The conquest of Portugal was announced by Buonaparte not less confidently than his sentence of subjugation against Zaragoza; and no difficulty was expected in effecting it. It was stated in the bulletins that the rage of the Portugueze against the English was at its utmost height; that they were as indignant at the perfidy of their allies as they were disgusted by their difference of manners and religion, by their brutal intemperance, and by that arrogance which made these islanders odious to the whole continent; that bloody affrays between them were occurring every day, and that the British garrison of Lisbon had embarked in order to abandon a people whom they had deceived and outraged. The real state of things gave some plausibility to these falsehoods; for the French were well informed of the alarm that prevailed in Lisbon, which was indeed such as seemed to justify their vaunts, and might easily ♦Preparations by the English for evacuating Lisbon.♦ enable them to accomplish their purpose. Preparations had been made for evacuating that capital; transports were collected in the Tagus, and notice officially given to the British merchants to hold themselves in readiness for immediate embarkation in case the enemy should advance towards them. These measures were taken early in January, before it was known that Sir John Moore was retreating. As soon as intelligence of his retreat was received, the ♦Address of the Regency to the Portugueze.♦ Regency communicated it to the people. “Portugueze,” they said, “the governors of the kingdom do not mean to deceive you. They themselves announce that the armies of Moore and Romana have retired to the interior of Galicia, leaving our frontiers uncovered; that those frontiers, from their great extent, are exposed to invasion; that the Emperor of the French is accustomed to employ his whole force when he attacks a nation; that his rapid marches give no time for the reunion of troops to act against him on the defensive; and that he presses on to the capital, endeavouring to surprise the government, and to spread anarchy and confusion. This mode of warfare exposes some cities and towns to the ravages of invasion; but such partial ravages are not the ruin of a state. It was in the centre of Portugal that our ancestors sealed our independence with their blood. Knowing this, the governors have directed their measures accordingly; strong passes, formed by nature to be the bulwarks of our liberty, and deep rivers, which cannot without danger be crossed, will be defended in a military manner; and if, in spite of this, the enemy of Europe should proceed to Lisbon, he will find around it a determined people, who will cause the glorious deeds of those times to be remembered, when the walls of that city were the scene of their heroism and their triumph.”

This was wise language, and though it proceeded from a government on which they had little reason to rely, the Portugueze answered the appeal with enthusiasm. The squares were filled, the streets lined with volunteers, practising their evolutions with a zeal deserving better teachers than it found. In these ranks the old man and the stripling stood side by side, ... all pedantry of inches and proportion was forgotten; the strength to carry arms, and the heart to use them, were the only qualifications required. Some were armed with fowling-pieces, some with bayonets screwed upon poles, some with pikes and halberds, which for centuries had hung idly in the hall; bullets were piled up in heaps at every stall, with flints and ramrods; and rusty weapons of all kinds were brought out from the dust to answer the general demand for arms. The children with their flags and wooden guns were playing at soldiers, imitating the discipline of their fathers with that spirit which, if well fostered and directed, would render any country invincible. There was no want of courage, of enthusiasm, or of patriotic feeling; but the people had none to direct and train them, none to whom they could look with confidence.

It was the beginning of February before the news arrived of Sir John Moore s death, and that his army had withdrawn from Spain. Fourteen thousand English troops had been left at Lisbon when that army began its march. Some regiments had advanced to the frontiers, that they might be near the commander-in-chief if he should require to be reinforced, or find it expedient to fall back upon them. These, learning that he had retreated by a different route, and that superior forces were hastening against them, returned by forced marches to the capital. Every thing was in confusion there. One day the cavalry was embarked, the next it was relanded. The sea batteries were dismantled, and their guns shipped for Brazil; those at Fort St. Julien alone were left mounted, as a defensible post if the British troops should be forced to embark precipitately. The women belonging to the army were sent on board. These preparations exasperated the people: they were eager to do whatever should be required of them in the defence of their country: that their own governors wanted courage or ability to stand by them was nothing more than what they expected; but from the English, the old and faithful friends of the Portugueze, they looked for that assistance which England had never refused to Portugal in its time of need. The feeling which this intended abandonment produced was rather anger than fear; and they resented it more as if they felt ashamed for allies long trusted, and always found worthy, than alarmed for the consequences to themselves. A party of the armed populace seized the English Ambassador’s baggage, which was ♦Feb. 24.♦ packed up for removal. The government affected to consider this as the work of French emissaries, though it was evidently a manifestation of the general temper. Threats of condign punishment were denounced against any person who should again offer insult to a British subject; and the people were assured it was only by the powerful assistance of the British army that their national independence could be maintained.

