The day after he reached Murviedro, he assaulted the fort at two in the morning; in three places the escalade was attempted, but the French were repulsed at all points with the loss of their ladders, and of more than 400 killed and wounded. Suchet was induced to make this dangerous attempt by his engineers, who discovered two old breaches which had not ♦Mem. 2. 161.♦ been effectually repaired, and who were sensible of the great difficulties they should have to encounter in a regular siege. His men, too, he says, since their exploits at Tarragona, regarded it as pastime to march to an assault; but the way there had been prepared for them by corruption. They kept possession of the town, broke through the party walls of the houses, that they might communicate without exposing themselves ♦October.♦ to the garrison’s fire, barricadoed the streets, and planted guns in those houses which looked toward the fort. This was not effected without loss, and they had not yet brought up their battering train; it was to come from Tortosa, and the little fort of Oropesa in their rear commanded the road. Suchet gave directions for reducing this, and acted in the meantime against the troops in the field. Obispo was attacked on the 30th at Seneja, and driven back upon Segorbe; there he rallied, but reinforcements came to the enemy, which again gave them the superiority; they entered Segorbe in pursuit of his broken troops, put all who resisted to the sword, and drove him towards Liria. The next object of Suchet was to drive Carlos O’Donnel’s division beyond the Guadalaviar. On the night of October 1st he marched against it; the advanced guard was attacked and routed at Betero; the main body at Benaguacil. Little loss was sustained by the Spaniards in these actions, but they did not contribute to raise the character of the Valencian troops in the eyes of their enemies; and Suchet, who knew that the struggle would be with Blake, endeavoured to provoke that general into the field, by reproaching him for having remained idle in Valencia while two divisions of his army were defeated.

He had made himself, however, already so far master of the field, as to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption. Oropesa surrendered on the 11th, after a cannonade of a few hours; Captain Eyre, in the Magnificent, had just arrived to assist it, but he came only in time to bring off the garrison of a tower about a mile distant. Artillery and tools could now be safely brought from Tortosa; and a week afterwards a practicable breach was effected. Twice in the course of a day and ♦Oct. 11.♦ night the French attempted to storm it, and were repulsed with great slaughter. The fort, though, according to the inveterate habit of procrastination which has for centuries been the reproach of Spanish policy, its works were incomplete, yet was capable of ♦A second assault repelled.♦ making a very formidable resistance; for it was so constructed as to form four parts, each of which might be defended after the others were taken. Blake calculated upon the impetuosity of the enemy, the steadiness of the garrison, and the patriotism of the governor; the two former did not deceive him: and he had laid down for himself a wise plan of operations; which was to abstain from battle, in hope that the French would weaken themselves in the siege, and might be compelled to retreat by movements upon their flank and on the side of Aragon.

It was part of this plan to surprise the French in Cuenca, and thus cut off Suchet’s communication with Madrid: this expedition was committed to General Mahy, with whom the Conde de Montijo was to co-operate. The attempt proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his division to join the commander-in-chief. In Aragon the Spaniards were led by men of a different stamp, and their movements would have led to very different results, if the spirit of provincialism, and that insubordination which long habits of military independence can scarcely fail to produce, had not frustrated fair beginnings, and bright prospects of success. A decree of the Cortes had attached the guerrilla parties to the armies of their respective districts, and given rank to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them thus to a military superior whenever they should be called upon. By virtue of this decree, Duran and the Empecinado, who commanded, the one in Soria, the other in Guadalaxara, each with the rank of brigadier, had been ordered by Blake to unite and enter Aragon, which Suchet had drained of troops for his expedition against Valencia. It was not easy to bring these irregular companies under any restraint of discipline: the Junta of Guadalaxara were not willing to part with the Empecinado’s band; the men themselves were not willing to leave what they considered as their own district; disputes broke out ♦Dispersion of the Empecinado’s troops.♦ among them when their leader was not present; they turned their arms upon each other at Villaconejos: after an affray in which some were killed and many wounded, the rest dispersed, were overtaken by the French, and suffered great loss; and ♦M. del Palacio, Traslado a la Nacion Espanolo, p. 19.♦ Cuenca was in consequence again entered by the enemy, who committed their usual enormities there. The Empecinado, however, was soon heard of again: he formed a junction with Duran, and their collected force was computed at about ♦His subsequent successes in conjunction with Duran.♦ 4000 men. With the greater part of this force they appeared before the city of Calatayud, where the enemy had a garrison of between 800 ♦Sept. 26.♦ and 900 men. Not expecting so bold a measure on the part of the guerrillas, the French upon sight of them sent out a detachment, who took post upon an eminence before the city, where there was a ruined castle. Of that detachment about fifty were killed, and as many made prisoners, not a man escaping. The garrison then, and all the persons connected with them, took shelter in the convent of the Mercenarios. This edifice had been fortified, and was one of those posts which gave them military possession of the country. The Spaniards had no artillery, and having in vain attempted to burn it, began to mine. This was a branch of warfare in which they had little skill and less experience: ... on the third day the mine was ready; it was exploded, and produced no effect; two others were immediately commenced. Meantime a reinforcement of 200 foot and fifty horse, the precursors of a larger force from Zaragoza, came to relieve the besieged; ... the Empecinado hastened to meet them, routed them, and chased them as far as Almunia, taking the colonel who commanded, and more than 200 of their muskets and knapsacks, which they threw away to disencumber ♦Oct. 3.♦ themselves in flight. On the sixth day of the siege, the match was laid to the second mine, which produced little more effect than the first: the third, however, was more successful; it brought down part of the wall of the church, and the French then capitulated, on condition that the officers should be sent to France on their parole. Five hundred men were made prisoners, and about 150 killed and wounded were found in the convent. There were found here provisions and money which had been collected by the intrusive government: the grain was sold at a fair price to the inhabitants of the district for seed: this Duran and the Empecinado thought necessary, that they might lessen as much as possible the evils arising from the state of waste to which that part of the country was abandoned. Soon afterwards more than 3000 French arrived, hoping to recover the plunder; but the Guerrilla chiefs gave them no opportunity of effecting this, and the next day the enemy returned into Navarre, whither they were recalled to resist Espoz y Mina.

