On the night of the 16th the besiegers broke ground during a storm of wind, with heavy and uninterrupted rain. It was so dark that nothing could be seen by the enemy, and the tempest prevented them from hearing the working parties, who under these favourable circumstances were not discovered till daylight, although only 160 yards from the covered way of the fort. The ensuing night also was well employed. The weather continued so rainy that the trenches were knee-deep in mud and water. Had the soil been heavier, it would not have been possible to bring up the heavy artillery; manual assistance, as well as sixteen bullocks, being required to draw along each piece. It was a severe service for the three divisions, who had to go through more than double the work which had occupied four at Ciudad Rodrigo; and their tents were far from being proof against such rain. On the 18th the garrison made a sally with 1500 infantry and forty horse: they formed unobserved in the communication from the lunette S. Roque to the Picurina, then pushed forward, and were in the parallel before the workmen could stand to their arms; at the same moment the cavalry came round the right flank of the parallel at a hand gallop, and were presently in the depôts, a thousand yards in the rear of the trenches. There they made great confusion among the unarmed men, but retired on the appearance of troops before they could destroy any thing. They took two or three officers prisoners, tied them to their saddles, and cantered off with them some hundred yards, but on their falling from fatigue let them go. The infantry meantime filled in a small part of the parallel before the coverers came to the relief of the working parties: they were then driven back in great confusion, carrying off about 200 intrenching tools. But this sortie cost the allies about 150 men in killed and wounded; the commanding engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, being among the latter.

The weather, which had at first covered the operations of the allies, continued now so rainy as to impede them: the trenches were filled with water, and there was no possibility of draining them, the ground being a dead level; it was necessary to empty them and make an artificial bottom of fascines. On the 21st the enemy advanced two field-pieces on the right of the Guadiana to enfilade the parallel: such an intention having been apprehended on the preceding day, the parallel had been thrown back during the night; these guns, therefore, did little mischief, and they were compelled to withdraw them by a few riflemen posted on the banks of the river. But on the following night they threw up cover for three field-pieces there, brought them out soon after daybreak, and kept up a very destructive fire throughout the day, their shot pitching into the parallel at a range of 1400 yards. The inconvenience of having left the place open on that side was then felt, and the 5th division was ordered from Campo-mayor to invest it. That evening the trenches were again filled by one of those showers in which the rain seems rather to pour down in streams than to fall in drops: the pontoon bridge was carried away by the rise of the Guadiana, and the current of that river became so rapid that the flying bridges could with difficulty work: it became doubtful, therefore, whether the army could be supplied with provisions, and whether guns and ammunition could be brought over for the attack; and it began to be seriously apprehended, that if the weather continued thus to favour the enemy the siege must be raised.

An immediate improvement relieved that apprehension: the trenches were rendered passable during the night; the morning was fine: it was apparent that the enemy had mistaken the intended point of attack, for they had large parties employed in strengthening places against which nothing was designed: the batteries were so advanced that there seemed no doubt of their opening on the morrow, when at three in the afternoon the skies again began to pour down; every part of the trenches was again filled with rain: no advance could be made next day, the ground being so completely saturated that the water stood everywhere in pools, ... the earth was too wet to retain any form, the revetements of the batteries fell, no solid foundation upon which to lay the platforms could be obtained, and the guns could not be brought across the fields. But on the following afternoon the weather became fine; the batteries were completed in the course of the night; they opened on the forenoon of the 25th; and being now secured by a good parallel, and the batteries enfilading all the faces and flanks of the place which bore on Fort Picurina, it was determined to assault that fort that night.

