That officer, who well understood the weakness both of his forces and of his position, ... for the Vouga was at that time fordable, ... had retreated by a night march to Oliveira, not without apprehension that the enemy would send a detachment against Porto, where they would have found no other troops to defend it than the small and ill disciplined body which he could have carried thither. When he had ascertained that this was not their purpose, but that the whole army was advancing in pursuit of Lord Wellington, and had left their wounded in Coimbra, he lost no time, but immediately concerted means for surprising them in that city. The Army of the North, as it was called, under Lieutenant-General Bacellar, consisted of three divisions of militia, ... that of Tras os Montes, under Silveira, that of the Minho, under Brigadier-General Miller, and that of Porto, under Trant. It had also two regiments of Portugueze cavalry and three brigades of field artillery, ... this constituted its whole force. When Trant was sent round by Porto to Sardam, the other divisions were disposed so as to close upon the enemy’s rear; and the advanced guard, under Colonel John Wilson, followed them through Vizeu, and along the lower falls of the Caramula, intercepting their communications and taking their stragglers. This body was near enough to see from a distance the action at Busaco; and when Massena, withdrawing from thence, concentrated his army at Mortagoa, Colonel Wilson fell in with a detachment of his rear-guard, and in an affair of nearly equal numbers captured thirty mounted dragoons, and several infantry. As he proceeded he found the villages laid waste, and filled with the enemy’s dead and dying; and many of their wounded, falling into his hands, were committed to the surgeon’s care, and saved from the death to which the invading army in its haste had abandoned them. With this officer, and with Brigadier-General Miller, Trant intended to combine his movements; and having written to them, advanced from Oliveira to Mealhada, expecting to join them there, ... but the country through which they came had been completely wasted, so that the want of supplies, and the exhausted state of the horses, rendered it impossible for them to advance so rapidly as he had hoped. Delay would give the enemy leisure to prepare for defence, whereas it was probable that at this time they had no apprehension of an attack, and were ignorant that any troops were so near them: Mealhada is scarcely twelve miles from Coimbra, and by a rapid movement Trant thought he might be able with his own division to effect what, if time were lost and the French on their guard, the united bodies might find it difficult to accomplish. He determined, therefore, to proceed. At a little distance from Os Fornos he fell in with an enemy’s detachment, pushed on his cavalry so as to cut them off from Coimbra, and made them all prisoners, except a few who fell before the others surrendered. Then he ordered his horse to advance at a gallop along the principal road, cross the bridge over the Mondego, and take post on the Lisbon road, thus cutting off the communication between Massena’s army and the garrison. While the cavalry were crossing, an irregular fire was kept up upon them from St. Clara’s, a nunnery on the south of the river which the enemy occupied: as soon as the passage was effected, the French here proposed to capitulate; but Trant would hear of no capitulation, ... they must surrender at discretion, he said, and he would exert all his means to protect them from the people. The infantry meantime entered the city; and after a contest which continued about an hour, the French were made prisoners. Six or seven hundred convalescents thought themselves strong enough to defend the convent in which they were quartered, imprudently therefore they refused to surrender: the building was presently stormed, and most of them fell victims to Portugueze vengeance.

Colonel Trant found more difficulty in protecting the French than in taking them prisoners. The militia and armed peasantry under his command were exasperated almost to madness by the conduct of an enemy whose route from Pinhel might be traced by the smoke of burning villages. Coimbra itself presented a spectacle sufficient to excite the bitterest feelings of indignation. The French had ransacked every house, and church, and public building; they had for pure wantonness set fire to some of the houses, and they had heaped up promiscuously in the streets all the provisions which the army could not carry with it. Enough had been found in shops, and private houses, and in the convents of that populous and flourishing city, to have supplied the army for no inconsiderable time, if it had been collected in magazines: but Massena relied upon having the resources of Lisbon at his disposal; and the commissary-general, whom he had left as governor in Coimbra, however well he understood the importance of preserving the stores which had here fallen into his hands, was unable to restrain a soldiery, who from the commencement of the war had been permitted to indulge in licenses of every kind. About 800 of Trant’s men were natives of Coimbra or its district; not a few of the inhabitants, upon the recovery of the city, appeared from their hiding-places: the enemy had been surprised and taken in the very act of havoc; and nothing but the greatest exertions on the part of Trant, and the respect with which he was regarded, could have saved the prisoners from the vengeance of those who, in addition to their strong national feeling, were under the sense of private and present injuries, and those of the deepest kind. For though the greater part of the population had taken flight, in so populous a city there had been many for whom flight was impossible, ... age and sickness had detained some: others were bound by duty to the sick and aged; and others again, under the fear of casting themselves upon the world as wanderers, and the hope that by remaining with their property they might preserve a part at least, had waited for the evil under their own roofs, or hesitated whither to fly, till it had been too late; and these unhappy persons had found no protection from the established laws of war, or the common usages of humanity. Under these circumstances there was no other means of preserving the prisoners but by marching them to Porto. Brigadier Miller and Colonel Wilson, who had formed a junction on the day that Trant’s dispatches reached them, having pushed on with all speed to support him in his attempt, arrived at Coimbra a few hours after him. Leaving them therefore in the city with part of his brigade, with the other he convoyed 4000 of the French, going himself to protect them, as well knowing that, unless he were present, they would never reach Porto alive, ... for his men had been raised in that country, which was the scene of Soult’s cruelties, and some of them were from that village of Arrifana, where horrors had been perpetrated of which ♦See vol. iii. p. 269.♦ the military murders committed under General Thomieres’ orders were the least part.