General Reille, with two divisions, had used his utmost endeavours to destroy this most enterprising of the Guerrilla chiefs; and Mina, compelled once more to break up his little army into small bodies, had for three and fifty days eluded the enemy, by continual marches and countermarches among the mountains, suffering hunger, nakedness, and every kind of fatigue and privation, with that unconquerable spirit of endurance which is the characteristic virtue of the Spaniards. To effectuate his long-desired object, the French general, in the spirit of ♦Aug. 21.♦ the wicked government which he served, set a price upon the heads of these gallant men, offering 6000 dollars for that of Mina, 4000 for Cruchaga’s, and 2000 each for those of Gorriz, Ulzurrun, and Cholin. This detestable expedient failed also. A traitor, by name D. Joaquin Geronimo Navarro, then offered to treat with the Guerrilla chief, and win him over to the intruder’s cause; or, if he failed in this, to seize him at a conference. Mina obtained intelligence of this second part of the plot, and when he was invited to confer with Navarro upon matters which, it was said, nearly concerned his own interest, and that of his men, and the welfare of the kingdom, he replied, that Navarro must come and treat with him in person. The traitor accordingly appointed a meeting at the village of ♦Sept. 14.♦ Leoz, whither he came, accompanied by D. Francisco Aguirre Echechuri, D. Jose Pelon, and Sebastian Irujo de Irocin. Mina, with his adjutant Castillo, met them, partook of a supper which they had prepared, listened to their proposals; then, being beforehand in the intended surprisal, seized them, called in his assistants, and delivered them over to a council of war, by whose sentence they were put to death.

Lord Wellington’s movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo at this time compelled Marmont to withdraw his troops from Navarre. Immediately Mina reunited his men, and occupied Sanguesa. “Vengeance,” he cried, “for the victims who have been sacrificed because they performed their duty to their country! While some of these are at rest in the grave, others in dungeons, or led away into captivity in France, I will take vengeance for their wrongs. Arms and ammunition, arms and ammunition, ... I ask arms and ammunition of the nation and of all Europe, for public and for private vengeance. My division will carry on the war as long as a single individual belonging to it shall exist.” From Sanguesa he looked about him where to annoy the enemy with most effect: while Duran and the Empecinado were employed on the right bank of the Ebro, he thought he might act upon the left, by cutting off the French garrisons. The first which he assailed consisted of forty foot and seventy horse, at Egoa de los Caballeros, who kept close within their fort, in fear of such a visit. While he was mining the fort, the enemy during the night broke through the wall on the opposite side, and fled. The sudden cessation of their fire gave cause for suspecting what they had done: they were pursued, and twenty of the cavalry were all who effected their escape to Zaragoza. ♦Mina’s success at Ayerbe.
Oct. 16.♦ He then marched against Ayerbe, and began to mine a convent which the French had fortified there. While he was thus employed, 1100 French, with forty horse, came from Zaragoza to relieve the besieged, and cut off the Navarrese, who were only 900. Mina drew off his men as soon as he heard of their approach, and posted the infantry upon a height above the road; sending out parties to harass the enemy, and then fall back upon the main body. The French advanced, mocking the brigands, as they called them, and telling them to go to Valencia for bayonets, and they encouraged each other to attack with the bayonet, saying the brigands were without that weapon: but they were repulsed in their attempt to win the height, leaving nineteen dead and forty-nine wounded upon the field. They then proceeded to Ayerbe, received a supply of ammunition there, and being joined by twenty horse from the garrison, took the road to Huesca. Mina, though inferior in numbers, was superior in cavalry, having 200 horse, and of this superiority he made full use. With 160 horse he followed close upon the rear of the enemy, and impeded their march in the plain till his infantry came up. Part under Cruchaga got upon their left flank, another column under Barena menaced them in the rear, a flank company supported this movement, and on the right and in front Mina brought his cavalry. Unlike the French generals, who, whenever they boasted of victory, showed the baseness of their own nature by depreciating and vilifying their opponents, Mina bestowed the highest praise upon the courage and discipline of the enemy in this action. They formed themselves into a square, closing their files with the utmost coolness as fast as the men fell. Three times the Spaniards broke them, pouring in their fire within pistol-shot. They formed a fourth time; Cruchaga then, after pouring in a volley, attacked them with the bayonet; at the same moment they were assailed in the same manner by the rest of the infantry; they were again broken, and the cavalry began to cut them down. The commander, seventeen officers, and 640 men laid down their arms and were made prisoners. The French cavalry also surrendered; but thinking that they saw a favourable opportunity for escaping, they wounded some of the unsuspecting Spaniards, and rode off. This conduct met with its merited punishment; they were so closely pursued, that five only reached Huesca, and two of those were cut down at the gates; the remaining three were all who escaped of the whole detachment. Among the Spaniards Lizarraga fell, who commanded the cavalry that day. Mina, whose horse had been shot under him, immediately advanced to Huesca; the garrison had fled, leaving behind them some of their effects, and five Spanish officers, who thus received their liberty from the hero of Navarre.