The enemy, as soon as they perceived what point was immediately threatened, took every means for strengthening it, and abandoning their works on the right bank deepened the ditch of the Picurina, and strengthened the gorge with a second row of palisades: they also formed galleries communicating with each other, and brought a reverse fire to flank the ditches. Under the three angles of the glacis they placed fougasses, and arranged upon the parapets loaded shells and barrels of combustibles, which were to be rolled among the assailants at the moment of assault; and that each man might have several pieces to discharge, 200 loaded muskets were ranged along the interior crest of the parapet. With these preparations the governor calculated upon a good defence. Six batteries played upon the fort and the town, and were answered from a greater number of guns: the Portugueze gunners stood to their cannon with as much coolness, and directed them with as much precision, as the British: it was impossible to say whether the guns of the besiegers or of the besieged were best served, and this uninterrupted roar of artillery was continued till sunset with great destruction on both sides. Captain Mulcaster of the engineers, an officer of great ability, was killed in the parallel by a cannon-shot.

Major-General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches, directed the assault of the fort. Two detachments of 200 men each were formed in the parallel: both were to quit it at the same time by signal; the one under Lieutenant Stanway, on the extreme left, to move round the right flank of the work and endeavour to force the gorge; the other under Lieutenant Gipps, from an opening about the middle of the parallel, to move direct upon the communication from the town to the fort, leave 100 men there to prevent succour from being sent, and with the other hundred to march upon the work with the twofold purpose, of aiding the left detachment in forcing the gorge, and of preventing the garrison from escaping. Another 100 men under Captain Holloway, R. E., were formed in one of the batteries to assist the others by a front attack, if they should find much difficulty in forcing in at the gorge. About ten o’clock the signal was made: the left party reached the gorge undiscovered; but when they attempted to cut down and force over the palisades, so heavy a fire of musketry was opened upon them that none could effect it. That half of the right detachment which proceeded to the gorge was received also with such a fire, that their attempts to get over the palisade were fruitless: instead of persevering in the desperate endeavour, they drew round to the left flank of the work where the ditch was not flanked, fixed their ladders against the escarpe, and were presently on the top of the parapet overlooking the enemy, who defended the rear: at the same moment Captain Holloway’s party from the battery forced in at the salient angle, ... but both that officer and Lieutenant Gipps were wounded. The garrison seeing the assailants within the works ran into a guard-house, and there barricadoed themselves: the troops were not prepared to dislodge them; they had lost their leaders; and while they were uncertain how to proceed, a report arose that a large detachment was coming from the town to relieve the fort. It seemed in their confusion as if they were on the point of abandoning the place; and the garrison supposing this to be the case, came out of the guard-house. But at that critical moment General Kempt by great exertions restored their confidence: they turned upon the enemy, and of the 300 who composed the garrison scarcely any escaped. They fought resolutely to the very last, their officer setting them a brave example: several threw themselves into the water and were drowned, about 70 only were made prisoners. The loss of the assailants was greater: four officers and 50 men were killed, 15 officers and 250 men wounded. It was found, upon inspecting the fort, that the batteries had done very little to facilitate its capture; and the engineers said, that had they been aware how little it was injured, they would not have recommended the escalade so soon. The advantage which had been gained was of great importance; but those successes are dangerous in their consequences, as well as dearly bought at the time, in which courage performs what ought to be the effect of skill.

The enemy, who undervalued the skill of our engineers, and had such an opinion of British valour that they thought nothing too rash or too desperate for it to undertake, supposed that a general assault was intended. And about the time when the Picurina had been carried, the alarm-bell rang in the town, rockets were thrown up, and a random fire of musketry and cannon was opened from every part of the works. Presently, the alarm of a sortie was given by a drum beating in the lunette of S. Roque; the guard of the trenches commenced a heavy fire, this occasioned a heavier firing from the town, which again increased that from the trenches, and it was not till long after midnight that the vain alarm on both sides subsided. It had not been without some cause; a battalion had been ordered out to succour the fort, but so late as to sustain a heavy fire from it, which compelled them to retire with the loss of twenty men. A lodgement was then formed on the terre-plein of the fort, which lodgement was knocked to pieces in the course of the following day, by a constant and very heavy fire from the town; but before night the sappers completed a fresh one. Other batteries were now constructed, and the enemy then perceiving that the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were the objects of attack, used all possible means for strengthening them.