Above 150 officers and 5000 men were made prisoners by this well-timed enterprise; 3500 muskets were taken, nearly the whole of which were charged; and hence the number of effective men may be estimated. A great number of kine and sheep were found, which the enemy had collected; had they crossed the Vouga they might have carried off from 2000 to 3000 head of cattle in one or two days’ sweep of the country between that river and the Douro. In the commissariat, as well as in the hospital department, Massena suffered a loss here which was severely felt; the capture of his wounded under such circumstances was not more mortifying to him than the disappointment was painful of those hopes which he had founded upon the possession of Coimbra. Instead of having a garrison in that important quarter, occupied in collecting for him the resources of a fertile country, and facilitating his intercourse with Spain, his communications were now impeded; he was cut off from Beira and the northern provinces; the Portugueze, encouraged by success, were acting in his rear, and in front there was a formidable force in a position, which he soon perceived it would be hopeless to attack. He had no other means of subsistence for his army than what might be procured by force, and any reinforcement must be strong enough to fight its way from the very frontier of France, for a small party could nowhere pass in safety. But the sea was open to the allies; ... every day witnessed the arrival of supplies and stores in the Tagus, and it was reasonably to be expected that Lord Wellington would soon receive reinforcements enough for enabling him to act upon the offensive. Massena felt now the difficulties of the situation in which his own confidence and that of Buonaparte had placed him. But he manifested no sense of weakness; and having well reconnoitred the right of the lines, he placed his three corps separately in bivouac in front of it, and determined, but with due caution, to make at least a trial of that fortune which had never failed him till he was opposed to British enemies.

There was a redoubt in an important point of the position, at the foot of the heights above Sobral; opposite to this, at a little distance, the French established one, and Massena having strictly observed the ground, gave orders for attacking the British redoubt, and took his station on a hill to see the issue of this his first ♦Early Campaigns, 191.♦ operation. The Honourable Colonel Cadogan of the 73d commanded there, and not only were the enemy repulsed, but their own redoubt was attacked, carried, and maintained. Convinced by the trial how little was to be hoped from any bolder measures, Massena ventured no farther. To cover his own plans, he still however maintained his position, and made such demonstrations, that the allies were daily under arms before daylight, with their general-in-chief ready to direct their operations, expecting and hoping that a general attack might be made, and in full assurance that it could only end in the defeat ♦Colonel Jones’s Account, i. 308.♦ and destruction of the enemy. But the French commander was not now so confident in his own troops, nor so ignorant of those to whom he was opposed, as to incur the danger of a defeat which must have been irreparable. The demonstration was made for the purpose of covering certain movements in his rear, and after a week of anxious and eager hope, the allies were convinced that no attempt would be made to force their inexpugnable position.