Mina was now embarrassed with his prisoners: he marched them to the coast, in hopes there to find means of embarking them for Coruña, and fortunately the Iris, Captain Christian, was in sight, and took 400 of them on board. While he was thus employed, Cruchaga learnt that the French had collected considerable stores of grain in Tafalla, relying in perfect security upon the fortifications, where they had mounted four pieces of cannon, and upon the situation of that city on the road to Zaragoza, within reach of succour from Pamplona and Caparrosa. From Sanguesa he watched the motions of the French. By a rapid march he reached S. Martin de Ujue, two short hours distant from the city, and he took such effectual means for keeping his movements secret, that no intelligence could be given to the enemy. At daybreak, he approached Tafalla with that silence which he said was peculiar to his troops: they surprised the guard, the French retired within their fort, Cruchaga entered with music before him, as in triumph, and loaded the grain upon beasts which he had brought with him for the purpose. It had not been his intention to attempt any thing against the enemy’s works: but his men heard that a priest, a number of peasants, and about thirty women, were confined in a fortified convent, because they had relations in the service of their country, or were suspected of favouring their country’s cause; and they attacked the convent. The French abandoned it, and fled to their other works, leaving good spoil behind them to the conquerors. They, however, rejoiced more in having delivered their countrymen from these oppressors, than in the important stores which they obtained by the day’s expedition; and before they left Tafalla, they drew up in the centre of the city, and the band played, to comfort, Cruchaga said, the hearts of the Spaniards!

Mina had obtained military rank for himself and his officers, and was now colonel and commandant-general of the division of Navarre, under which appellation his troops were considered as attached to the seventh army under Mendizabal. Pre-eminent as were the services of this chief and his followers, they did not obtain this rank without repeated solicitations, and the direct interference of the Cortes; for the Regency at first would only concede them the title of urbanos31, or local militia. The fitness of this designation was well exposed by Sr. Terreros: “They,” said he, “who go among the mountains hunting the wild beasts of France, and bathing their weapons in French blood, are local militia! and they who live at home and drag their sabres at their heels in coffeehouses, are regulars and veterans!” ... Mina’s object in soliciting rank in the regular army was, that his men when they fell into the hands of the enemy might not be put to death as insurgents; but, like the Empecinado, and Manso, and Ballasteros, he found that men who were equally destitute of honour and humanity could only be made to observe the ordinary usages of war by the law of retaliation. Repeatedly and earnestly had he applied to the French generals, conjuring them to respect the laws of war; nor did he cease to remonstrate till farther forbearance would have been a crime. In the course of two days twelve peasants were shot by the French in Estella, sixteen in Pamplona, and thirty-eight of his soldiers, and four officers, were put to death: Mina then issued a decree for reprisals, exclaiming, ♦His decree for reprisals.♦ that the measure was full. He began his manifesto by contrasting his own conduct with that of these ferocious invaders; then declared war to the death and without quarter, without distinction of officers or soldiers, and especially including by name Napoleon Buonaparte. Wherever the French might be taken, with or without arms, in action or out of it, they were to be hung, and their bodies exposed along the highways, in their regimentals, and with a ticket upon each specifying his name. Every house in which a Frenchman should have been hidden should be burnt, and its inhabitants put to death. If from any village information were given to the enemy that there were volunteers there, such volunteers not amounting to eight in number, five hundred ducats should be levied upon that village, for the information; and if any volunteer in consequence should have fallen into the hands of the French, four of that village should be chosen by lot and put to death. Mina’s anxiety not to bring the inhabitants into danger is apparent in this decree; he seems to have thought that if as many as eight volunteers were in one village, the imminent hazard of concealing them might exempt the people from punishment for informing against them. He declared Pamplona in a state of siege, and the villages and buildings within a mile round the walls; within this line no person was to pass on pain of death; the parties who should be stationed to observe it were ordered to fire upon any one who trespassed beyond the bounds assigned, and if they apprehended him, wounded or unwounded, to hang him instantly upon the nearest tree. All persons who wished to leave that city should be received with the humanity of the Navarrese character; they were to present themselves to him in person; ... if a whole family came out, it was sufficient that the head should appear. Deserters of all ranks were invited by a promise that they might, at their own choice, either serve with him or go to England, or return to their own country; in either of which latter cases, he undertook to convey them to one of the ports on the coast; and he decreed the punishment of death against all who should kill or betray a deserter, or refuse him shelter and assistance. All persons were forbidden to go beyond the limits of their respective villages without a passport from the Alcalde or Regidor, signed by the parochial priest, or by some other inhabitant in places where no priest resided: whoever should be apprehended without one was to be shot: the innkeepers were charged to demand the passport from all their guests, and seize every person who could not produce one, and deliver him over to the first Guerrilla party. If any village should pay, or influence the payment of the forty pesatas per week, which the enemy had imposed upon the parents and relations of the volunteers, (the name by which Mina always designated his followers,) the property of the magistrates, priests, and influential persons of that village should be confiscated at discretion. And in requital for this imposition of the Intrusive Government, he imposed a weekly mulct of twice that sum upon the parents, brothers, and kinsmen, of those persons who were in the employ of the French at Pamplona. This decree was to be circulated in all the cities, towns, valleys, and cendeas (parochial, or district meetings) of Navarre; it was to be proclaimed every fifteen days, and to be read by the officiating priest in every church on the first and third Sundays of every month: wherever this duty was omitted, the magistrates, priests, escribanos, or town-clerks, and two of the influential inhabitants, were declared subject to military ♦Dec. 14.♦ punishment. He dated this decree from the field of honour in Navarre, and the Government ratified it by inserting it in the Regency’s Gazette.