The enemy imputed the loss of the Picurina to the misconduct of its garrison; the captain of artillery had been wounded in the course of the day, and relieved by one who was thought not to have shown equal courage: no use had been made of the loaded shells and combustibles; but if the fort had been well defended, the governor thought the allies would have failed, as they did in their assault during the former siege. A singular stratagem was now practised by the commanding officer of the engineers, Colonel Lamarre, which, if accident had not frustrated it, would have cost the allies dear. Captain Ellicombe, going at dusk to adjust the lines of direction of the sap for the night, found those returns which were already begun, in a good line, clear of enfilade, but that which was marked by the white line and not yet commenced, fell in the direct enfilade of three guns: this he mentioned as a lucky discovery, and it was supposed to have been the effect of accident, the line it was thought having, at the time of laying it down, caught unobserved in the dark against some stone or bush. But it was afterwards ascertained that a soldier had been sent out from the place just as evening closed, to remove it, and bring it directly under fire.

It was against the lunette of S. Roque that these works were intended; could the enemy be driven thence, a dam which retained the waters of an inundation might be broken down, and the works might then be pushed much nearer to the place. More skill and more courage could not have been displayed than were manifested by the garrison, animated as they were by former success, and by the expectation of being speedily relieved. On the other hand, Lord Wellington was not without cause to apprehend that a second battle of Albuhera might be to be fought. On the 30th of March it was understood that Soult was advancing, and the 5th division was therefore withdrawn from before St. Christoval and marched to the front, some Portugueze cavalry being stationed to watch the town on that side. Two breaching batteries opened next day on the Trinidad bastion, but these produced no considerable effect, and the sappers had made little progress against ♦April 4.♦ S. Roque’s, when Marshal Soult advanced to Llerena. It was then intended to leave ten thousand men for guarding the trenches, and to give him battle with the remainder of the army: the covering army was about to fall back on Talavera la Real. But at noon on the 5th, Lord Wellington reconnoitred the trenches and thought they might immediately be assaulted: in the afternoon he determined to defer the assault till the following day, and meantime endeavour to break the curtain between the Trinidad counterguard and an unfinished ravelin. Fourteen guns opened upon ♦April 6.♦ this curtain at daylight; in two hours the walls were brought down, and by four so practicable a breach, as it appeared, was formed, that the assault was ordered for ten o’clock that night. The attack was to be at three points: that of the castle by escalade; those of the Trinidad and S. Maria bastions by storming the breaches. The castle was to be assailed by the 3rd division under Major-General Picton; La Trinidad by the 4th under Major-General Colville, and Santa Maria by the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard. At the same time, S. Roque’s was to be assaulted by a party from the trenches, and the 5th division to alarm the enemy by threatening the Pardaleras and the works towards the Guadiana.

Meantime the French were indefatigable in preparing for defence. They imputed it as a gross fault to the British engineers that they had not destroyed the counterscarps, an operation which there was no time for performing, even if it had been possible to perform it without men more accustomed to such labours than any in the allied army: but because this had been impossible, the enemy were enabled to form at the foot of their counterscarps, and behind the breaches the most formidable obstructions which destructive ingenuity could devise. Night and day they were employed in clearing away the rubbish, destroying the ramps of the covered way, and making retrenchments behind the trenches. The fallen parapets were replaced with fascines, sandbags, and wool-packs; casks filled with tarred straw, powder, and loaded grenades, were arranged along the trenches, and large shells with them. Immediately in front of the breaches at the foot of the counterscarp, sixty fourteen-inch shells were placed in a circular form, about four yards apart, and covered with some four inches of earth, and a communication formed to them with powder hoses placed between tiles in the manner of mine-tubes. Chevaux-de-frise were formed of sabre blades; ... all the artillery stores were turned to account; even a large boat was lowered into the ditch and filled with soldiers to flank one of the breaches, where it was of great use.