The bulletins had announced that Marshal Soult would cross the Minho from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Porto by the 20th, and Lisbon by the 28th. His instructions were to march along the coast, as the shortest and most convenient line, where, though there was no high road, there were no mountains, and the ways every where practicable for carriages; he was to govern the country as Junot had done, and induce the people as soon as possible to request from Napoleon a King of his appointment. The nominal force allotted him was 50,000 men, and the staff might have sufficed for twice that amount; but the efficient numbers fell far short. They had suffered much in the battle of Coruña; they had suffered also by their rapid advance through so difficult a country in the severest weather; and in means also they were deficient; for though it was their system to take whatever they required, they were now in a province where little was to be found. Plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, whatever marketable plunder Galicia afforded, these dealers in wholesale rapine shipped from Coruña for France. Articles ♦Difficulty of providing for the French army.♦ of immediate necessity were not so readily obtained. The military hospitals were in want of every thing, even rags for the wounded, for linen here was a luxury not in general use. The mills of that country (which are of the simplest construction, working by a single horizontal wheel) were so small that ninety of them could not supply more flour in a day than was required for the daily consumption of the invading army; and as the invaders could find no Spaniards to serve them, they were obliged to draw not only millers, but bakers and butchers from the regiments. Grain was scarce, Galicia being a grazing province, which at no time produced more than a third of what its own inhabitants required. The summary mode of stripping them by requisitions, to which the French as usual resorted, was in this instance impeded by their own people: for the detachments who were stationed in different parts to keep the communication open, finding how scanty the resources were, and apprehending that if food were sent away they should be left without it, suffered the ♦Mém. sur les Operations du M. Soult, 56, 60.♦ orders of the commissariat to be neglected, and took care of themselves alone.

Marshal Soult, however, entered upon his expedition in full confidence of success. He believed that a great proportion of the British troops had perished by shipwreck during the heavy gales which had prevailed after their embarkation; that they had determined as soon as he should approach Lisbon to blow up the magazines and arsenals, and abandon the place; ♦Intercepted letter to Joseph. Feb. 4.♦ that they talked of nothing more enterprising than a landing at Quiberon; and that this was a mere vaunt, for certainly it would be long before their army would be again in a condition to show itself.

The plan which had been laid down for him was well concerted. Marshal Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajoz, and send a column in the direction of Lisbon to facilitate the operations against that city. Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida, occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march upon Abrantes as soon as Soult should have reached ♦Oper. du M. Soult, p. 50.♦ Porto, and when that general was master of Lisbon, Lapisse was then to join Victor, and enter Andalusia, the conquest of the south of Spain as well as Portugal being considered certain. Ney, meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the army of Portugal. Leaving him in command of this province, which was said to be subjugated, Soult removed his head-quarters to Santiago, and ordered General Lahoussaye from Mellid to march upon Ribadavia and Salvatierra, obtain intelligence of Romana’s movements, and ascertain what means might be found there for crossing the Minho. General Franceschi at the same time was dispatched with his light cavalry to take possession of Tuy, and examine whether the passage might not best be effected near that city; and General Merle with a division of infantry was sent from Betanzos to Pontevedra to support them. Franceschi ♦Vigo and Tuy occupied by the French.♦ fell in with a body of Spaniards at Redondela, and took from them four guns. Profiting by the panic which the fugitives were likely to impart, he sent a detachment to summon Vigo, and the governor was weak or treacherous enough to surrender a fortified and well-provided town at the first summons of a division of cavalry. Tuy also, which in former wars had been a place of great importance, the strongest upon that frontier, was entered without resistance. Somewhere below this city it was resolved to attempt the passage, and there accordingly the main body of the army was collected.