Having consulted with Marshal Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Montbrun, Massena determined upon sending to Buonaparte to request reinforcements, and taking a position in the interior of Portugal till they should arrive. As a preparatory measure, Montbrun was sent with the advanced guard, and with Loison’s division to occupy Abrantes. Meantime he established his head-quarters at Alenquer, those of Regnier’s corps were at Villa Franca, of Junot’s opposite to Sobral, and of Ney’s in front of Torres Vedras. Montbrun was detained two days at Santarem by an inundation of the Tagus, which covered the Campos de Golegam; as soon as the waters had retired, he advanced to Barquinha; that place, like Santarem, was deserted, but the inhabitants, relying too much upon protection from Abrantes, and from the river, had collected large magazines there, which they had now no time for removing. When he reached the Zezere, thinking to cross at Punhete, he found that the bridge of boats had been destroyed, and that a detachment from the garrison of Abrantes was entrenched in the town, which stands on the left bank. The Zezere is at all times a rapid and formidable stream; at that season it was nowhere fordable; the banks are high and difficult, and after consulting with the other generals, Montbrun determined to set the town on fire, that, under cover of the conflagration, he might throw a bridge across, and effect his passage: this resolution was taken at night; in the morning it was found that the allies had withdrawn; the river was then bridged without opposition, and the enemy advanced upon Abrantes. But that city was well provided against any sudden attack; and the French, perceiving that nothing was to be done there, retired to Punhete, and Barquinha, and Golegam. Montbrun’s next orders were to take possession of Torres Novas and Thomar. Colonel Wilson had been instructed to proceed with his corps of militia towards these towns, for the purpose of confining the enemy’s detachments on that side; but he, and Trant, and Miller, were charged always to keep in view the necessity of preserving their communication with the Lower Douro. Wilson, after the recapture of Coimbra, had followed the enemy through Leiria, and afterwards occupied the road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar. But this town had been taken possession of by Montbrun, and there and at Torres Novas stores were found which relieved for a while the distress of the invaders, who depended for their subsistence entirely upon what they could find.

It was because Massena was too strong in numbers to be beaten without a greater expense of lives than Lord Wellington could then afford, that the British commander trusted to famine, and to that worrying system of national warfare which no army can withstand. Famine would soon and surely have compelled the invaders to retreat if the orders of the Regency had been duly observed, and the country completely cleared of all stores before the enemy approached. But the local magistrates had not taken effectual measures for enforcing these orders; while the danger was at a distance, they had continued to hope it might be averted, or at least that it would not reach their particular districts; and in very many places the farmers had secreted their stores, that they might not be constrained to sell them to the commissioners at a low price and at long credit. The precautionary measures of the government were so far carried into effect, that the enemy were severely distressed, and finally found it necessary to abandon their enterprise; but they were able to subsist some months upon what they found, for nothing escaped their search. The French soldiers had been so long accustomed to plunder, that they proceeded in their researches for booty of every kind upon a regular system. They were provided with tools for the work of pillage, and every piece of furniture in which places of concealment could be constructed they broke open from behind, so that no valuables could be hidden from them by any contrivance of that kind. Having satisfied themselves that nothing was secreted above ground, they proceeded to examine whether there was any new masonry, or if any part of the cellar or ground-floor had been disturbed: if it appeared uneven, they dug there: where there was no such indication, they poured water, and if it were absorbed in one place faster than another, there they broke the earth. There were men who at the first glance could pronounce whether any thing had been buried beneath the soil, and when they probed with an iron rod, or, in default of it, with sword or bayonet, it was found that they were seldom mistaken in their judgement. The habit of living by prey called forth, as in beasts, a faculty of discovering it: there was one soldier whose scent became so acute, that if he approached the place where wine had been concealed, he would go unerringly to the spot.

But before supplies could be brought in by this marauding system, the distress which was felt in the invading army occasioned a considerable desertion. The more desperate deserters, instead of going over to the British lines, collected in strong parties in the country about Alcobaça, Nazaré, and As Caldas da Rainha, and at length formed themselves into a regular army of robbers, calling themselves the 11th corps, under their officers and general. When they fell in with a detachment of their countrymen, they compelled them to join with them, and in a short time their numbers amounted to more than 1600. The annoyance became at length more serious to Massena than to the Portugueze; he sent two strong detachments against them, and it was not till after an obstinate action that they surrendered to a superior force, ... their leaders were then shot, and the men returned to a course of duty which differed very little from their predatory life.

There was necessarily great distress meantime at Lisbon, because so many families had taken refuge there in a state of destitution; but that distress was alleviated by the care of the government, and by a religion in which alms-giving ranks high in the scale of religious works, and is enjoined as a regular compensation for sin. Thousands of these poor fugitives were hutted in the open country; many were sent across the river, and they who came from those parts of the country which, by the recovery of Coimbra, were delivered from the French, returned home. Provisions were dear, but there was neither danger nor dread of famine. That country from which the capital receives all its garden produce was within the British lines; on the other side the river Alentejo and Algarve were free from the enemy; and the latter fertile province, with that part of the former which is considered as the granary of the south of Portugal, perfectly secure from them, unless the subjugation of the kingdom were effected. The Barbary coast was close at hand; ships from America and England were daily arriving, and the supply of wheat was soon fully equal to the consumption of the army and of the increased population.