The movements of the Guerrilla leaders on the Ebro, as well as in Navarre and Upper Aragon, made Suchet feel that he had placed himself in a situation in which every day that deferred his success increased his danger; nor was he without uneasiness on the side of Catalonia, where the Catalans carried on their warfare with such vigour, that the French could aim at nothing more than preserving and provisioning their fortified posts. His communication with Tortosa was interrupted by the armed peasantry; scarcity began to be felt in his camp, and he was obliged to detach 4000 men to protect a convoy going from Zaragoza. It was Blake’s hope that Duran, the Empecinado, and Mina, might threaten that city, and perhaps succeed in delivering it from its oppressors. The plan was well concerted, and if it had been executed, Suchet would hardly have ventured to maintain his ground in the kingdom of Valencia. The attempt, however, was not made; for some difference arose between Duran and the Empecinado, and instead of forming a junction with Mina, they separated from each other. By this time Murviedro was closely pressed, a battery of eight four-and-twenty pounders had been constructed, and the governor made signals of distress. The ♦Blake determines to give battle.♦ Spaniards were eager for battle; and Blake, foregoing his first and better resolution, consented to gratify them, in the hope that one victory, when victory certainly appeared attainable, and would be of such immense importance, might repay him for the many disasters which he had sustained. He advanced, therefore, on the 24th about noon, and took post for that night on the height of El Puig, his right resting on the sea, and his left upon Liria.

The country between Valencia and Murviedro is like a closely-planted orchard, bounded by the sea on the right, and on the left terminating at some distance from the foot of the mountains which separate Valencia from La Mancha, Cuenca, and Aragon. Three great carriage roads cross this land of gardens; and by these three roads the attack was to be made; for though, from the nature of the ground, the left wing could not be united with the centre and the right, it was thought that this would be a less inconvenience than to leave open either of the three roads. It was of especial consequence to occupy the left road, that of Betera; for should Suchet, as might be expected, endeavour to anticipate the attack, he might otherwise send his main body in this direction, where the mountains would cover them, and the open country give free scope for his cavalry and for those manœuvres, in which Blake knew but too well the superiority of the enemy.

On the next morning the army was put in motion. Zayas commanded the right, Lardizabal the centre, Carlos O’Donnell the left, consisting of the Valencian division under Miranda, and the Aragonese under Villacampa: Mahy, with the Murcian division, was to support this wing; Blake, with another body of reserve, remained upon El Puig. The left wing was to begin the attack, relying upon the support which they would receive from the centre and the other wing, who were to accompany the movement and cover them on the right: this, it was thought, would be a resource in case of a want of firmness on their part, which would not have been the case had a different disposition been preferred. If there was an error in Blake’s disposition, it was in thus trusting the principal attack to that part of his army upon which he had least reliance.

Suchet, who desired nothing so much as an action, prepared to meet his antagonist, leaving six battalions to continue the siege. At eight in the morning his sharp-shooters were briskly driven back; and from that moment, he says, he knew that he had to contend with troops very unlike those of Valencia. Some strong columns outflanked him on the left, and his right, which was a league distant from the main body, was outflanked also by O’Donnell. Both armies began their movements at the same time: about half way between them on the left of the Spaniards, where the fate of the battle was to be decided, was a ridge of ground, which offered some advantage, and which both parties endeavoured to gain. The sharp-shooters of O’Donnell’s division running with eagerness towards this point, drove back that part of the French cavalry which covered the enemy’s advance: they got possession, and were supported by two battalions and some field-pieces; but their ardour had been inconsiderate, for they had separated too much from the columns, and the French, who knew how to avail themselves of every opportunity which was offered, speedily dislodged them by a well-supported charge.

