crystallizers, with an aggregate capacity of 37,400 cubic feet; thirty 40 inch Weston centrifugal machines and the most improved installation of conveyors, and other auxiliary and automatic machinery of practical design for the handling of the finished product. Three molasses storage tanks, of 425,000 gallons capacity each, accommodate the final molasses thrown off by the factory. These are situated near the wharf, and from them shipment in bulk is made directly into deep draught tank steamers.

The company’s railroad is thirty-five miles in length, of standard gauge, laid in 60-pound rails, and furnished with cars completely made of steel and having each a capacity of twenty tons.

When it is considered that the entire tonnage of many thousand acres must be transported within a certain period to a central point, and that the supply of cane to the factory must be equal and continuous to avoid the losses that result from retardation or stoppage of the mill, the great importance of the transportation system on a plantation may be appreciated.

The modern method of the large central with its immense sphere of influence, necessitates that the railroad be thoroughly equipped and efficiently managed. The old practice of carrying the cane from field to factory in an ox cart has passed into disuse along with the small mill, and has been superseded by the present railroad, with standard gauge roadbeds, heavy rails, steel cars, powerful locomotives, and schedule running, the whole being under the direction of a practical railroad man, as train despatcher. Although the standard gauge is often used, the narrow gauge is generally employed. On estates which are a considerable distance from any trunk line or public road, the latter is preferable on account of the lower cost with correspondingly smaller car capacity; while on large estates, where the cars have a capacity of twenty tons or over, it is necessary to lay the standard gauge road for the greater efficiency and smaller cost of maintenance.

Opinions vary as to the most convenient and economical size of car to be used on small and large plantations. It is, however, beginning to be generally admitted that the larger the car, having in mind the weight of the rail, the better the results. Experienced constructors are now recommending a steel frame car, mounted on strong trucks, with automatic couplers and air brake attachments. A steel car has been found by carefully observed experience to have a longer life than a wooden one, since it is in the field the year round, and if it is well painted the deterioration is much less than with the other style.

Recently, plantation operators have learned that it is a mistake to use light locomotives with heavy loads. The result is an abnormal deterioration, while when a locomotive of sufficient power and weight is used, less trouble is experienced in hauling the train and the wear and tear is minimized. Up-to-date plantations are furnished with an adequate round-house, where the engines can be under the eye of an experienced mechanic, and where repairs can conveniently be made.

Closely connected with the railroad is the telephone system, which is of great service to the train despatcher, in many instances avoiding serious delays at the mill. The telephone is also, of course, in constant use by all branches of the operation.

The method of discharging cane from the cars is very different from the old slow process, which was akin to that of unloading a hay wagon with pitchforks. Nowadays an electric overhead travelling crane lifts the cane from the car, weighs it automatically in suspension, and then drops it into the cane hopper and elevator.

The tendency of late years has been towards the construction of large centrals, either by the consolidation of a number of the smaller and older ones, or by the erection of new sugar houses, thus effecting vast economies in field transportation and factory labor, and bringing the cost of maintenance and manufacture to a minimum.

Large centrals necessarily employ a large number of laborers during the crop season, as well as in the dead season, and in order to make

them contented and break their former habit of moving from one locality to another at the prompting of a whim, it has been found advantageous to provide them with comfortable homes and sanitary surroundings. This latter-day development is well exemplified in the village of Preston, attached to the plantation under consideration. The streets are wide and regular, and each is lined with model dwelling-houses. The sanitary arrangements are in charge of a specially organized corps of experienced men. A large and well-equipped school is maintained; there are two churches of different denominations, besides a well-stocked store, where goods are sold at cost. The company operates a modern hotel in the village, where meals are dispensed at small cost to those who prefer not to cook in their houses.

As each succeeding generation receives educational advantages, it follows that there is a constantly increasing desire to live on a better plane and under improved conditions. Therefore the provision of proper accommodations becomes an economic necessity upon large centrals, where the supply of labor must be dependable, and can be best made so by encouraging it to become permanently resident. This system will go a long way toward tending to solve the labor problem for large corporations, and deserves the serious attention of all employers of labor in considerable numbers.