Two rivers, the Lama and Tamboga, which rise in the north-east part of Galicia, unite and form the Minho; but the Sil, which joins it with an equal body of waters, is believed to have been the Minius of the ancients. It is the boundary between Spain and Portugal along a considerable line; upon that line it is never fordable, except at one place above Melgaço, and there only after an unusual continuance of dry weather. There is no bridge over it below the city of Orense, and the Portugueze had been sufficiently aware of their danger to remove all the boats to their own side of the river. Just at its mouth it is joined from the Portugueze side by the river Coura; each stream has formed a bar, and upon an island between these bars the Portugueze had a fortress and a small Capuchine convent. On the Spanish side, immediately at the mouth of the river, Mount St. Thecla rises, a place of great local celebrity, because of an annual pilgrimage, and known to sailors as a sea-mark. ♦Feb. 10.♦ On the other side of this mountain is the little port and town of S. Maria de la Guardia, and thither Soult went with the captain of a French frigate and some seamen who had been prisoners at Coruña, to reconnoitre and consult concerning the passage. Means of transport were found in the fishing-boats of Guardia; but it would have been difficult to double the point in them when laden as they must have been for that service, and they would have been perilously exposed to the fire of the island. He determined, therefore, to carry the boats overland a distance of about three miles to a lake or broad, from which the little river Tamuga issues, and enters the Minho above the village of Campos Ancos. There was great difficulty in removing them, and still more in conveying two pieces of artillery to the same place. Means, however, for transporting three hundred men at once were collected, and the troops appointed for this service were exercised in embarking and disembarking on the lake, where it could be done in safety. The attempt was to be made at high-water, and under favour of the night, though little danger was apprehended from the old frontier fortress of Caminha, in the face of ♦Failure of the attempt.♦ which they were to cross; for the works, originally ill planned and ill situated, had long been neglected, and the French held in equal contempt the place and the people by whom it was garrisoned. However, in order to deceive them, the troops were withdrawn from the opposite shore, and a feint made of marching up the river. ♦Feb. 15.♦ The flotilla descended the Tamuga easily and in good order; but when they came into the great stream the want of sailors was felt. The boats separated; those that were best manned reached the shore; but the Portugueze were upon the alert. General Bernardim Freire, who had been appointed to the command of Porto and of that province, had sent a detachment with two six-pounders to this point. They kept up a fire with good effect; the tide turned; the other boats unable to stem it, or approach the shore, where they could assist their comrades, found it necessary to return; some were sunk, and about forty men were made prisoners.

Four days had been consumed in preparations for this vain attempt. It was impossible to wait till the river should have fallen so as to render the passage practicable, for the troops could not be supplied where they were, and they were beginning to suffer from inaction. Soult therefore left General Lamartiniere to command at Tuy, with 350 men, besides 900 who were on the sick list. Some public money had been found in that city, and six-and-thirty field-pieces were left there, besides some guns and ammunition which had been brought from Vigo. It was thought a position of some importance at this time, and this force sufficient to maintain it. He then marched for Orense, making this long circuit to cross the river with less unwillingness because he had received intelligence from Lahoussaye ♦Operations du M. Soult, 73, 80.♦ that the peasantry were in a state of insurrection in consequence of Romana’s proclamations.

