These were fair professions; nor were the intentions of the Central Junta less laudable than their language. Tilly alone excepted, the members were upright and honourable men, worthy to represent a nation distinguished for its high sense of honour. But they were unacquainted with each other, and except the President, Jovellanos, and Garay, wholly unused to business: for a national assembly too few, and for an executive government too many. Jovellanos was of opinion that they ought immediately to appoint a regency of five persons, one of them being a dignitary of the church, to be installed on the first day of the ensuing year: that the Central Junta should then be reduced to half its original number, retaining one member only of each deputation, for the purpose of watching over the observance of the constitution entrusted to the regency, and corresponding with the provincial Juntas, which should thenceforward consist of four members each: these were to exist as long as the Council of Regency; and the Central Junta of Correspondence, as it was then to be called, only till the meeting of the Cortes, which Jovellanos maintained ought immediately to be announced as to assemble as soon as the enemy should have been driven out of Spain, or, at all events, in two years from the present time, if the delivery of the country should not be accomplished before. He proposed also that the Junta, before it resigned its powers, should appoint persons qualified for such a task to prepare plans of reform in the constitution, laws, finance, system of public instruction, army, and marine; ... these plans were to be formed under the inspection and approbation of the Council of Regency and the Junta of Correspondence, and finally submitted to the Cortes. ♦1808.
October.♦ In delivering this advice, Jovellanos, to remove all suspicion of any interested views, repeated in writing the solemn declaration which he had before made by word of mouth, that he never would accept of any office or employment himself; the natural and invincible repugnance which he had ever felt for such preferment, the bitter price which he had paid for having once accepted it, in deference to a brother whom he respected like a parent, and the sad sense of decay both in his physical and moral powers, determined him to this resolution. The only duty which he would undertake to perform was ♦Jovellanos Memoria, p. ii. § 33, 34. Appendices, No. 5.♦ the noble one of simply delivering those opinions which he thought most conducive to the good of his country, in discharge of the high trust wherewith his own province had honoured him.

Jovellanos expected the greatest benefit from a Cortes; but he apprehended great evil if it were hastily convoked, and without due preparation. That party who have since assumed the appellation of Liberales censured him for proposing to postpone it so long. They were then a very small, but active, minority, consisting chiefly of physicians, lawyers, and unbelieving priests, whose little knowledge, exclusively derived from prohibited French books, was worse than ignorance. These persons were for hurrying on to a jacobinical revolution, and were impatient for a Cortes as the first great means of embodying that democracy which they expected to govern. But there were also many of the best of the Spaniards who looked to the Cortes as the surest means of delivering their country, and restoring it to its former dignity and power; and the same views were very generally entertained in England, and by the British Government itself. In fact, the assembling of a Cortes had been proposed by our first authorized agent, Mr. Stuart, to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias. Some of the difficulties which would attend it were then perceived; the Asturians proposed that it should assemble at Oviedo, the Galicians at Villa Franca in the Bierzo, each Junta wishing that it should be convoked near their own place of abode; and for the purpose of retaining their power, they wished to enlarge the deputation, so that all their own members might be included. Though it was thus seen that the measure was not so easily accomplished as had been supposed, still the opinion prevailed in England, that if a free legislative assembly were established in Spain, the same blessings would ensue as the British people enjoy under the well-tempered constitution which has grown with their growth, and adapted itself to their circumstances. There are errors from which it is painful to be undeceived. Those persons were wiser in their generation, who, having the recent example of France before their eyes, believed that legislative assemblies, in countries unaccustomed to such modes of legislation, are more to be dreaded than desired; that the reformation which is thus begun tends to certain anarchy; and that where great and extensive improvements in the existing system are necessary, the only means whereby they can be effected, without inducing worse evils than those which are removed, is by an upright and far-sighted minister, under a strong government. Upon ♦Florida-Blanco averse to it.♦ this point Florida-Blanca judged more truly than Jovellanos. Such, however, was the respect with which the opinions of that admirable man were at this time heard, that his proposal would have been carried, if the Junta had come ♦Jovellanos Memoria, p. ii. § 35.♦ to an immediate decision upon it; and it was only by deferring the final discussion till Nov. 7, being that day month, that the minority averted a measure which shocked their prejudices as much as it alarmed their fears.