This error was fatal; for the want of discipline was felt in leaving the ground, as it had been in winning it: one battalion after another, after a feeble resistance, was thrown into disorder, and abandoned the field. It was now that Mahy with the reserve should have endeavoured to support them and retrieve the day, but the order for him to attack did not arrive in time, and he did not advance in time without it: and seeing that the chief efforts of the enemy would now be directed against him, and that his cavalry abandoned him on their approach, he immediately commenced his retreat. While the fate of the left wing was thus decided, Suchet broke through the centre: not without a brave struggle on the part of the Spaniards. D. Juan Caro, the brother of Romana, who commanded a body of cavalry on the left of the centre, made a desperate charge against the enemy’s horse, though they were supported by artillery, and defended by a mud wall. The Spaniards leaped the wall, Colonel Ric of the grenadiers leading the way, and cut down the French at their guns. The enemy’s reserve came up, and the second line of the Spaniards, which should have supported them, having been unhappily detached to reinforce the vanguard, the guns were retaken, and Caro himself was made prisoner.

The centre of the Spanish army was now defeated: Lardizabal, however, supported the character which he had gained at Santi Petri, and collecting some cavalry, checked the enemy and covered the retreat of his troops. But it was on the right that the Spaniards displayed most resolution; and had all the army behaved like Zayas and the division of Albuhera, Blake’s highest hopes might have been accomplished. They, though unsupported on their left, cleared the road before them, and when the day was lost in the other part of the field, repeatedly repulsed the superior forces which were brought against them. By the account of Suchet himself, the action was maintained here with great slaughter: they covered their left with a battalion in mass, and stood their ground till their cartridges were consumed, ... Zayas then sent for more, but Blake ordered him to retreat. This movement was admirably executed, all the wounded were removed, and so little were the men dispirited, that twice they demanded to be allowed to charge with the bayonet. They occupied the houses in the village of Puchole, and fired from the roofs and windows; but here, by an error, for which the commandant of the imperialists of Toledo was suspended, the remains of the Walloon battalion were surrounded and made prisoners. When the fugitives had reached Tuna, the reserve was ordered to retreat, and Zayas brought them off in the face of the enemy.

This was the best action which had yet been fought by the Spaniards, but it was most unfortunate in its results, and the issue proved but too plainly that it ought not to have been hazarded. By the French account 4639 prisoners were taken, four stand of colours, and sixteen pieces of cannon; the killed and wounded were estimated at 2000 men; on their own part they acknowledged only 128 men killed and 596 wounded. Suchet was struck by a ball on the shoulder, General Harispe had two horses killed under him, and two others of the French generals were wounded: the manner in which they exposed themselves, and the number of officers of rank whose names appeared among the wounded, prove that the victory was not achieved without difficulty, nor without greater loss than the official account admitted.

The garrison of Murviedro, when they saw the battle commence, threw their caps into the air with shouts of joy, calling to their countrymen to come on to victory. In the evening, Suchet, leaving his army a league from Valencia, returned to the camp: a breach had been made during the day, which was not yet practicable, but by the fire of some hours longer would have been rendered so; the French general had no inclination to assault the walls again; ... it was of consequence, he said, to profit by the victory which had been gained under the eyes of the garrison; ... and the governor’s want of constancy, or perhaps of integrity, enabled him to do this most effectually; for Andriani had no sooner satisfied himself that General Caro was really taken prisoner, than, as if the victory of the French had destroyed all hopes, he capitulated with more than 2500 men. “Thus,” said the French, “we became masters of a place which had so long resisted Hannibal.” Had Andriani been as true to the cause of his country as the soldiers under him, the second siege might possibly have become as famous as the first. A successful assault could only have put the enemy in possession of a fourth part of the fort, when there would have been three more breaches to make, and three more ♦Mémoires, 2. 191.♦ attacks. It was the governor’s duty to have resisted to the last extremity; but to that extremity he was not reduced. By Suchet’s own statement, the place was in no danger, and notwithstanding all the efforts of his engineers and all their skill, nothing could be less certain than the success of a new assault.

Blake, in the orders which he issued on the following day, said that he was dissatisfied with certain corps, and with some individuals, and that as soon as their cowardice was juridically proved, he would punish them with all the rigour of national justice. But in general he declared, that the conduct both of officers and men, and especially that of the division under Zayas, had been satisfactory. “For himself,” he said, “he was sufficiently accustomed to the vicissitudes of war, not to be surprised at the ill success of the action, and he was not the less confident of being able to repel the invasion of the enemy.” But Blake did not feel the confidence which he affected. He confessed afterwards, that after the fall of Tarragona, the loss of Valencia was to be apprehended; but that the brilliant manner in which the defence of Murviedro was begun, the forces which its defence gave time for assembling, and the spirit of the officers and troops, had given well-founded and flattering hopes, which continued till this battle extinguished them. From that moment, he said, nothing but what was gloomy presented itself; only some political revolution, or other extraordinary event, which should deprive Suchet of his expected reinforcements, could save Valencia; and his plan was to defend the lines which had been formed for its protection as long as possible, without entirely compromising the safety of his army.