Romana indeed had not been inactive during the short respite which had been allowed him. Had the French rightly appreciated his unconquerable spirit, and apprehended the effect which such a man was capable of producing upon a brave and generous peasantry, they would have deemed his single destruction of more importance to their cause than the capture of Ferrol ♦Feb. 13.♦ and Coruña. By this time he had collected some 9000 men; to form an efficient army was in his circumstances impossible, utterly destitute as he was of means; but what was of more consequence, he had roused the country; his presence was infinitely important there, and his name and his example hardly less so in other parts of Spain, for in every part the people were encouraged by a persuasion that their countrymen elsewhere were more fortunate than themselves. Every where except upon the spot it was believed by the Spaniards that Romana was at the head of a formidable army; when his troops were so ♦Opinion of his strength.♦ broken, a victorious enemy so close upon him, and his condition so hopeless in all human appearance, that he himself must have considered his escape from captivity, and the death to which he would then have been condemned, as manifestly providential. The Galicians at Lisbon (in which city there were always some thousands of those industrious men) were at that time embodied for the purpose of marching to join him; and the Spanish minister wrote to desire that he would send officers to discipline and take charge of them. The dispatch found him on the Portugueze frontier: he represented in reply that his own force consisted chiefly of new volunteers, so that none of his officers could be spared: he could only send some who belonged to the provincial regiments of Tuy and Compostella. But of men there was no want; for even if they had been less willing to take arms for their country and their cause, mere desperation would have driven them to it. Had the French been better disposed to observe what for the last century at least had been the common humanities of war, it would not have been possible when they were to support themselves as they could by preying upon the countries which they invaded. Free licence in one thing led to it in all, and when resistance was provoked by the most intolerable outrages, it was punished with fire and sword. The little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelinos and ♦Villages burnt by the French.♦ S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets, were burnt by the invaders, and more than 2000 persons, who were thus reduced to ruin and deprived of shelter, fled into the Portugueze territory, hoping to find refuge there.

The Portugueze General, Francisco da Silveira, had taken the command upon that frontier; his force consisted of 2800 regular troops, 2500 militia, and only fifty horse. Romana ♦Feb. 24.♦ had an interview with him at Chaves, while the enemy were preparing for their vain attempt to pass the Minho; and they had resolved upon attacking the French at Tuy, when they learnt that Soult was advancing up the river. They then took up a position for the defence of Chaves, the Spaniards upon the right bank of the Tamega from Monterrey to that fortress, Silveira from the bridge of Villaça to Villarelho. The Portugueze were elated by the failure of the French in their attempt to cross the Minho, which indeed had in some degree dispirited the invaders; and Romana, though fully aware of the inefficiency of his own force, had yet an entire reliance upon the national character and the spirit which had been raised. The secular clergy as well as the monks were zealously aiding him; the monks of S. Claudio, of S. Mamed, and of S. Maria de Melon, and the parochial priest of the latter place, distinguished themselves especially in this good work. His orders were, that all should take arms who were capable of using them, and that the remaining part of the population wherever the French came should abandon their houses, and carry away all provisions.

These orders were very generally obeyed. The small parties of the French were harassed or cut off wherever they appeared; and when Soult approached Ribadavia a brave resistance was made in the village of Franzelos and before the town. The peasantry were not dispersed till great carnage had been made among them; and the invaders upon entering the town found only about a dozen persons remaining there. Detachments were dispatched against the peasantry on all sides, and the greater part of the artillery was sent back to Tuy, as much because of the opposition which was experienced, as owing to the state of the roads. At Orense ♦Operations de M. Soult, 92–99.♦ part of the people remained, and the magistrates5 submitting of necessity, came out to meet the French. Here Marshal Soult received dispatches from Ney; the contents were kept secret, but it was reported that Ney advised him not to pursue his intention of entering Portugal. The report considerably affected the superior officers, and those especially who, having belonged to Junot’s army, understood the horrible sort of war in which they were again to be engaged. The two Marshals were upon ill terms with each other, and a spirit of dissension was thus introduced into the army.

After remaining more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march for Portugal, by way of Monterrey and Chaves. In this line he expected to find a road practicable for artillery, and he thought Romana would be so effectually crushed, that he should meet with no enemy capable of molesting him in that quarter. He had sent a trumpet to that general’s outposts, requesting permission for an officer to pass with a letter to the Marquis. It was granted. The letter merely contained an offer of honours and employments in the Intruder’s name, if Romana would acknowledge him as King, and bring over his troops. Romana having glanced at the contents, bade the bearer return, and say that the only answer to be given to such proposals was from the mouth of the cannon: but the real object of the overture was, that the officer who had been selected for this service might reconnoitre the position; and this the Spaniards, unaccustomed as they were to military precautions, gave him full opportunity of doing. On the following day General Franceschi was ordered to attack their right, which was posted to the south-east of Monterrey, on the heights of Orsona. The rout was so complete, that the actual loss did not amount to more than some 300 slain, and as many prisoners: the French considered the dispersion of the army which ensued as its destruction, and believed that Romana had fixed upon so remote a point as Asturias for the rallying place. While Franceschi was thus employed on the right, Laborde attacked the vanguard of the Portugueze at Villaça, who retired6 at night, after a good resistance, losing one of their two guns.