The Junta were at this time full of hope; they had just confidence in the national character; and they were elated by the enthusiastic spirit which had manifested itself, the splendid successes which had been obtained, the apparent inactivity of the enemy, and the promised co-operation of Great Britain, which had already effected the delivery of Portugal. They had also encouraging advices from Catalonia. After relieving Figueras, the French dispatched a force from that fortress to get possession of Rosas, but failed in the attempt. ♦July 16.♦ Ill armed, and worse disciplined as they were, the Catalans displayed that unconquerable spirit which in all ages has distinguished them.

In no other province were such great and continued exertions made against the invaders: and in no other province were the people left so entirely to their own resources. They made the most urgent solicitations to the Junta of Seville for a supply of artillery, which could have been spared in abundance from the arsenals of Seville and Cadiz, and which Lord Collingwood offered them the means of conveying; but they could obtain none, and were fain, therefore, to use the trunks of trees, bored, and hooped with iron. The want of cavalry was even more severely felt in all the level part of the country; ... no substitute could be found for this, nor was it possible that their volunteers and newly-raised levies could resist the well-disciplined horse-soldiers upon plain ground. They had, however, been eminently successful where the ground favoured them; and confiding in their numbers, they occupied the right bank of the Llobregat from San Boy to Martorell, in order to distress the enemy in Barcelona. From thence they were dislodged by General Lechi, who, marching out by night with 2500 men, forded the river in several places at daybreak, drove them from their batteries, sacked the towns and villages along the line, set fire to them, and returned in triumph, bearing as trophies the banners of the churches which had been plundered. ♦Duhesme resolves to besiege Gerona.♦ Duhesme then resolved to undertake the siege of Gerona, having concerted it with Reille, who was to co-operate with him from Figueras. It was an object of great importance; for while Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards, they would be able greatly to molest, if not wholly to interrupt, the communication by land between Barcelona and France. Materials of every kind were found in the well-stored arsenals and magazines of Barcelona, and the horses, mules, and carriages of the inhabitants of that city were put in requisition for conveying them. So sure of success was Duhesme, and so exasperated by his former failure, that he is ♦Cabañes, p. i. 80–85.♦ said to have declared he would arrive before the city on one day, attack it the next, take it on the third day, and on the fourth destroy it.

He began his march on the 10th of July, with about 6000 men. From Barcelona to Gerona is a journey of twenty hours; but Duhesme had not calculated upon the obstacles which he was to encounter on the way. The road for two-thirds of the distance lies always within sight of the sea, and in great part along the coast; the Catalans, under D. Francisco Milans, had broken it up, and annoyed him with great activity on his left, while an English frigate, and some smaller vessels, brought their guns to bear upon him from the sea; these impediments delayed him five days between Caldetas and San Pol. On the 19th he divided his troops; one part crossed the wild mountains of Vallgorguina to S. Celoni, and endeavoured by a sudden attack to get possession of Hostalrich. Twice they attempted to escalade it, and were repulsed with loss by the acting governor D. Manuel O’Sulivan. The other division continued the coast road, losing many guns and much of its ammunition there. They rejoined on the way to Gerona, and arrived before that city on the 22nd, where they were met on the following day by Reille ♦Cabañes, i. 85–87.♦ with 2000 men from Figueras; but Duhesme had suffered so much on the march, that he was in no condition for active operations, and the remainder of the month was employed in preparing for the siege.