An extraordinary circumstance, which might be called accidental, contributed greatly to the terrible effect of these formidable preparations. The Spaniards at some former time intending to have strengthened Badajoz, had commenced their improvements, as usual with them, upon a great scale, and, as usual also, left them unfinished. Thus they had so greatly widened the ditch as to include within it the covered way and part of the glacis of the original trace; designing to build a ravelin to this front, this old glacis and covered way in the space which was to be occupied by that work were not removed, and they remained in the ditch like an ill-shapen rock. The interior of this being the old counterscarp, the front of it, where it had been cut down to admit of building the new one, was very steep and difficult of ascent. The light and 4th divisions, at the hour appointed, entered the covered way without difficulty; bags of hay were then thrown down, and ladders placed down the counterscarp: they descended readily, and the ditch was presently filled with men. The 4th division, which was on the right, mistook these old works in the ditch for the breach, cheered each other up, and mounted with alacrity; but when they had reached the summit they found themselves there exposed to the fire of the whole front, with a difficult descent before them, the space between them and the foot of the breaches appearing like a deep ditch; there were in reality very deep excavations in many parts of it, sufficiently extensive to prevent an indiscriminate rush forwards: and water had been introduced along the counterscarp, by means of which all approach to the breach either in the face or curtain was precluded, except by passing over the seeming rock, between which and the foot of the breach the space was so restricted that a body of men could advance in only a very small front. The night was very dark, and this it was felt would render any confusion irremediable; but confusion presently arose, for the engineer who led the light division was killed before he got to the ditch, and being the only person who knew the way to the breach which they were to have assaulted, they were directed too much to the right, and got upon the same summit where the 4th stood hesitating and perplexed, and thus the confusion was increased, and both crowded towards the great breach, instead of taking each its own. They had only five or six ladders to descend by, which could take only four at once, and this close under the main force of the garrison, selected and placed there as at the post of danger, and most of them having three spare muskets, with people to load them in the rear as fast as they could be discharged. The assailants were so thickly crowded on the glacis and in the ditch, that it was not necessary to aim at them; but fire-balls were cast among them, which effected the double mischief of increasing their confusion, and rendering all their movements as distinctly visible as if it had been noon-day; the oldest soldiers declared that they had never before been exposed to so rapid and murderous a fire. Major-General Colville fell among the first, severely wounded in the thigh, ... the last sound which he heard before he fainted was the voice of Captain Nicholas of the engineers, exhorting his men in the ditch. That young and excellent officer, whose charge it was to lead the 4th division to the breach, after twice essaying to reach the top, fell wounded by a musket which grazed his knee-pan, a bayonet thrust in the great muscle of his right leg, his left arm broken, and his wrist wounded by musket-shot; ... yet, in that state, seeing his old friends and comrades, Colonel Macleod and Captain James, fall, and hearing the men ask who should lead them to the third onset, he rallied, and ordered two of his men to bear him up in their arms. Two brave fellows attempted this most perilous service; they had just reached the top when one of them was killed, and at the same moment, Nicholas received a musket-ball, which passed through the chest, breaking two of his ribs upon the way, upon which he fell from the top to the bottom of the breach mortally hurt, and receiving further injury from bruises in his fall.

Never were brave men exposed to slaughter under more frightful circumstances. The breach would not admit of more than fifteen abreast: the assailants repeatedly reached the summit, though the slope was covered with planks full of spikes. There they found the entrance closed with chevaux-de-frise which it was neither possible to break down nor to cut away, nor to get over. Many gashed their hands in attempting to pull them down at the muzzle of the enemy’s muskets, from which a new species of shot, which the soldiers called musket-grape, was poured in upon them in one continuous discharge; ... it consisted of slugs fastened together, and resembled grape-shot in miniature. Under this incessant fire, shells, hand-grenades, bags of powder, and every destructive form of missile or combustible that ingenuity could invent, were hurled into the ditch. Gunpowder, it is said, had never, since the hour of its discovery, been employed with more terrific and terrible effect. The explosions frequently created a light more vivid than broad day, which for a moment was succeeded by utter darkness, ... and then again the whole ground seemed to be vomiting fire under their feet and every where around them, while they had no possible means either of defending themselves or of retaliating. The officers led their men so close to the enemy’s guns, that they felt the wadding as well as the ball; when one fell another took his place; but as it had been impossible to recover from the first confusion, the men could not be moved like a machine in collective strength; individual efforts were all that could be made, and these, though made with devoted courage, were necessarily vain, the best and bravest putting themselves forward, and sacrificing themselves; till at length the troops, knowing it hopeless to make any farther effort, and yet too high spirited to retreat, stood patiently in the ditch to be slaughtered. It was not till more than two hours after the commencement of this carnage, that Lord Wellington, being made acquainted with their situation, ordered these two divisions to be withdrawn and to be formed a little before daylight for a fresh assault. He might well indeed conclude, that after the blood which had already been shed there, success was to be purchased at any cost; and certainly there would have been much more chance of success in the second attempt than in the first, when it might be made in good order, and when the enemy’s trains had been fired, and their combustible preparations expended.