The present method of sugar production distinctly separates the operations of cane growing and sugar manufacture. The latter involves by far the greater expense and yields proportionally greater profit. Much the greater proportion of the skill called into play by the industry is also applied to the factory operations. It is still the case that some large estates control and work entire plantations, but there are more centrals that have nothing to do with the cane until it is cut and delivered to their cars. In such cases, a number of plantations, large and small, the average size being about 1500 acres, lie in the vicinity of the central and furnish its material under contract. The usual arrangement is to give the cane planter five per cent. of the sugar produced from his supply.

The workings, costs, and returns, of a moderate-sized mill are shown in the following statement which was recently formulated by a thoroughly practical and experienced sugar manufacturer of Cuba.

A mill designed to handle 100,000 bags of sugar in a crop season will require about $1,000,000 investment, including $150,000 for running expenses. The area of cane necessary to supply such a mill is 6,000 acres. This, if owned and worked by the mill, would call for an additional $500,000 investment. As has been said, however, the tendency is to secure the supply from independent growers, under contract, in the same way as the beet-sugar mills of our western country deal with the neighboring farmers. In this case, the planters receive five per cent. of the cane in sugar, or its equivalent in money. Sugar cane in Cuba contains from ten to twelve per cent. of sugar, of which the mill retains five or seven per cent. Plantation and mill management are generally separated, in few cases combined.

The calculation of returns is based on the very conservative rates of ten per cent. extraction and a price of 2.75 cents per pound. The price of sugar is subject to great and frequent fluctuations, but there are mills in Cuba that produce a twelve per cent. average constantly.

The 6,000 acres (180 caballerias) presupposed will produce 325,000,000 pounds of cane, and from this will be extracted 32,500,000 pounds of sugar, or the equivalent of 100,000 bags of 325 pounds each.

The beet-sugar competition of late years, and particularly that of the German product which is supported by a bounty, has had a very depressing effect upon the Cuban industry. This was considerably relieved by the countervailing duty placed upon bounty sugar by the Dingley Bill of 1894. The effect of this was to place the latter products on exactly the same footing, so far as the United States market is concerned, as though they did not enjoy the advantage of a bounty. The competition is still severe, however, on account of the vast quantity of Germany’s production and the lower cost of it. This is due, not to cheaper labor, but to more scientific and intensive methods. In fact, the future value of Cuban sugar is dependent not upon the cost of producing it so much, as upon the cost of production in Germany, and the extent to which the commodity may be admitted duty free into the United States from Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico.

On this subject, Mr. E. F. Atkins is quoted as follows in Industrial Cuba:

“With new capital and skill the average cost of production in Cuba can be reduced, and with either free sugars or a uniform rate of duty in the United States, assessed upon all sugar (a countervailing duty to offset foreign bounties being always maintained), she can hold her own and recover her prestige as a sugar-producing country, but the margin of profit in sugar manufacture is so small, and the world’s capacity for production so great, that Cuba cannot recover her prosperity in the face of any advantage to be given to sugars from other countries entering the United States. At current prices in Cuba, cane is worth to the planter the equivalent of $2 to $2.50 per ton net, out of which price he must pay for his planting and cultivation, cutting and delivery to the nearest factory or railroad point. As the cost of cane production consists almost entirely of labor, and wages in Cuba, for some years previous to the insurrection, ranged about the same in Spanish gold as similar work commanded in the United States, the profits in this branch of the business have not been great, and have been dependent upon skill in management, quality of lands, and proximity to the factories.

“The supply of labor and rates of wages in the future are now most serious questions to the sugar producer in Cuba, and present the greatest obstacle to reduction of cost. For supplies of cane the manufacturer must depend either upon his own resources, or upon large planters. Factories to be operated at a profit must be kept running day and night, and cane, owing to its nature, must be ground immediately it is cut. The grinding season in Cuba