On the very day that the French General appeared for the second time before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, with 4600 regular troops from Minorca, landed at Tarragona. Many officers, who had hitherto remained in Barcelona, and several magistrates, escaped now from that city to join it. The first measure of the Marques was to strengthen the line of the Llobregat, which the Somatenes and Miquelets, undismayed by their late defeat, had again occupied. The Conde de Caldagues was sent with a detachment upon this service, and the garrison, who made a vigorous attempt to dislodge him immediately on his arrival, were repulsed. The Catalans were now in high spirits, and with the assistance of Lord Cochrane, in the Imperieuse frigate, made a successful attack upon the Castle of Mongat, a small fort on the coast, about nine miles from Barcelona, which the French had strengthened, as a point of support for their plundering incursions to the eastward. About an hundred prisoners were taken there, seven pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity or ammunition ♦1808.
August.♦ and stores. The enemy could no longer maraud in that direction, and feeling great present inconvenience, began to apprehend serious consequences ♦Barcelona blockaded.♦ from the blockade of Barcelona: the British cruisers watched it effectually by sea, and in the only part of the land now open to them, which was the mountainous country in their immediate vicinity, between the Llobregat and the Besos, they had to contend with an ♦Cabañes, p. ii. 3–25.♦ armed and exasperated peasantry; for even those persons who would have remained quiet were driven to despair by the system of fire and sword which Duhesme pursued.

Barcelona, with its fort Monjuich, is one of the strongest places in Europe. It is remarked by Swinburne, that the citadel was calculated to overawe the inhabitants at least as much as to protect them from a foreign enemy. For this in fact it was built, when six hundred houses were demolished for its site; and to the same purpose it was now applied against the family which built it, when Buonaparte’s perfidy had made the Bourbons as popular in Catalonia as they had been hated there during the war of the succession. Every house in Barcelona lies exposed to Monjuich, which stands singly on the south-west. A new fortress had been erected there early in Charles the Third’s reign, and it had that completeness and magnificence which characterised public works in Spain. On the sea side it was considered impregnable, so admirably had the natural strength of the situation been improved by art; and toward the land the glacis had been sloped at an incredible expense in such a manner that no approaches could be made under shelter. The population of Barcelona in 1797 was 130,000, and if the increase since had been in proportion to that of the ten years preceding, it must have amounted to 150,000 at this time. Yet this population, than which a braver and nobler-minded people were no where to be found, was kept under control by 4000 French, Lechi having been left with no greater force. The city was so completely at the mercy of the citadel and Monjuich, that the invaders had nothing to fear from open attacks. Their only danger was from stratagems or famine. Against the former they were always on their guard; and it was to open the communication for supplies and reinforcements from France that Duhesme had undertaken the expedition against Gerona.

The Marques del Palacio arrived in Catalonia without treasure or provisions, and there was no government to which he could look for either. The contributions which had been raised had already been expended, and nothing was to be obtained by way of loan. A temporary resource was found in the confiscation of French property; for in these calamitous times the numerous French families who were settled in Spain bore their full share in the general misery and ruin. These funds, however, could not long suffice; and for the better establishment of some permanent system, it was agreed that the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, which had hitherto resided at Lerida, should remove from that inconvenient situation, and accompany in future the head-quarters. The Junta was newly constituted accordingly, and the Commander-in-chief was chosen president. The Marques would now have marched to raise the siege of Gerona; but such means as he would have deemed adequate were wanting; he had no cavalry, the little which there was in Lerida and Tarragona was unfit for action, and perhaps he reasonably distrusted his troops if they were led against a well-disciplined ♦Caldagues sent to interrupt the siege of Gerona.♦ army. Caldagues, however, was sent to harass the enemy and interrupt the siege, with four companies of regular troops, 2000 Miquelets and Somatens, and three pieces of artillery. He was joined at Hostalrich by more of these new levies, making his whole number 4300 men, and he received two cannon from that fortress. They advanced to Castella, passing within sight of the French encampment; some officers came out of ♦Cabañes, ii. 30–32, 52–55.♦ the city to confer with the Count, and a joint attack upon the enemy’s batteries was concerted for the following morning.