The French had left 200 sick and wounded at Ribadavia; they had removed them to Orense, where nearly 500 were added to the number, and now the whole were ordered to Monterrey, in so insecure a state did Soult consider the country which he was leaving. The old works at Monterrey, he thought, might be so repaired as to render that place tenable, and make it serve as a base for his line of operations. There and in the little town of Verin, on the opposite side of the Tamega, which contained about 2000 inhabitants, scarcely twenty persons had remained; and the French began to doubt the saying of Buonaparte, that men with bayonets could want for nothing. The fugitives, however, had left wine in Verin; and in order to pay some part of his establishment, Soult raised a few thousand pounds by a loan from the troops, ... part of the money which had been thrown away in Sir John Moore’s retreat. General Merle was left to collect his division there, forming the reserve, and the rest of the army advanced down the Tamega, to enter Portugal, before any effectual preparations could be made for resisting them. Marshal Soult was so apprehensive ♦Operations de M. Soult, 107–111, 115.♦ lest the troops should suffer in health, that when they crossed the river by a ford little more than knee deep, he erected two temporary bridges there for the infantry.

Chaves is the frontier town of Portugal on that side, as Monterrey is that of Spain; both are on the Tamega, a river which, rising in the Sierra de S. Mamed, and watering the fertile vales of Monterrey and Oimbra, enters Portugal at Chaves, turns again into Galicia among the mountains of Barroso, and re-entering Tras os Montes, joins the Douro at S. Miguel de Entre ambos os Rios with a stronger and larger volume of waters than is borne to it by any other of its tributary streams. Chaves is known to have been the Aquæ Flaviæ of the Romans, so named because of its hot springs, and in honour of its founder Vespasian. The baths, when flattery in course of nature was out of date, supplanted the memory of the Emperor; and the place then obtained the more appropriate name of Aquæ Calidæ, which in process of time was abbreviated and corrupted into Chaves. The springs are said to be more efficacious than any other in Portugal; but the buildings which formerly served to accommodate invalids who came to seek relief from these waters were demolished by the Conde de Mesquitella, toward the close of the seventeenth century, in order that the guns might command the approach on that side without impediment: he has been censured for this as having committed a certain mischief for the sake of a frivolous precaution. At that time Chaves was considered a place of importance. The walls were now in many places fallen to decay, and though the citadel was in better repair, both it and the town were commanded from several points, and at short distances.

Whatever hopes Silveira might have entertained of opposing the French with the assistance of Romana’s army, he was fully sensible after the rout of the Spaniards that he could neither stand his ground in the vale, nor defend the dilapidated works of the town with men of whom the greater number were half armed and ♦March 7.♦ wholly undisciplined. On the day therefore when the enemy entered Monterrey he gave orders for evacuating Chaves, and withdrew to ♦1809.
March.♦ the heights of Outeiro Joam, and S. Pedro de Agostem. Small as the regular force was which he commanded, Portugal, he well knew, could ill afford to lose it; opportunity for seriously annoying the invaders was likely to occur, but to expose his men now would be vainly and wantonly to sacrifice them. Thus he reasoned; ♦Some mutinous officers resolve to defend it.♦ but the spirit of insubordination was abroad. The peasantry, in ignorant but honest zeal, insisted upon defending the place, and they were supported by certain of his officers, who were actuated some by mere presumption, others by the intention of ingratiating themselves with the enemy, whom they thus should serve. To Chaves therefore these persons returned, and ♦Diario Official. Correio Braziliense, t. iii. p. 110–11.♦ the vanguard which, having been stationed at Villarelho to observe the French, he had ordered to follow him, joined with this party, and prepared to defend the town, in contempt of his authority. If Silveira’s character had been any ways doubtful, or if he had been less esteemed and less beloved by the soldiers, he must at this time have fallen a sacrifice to popular suspicion.