Valencia stands in an open plain, upon the right bank of the Guadalaviar, about two miles from the sea. Its old ramparts were at this time in good preservation; but works of antiquity are of little use against the implements of modern war. They were thick walls of brick-work, flanked with round towers at equal distances, and without moats. The river flows at the foot of the walls the whole extent of the eastern side, separating the city from its suburbs; the suburbs, being of later date than the town, are more open and commodiously built, and contain a larger population; including them, the number of inhabitants is estimated at 82,000. The adjoining country is in the highest state of cultivation; and the city, from its history, its remains of antiquity, and the customs of the people, is one of the most interesting and curious in the whole Peninsula. In no part of Spain, nor perhaps of Christendom, were there so many religious puppet-shows exhibited; nowhere were the people more sunk in all the superstitions of Romish idolatry, and, if the reproaches of even the Spaniards themselves may be credited, there was as little purity of morals as of faith. It is a proverbial saying, that in Valencia the meat is grass, the grass water, the men women, and the women32 nothing. But if the Valencians were, as a censurer has said of them, light equally in mind and body, the cause has been wrongly imputed to their genial and delicious climate; the state of ignorance to which a double despotism had reduced the nation, and the demoralizing practices of the Romish church, sufficiently account for their degradation.

The Guadalaviar at Valencia is about a hundred yards wide; it is usually kept low, because its waters are drawn off by canals, which render the adjoining country like a rich garden; but in the rainy season the stream is so strong, that it has frequently swept away its bridges. There are five of these, fine structures, and so near each other, that all may be seen at once. Two had been broken down, and the other three were covered by têtes-de-pont. There had been ample time to provide for defence, and much labour and much cost had been bestowed upon the works which were deemed necessary. A small ditch filled with water was made round the wall, with a covered way; works also were constructed to defend the gates; but the Valencians chiefly relied upon their intrenched camp, which contained within its extensive line the city, and the three suburbs upon the right bank. These works were fortified with bastions, and mounted with 100 pieces of cannon; they extended from the sea to Olivette; but as the point in which they terminated was weak, because it could be attacked in the rear by the left bank, other interior works were commenced, for the purpose of insulating this from the rest of the line. The engineers relied also upon their command of the river, meaning to cover the approaches by inundations, and to fill the fosses of their camp, which might easily be done, the ground being a low plain intersected by numerous canals.

Suchet summoned the city the day after his victory, saying, that he had taken 8000 prisoners, many generals, and the greater part of Blake’s artillery, and calling upon the governor to save Valencia from the calamities and outrages which a vain resistance must inevitably draw upon it, and of which all the fortresses besieged and taken by the French presented terrible examples. He promised an amnesty for the past, offered the people his special protection, and assured them that the French would endeavour, by generous proceedings, to make them forget the evils of war, and the horrible anarchy in which they had so long been plunged. Blake published this summons, and did not think proper to reply to it; at the same time he appealed to the people as witnesses of the valour with which the troops had fought, and the good order in which they had effected their retreat, for the purpose of occupying their former position.

The enemy soon closed upon the city, and established themselves in the suburb called Serrano, on the left bank of the river, not, however, without considerable opposition. They won their way foot by foot, and carried the last house by sapping and mining. Had the spirit of which the people here gave proof been properly fostered and directed, Valencia would have been safe. Having gained the suburb, they formed a contravallation of three strong redoubts, having seven feet water in their ditches, with two fortified convents and some houses, to confine the besieged within their têtes-de-pont. The fire of the Spaniards was well directed to annoy them during these operations; but the loss inflicted upon the enemy by no means counterbalanced the advantage which they had gained, in possessing themselves of the fortified convents in the suburb. Next they occupied the Grao, which is the port of Valencia.

Suchet’s left was now at the Grao, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburbs. Using every possible exertion to ensure success, he brought up in the course of December 100 four-and-twenty pounders, thirty mortars and howitzers; and when this formidable train was ready, and his reinforcements had arrived, he put the army in motion for decisive operations. On the night between the 25th and 26th of December, two bridges were rapidly constructed by the engineers, a league from Manisses, above all the sources of the different waters, in order that the troops might not be engaged in a labyrinth of canals. Blake had posted his infantry from the sea to Manisses, and his cavalry on more elevated ground above that village, to cover his left. He had fortified the villages of Mislata, Quarte, and Manisses, on the banks of the river, and connected them by lines with artillery. His great object was to keep possession of Quarte and S. Onofre; as long as that was done, and the cavalry retained its position, it would be in his power either to risk a general action, drawing from Valencia all the troops for that purpose; or to evacuate the city, and leaving only a small garrison for the purpose of capitulating, draw off and save the great body of the army. And even if the enemy should succeed in turning the left wing, and thus cut off his retreat by the great road, it was scarcely possible, he thought, that the two Cullera roads should be intercepted on both sides of the lake of Albufera.