This was on the night of the 15th; Duhesme had been so harassed in his operations, and so slow in them, that though he arrived before Gerona on the 19th of July, it was not till the morning of August 13 that his batteries began their fire. It was directed chiefly against the Castle, which, like that at Barcelona, bears the name of Monjuich, and which, with all the other forts around Gerona, had been neglected, and was in a state of great dilapidation. On the 15th a considerable breach had been made. The garrison was then strengthened with 900 men, who were ordered to be ready at daybreak, and to sally as soon as the relieving troops should be ascending the hill of Monjuich; but instead of waiting for this, they sallied as soon as they saw them marching down the distant heights of St. Miguel and Los Angeles. The execution therefore was as rash as the plan, and certainly few attempts in war have ever been made in which there was so little reasonable prospect of success. The besieging army consisted of 11,000 men, of which 1000 were cavalry, all disciplined soldiers, upon whom their officers could rely. There were 4700 regular troops in Gerona, who, for want of discipline, were not to be relied on in the field; and of the force which Caldagues had now collected, amounting to 6000, there were but 300 regulars. But Duhesme was at this time too much dispirited by the general prospect of affairs in Spain, and the reverses which he himself had suffered, to be sensible of his own superiority, or to profit by the errors of his opponents. One battery was taken at the point of the bayonet in this premature sally, and presently set on fire. A second also was stormed; the French, who had been driven from it, recovered it, being reinforced by a Swiss battalion; but a column of the Spaniards arrived in time to assist their countrymen, and it was again taken, and the carriages burnt. D. Henrique O’Donell, who held the rank of Sargento Mayor in the regiment of Ultonia, distinguished himself greatly in this part of the action. The destruction of these batteries was the object for which Caldagues had hazarded an attack upon an enemy so greatly superior in strength. His own troops, meantime, drove the French from the heights of S. Miguel to the village of Camp-Dura; from thence they, in their turn, were driven back to the heights, and being ♦Cabañes, ii. 55–62.♦ there reinforced, made the enemy again give way before them, dislodged them from Camp-Dura, and pursued them till they crossed the river Ter to Sarria.

Caldagues dispatched news of his victory from the field of battle to Tarragona, saying that the enemy’s batteries were demolished, and all the artillery taken with which they had battered Monjuich in breach. All that he had hoped, and more than he could reasonably have expected, had been obtained; and when his troops, flushed with success, would have exposed themselves in the plain to the French cavalry, he restrained them, ordered them to fortify themselves upon the heights, and exerted himself to repair the breach in Monjuich, lest it should be attacked in the morning. Duhesme indeed might have recovered in the night the positions which he had lost, so little discipline was there among the Spaniards, and so little watch or order was observed, notwithstanding the strict injunctions of the Commander. But Duhesme appears to have been one of those men who lose their powers of mind when good fortune forsakes them; and Caldagues, when day broke, and he was expecting a formidable attack, discovered, to his astonishment, that the enemy had disappeared. They had fled, rather than retreated, in the night, and in such haste, that they left several hundred barrels of powder which they might with ease have rolled into the river. Reille returned to Figueras with little loss, there being no impediment in that direction; but Duhesme, who did not venture a second time upon the coast road, when he reached Calella took a line between the high ♦Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, Pieces Justif. No. 3. Cabañes, ii. 62–81.♦ mountains and the sea, throwing his artillery down the precipices, and abandoning great part of the baggage and stores, and even leaving the sick and wounded who were not able to sit on horseback. The retreat was made with such precipitation, that Milans, who pursued, did not come up with them till they were within seven miles of Barcelona, on the heights of Mongat. But Lechi being, fortunately for them, apprised by a spy of their approach, met them there with part of the garrison, at a time when a small Spanish force might have completed their destruction.