But the opposition writers in England endeavoured to raise an alarm, “that Lisbon, not Massena, was in danger of famine; he,” they said, “could drive in upon our lines the population ♦Opinions of the opposition in England.♦ of the surrounding country to increase our difficulties, and to relieve his own could send his foraging parties into an immense track of country as yet untouched. England, meantime, must send out not merely regiment after regiment, but cargo after cargo of grain throughout the winter; and what if the bar of the Tagus should be locked up by adverse winds? Massena, we might be sure, with the talents and prudence universally ascribed to him, did not act without a confident prospect of success. It had been said in the Gazette, that he possessed only the ground on which his army stood; this was an erratum, where for Massena we ought to read Wellington. Our situation in Portugal would become infinitely more disagreeable than his, even if he did not, bringing his whole force to bear on one, two, or three points, by his superior numbers thus concentrated, break the lines in which Lord Wellington’s army was so much drawn out. He would have the most productive part of the kingdom open to him; we should have only Lisbon and its vicinity, with the whole Portugueze army to maintain, as well as the British; nay, with the whole population of Lisbon, increased by the fugitives who had taken asylum there, deprived of their usual resources, and thrown upon us even for daily bread! What a delicate and irksome part then would our troops have to support, if they were to pass the winter upon those mountains, possessing no part of Portugal but that in which they were posted, incessantly harassed by the French in their front, with a Portugueze army double their own number within their lines, and a starving metropolis in the rear? The French had obviously the advantage; they could remain in their post as long or as short a time as they pleased: they could retire and return at their discretion. They might wait for the reinforcements which the despot their master would draw to their aid from every quarter of subjected Europe: they were likely to accumulate, while the British must in the nature of things decrease. Massena was in truth master of the game he had to play. The most disastrous thing that could happen to us, next to positive defeat, would be the necessity of keeping our position on these heights for the winter; and we trust,” said these hopeful directors of public opinion, “we trust that we shall not have to incur that calamity! Lord Wellington may reembark his troops without much molestation; and rather than he should be driven to the necessity of continuing in these positions for the winter, we confess, we wish that he were re-embarked.”

The people of Lisbon had not been without some apprehension that the British government would withdraw, rather in hopelessness than in weakness, from the contest. The merchants, therefore, had prepared to take flight, some for Brazil, others for England. But when they saw with what determination the lines were manned, this apprehension was laid aside; the fullest confidence succeeded, and all persons relied upon the skill of Lord Wellington, the strength of his position, and the discipline and courage of the allied armies. Such was the security which they felt behind his impregnable lines, that parties resorted to Alhandra for the sake of seeing them, as idlers flock from London to behold a review. A battalion of British seamen had been formed to serve in defending that part of the position. Land service was a jubilee to these men; they had the town of Alhandra to themselves, the inhabitants having forsaken it, and there those who were off guard sat in large armed chairs of embossed leather, two centuries old, smoking and drinking in the open streets. In reconnoitring this part of the line from the side of Villa Franca, General La Croix was killed by a shot from the water. Frequent skirmishes took place on the right flank and in the rear of the French encampment; but the piquets, by one of those agreements which mutual convenience will sometimes produce between enemies, did not fire upon each other, and this gave occasion for some of the old humanities of war. Some of our men even went and drank wine with the French, till an order was issued prohibiting a sort of intercourse which could neither with propriety nor safety be permitted.