This might probably have been his determination, if no advantage had been obtained in any other part; but immediately before he gave this order, he received intelligence, that the 3rd division was in possession of the castle. Major-General Kempt, who led this attack, was wounded in crossing the river Rivellas below the inundation, a fire having been opened upon them from the whole of the eastern works, as soon as they reached that stream. It was General Philippon’s intention, if the breaches should be forced, to retire into the castle, which had the strength of a citadel: with this and the tête-du-pont, and Fort Christoval, he might yet have held out some days, and give time thereby for those movements which he supposed would again be made for his relief. With this view he had strengthened and stored it; all its gates had been built up, and the ramparts were covered with large Spanish shells, stones, beams, and whatever could be thrown upon the heads of the assailants. By means of these preparations, a most obstinate resistance was opposed to the escalade, and for a considerable time all who attempted to rear the ladders were destroyed. At length an entrance was forced up one ladder at an embrasure; the defence immediately slackened, and other ladders were quickly reared, with that alacrity which the feeling of success inspires. An officer of the German Legion, Girsewald by name, who was remarkable for his bodily strength, was one of the first who mounted. A French soldier fired at and missed him, then made a thrust with the bayonet; Girsewald, with his left hand, parried the bayonet and seized it, and held it so firmly, that the exertions which the Frenchman made for recovering his weapon, assisted him in mounting, till he got high enough to aim a blow in his turn, with which he severed his antagonist’s head from his shoulders. A false report having been made to Philippon that one of the bastions had been entered by the assailants, the falsehood of that intelligence made him doubt and hesitate when he heard they were escalading the castle. Two companies which he intended to order thither, by some mistake either in giving or understanding the order, went to the breaches instead, where they were not wanted; and four others, which took the right direction, arrived too late: the castle had been taken; they were received by a heavy fire of musketry, and dispersed with loss. One of the last shots which were fired struck Girsewald on the knee; he would not let the limb be amputated, and therefore the wound proved fatal.

The 5th division were not less successful, though the party with the scaling ladders lost their way, and Lieutenant-General Leith could not, in consequence, move till it was after eleven o’clock. The bastion of S. Vicente which he attacked was fully prepared for defence, and the troops were discovered when on the glacis; yet they forced in by escalade. Major-General Walker then advanced along the ramparts to fall on the rear of the enemy who were defending the breaches; the troops, when driving the French before them, were opposed by a single field-piece placed on the terre-plein of the curtain; the gunner lighted a port fire as they approached: at the sudden blaze of light, one who was among the foremost in pursuit cried out “A mine!” That fearful word ran through the line of pursuers; the very men who had so bravely won the bastion, as if their nature had been suddenly changed, took panic, and in spite of their general’s efforts, who was severely wounded while endeavouring to rally them, were driven back by the bayonet to the place whereat they had entered: but by this time the reserve had formed there, the pursuers in their turn were checked, and the British marched immediately to the breaches, from which the defenders then dispersed, seeing that all was lost. This attack might have been spared if any signals had been agreed upon by which Picton’s success should have been made known; for want of such concertment, General Leith’s attack was made after the escalade had succeeded; he met with the same opposition as if the fate of the place had not been decided in another quarter, ♦Col. Jones’s Sieges, 303.♦ and thus Badajoz may be said to have been twice carried that night. Philippon with his staff retired into Fort Christoval, and surrendered in the morning.