An outcry was raised against Palacio because he had not intercepted the enemy in their retreat, nor was he ever forgiven by the unreasonable people for not having done what it was impossible to do. When the account from the field of battle reached him at Tarragona, the French were half way to Barcelona; and before he was apprised that they had broken up the siege, they were already in that city. The command which he had ♦Cabañes, ii. 101.♦ undertaken was no enviable one. The repulse of the enemy at Valencia, their losses in Andalusia, and the heroic defence of Zaragoza, had ♦Difficulties of the service.♦ raised hopes which nothing but the most brilliant success could satisfy; the service in which he was engaged required great steadiness and military skill; the best of his troops were wanting in both, and the great body of them fit only for irregular war. The Junta of Catalonia had decreed that an army of 40,000 men should be raised; and because there were no officers to command, and no time for disciplining them, they determined that the whole force should consist ♦D. Fr. Manoel Hist. de Catalaña, l. iv. p. 90.♦ of Miquelets. This class of irregular troops was originally called34Almogavares; but when they began to alter their savage appearance and barbarous mode of warfare, they took their present name from one of their favourite commanders, Miquelot de Prats, a notable partizan who attached himself to Cæsar Borgia. The name was popular among the Catalans, the Miquelets having distinguished themselves whenever the country was invaded, and especially in the succession war. It was intended to raise forty tercios of a thousand men each, and this might have been done in a few days, such was the national spirit, if equipments of every kind had not been wanting. A great bounty was given to these Miquelets, but this prevented recruiting for the line, and the regular troops were disgusted at seeing that men received larger pay for engaging in a service where they had more ♦Cabañes, i. 90–93.♦ liberty, and were subject to less discipline. On the other hand, the Miquelet officers received less pay than those of the army, and were less esteemed, their rank being only during the war. The force which was thus defective in its constitution, was also ill armed. Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon whom pressing demands for arms were made from all that side of the peninsula, could allot but few to Catalonia; and the abundant supplies which had been sent out by England were dispatched to other parts, where they were neither so much wanted nor so well bestowed; for Barcelona was the great arsenal of the province: 50,000 firelocks had there fallen into the enemy’s hands, whereas the manufactory at Ripoll could furnish the Catalans with not more than 150 per week. Palacio therefore ordered pikes or partisans to be made, with which he armed the two foremost ranks of the Miquelets, who, as upon the old system, were drawn up three deep. In hands that can be trusted with the bayonet the pike would be a weapon hardly less efficient; but for these raw troops the want of fire-arms lessened the little confidence which they felt in themselves when they were brought to encounter soldiers as well disciplined as armed. ♦Cabañes, ii. 130–132.♦ Even the regular troops knew their own inferiority in the art of war. They were incapable of manœuvring in the face of an enemy; for so greatly had their discipline been neglected while no danger was apprehended, that they had gone through none of the rehearsals by which soldiers ♦Cabañes, i. 78.♦ are prepared for real action; mere drilling seems to have been all the instruction they had received.

With this force, as ill officered as it was ill provided in all other respects, the Marques removed his head-quarters to Villa-franca, to maintain the line of the Llobregat, and take advantage of any opportunity for recovering Barcelona while the blockade was kept up. An expectation that something would be attempted by the inhabitants seems to have influenced the Spaniards to this measure, otherwise ill judged. The recovery of Barcelona was indeed an object of the greatest importance; but weakened as Duhesme then was, a few thousand Miquelets, with the armed population, would have sufficed to prevent the incursions of the garrison, and the Spaniards should have taken their post on the Pluvia instead of the Llobregat, with the Ter for their second position, and Gerona and Hostalrich to ♦Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, 280.♦ support them, ... there they could best have impeded the efforts which the French would make for relieving and securing to themselves the strongest place in Spain. A British force might here have rendered the most essential service. Deputies from the Junta of Catalonia were sent to Madrid, to consult with the Council of Generals there upon the affairs of the province; and in the hope of obtaining British aid one of them proceeded to Lisbon to confer with Sir Hew Dalrymple. All that could be done in that quarter was effected; the Spanish troops in Lisbon were embarked for Catalonia; and the British Government, sensible of what might be effected there by timely measures, ordered thither 10,000 men from the army at that time stationed ♦British troops ordered from Sicily, but detained there by the commander.♦ in Sicily. But a feint of invading Sicily was made by Murat, who had succeeded Joseph Buonaparte as Intrusive King of Naples; and the troops were detained in an inactive and unworthy service, when they ought to have been co-operating for the most important ends with one of the finest and bravest people in the world. At no other time or place during the whole war could such a body of English troops have been employed to so much effect as at this time in Catalonia. Some petty jealousies or idle forms had hitherto deprived the Catalans also of cavalry when it might have been most useful. There was a regiment of hussars in Majorca, for which the Junta repeatedly applied, and its applications were earnestly enforced by the British officers who were in communication with that island; but it was ♦Cabañes, ii. 129.♦ not till after a series of frivolous and vexatious delays that they were embarked at length in the beginning of October; and a detachment of them had not reached the Llobregat more than twenty-four hours before they were led to intercept the enemy at S. Culgat, on their return to Barcelona from a marauding expedition. Not expecting to be attacked by cavalry, the French were taken by surprise; they suffered a considerable loss, and from that time confined their incursions within narrower bounds. The troops from Portugal soon afterwards arrived; reinforcements also came from Valencia and Majorca; Palacio ♦Cabañes, ii. 161.♦ was removed from the command, because of the unpopularity which he had incurred, and was succeeded by D. Juan Miguel de Vives.