Part of the enemy’s advanced guard came in sight of Chaves the next day. On the following Silveira went into the town, and endeavoured, but in vain, to convince the refractory officers that it was not possible to oppose any effectual resistance. Again on the morrow he entered it, summoned all the superior officers to a council of war, and protested against the resolution ♦March 10.♦ which had been taken, explaining at the same time the grounds of his opinion. All the officers agreed with him except those who by aid of the populace had taken upon themselves the command. By this time the place was invested on three sides, and Soult summoned the general to surrender. Silveira returned a verbal answer, that he had nothing to do with the defence of Chaves, but only with the army which he commanded; he then retired to the Campo de S. Barbara. A letter from Marshal Soult followed him, requiring him to retain the army and govern the province in the Emperor Napoleon’s name, and spare the effusion of blood which must otherwise follow. Silveira replied by word of mouth, that one who had the honour to command Portugueze could give ear to no such proposals; and that he would never listen to any except that of Marshal Soult’s surrender. Meantime a fire was kept up from the place with as little effect as judgement, and the French suffered some loss from the peasantry and from small parties who were on the alert to seize every occasion. A second summons was now sent in; by this time the ardour of the refractory troops had begun to cool, and the self-elected commandant dispatched a messenger to Silveira, requesting orders. Silveira’s reply was, that he who had taken upon himself to defend Chaves contrary to his orders must act for himself. He desired, however, that the officers who were in the place might be directed to bring off the troops during the night, saying that he would cover their retreat by bringing down a greater force upon Outeiro Joam. The movement was made on his part; but he looked in vain for any ♦Diario Off. Cor. Braz. 112.♦ attempt on the part of the garrison, and on the following morning they surrendered prisoners of war.

It was now seen what motives had influenced the promoters of this mock defence, for all the staff-officers offered their services to the Emperor Napoleon; the troops of the line followed their example, but with a very different intention, and took the first opportunity to escape. Marshal Soult could spare no force for marching off his prisoners, nor for securing them at Chaves; he therefore required an oath from the militia and peasants that they would never again bear arms against the French, and dismissed them. This conduct excited murmurs among those who would rather, after the example of their Emperor, have made sure work. If Junot had commanded the army, they said, the place would have been stormed as soon as they appeared before it. Marshal Soult was not a jot more scrupulous than his predecessor; but at this time the treasonable disposition which had been manifested by a few officers led him to suppose that it might be more easy to conciliate the Portugueze than he had found it to coerce their neighbours, and under this persuasion he established his hospital at Chaves; accordingly the sick and wounded were once more removed, and about 1400 were left there with a small force for their protection under the chef de bataillon Messager. The Marshal then announced his appointment as Governor-general ♦Operations de M. Soult, 118–124.♦ of Portugal, ... the rank which Junot (whom the Portugueze called the Duke in partibus) had held, and proceeded on his march.

His effective force consisted at this time of 21,000 men, the country through which he had to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe, nor would it be possible any where to find a peasantry better disposed to defend their hearths and altars, nor better able, had there been common prudence to direct their willing strength. But the military profession had fallen in Portugal to the lowest point of degradation; and governments which weaken every thing for the miserable purpose of rendering a corrupt and anile despotism secure, find themselves powerless and helpless at the first approach of danger. The Portugueze in these provinces were aware that invasion would be attempted, though they knew not on what side; and the effect was to produce tumults among the people, insubordination in the soldiers, apprehension, vacillation, and confusion among the chief officers and rulers, and a state of suspicious excitement which predisposed the public mind equally for impulses of furious cruelty or of unreasonable panic. The Bishop of Porto applied to the Regency for succours; but Lisbon at that time was itself as likely to be attacked, nor indeed had the government any troops upon whom the slightest confidence could be placed. How capable the Portugueze were of becoming good soldiers, though well understood by those who knew the people, and indeed not to be doubted by any who had any knowledge of human nature, had not yet been tried: with excellent qualities and the best disposition they were perfectly inefficient now. The Bishop had been offended with Sir Robert Wilson for having passed into Spain with a body of Portugueze troops. The consequences of Sir Robert’s movement to Ciudad Rodrigo had been more important than he himself could have anticipated, and yet in leaving Porto he lost one of the fairest occasions that was ever presented to an active and enterprising spirit. Acting as he did there with the full concurrence of the Bishop, and possessing his confidence, there was time to have disciplined a force which might have impeded the passage of Soult’s army through the strong defiles it had to pass, and have presented a resistance at Porto as successful as that of Acre, and more fatal to the enemy. The means of defence were in abundance, order and intelligence for directing them alone were wanting. The population of the city may be estimated at 80,000, and there were 2000 troops of the line there, 3000 militia, and 15,000 ordenanças; the latter half armed, and the greater part without discipline. A line of batteries was erected round the city and suburbs, extending from the Castle of Queijo on the coast to the village of Freixo on the Douro; the line was about three miles in extent, and between two and three hundred pieces of artillery were mounted there in thirty-five batteries. Had it been well constructed, a large force would have been necessary to defend it: but there had been as little skill in the formation as in the plan; the batteries were without parapets, and the houses and trees which might afford cover to an enemy were not taken down.