The place was plundered during the remainder of the night and on the following day, nor could order be restored till the day afterwards. The doors were forced by firing through the locks, and most of the inhabitants had placed a table immediately in the entrance of their houses, with a candle and a bottle of brandy, supposing that this would content the soldiers: the consequence was that, excited as they already were, they became half mad with the fiery spirit. But whatever excesses they committed, their excitement took the form of good fellowship toward their defeated enemies; and they were seen walking about with the French soldiers, arm in arm, inviting them to drink, and taking every care of them. As soon as fresh troops could be brought up from the corps of observation, they were marched in, and order was then restored. 59 officers and 744 men were killed on the night of the assault; 258 officers wounded and 2600 men; the total number of killed and wounded during the siege was 5000. The garrison consisted of nearly 5000, of whom about 3500 were made prisoners.

On this occasion the French Marshals had been less alert than during the former siege, and they had not acted so well in concert. Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st, with all the force he could collect. On the 4th he reached Llerena; and having arrived at Villa-Franca, two marches only from Badajoz, on the 8th, he there learned that the city had been taken on the night of the 6th. The inhabitants reported, that his chagrin at this intelligence was manifested in fits of intemperate anger, and that he broke nearly all the plates and dishes within his reach. Before daylight he commenced his retreat; the allied cavalry immediately followed his march, and on the 11th, attacked his rear guard (consisting of General Drouet’s cavalry, 2500 in number) at Usagre, and drove them to Llerena, killing many, and bringing away about 150 prisoners, and nearly as many horses. It was believed throughout this part of the country, that Ballasteros had entered Seville; and the people giving, with their characteristic credulity, implicit belief to the idle rumour, made rejoicings everywhere for the supposed success, and seemed wholly to disregard the recapture of Badajoz.

If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned at this time as it ought to, and as Lord Wellington expected it would have been, his intention was immediately after the capture of Badajoz to have advanced upon Seville with 40,000 men; that movement would instantly have raised the siege of Cadiz, and Soult might probably have been obliged to withdraw from Andalusia, and take up a defensive position on the Tagus. But the British Commander’s operations were still crippled by the insufficiency of his means; the Spaniards were not to be relied on for any exertions, however necessary, for their own deliverance; the Portugueze were paralysed by the poverty to which the government and the nation were reduced; and the British ministry were not yet sufficiently encouraged by success and by popular opinion, to increase their efforts and therewith an expenditure ♦Marmont enters Beira.♦ already unexampled in amount. Marshal Marmont, meantime, supposing that Soult would be able to raise the siege of Badajoz, thought the opportunity favourable for an attempt upon the Beira frontier. Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and had ♦Arrangement for the defence of that frontier.♦ little means of providing against it. Relying, however, upon the officers whom he had left in command at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, for all that could be done by vigilance and sound judgment, he had directed General Bacellar to collect the Portugueze militia corps and march thither, ... Sylveira to protect the Tras-os-Montes, and Brigadier-Generals Sir Nicholas Trant and Sir John Wilson to cover that part of Beira extending from the Douro along the Coa to Sabugal, with especial orders to look to the safety of a considerable magazine of ammunition at Celorico. Bacellar fixed his head-quarters at Lamego; the two Anglo-Portugueze Brigadiers had about 3500 men, but only a single squadron of dragoons between them, and but a small proportion of the men had served with them in the former campaigns. In Portugal, the militia is a service in which no man willingly either enters or continues, for they receive only half the pay of the regular soldier, and half the ration of provisions, and are clothed at their own expense. This body is composed wholly of married men, or of widowers having children, these being the only persons exempted from the conscription: such men were naturally anxious and desirous of returning home, whenever, by means of favour or of corruption, they could obtain leave; in the interval of the campaign, their places were supplied by others of the same class; two-thirds at least of the whole number consisted of such raw recruits, and the others had not been exercised one day since they were disbanded in the spring of the preceding year.