The want of military knowledge and military talent was never more severely felt in any country than in Spain at this momentous crisis. It could not be doubted that Buonaparte was preparing to bring against the Spaniards that tremendous force which none of the continental powers had hitherto been able to withstand. If he seemed to delay, it was only that the preparations might be more complete; sure, meantime, that neither Spain nor England knew at that time how to profit by the interval, and that very probably disunion might arise among the Spaniards themselves, of which he might take advantage. The French had paid dearly for the error of dividing their forces, and advancing where they had no point of support; they were now in strong positions, receiving reinforcements from time to time, and waiting in security till Buonaparte should come in person to complete the subjugation of Spain, which they, as well as the tyrant himself, believed could not be averted by any human interference. About the middle of August they sent a detachment to take possession of Bilbao, a beautiful but defenceless city, commanded on every side by its hanging gardens. The inhabitants, inferior in number, ill armed, and without any works to protect them, made a brave resistance, in revenge for which the French committed great enormities when they entered the town: had they arrived a few hours later, they would have got possession of arms, ammunition, and money from England, which were just entering the harbour.

A full sense of their danger, when the whole wrong which was intended them was avowed, had roused the Spaniards to their first great and successful exertions. After their victorious troops had entered Madrid, they were less alive to the danger, and more sensible of the embarrassments of their situation. Sudden efforts, directed by the emergency which called them forth, would no longer avail. Foresight and combination were required for extensive operations; and these were thwarted by selfish views, and still more by capricious or obstinate tempers, which in this state of general insubordination there was nothing to restrain. The Galician army under Blake, having the plains of Castille before them, could not advance without cavalry in the face of an enemy who had from three to five thousand dragoons; and Cuesta would not send his cavalry to act under Blake, because of his quarrel with that General and with the Junta of Galicia. The Extremaduran army, from a similar feeling of pride, was kept vapouring before Elvas, while it was called for by all the authorities at Madrid. A more vexatious impediment was interposed by the Junta of Seville. That Board had thought proper, when the army in Andalusia was first raised, for one of its members to accompany the Commander-in-chief, that no injury might arise from delay in consulting the civil authority, and perhaps also to rid themselves of Tilly, who was the person appointed. When, to their disgrace, they elected this man to the Central Junta, D. Andres Miñano was deputed to the army in his stead, with a salary of a thousand dollars per month; but public opinion at Seville was so strongly expressed against this misapplication of the public money, and supported by so many members, especially by the Archbishop, that the allowance was reduced one half. The whole was a needless expense, for the Junta was still so tenacious of their authority, that this representative was a mere agent to execute their pleasure, and not to determine upon his own judgement. They sent positive orders that the army of Andalusia should not advance beyond Madrid; and knowing that Castaños had delivered his opinion strongly upon the impropriety of regarding any army as belonging to its own province instead of the kingdom at large, they let him know, that if these instructions were disobeyed he should not be supplied with money. At this time the French had driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and pushed forward to Borja; the troops which were opposed to them in that quarter falling back upon Zaragoza. Pressing demands for support came from Palafox: the Generals who were at Madrid saw that the Andalusian army ought to advance without delay, and this it could not do without money. This matter was taken up warmly by the British agents at Madrid and Seville; and as the Junta of that city had received two millions of dollars from the British Government, a strong remonstrance was presented to them upon their present conduct, and they were called upon to apply it to the public service without delay. Their reply, which, like all their papers, was written with great ability, would have been satisfactory, if they had not passed over in silence their orders that Castaños should not advance. They argued, that after all that Andalusia had done, it was to be expected that La Mancha and the other provinces which the Andalusian army was gone to protect, would provide for it while it was employed in their service. The sums which they had received from Great Britain had been sent expressly to them, as other sums had to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias, who had neither incurred such expenses, nor contributed such aid to other parts of Spain. But upon this matter they waived all discussion; ... they answered the bills which an English agent at Madrid had negotiated for the use of their army, authorized Castaños to draw on them according to his wants, and immediately sent forward 200,000 dollars. This was just before the meeting of the Central Junta: the Andalusian army was then advanced to Soria, the Valencian under General Llamas moved to Zaragoza, and Blake toward Miranda upon the Ebro.