Certain movements of the enemy seemed at this time to indicate an intention of crossing the Tagus. Laborde was sent to garrison Santarem. He threatened to destroy the little town of Chamusca on the Alentejo side (noted for its sweet wine), if the boats there were not sent over for his use: upon which the inhabitants burnt them. A detachment advanced toward Villa Velha, in hopes of winning the bridge there, but it had been removed in time. Abrantes secured the passage against them at one practicable point; and Major-General Fane was sent into Alentejo to observe the enemy at Santarem, with a sufficient force to defeat any attempt that might be made in that quarter. Meantime Massena’s apparent inactivity was regarded with some wonder, and made the subject of pasquinades in his own army. Sickness and desertion were daily reducing his numbers; his only possibility of success depended upon effecting a plan of co-operation with Soult; but time must elapse before that could be attempted, and without reinforcements he could not maintain his ground in Portugal the while. For these he had applied pressingly, and having determined where to await them, and prepared accordingly, after remaining a month in front of the British lines, he broke up from his bivouac on the night of the 14th of November, for the purpose of retiring into cantonments. The allies were immediately put in motion to follow him, but the movement was so ably conducted, on the enemy’s part, that not above 400 prisoners were taken during the retreat.

Lord Wellington, not knowing what might be Massena’s intention, could not pursue him with his whole force; Picton’s division was retained in its station, in case the enemy should move round Monte Junto for the purpose of making an attack on that side; and Hill was sent across the Tagus with his corps, to protect Alentejo, and communicate with Abrantes, if that place should be attacked. With the remainder of the army Lord Wellington followed the French, and came up with them near Santarem, where they occupied a position strong in itself, and rendered formidable by retrenchments and abbattis. It was where the high road, which is in that place a raised causeway walled on either side, crosses a wide morass, through which the Rio Mayor makes its way to the Tagus. The approach was defended by breastworks and trees cut down, and the causeway was commanded from a hill, close to its termination on the Santarem side, by artillery, which would have swept its whole length. Demonstrations for attacking them were made, rather to ascertain whether a retreat from the country were intended, than with any intent of assailing a position so well chosen and secured. Had this indeed been seriously designed, the heavy rain which fell during the night, and rendered the fords of the Rio Mayor impassable, must have frustrated it. Perceiving that the enemy were in considerable force there, instead of being, as had been at first supposed, only the rear-guard, and having ascertained that Massena’s ♦Both armies go into cantonments.♦ purpose was to canton his troops in the finest part of that country, Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front of Santarem, and cantoned the army at Cartaxo (where his head-quarters were fixed), Azambuja, Alcoentre, Alenquer, and Villa Franca, from whence they might at any time fall back within their lines, if the enemy should receive such reinforcements as might render this expedient. Massena’s head-quarters were first at Santarem, but he soon removed them to Torres Novas: Regnier was left at Santarem with his corps; Junot’s was cantoned at Pernes; Ney’s at Thomar, Torres Novas, and Punhete; the companies of artificers at Barquinha, and a reserve of cavalry at Ourem. In this state both armies prepared to pass the winter, both expecting reinforcements, and each ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that circumstances might present.

“If this,” said the despondents in England, “be termed the defence of a country, the Portugueze or any other people may well exclaim, God preserve us from such defenders!” “The campaign,” they predicted, “would be renewed in February, with such an accumulation of force on the part of the enemy, as must make the protection even of Lisbon hopeless, much less the deliverance of the Peninsula.” “They knew how galling it must be to the pride of the nation thus to be foiled, and thus, in expedition after expedition, to see the treasures and the blood of their countrymen squandered in vain; but if the public would give confidence to men of shallow intellects, ... to men who, having no real stake in the country, submitted to execute the projects, however extravagant, of the Junta who had so long misguided us, ... they must bear the calamity and disgrace of constant miscarriage. It was a most erroneous view of British policy, to conceive that we could ever, with our limited population and commercial habits, become a military people; and it would be just as rational for the French to strive to cope with us by sea, as for us to enter the lists with them by land. All that they now prayed for was, that our eyes might be at length opened to the true policy which we ought to pursue, that of retrieving our finances, and employing our resources upon objects truly British.” This was the language of the opposition, and it excited now for the first time the fears of the English public, because circumstances as melancholy as they were unforeseen seemed to render it probable that they would soon have it in their power to act upon the principles which they professed.