Soult meantime, as soon as he had entered Chaves, thought to cut off Silveira; but that general frustrated his intent by retiring first to the mountains of Oura and Reigaz, and then to Villa Pouca, where he took a position with the ♦March 13.♦ determination of defending it. The French, however, did not think this little force of sufficient consequence to delay their march; and sending out parties in different directions, in the hope that the report of their entrance spreading on all sides, might reach the Generals who were to co-operate with them, but with whom they had no means of communicating, they proceeded by the Braga road. The resistance which they found evinced the brave spirit of the people, and the incapacity of those who commanded them. The villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off, they were fired upon by the peasantry from the heights and the cover of crags or trees; any military attempt to impede them was conducted with so little skill or order, that it served only to confirm their contempt for the nation upon whom they had brought and were about to bring such unutterable miseries; but sometimes a handful of Portugueze stood their ground with a spirit like that of their ancestors; and sometimes an individual would rush upon certain death, so he could make sure of one ♦Operations de M. Soult, 128.♦ Frenchman, knowing that if his countrymen would act upon the same principle of life for life, the kingdom would soon be delivered from its unprovoked invaders.

Bernardim Freire, not knowing whether the enemy would take the way by Braga or by Villareal, had given orders to secure the positions of Ponte de Cavez and Salto on the latter road, Ruivaens and Salamonde on the other: his head-quarters were at Braga, a city which had long been in a state of strange confusion. The clergy with whimsical indecorum had embodied themselves to serve as a guard of honour for the Primate till their services should be needed for the defence of the place; and part of the exercise of this ecclesiastical corps was with one ♦Dialogo entre Braga e o Porto, 19–21.♦ hand to take off the hat at the Ave Maria bell, and present arms with the other. Men lose their proper influence when they go out of their proper sphere; and the extraordinary circumstances which justified the clergy in taking arms, and even increased their authority while they acted individually either in the ranks or in command, did not save them from ridicule when they thus exposed themselves to it as a body. At any time this would have been an evil; it was especially so when the bonds of authority had been loosened, and envy, cupidity, and hatred were under no restraint. General Freire had neither the talents nor the character to command respect; and on his return from inspecting ♦March 15.♦ the positions at Ruivaens and Salamonde he had been insulted and menaced by the rabble at S. Gens. On the following day, having received intelligence that the enemy were on the way to Ruivaens, he went to the heights of Carvalho d’Este, with the intention of occupying a strong position there, not indeed in any expectation of defeating the enemy, for having just military knowledge enough to see all the difficulties of his situation, he knew himself and the men under his command too well to entertain any hope; but time he thought might be gained for removing the stores from Braga, and whatever else could be saved. It was soon understood that the pass of Ruivaens had been forced, and this intelligence was presently followed by the fearful tidings that the French had won the defiles of Salamonde also. His only thought now was of retiring upon Porto; and having dispatched in the night an order written in pencil to his adjutant-general for removing the military chest from Braga, and advising ♦March 17.♦ Parreiras, who commanded at Porto, of the enemy’s approach, he entered the city in the morning, and found it in a state of complete anarchy. His dispatches had been seized and opened by the mob, and some of his messengers murdered. Conceiving that his only course now was to provide for the defence of Porto, he gave orders accordingly. The populace were of a different opinion; they thought the position at Carvalho d’Este ought to be defended, and considered it either an act of cowardice or of treason to let the French advance without resistance. Freire, however, left the city without receiving any injury, and took the high road ♦Sentença sobre as Atrocidades, &c. Corr. Braz. iv. 521–531.♦ to Porto. At the village of Carapoa the peasants detained him as a traitor; he was rescued by the timely arrival of a commandant of brigade, and proceeded with a guard of twenty men for his protection; but falling in presently with a party of ordenanças, they seized him, and insisted upon taking him back to Braga.