The general’s hopes were, as usual, frustrated by the misconduct of those in whom he trusted, and by the ♦Dec. 26.♦ rapidity of Suchet’s movements. At daybreak the two bridges were completed, three divisions of infantry and the whole of the horse passed, and drove back the Spanish cavalry; and the French getting possession of the sluices, turned the waters of the canals into the river, and thus deprived Valencia of one means of defence on which she had relied. Another division crossed the river between Quarte and Mislata to occupy the Spaniards in front. Here Zayas again displayed that resolution, and that military skill, which made him more, perhaps, than any other man at this time the hope of the Spanish armies; but the troops on the left, where Mahy commanded, gave way, as they had done in the former action; they abandoned the intrenchments at S. Onofre, ... the vital points of the line, ... without even waiting for an attack, and retired from Manisses almost upon the first fire. Mahy, with about 5000 men, reached Alcira, abandoning the artillery; the rest of the division was unaccounted for; the loss in killed could have been little or none, and the French made no boast of the numbers which they had taken; they who were missing then must mostly have dispersed in their flight, the unavoidable consequence when men have lost all confidence in their leaders.

The investment of Valencia was completed before the close of the day; and Suchet, again turning against the Spaniards those advantages of which they had so little availed themselves, secured himself everywhere by the canals and fosses with which the ground was intersected. Still the lines remained which the Valencians had for three years been employed in constructing; but after the labour, and the cost which had been expended upon them, when the hour of need came they were found, or thought to be, untenable. Blake, with the troops who were without the city, might still have effected a retreat; but he wished to save as much of the army as possible, and to prepare the people for a catastrophe which they had never looked on to, and to which he perceived they would not be induced to submit, till they felt the uttermost necessity. Such, indeed, was their disposition, that men like Santiago Sass, and D. Pedro Maria Ric, and such women as the Countess Burita, would have protected them better than Blake with his army and all his lines and defences.

A council of war was held, and it was agreed unanimously that the army should endeavour to effect its escape on the night of the 28th. They went through the gate of S. Jose; but before they had gone far, the advanced posts discovered them; about 300 men made their way to the mountains under favour of the darkness, about as many more were killed or drowned in the canals, and the rest withdrew within their intrenchments, having no confidence in the works, nor in their general; and their general having none in them, nor in himself, nor any hope from without or from ♦Xativa surrendered.♦ within. An event more discouraging than the surrender of Murviedro occurred the day after this attempt, for the town of St. Philippe, half way on the road to Alicante, was given up without opposition to Suchet’s advanced guard. This place had distinguished itself in the War of the Succession for its inflexible fidelity to the Austrian party. The inhabitants defended themselves, as Marshal Berwick relates, with unheard-of firmness, maintaining street by street and house by house, for eight days after his troops were within the walls; in revenge for which he razed the town; all the surviving inhabitants were removed to Castile, and forbidden on pain of death ever to return; and Philip, when a new town was erected on the ruins, abolished its old name of Xativa, and imposed upon it that of St. Philippe.... Even the new race of inhabitants felt this name as a reproach; and but a few months before this cowardly surrender, the Cortes, at their petition, had passed an edict restoring the old appellation. It was just restored in time to be disgraced. The French found a great quantity of provisions and a million of cartridges, ... hoarded there for this shameful end!

While the enemy succeeded thus, almost without opposition in every thing they attempted, Blake resolved to make a second trial at escape; but the people ♦Blake abandons the lines and retires into the city.♦ compelled him to give up this project, and remain in patient expectation of a fate which he no longer made an effort to avert. This he calls an inconsiderate popular movement; but the people, who saw their works as yet untouched, above 16,000 regular troops to defend them, including the best officers and artillerymen in the service, with artillery and military stores in abundance, and the population of the city ready and eager to bear their part in the defence, might have encouraged a general to hope, and ought to have inspired him with a more ♦1812.♦ heroic despair. Suchet opened his trenches on the first night of the new year; on the fourth they were advanced within fifty toises of the ditch. Blake then called another council, the result of which was, that the lines were abandoned, and the troops retired into the city, taking with them their field artillery, but leaving eighty pieces behind.

The French general says, that the astonishing desertion from the Spanish army induced Blake to abandon these vast and important works. Blake himself assigned no such cause, but the desertion must undoubtedly have been very great, ... a commander who feels no hope can excite none. The suburb of Quarte was immediately seized by the enemy, and Suchet bombarded the city during the whole of the fifth. The next morning he sent in a summons, “thinking,” he says, “that an army which had just abandoned works of such strength, mounted with eighty-one pieces of cannon, would call loudly for capitulation, now that they saw the effects of ♦The city a second time summoned.
January.♦ a bombardment upon a city which at that time contained no fewer than 200,000 souls.” The summons was in these words: ... “General, the laws of war assign a period to the sufferings of the people; this period has arrived. The imperial army is now within ten toises of the body of your fortress; in some hours several breaches may be effected; and then a general assault must precipitate the French columns into Valencia. If you wait for this terrible moment, it will no longer be in my power to control the fury of the soldiers, and you alone will have to answer to God and man for the evils which must overwhelm Valencia. The desire to spare the total ruin of a great city determines me to offer you an honourable capitulation: I engage to preserve to the officers their equipages, and to respect the property of the inhabitants. It is unnecessary for me to add, that the religion we profess shall be revered. I expect your reply in two hours, and salute you with very high consideration.”