One of the first things which Castaños had requested after he had opened a communication with Gibraltar was, that dispatches might be forwarded to Romana, who commanded the Spanish troops in the Baltic. He expressed the greatest anxiety concerning him and his army, who had been thus treacherously removed to so great a distance from their own country, but at the same time the fullest confidence in them and their Commander. He judged of the men as Spaniards, of the General by his individual character. D. Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marques de la Romana, was a man whose happy nature had resisted all the evil and debilitating influences of the age and country and rank in which he was born. His public career was begun in the navy; but having attained the rank of Capitan de Fragata, he quitted that profession for the land service, a change not unfrequent in Spain. During the French revolutionary war he served under his uncle, D. Ventura Caro, who commanded on the Biscayan frontier; and having distinguished himself there, was made General of division in the army of Catalonia, under Urrutia, where he continued to be conspicuous for his good conduct. When that miserably misconducted war was concluded by a scandalous peace, Romana devoted part of his leisure to the theory of his profession, which he was the better able to study as having received an excellent education, and made the best use of it. And so evenly did he steer his course, that without in the slightest degree courting the favour of Godoy, or sullying himself by any condescension, he never became an object of his persecution; a singular instance of good fortune in those disgraceful times, or rather of what may be effected by undeviating rectitude and good sense. For he possessed a rare union of frankness and perfect prudence; and while his own breast wore no disguise, and needed none, could read with unerring intuition the characters of others. There was in his manners that simplicity which is the sure indication of generosity and goodness, and which wins confidence while it commands respect. Spain, where honour is the characteristic virtue of the nation, where so many heroic and illustrious men have arisen, has never produced a man more excellently brave, more dutifully devoted to his country, more free from all taint of selfishness, more truly noble than Romana.

The force under his command consisted of about 14,000 men. They were marched to Hamburgh in Aug. 1807, and quartered there, along the Elbe and at Lubeck, as part of the army under Marshal Bernadotte, then Prince of Ponte Corvo. It was reported that this army was to invade Sweden, in conjunction with the Danes, and the Spanish division was put in motion accordingly about the middle of March. But when the van-guard, having safely crossed the Little Belt to the Isle of Funen, was preparing for the passage of the Great Belt, they were prevented by the appearance of an English frigate and brig between Nyeborg and Corsoer, at a season when it was thought no enemy’s vessels would venture into those seas. The remainder of the troops therefore were of necessity ordered to halt, and were quartered in Sleswic, till they should be able to effect the passage. The Prince Christian Frederick, of seventy-four guns, was sent to clear the Great Belt of these enemies, but falling in with the Stately and the Nassau, was captured, after a severe action, close to the shore of Zeeland. Bernadotte, who had crossed to that island a few hours only before the English cruisers appeared, was now, in order to return to his head-quarters at Odensee, obliged to go round the Isles of Falster and Laland, land in Sleswic, travel to Kolding, and from thence cross the Little Belt. Watching their opportunity, as they could during the months of April, May, and June, some of these troops got to the Isle of Langeland; and some succeeded in effecting by night the passage of the Great Belt from Funen to Zeeland, the greater number still remaining in Funen, or upon the coast of Jutland.