Toward the latter end of October the Princess Amelia died, after a protracted and painful illness, which she had endured with exemplary meekness and resignation. Aware of what must be its termination, she had some of her hair set in a ring, and one day when her blind father, making his daily visit, came to her bed-side, and held out his hand to her, she put this sad memorial upon his finger silently. Her dissolution occurred so soon afterwards, that she never knew the fatal consequences. The King had suffered intense anxiety during her illness, and when he felt this last indication of his daughter’s love, feeling at the same time but too surely all that it implied, it affected him so strongly as to bring on the recurrence of a malady which had rendered the appointment of a regent necessary two-and-twenty years before. There was, however, good reason for hope, because the disease of mind was not constitutional and hereditary; they who had the best grounds for forming an opinion believed that its foundation was laid by extreme anxiety and consequent insomnolence during the latter years of the American war. The physicians confidently expected that it would prove of short continuance, and therefore parliament having met according to summons, adjourned for a fortnight without a dissentient voice. At the expiration of that term a second adjournment for a similar time was proposed, upon the same grounds, and carried against a small minority: that time also having elapsed, a report of the privy council was laid before parliament, containing the examination of the King’s physicians, all of whom declared it highly ♦1810.
December.♦ probable that he would recover. Upon this report the house adjourned for a third fortnight, but not without warm debate and a great increase of numbers to the minority. At the end of this third adjournment ministers informed parliament that although a considerable degree of progressive amendment had taken place, and the same confident hopes of ultimate recovery were still entertained, yet the immediate state of his Majesty’s health was not such as could warrant them to propose a farther adjournment. It became necessary, therefore, to deliberate in what manner a regency should be formed.

During the subsequent proceedings, ministers were accused in the most vehement language of flagrant usurpation, and of grossly violating the constitution. They were called a parcel of second-rate lawyers and needy adventurers, who in their desperate ambition cared not for the fate of the nation, so they could only contrive to keep their places and retain the command of the public purse. Their proceedings, it was said, were miserable shams and pretences, tending to inflict a mortal stab upon the constitution of the country, and to vest the government in an oligarchical House of Commons. Mr. Perceval would fain persuade that house to make him governor of the country, and let him put the crown in his pocket. Parliament, therefore, was exhorted to withdraw from ministers as speedily as possible the power which they enjoyed, for the day of their dismissal, it was said, would be the best day England had ever seen. Among the evils which might be expected from the suspension of the executive power, it was urged that no assistance could be sent to Lord Wellington, no money drawn from the exchequer, however indispensable a supply might be at this time. Lord Holland dwelt upon this argument; to which Lord Liverpool replied, he was not aware of any injury to the public service from any such delay, nor that ministers had abstained from any acts, from which, under other circumstances, they would not have advised his Majesty to abstain. At whatever risk to themselves, he said, they would do that which they deemed most conducive to the safety, honour, and interest of the country, leaving it for the justice of parliament to consider of, and decide upon, the grounds of their justification. This reply was not received as it ought to have been. Lord Holland made answer, it was highly proper that indemnity should follow statesman-like measures, called for by necessity; but those who had assumed the functions of the executive power could not be entitled to indemnity for measures rendered necessary by a delay which they themselves had caused. And the Duke of Norfolk observed in the same tone, that if no inconvenience had resulted from the suspension of the executive power, then had ministers in effect taken the sovereignty into their own hands.

Upon this subject Mr. Perceval spoke with characteristic manliness. “We have not,” said he, “been blind to these things. If ministers should find it necessary to take such steps, they would be justified under the particular circumstances of the case; but they would act under a heavy responsibility, and parliament would be bound in duty to examine their conduct afterwards. I am deeply convinced, that I stand in a situation of as deep responsibility as ever a minister stood in; a double responsibility, a responsibility to the public, and a responsibility to the King my master. I feel this to be our situation; and parliament must have felt it so too, in suffering the delays that have already taken place. Gentlemen opposite may put what construction they please upon what I am about to say; but I do contend boldly before parliament, and before my country, that if, under these circumstances, any measure, in any of the public departments, required the sign manual, the officer at the head of that department would act most culpably if he did not issue the necessary orders to his inferior upon his responsibility. This is the view I have of the situation and of the duties of his Majesty’s ministers; and although gentlemen on the other side have thought proper to insinuate that our measures have been influenced by a desire of retaining our offices, I am sure the house will not be of opinion that our situation is particularly enviable, or one that could by any possibility be an object of choice. We feel ... we admit ... all the inconvenience of the present state of things; but, considering the duration to be but short, are they in any degree equal to the inconvenience of appointing another person to execute the functions of the sovereign; or, in other words, of appointing a regent, unless the necessity of the case absolutely requires it? It is not from feelings of delicacy only that his Majesty’s ministers have acted, but from the conviction that the preserving to his Majesty the power of exercising his authority immediately upon his recovery, without the interruption of a regent, would be a great national advantage. The regent, when appointed, would of course act as he thought best for the interests of the state; and even admitting that the plans which he would adopt would be better than those now pursued, yet I contend, that this change from a bad to a better system, with the probability of again shortly recurring to the old system, would be much more injurious to the welfare of the public, than the inconveniences which have been so strongly urged by the gentlemen on the other side of the house.