Marmont did not know how weak a force could be brought into the field rather to observe his movements than to oppose them; but he knew that Ciudad Rodrigo was ill-stored with provisions, and that the injury which Brennier had done to the fortifications of Almeida when he abandoned that place had been insufficiently repaired. Advancing, therefore, from Salamanca with about 20,000 men, including 1200 cavalry, he summoned Ciudad Rodrigo: the Spaniards had made so little progress in repairing the works, that he might probably have carried it by escalade; but the French had now lost something of their confidence; he was afraid of committing himself, and leaving one division to blockade it, proceeded with the rest of his army towards Almeida. Colonel Le Mesurier commanded in that fortress, and its safety depended much more upon the character of its commander than upon its own strength or that of the garrison, which consisted entirely of militia. Trant, arriving with his division upon the Coa just at this time, and receiving intelligence there of the enemy’s movements, proceeded without delay to occupy the position of the Cabeço Negro, which Lord Wellington had occupied during Massena’s operations against Almeida: the French were already arriving before that place, and it was with difficulty that a corps of between 7 and 800 Spaniards under D. Carlos d’España escaped their close pursuit and effected a junction with this body of Portugueze. It was of great consequence to communicate with Colonel Le Mesurier now. Trant, though exposed to the fire of the French advanced posts, effected this, and during a short interview, they agreed upon the course to be pursued in case Almeida should be seriously threatened; and also, that during the night an attempt should be made to impose upon the French by making show as of a considerable force upon the left bank of the Coa. Accordingly, fires were kindled to the right and left of the position; and the enemy, deceived by this easy stratagem into a belief that a corps of British troops was present, gave up their intention of assaulting the fortress; they only threw forward a reconnoitring party upon the glacis, which the Governor drove back with loss.

Had Marmont assaulted the place, he might probably have captured it, and would have found there a battering-train, which would have enabled him to break ground before Ciudad Rodrigo. On the following morning he withdrew, and leaving Almeida in the rear proceeded to Sabugal, where he established his head-quarters: it was now at his option either to advance upon the Tagus by Castello Branco, or by Guarda upon the Mondego and Celorico; but his operations had neither been ♦Advance of the French to Castello Branco and their retreat.♦ well concerted, nor were they vigorously pursued. His advanced guard followed the first hussars, who had been left under Major-General Alten in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, through Lower Beira, but at a distance; and they entered Castello Branco, that officer having fallen back thither, and retiring from thence before them with Brigadier-General Le Cor’s brigade of militia which had been stationed there. The hospital and the stores were removed beyond the Tagus. The enemy did not cross the river in pursuit, and when Alten and Le Cor recrossed, the French retreated, evacuating the city two days after they had taken possession of it.

Meantime Bacellar, who had removed his head-quarters to Celorico, instructed Trant and Wilson to occupy Guarda, relying upon Dumouriez’ erroneous opinion of the advantages of a position which Lord Wellington afterwards pronounced to be the most treacherous one in Portugal. They, though they were not at that time aware of the defects of the ground which they were ordered to take, would far rather have moved behind the Mondego, from whence the magazines at Celorico might have been better protected. The French were dispersed over a large extent of country for the purpose of procuring provisions, and for plunder; but Marmont, having collected about 10,000 of his men and half his cavalry, on the evening of the day on which his advanced guard retired from Castello Branco, advanced upon Guarda, expecting to surprise the Portugueze divisions there. A hundred men under a Captain and two Lieutenants had been stationed about half a mile in front of the town, on the Sabugal road. Marmont himself advancing with 500 cavalry, surprised and captured the out-piquet of the party, and pushed on within 200 yards of the city, but hearing the drums beat to arms, and being unsupported by infantry, he thought it prudent to fall back upon his main force. The Portugueze, who at that moment could have offered little resistance even to a less formidable enemy, soon drew up on the outside of the town, towards the danger; it was just at daybreak, and they ascertained the great superiority of the French in time to commence their retreat. Guarda being untenable, and the troops having only rations for the present day, and depending upon Celorico for supplies which would now be cut off, Trant, therefore, in concurrence with Wilson’s opinion, resolved to retire behind the Mondego, which was about six miles distant. Two battalions were continued in position, while the remainder retired through the town, and took up ground in its rear unobserved by the enemy; but no sooner were the whole set in motion than the French cavalry followed, threatening to charge the columns. The ground for about five miles was entirely open; but a regiment was successively halted in echelle for the protection of the troops in march, and by this means the movement went on in perfect order, till the moment when all danger seemed to be at an end.