The French journals affirmed that these troops had taken the oath of allegiance to the Intruder with unanimous enthusiasm. No man who knew the Spanish character believed this falsehood. They were in a situation where they were cut off from all communication with their own country, and where no intelligence could reach them but what came through the French press, or other channels equally under the control of the French government. Nevertheless in these garbled and falsified accounts they saw enough to convince them that their countrymen were not submitting to a foreign dominion so easily as the tyrant endeavoured to represent. This opinion was confirmed when a dispatch arrived from Urquijo to Romana, requiring the army to take the oath to the Intrusive King, that dispatch being the only paper which the courier brought; ... it was plain, therefore, that private letters were intercepted, and that something must have occurred of which it was important that they should be kept in ignorance. When the oath was proposed, it was taken without much demur by the troops in Jutland under D. Juan Kindelan, the second in command. Those in Funen, with the Commander, refused it vehemently at first, but took it at length conditionally, that is to say, with a protestation that it was to be null if the changes which had occurred in Spain were not confirmed by the general consent of the nation. The regiments of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which were in Zeeland, were less placable; being under the immediate command of a Frenchman, General Frerion, they attacked his house, killed one of his aids-de-camp, and wounded another, and he himself only escaped with life by disguising himself, and flying to Copenhagen. The men then planted their colours, knelt round them, and swore to be faithful to their country.

The British Government meantime had not been inactive. The first difficulty was how to communicate with the Spanish Commander. A Roman-catholic priest, by name Robertson, was found willing to undertake this dangerous service, and qualified for it by his skill as a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other credentials might probably have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote connected with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission. During Mr. Frere’s residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was an accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gests of the Cid, as the most animated and highly poetical, as well as the most ancient and curious poem in the language. One day he happened to call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a conjectural emendation in one of the35lines; Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated with his friend the British Ambassador. Mr. Mackenzie was sent with Robertson to Heligoland, there to provide means for landing him on the continent, and to make farther arrangements as circumstances might direct.

The war with the Northern powers, and the interdict against British goods, had given the miserable island of Heligoland an importance at this time which it had never before possessed. Upon Mr. Mackenzie’s arrival, an embargo was placed on the shipping there, and Robertson was dispatched in a boat to land on the nearest shore; but so vigilant a watch was kept wherever this might have been possible, that after three days he returned to the island, convinced there was no hope of accomplishing his errand unless he were provided with a passport. Fortunately a vessel belonging to the port of Bremen had recently been captured, and carried into Heligoland. Mr. Mackenzie sent for the master, and proposed to liberate him and his ship if he would engage to procure a passport for Robertson at Bremen. It happened to be in the man’s power to redeem himself and his property upon these easy terms, for he had a near relation in office in that city. The engagement was faithfully performed; and Robertson, whose appearance was quite German, and who assumed the character of a schoolmaster, found his way to Romana. That noble Spaniard was greatly agitated at learning the real situation of his country; the success in Andalusia, the deliverance of Zaragoza, and the retreat of the Intruder from Madrid, were not known in England at the time of Robertson’s departure; but he did not hesitate a moment. Their conversation was in Latin; and Robertson was sent back with a request that Mackenzie would proceed to the Baltic, and procure the assistance of as many troops as might be necessary to cover the retreat and embarkation of the Spaniards. Ten thousand British troops, under Sir J. Moore, had been sent to Gottenburg in the month of May, to co-operate with the Swedes. It was this aid that Romana required.

This information was immediately communicated to the British Government, and within a week Mr. Mackenzie received letters for Sir John Moore, directing him to employ the troops in this service. Instead of sending these dispatches, he thought it better to carry them, and confer with that Commander in person, but when he reached Gottenburg the expedition had sailed for England. Having left Heligoland without permission, he now attempted to return thither, and for that purpose embarked in the packet. A gale of wind drove it on the Danish coast. A privateer, carrying sixteen guns, and well manned, came out, expecting an easy capture; inferior as the English were, both in men and guns, a fight of four hours was supported, till the Dane put his ship about, and the packet returned to Gottenburgh in a shattered state. Baffled in this intent, he thought his better course would be to make for the fleet in the Baltic, and acquaint the Admiral with the disposition of the Spaniards. Travelling therefore with all speed to Ystad, he there found a Swedish vessel, which conveyed him to Sir James Saumarez’s ship the Victory; and upon his representations Sir James, without waiting for instructions, ordered Admiral Sir Richard Keats, with part of his squadron, to the Great Belt, there to act in concert with Romana. While they were preparing, orders for the performance of this service arrived. A Spaniard attached to the embassy in London came out with the dispatches, bringing letters from the Junta of Galicia, and from individuals to Romana and the second in command.