Blake replied, “Yesterday, perhaps before noon, I might have consented to change the position of the army, and evacuate the city, for the sake of saving its inhabitants from the horrors of a bombardment; but the first twenty-four hours which your excellency has employed in setting it on fire have taught me how much I may depend upon the constancy of the people, and their resignation to every sacrifice which may be necessary, in order that the army may maintain the honour of the Spanish name. Your excellency may consequently continue your operations; and as to the responsibility before God and man, for all the misfortunes which the defence of the place occasions, and all those which war brings with it, it cannot attach to me.” This ♦Suchet expects a desperate resistance.♦ reply led Suchet to apprehend he should have to encounter a Zaragozan resistance. “The general,” said he in his dispatches, “is no longer the master; he is obliged to obey the decisions of a fanatical Junta, composed of seven persons, five of whom are Franciscan monks, and the other two butchers of Valencia; the same who, about three years ago, directed the massacre of 400 French families that were ordered out of the country. I therefore continue my operations with vigour against the place, which at this present moment counts a population of 200,000 souls. Five of the principal chiefs of the insurgents are now within its walls, with all their property, and whatever fanatics or madmen are yet left in Spain. The engineers will open their works under the walls. The artillery raises formidable batteries; and notwithstanding the rains, it will in a few days be able to make a breach in the last enclosure. The army is waiting with impatience for the attack, and if we should have to make a war of houses, as at Zaragoza, it will be rendered of short continuance, by the ability and rapidity of our miners.”

Had the Valencians resorted to this mode of defence, Suchet’s miners would have found themselves engaged in an extraordinary subterranean war, among the Roman sewers; but after relying so long upon the army, and a military defence, it was too late to organize the people for that better system, which, if it had been determined upon from the first, might have proved successful, and which, even in its most disastrous termination, would have added as much to the strength of Spain as to the honour of Valencia. But Blake had nothing of the heroic character which had been displayed so eminently in Zaragoza and Gerona. He was a soldier, skilful enough in his profession, to have held a respectable, perhaps a high rank, if he had commanded well-disciplined troops; and now at the last he performed all that ♦He bombards the city.♦ the code of military duty requires. Three days and nights Suchet bombarded the city, which was so utterly unprovided for such an attack, that the people had not even cellars in which to take shelter: the enemy continued their approaches, till they had effected a lodgement in the last houses of the suburbs, and placed mines under two of the principal gates. Blake then offered to give up the city, on condition that he might march out with the army. Such terms were of course rejected; a council of war was therefore held, and terms of capitulation proposed, to which Suchet agreed the more readily, because, according to the system of Buonaparte, he meant to be bound by them no farther than suited his interest, or his inclination. The troops were to be made prisoners of war, the inhabitants and their property protected, and no inquiry made into the conduct of those who had taken an active part in the war. In one point the Spanish general exceeded his powers; forgetting that he was no longer in a situation to act as one of the Regents, and that even his free and voluntary act would have required the consent and approbation of the other members of the executive, he agreed that the French prisoners in Majorca, Alicant, and Carthagena, should be exchanged.

This capitulation delivered into the hands of the enemy 16,131 effective troops of the line, besides about 2000 in the hospitals, 1800 cavalry and artillery horses, twenty-two generals, Zayas and Lardizabal among ♦Jan. 9.
Blake surrenders the city to the army.♦ them, 893 officers, and 374 pieces of cannon. The most irreparable loss was that of fifty good artillery officers, formed in the school of Segovia, nearly 400 sappers and miners, and 1400 old artillerymen. The battle of Ocaña drew after it more disastrous consequences, but the loss in itself had been far less severe. Thus terminated General Blake’s unfortunate career; his failure at Niebla was the only one of his many misfortunes which was disreputable, but all experience was lost upon him: often and severely as he had felt the want of discipline in his troops, his obstinacy was not to be overcome, and he never would consent that the Spanish army should be brought into an efficient state of discipline by the English, though he had seen that a similar measure had delivered Portugal, and must have known that it would as certainly deliver Spain. But though the loss of a general, thus incorrigible in error, and whose continual ill fortune was such as almost to deprive the army under him of all hope, could not be regretted for the sake of Spain, Blake himself, amid all his errors and misfortunes, maintained the character of a brave man, and it was not possible to read his last dispatch without some degree of respect as well as compassion. “I hope,” said he, “your highness will be pleased to ratify the exchange which has been agreed upon, and to transmit orders in consequence to Majorca. As to what concerns myself, the exchange of officers of my rank is so distant, that I consider the lot of my whole life as determined; and therefore, in the moment of my expatriation, which is equivalent to death, I earnestly entreat your highness, that if my services have been acceptable to my country, and I have never yet done anything to forfeit the claim, it will be pleased to take under its protection my numerous family.”

Suchet observed the capitulation like a Frenchman of the new system. He had promised that no man should be molested for the part which he had taken; but no sooner was he master of the city, than he sent 1500 monks and friars prisoners into France, and executed in the public square some of those who were most distinguished for their zeal in the national cause.