Meantime the peasantry from all sides had flocked to that city, some retreating before the French, some hastening to meet them; some armed with pikes, those who had fowling-pieces looking for ammunition, all demanding to be embodied and led out against the enemy. At this juncture Baron d’Eben arrived on his retreat, in obedience to the General’s instructions. This Hanoverian nobleman, who was then a major in the British service, and equerry to the Prince of Wales, commanded the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and after Sir Robert Wilson’s departure for the frontier had continued to train his men with a diligence and success which won the confidence of the people. The populace crowded round him, seized the reins of his horse, exclaimed that they were determined to defend the city, reviled the General for not leading them against the invaders, and insisted upon his taking the command. Baron d’Eben promised to assist their patriotic exertions in the best manner he could, but said it was necessary that he should first speak with the General. By thus complying with their wishes he hoped to obtain an ascendancy which might enable him to prevent excesses; and for the moment he seemed to have succeeded, for they allowed him to leave the city for that purpose with an escort of an hundred ordenanças. They had not proceeded far before they met Freire on foot between two ruffians, who held him by the arms, and followed by a ferocious mob, who threatened to fire upon D’Eben when he attempted to interfere. Yielding to a rabble whom he was unable to oppose, he turned his horse toward Braga; the rabble then cheered him, and when he reached the house where his quarters were, thither the unfortunate General was brought. Freire called upon him for protection; but when the Baron endeavoured to lead him into the house, one of the infuriated multitude thrust at the General with a sword, and wounded him slightly under D’Eben’s arm. He got, however, within the door, and D’Eben hoping to save him by employing the people, went out and ordered the drum to beat, and the ordenanças to form in line. The mob continued to fire upon the house where Freire was sheltered; and D’Eben then, as the only means of saving him, proposed that he should be put in prison. This was done: and seeing him as he thought safe there, he yielded to the clamours of the people, who required to be led against the enemy. Accordingly he formed them in such order as he could, and set out. Presently a firing was heard in the city, and he was informed that the rabble had dragged out the General from the prison, and murdered him with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. Men, like wild beasts, when once they have tasted blood, acquire an appetite for it. The cry of treason, while it served as a pretext for old enmities and private designs, deceived the ignorant and inflamed the furious; and several persons of rank, as well as many of Freire’s officers, were butchered in the city and in the neighbouring villages.

The command was now a second time forced upon Baron d’Eben by acclamation, and to him the papers of the murdered General were brought. He sealed them up, dispatched them to Porto, and prepared as well as he could to put his tumultuary force in order. The bells from all the churches were ringing the alarm, and the ordenanças were coming in at the call: no preparation had been made for supplying them with food when they were ordered to their stations, nor were there any cartridges which would fit their pieces. A single mould was at length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would allow. Meanwhile the French vanguard under Generals Franceschi and Laborde, with the brigade of General Foy, arrived before the position of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks were made, ♦March 20.♦ and the Portugueze kept their ground. By this time the other divisions of the French had come up, and D’Eben had collected about 23,000 men; 2000 consisted of regular troops, the legion and the Braga militia; of the remainder only 5000 were armed with fire-arms, and most of these had only three rounds of ammunition. Such a multitude was little able to withstand the well-concerted and well-sustained attack of a disciplined force nearly equal in numbers. They were presently routed, and the French having found one of their fellow-soldiers horribly mutilated by some ferocious persons into whose ♦Operations de M. Soult, 142.♦ hands he had fallen, showed little mercy in the pursuit. D’Eben and some of his officers attempted in vain to rally the fugitives, that they might defend the city; the answer to all his exhortations was, that there was no ammunition. The last act of the rabble was to murder those remaining objects of their suspicion whom D’Eben had hoped to save by putting them in prison.