“The delay which has taken place has been no covert delay: it has been perfectly open, and the reason why it was asked was fairly stated. We have had no disguise, no subterfuge; our object was broadly and fairly stated to parliament. Sir, I say again, that ministers feel deeply the heavy responsibility of their situation: they know that their conduct will necessarily be examined and scrutinized by parliament; they know that they may have to request justice from parliament for their conduct, at a time when those who are now censuring their conduct with so much acrimony may possess a greater sway than they do at present. Is such a situation, then, a desirable one? Is it an object of ambition? Is it possible that any man, or set of men, can covet such a situation, or wish to retain it, except from the imperious sense of the duty which they owe to their sovereign and to their country? That duty I will perform to the best of my humble abilities, and cheerfully submit my conduct to the justice of parliament and of my country.

“It has been asked, whether, if under the present circumstances the evacuation of Portugal were deemed necessary, any order could be sent out to Lord Wellington for that purpose? And do gentlemen really believe that any difficulty exists upon such a subject? Do they really believe that Lord Wellington would refuse to obey an order transmitted to him, by his Majesty’s secretary of state, for that purpose, merely because he had heard of the King’s indisposition? Undoubtedly they do not: the case they have put is then an imaginary one.... Sir, in the office which I have the honour to hold, money must be taken out of the Exchequer for the public service; it is the bounden duty of ministers to see that service performed; and do the honourable gentlemen opposite think that I would hesitate to draw the money for that purpose?”... At this a loud cry of Hear! hear! was raised from the opposition benches.... “Sir,” pursued Mr. Perceval, “I am unable to account for the distinction which the gentlemen opposite appear to me to make between the two cases which I have put. When I said that ministers would not hesitate to give orders for the evacuation of Portugal, if it were deemed necessary, they seemed, by their silence at least, to acquiesce in what I said; but when I spoke of applying the money voted for the public service to the public service, they affect great astonishment, as if the principle of the two cases was not the same. But do they think that where money has been voted by parliament, and ordered by parliament to be applied to a particular service, that I would hesitate to have that public service performed, for fear of the responsibility that would attach to me? Do they think that I would endanger the best interests of the country, from any consideration of personal danger to myself? Do they think that I would risk a mutiny in the army or the navy, rather than take upon me the responsibility of issuing their pay? No, sir, if I could be guilty of such conduct, I should be unfit indeed for the situation which I hold! I should be guilty of a base dereliction of my duty to my sovereign and my country!”

This was no empty language; and however the manly appeal might be lost upon those persons to whom it was immediately addressed, it was not lost upon the people of England. The ministers, with a spirit which alone might be sufficient to atone for all their errors, and entitle them to the lasting gratitude of these kingdoms, had ordered off reinforcements to Lord Wellington, on their own responsibility, at a crisis when they held their power by so precarious a tenure, that it was not unlikely their successors’ orders for the evacuation of Portugal might be upon the seas at the same time. For that this was the policy which the opposition intended to pursue, if, as they now fully expected, they were to be invested with power, ♦Issues of money required.♦ was what they themselves avowed. Issues of money also became necessary for the army and navy: money had been appropriated by parliament for these services; but the exchequer act requires that the issue should be under the great seal, or under the privy seal, or by authority of an act of parliament. Mr. Perceval thought that under the existing circumstances it would be proper to use the privy seal: the keeper of the privy seal was willing to take upon himself this responsibility; but the signature of Mr. Larpent, clerk of the privy seal, was likewise necessary, and that gentleman refused to affix it, pleading scruples on account of his oath of office. Mr. Perceval upon this issued an order from the Treasury to the Exchequer, deeming this sufficient, and thinking also that it was better for the responsible servants ♦1811.
January.♦ of the crown to risk the censure, or wait the indemnity of parliament, than to procrastinate public business, by bringing such topics into discussion in the house from time to time. ♦Jan. 1.
Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer.♦ But when these warrants were brought to Lord Grenville, in his capacity of Auditor of the Exchequer, he returned an answer to Mr. Perceval, requiring time “to consider the nature and extent of the duties which this new and unexpected course of proceeding imposed upon him;” and therefore requesting to know when it was necessary that the money should be issued. He was informed, “that, according to the usual course of supplying the weekly issues to the navy and army, it would be necessary that sums should be issued for both services, beyond the amount of the existing credit at the exchequer, either on the morrow, or the next day at farthest; but if an actual issue could be made within six days, no serious inconvenience was apprehended.” Lord Grenville then desired that the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor General should be taken. These law officers pronounced, that they “did not think the warrant of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury was in law a sufficient authority imperative upon the Auditor, nor, consequently, a legal sanction for his proceeding to obey the same; nor that any discretion was left to him by the law on this occasion, for the exercise of which he would not be responsible.” The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury transmitted this opinion to Lord Grenville, informing him at the same time “that their sense of the mischief to the public service, which would arise if any delay should take place, appeared to render it indispensable that the warrants should be forthwith complied with, and that they were consequently ready to take upon themselves the responsibility of any act which might be essential for that purpose.” Lord Grenville replied, that it was matter of the deepest concern to him to be made the involuntary cause of any, even the shortest delay, in an issue of his Majesty’s treasury, stated to him from such high authority to be important to the public service. “If,” said he, “I could be satisfied of the propriety of my doing what is required, there is no personal responsibility which I would not readily incur for the public interests; but I cannot persuade myself, that I could obey those warrants, without a breach of my official duty in that point, which is above all others peculiarly obligatory on the person placed in the situation of Auditor of the Exchequer; nor without a high and criminal violation both of a positive statute, and also of the essential principles of our monarchical and parliamentary constitution.