Immediately before the road to Celorico reaches the Mondego, it descends a sloping ground, much broken and covered with wood. The enemy’s horse was by this time pressing them close; Trant, therefore, halted his rear-guard of one battalion within the wood, about a hundred yards from the summit of the hill, where they could not be attacked by cavalry, and where by making a stand, they might have gained time for the rest of the troops to ford the river and form on the opposite side. But it had not ceased raining for some hours, and when they were ordered to fire upon some of the French who dismounted, and were firing their carabines upon them, very few of the firelocks went off; the men instantly lost confidence, and every one thought to escape unnoticed by favour of the ground. Trant presently found himself with not more than a hundred men besides the officers of his staff and of the regiment. The panic which these fugitives spread was increased by the small party of Portugueze cavalry, which having been employed thus far in watching the enemy, retreated with too much precipitation through the rear-guard, glad to find themselves in comparative safety among the trees; and some of them escaping to the main body, it was supposed from their report that the whole of the rear-guard had been cut off. All efforts of the officers were in vain; they took to flight; the enemy’s cavalry descended the hill unopposed, and made about two hundred prisoners without killing or wounding a single man. Five colours were lost in this rout, the bearers having either hid them in the wood, or thrown them into the Mondego; and a few men were drowned in hurrying over the river. Some of the fugitives hastened to Celorico, declaring that the enemy were in full pursuit, and continuing their flight, they spread the same report all the way to Coimbra. It had this ill effect at Celorico that the officer in charge of the depôt there set it on fire, concluding hastily, that what these persons reported as eye-witnesses, must to its ♦Marmont retreats.♦ whole extent be true. But night had closed opportunely for the Portugueze; their officers succeeded in rallying them beyond the river, and the French did not attempt to pass, waiting till the morning: during the night Marmont received unwelcome tidings that Badajoz had fallen, and that Lord Wellington was on his way to the north; he therefore retraced his steps towards Sabugal, concentrated his army there, and then commenced his retreat upon Salamanca, raising the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy in this expedition had robbed and murdered the inhabitants as usual; but they derived no advantage from it whatever, having attempted more than they could execute, and leaving unattempted what they might have achieved.

Marshal Beresford noticed the conduct of the militia in the severest terms; and it is worthy of remark, that the order which contained this censure found its way into the Moniteur, ... of so much consequence was it deemed at Paris to depreciate the Portugueze soldiers now when the French had begun to find them formidable. An alferes and two serjeants were brought to trial at Coimbra, for cowardice, and for spreading fearful and false reports upon their flight: they were condemned to death and executed. The Porto militia regiment in which the panic had begun was deprived of its colours till it should recover its character in the presence of the enemy; two other regiments which had lost theirs were not to have them restored till, in like manner, they had effaced the stain of their late conduct; and the Penafiel militia, which had lost one and preserved the other, was ordered to deposit that other with the Camara of their town till they should have approved themselves worthy to be intrusted with it again. As this was the only instance in which the Portugueze had disgraced themselves since their military establishment had been reformed, it was treated with the greatest severity.

Lord Wellington, as soon as he heard of Soult’s retreat, had put his army in motion toward the Beira frontier. He established his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo; the troops were cantoned between the Agueda and the Coa; and though the magazines at Celorico had been destroyed, those beyond the Douro sufficed for their supply. Here, therefore, they rested awhile to recruit their strength. Their means of transport were employed in provisioning Badajoz, and Lord Wellington prepared to follow up the brilliant successes of the campaign.