“I am told,” he continued, “that I must act on my own discretion, for the exercise of which I must alone be responsible. This responsibility, if it legally attaches upon me, I certainly cannot transfer to any other persons, and least of all to your lordships, whatever willingness you have expressed to take it on yourselves. My attempting to do so would itself be criminal; tending to confound the official relations in which I have the honour to stand towards your lordships, and to annul those checks which the law has established for ensuring the faithful discharge of our respective duties, and thereby the security of the public treasure. But I beg leave humbly to submit to your lordships, that the law has in truth invested me with no discretion on this subject. The exigencies of the public service, which your lordships have condescended to detail to me in these your warrants, are matters of state, of which, as Auditor of the Exchequer, I have no knowledge, and can take no cognizance; my official duty is strictly limited to an observance of the accustomed forms of the exchequer, and of the laws which have from time to time been passed for its regulation. To these I am bound to adhere; and it is on the fullest consideration which this pressure of time has permitted me to give them, that I am compelled to decline, but with all due respect to your lordships, a compliance with the requisition contained in those warrants, to which this letter refers.” His lordship concluded, by recommending that the difficulty should be submitted to the consideration of the two houses of parliament, with whom rested the right and duty to provide the means of removing it, and to whose pleasure he would defer with entire submission.

Mr. Perceval immediately laid this correspondence before parliament, saying, “that, though, if it had not been for the difficulty thus unexpectedly started, he should not have thought it expedient to bring the subject under their immediate notice, yet he had always anticipated it as his duty to submit it to their consideration, not for the purpose of obtaining a previous vote of indemnity, but, having incurred the responsibility of action, with the view of calling on the house to determine whether or not ministers had acted justifiably.” He now moved a resolution, that the Lords of the Treasury should issue their warrants for the payment of such sums as were necessary, and that the Auditors and officers of the Exchequer should obey those warrants. In the course of the debate he noticed the argument, that public inconvenience was now proved to have arisen from the delay occasioned by adjournments. “We have,” said he, “this marked, monstrous, abominable, and aggravated case before us, ... and what is it? what is this great public inconvenience? Why, that ministers have found it necessary to come to parliament to authorize the issue of money, for services for which that very money has been appointed!”

The resolution passed without a division; but, in the Upper House, twenty Peers, among whom were all the Royal Dukes, protested against it; because, they said, the principle on which it was founded would justify the assumption of all the executive power of the crown by the two houses of parliament, during any suspension of the personal exercise of the royal authority. This business attracted more notice than it otherwise would have done, because, upon Lord Grenville’s accession to the first place in the ministry after the death of Mr. Pitt, a bill had been passed, empowering him to hold at the same time the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Auditor of the Exchequer; offices which, it was argued in support of the bill, might without inconvenience be held by the same person. The imprudence of bringing thus to recollection a measure, which at the time had called forth strong animadversions, did not tend to lessen the unpopularity of Lord Grenville and the coalition with which he acted.