It was part of Lord Wellington’s plan that Marshal Suchet should be engaged on the eastern coast by the Anglo-Sicilian army, and thus prevented from sending assistance to the French in Aragon and on the upper Ebro. His position upon the line of the Xucar was too strong to be attacked in front by the force under Sir John Murray’s command, or acting in concert with him; and a movement by Requeña and Utiel upon their right flank, and by Tortosa and Lerida towards the rear, seemed as hazardous as it would have been circuitous and difficult. A naval expedition remained for consideration; and if a vigorous attack were made either upon Tarragona or Rosas, Suchet’s attention must necessarily be drawn thither, so that he could give no aid to the armies in the north, and must leave the open part of the kingdom of Valencia to the Spaniards. Tarragona was preferred as the point of attack, and Sir ♦April 14.♦ John was instructed to embark with that view. If he should succeed in his attempt against that place, an establishment would be secured on the coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army in Catalonia: but this was a question of time and means, and if Suchet should be strong enough in Catalonia to frustrate the attempt, Sir John was directed in that case to return immediately, and land as far north in the kingdom of Valencia as he could, ♦June.♦ and there join with the right of the Spanish armies, to assist them in profiting by the opportunity which Suchet’s absence and the withdrawal of a considerable part of his force from the Xucar might be expected to afford.

The expedition was to have been kept secret; but the preparations which were made at Alicante for the embarkation of a considerable corps could not be concealed, and Suchet was speedily informed of them. Already he had apprehended, by a movement of the Spaniards from La Mancha upon Cuenca, and of Villacampa from the frontiers of Aragon upon the upper Guadalaviar, that it was intended by a combined operation to compel him to evacuate Valencia; but as at that time Clausel’s activity relieved him from any inquietude with regard to Mina, he was enabled to withdraw a division from Aragon, and to place Pannetier’s brigade between Tortosa and Valencia, that he might direct it upon whatever point should be threatened, without leaving the line of the Xucar exposed.

By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700 cavalry, and 14,600 infantry, including Whittingham’s division of 5000, and above 4000 Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of that month the fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of Tortosa were instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the evening of the 2nd in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona. The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral Hallowell pronounced the attempt too dangerous, and therefore they returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor a brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition, occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.

Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3rd, in broad day, and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John Murray determined upon ♦M. Suchet’s Mem. 2, 311.♦ attacking it on the western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertoletti, who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by the fire of the town. But they were thought to be the key of the place, and that if the besiegers could establish themselves there, Tarragona must fall in three days. Accordingly two batteries were begun on the evening of the 4th, and on the morning of the 6th they opened their fire with good effect; another was erected during the night, and on the morning of the 8th the commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach in the Fuerte Real had been made; but he requested that it might not be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned to no account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men. The fire therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establishment. Meantime, when the weather would permit, the artillery and engineer horses, and the cavalry and artillery stores, were landed, and the operations of the engineers were so far advanced that two heavy batteries were constructed to enfilade the place. The city was then summoned to surrender; but as none of the batteries were as yet within 500 yards of the place, and the fire of the besieged had been very superior to that of the besiegers, General Bertoletti would not listen to the summons. On the 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that he was perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according to Sir John Murray’s order, Major-General Sir William Clinton, who had that day been left in temporary command of the siege, resolved to storm the Fuerte Real at nine that night. Accordingly a disposition for the assault was made, and arrangements for distracting the enemy’s attention by a simultaneous show of attack along the whole of his front, aided from the side of the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.

Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe with the command on the Xucar, had made for ♦Suchet’s movement for the relief of Tarragona.♦ Tortosa by forced marches with one division, his reserve, and a brigade of cavalry: and before his arrival he had dispatched orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer; but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it was made, and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the road could by any means be broken up or impeded, ... but in an open country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army; the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the heights, and had the fortified city in its rear: and he suggested to Sir John that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan division, marched immediately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen; that General would have advanced beyond Villa Franca; victory, considering the number and the quality of the allied troops, would not be doubtful, and it would decide the contest in Catalonia; and after driving him from Molins de Rey, and destroying the stone bridge over the Llobregat, by which bridge alone artillery could be brought across that river, there would be time to return and encounter Marshal Suchet.

To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard; but late in the evening of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from Barcelona; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and with such haste as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work which, if carried, must, in his opinion, have been abandoned the next day: he placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery, or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he thought, had all advantages; they had fortresses in every direction to furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they were defeated; whereas he was in the open field, without any point of support, or of retreat, except to the ships: and how serious an operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach where he had learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark in any but the lightest boats! Three days at least would be required to complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it without delay.

Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th; but that commander gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For public opinion loudly condemned his conduct; it became the subject of a court-martial; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgment in abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening; but it was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the beach; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements, by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation. The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of the 13th, by means of a mole constructed for the purpose, about two leagues from the town; but the other cavalry and a great part of the field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither Sir John Murray repaired in the Bristol early on the 13th, and where the whole armament was directed to assemble.

While the allies were thus re-embarking with discreditable precipitance, two other armies thought it necessary in consequence of this movement to retreat also, in equal haste, ... General Copons from the vicinity of Reus to the mountains, lest he should be exposed to a combined attack from Decaen and the garrison of Tarragona; and Decaen himself to Barcelona, apprehending that the allies had raised the siege for the purpose of bringing him to action. On the evening of the 13th an enemy’s detachment was seen advancing by the piquets in front of the fort at Col de Balaguer, and judging that this might be the advance of Suchet’s force, Sir John ordered part of the infantry to be re-landed as it arrived from Tarragona, in order to cover the embarkation of the cavalry and field-artillery, which had reached that point in the course of the day. He was not mistaken in this judgment, ... Marshal Suchet having found the way by the mountains impracticable, thought to force his way by the Col, expecting to reduce the fort with as little difficulty as the allies had done; and on the 14th he presented himself there on the road from Tortosa with the main body of his army. He found a battalion in position covering the fort; but, to his astonishment, he also discovered the British fleet at anchor between the Col and Hospitalet. His light troops and skirmishers extended themselves along the hills, and approached within cannon-shot of the fort. But he found it impossible to advance, so completely was the road on that side commanded by the fort and by the judicious station taken by the ships of war, which could anchor there close to the shore; and it was equally impossible for an army to remain there many hours, there being no water within many miles. He found it necessary, therefore, to retire the same evening to the village of Perillo, not knowing what had occurred at Tarragona, alarmed as well as surprised at what he had seen, and holding himself prepared to follow the movements of the fleet.

On the following morning he made a second movement on Valdellos, as if intending to attempt the mountain road. As soon as Sir John Murray was informed of this he apprehended that it was Suchet’s intention to turn the position which the allies occupied, and enter the plain of Tarragona in their rear; upon which the farther embarkation of the cavalry was suspended, and nearly the whole of the infantry were put on shore. He also sent a strong division, and all the cavalry, under Major-General Mackenzie, to observe the enemy’s motions, and attack them if they should attempt to press farther forward. They remained on the 16th nearly in the same position; but intelligence came that a column was in march from the side of Tarragona, and as this would have rendered General Mackenzie’s situation extremely critical, he was ordered to retire to Hospitalet, and accordingly retreated thither in the course of the night. Sir John now determined to take up a position in the plain, between the high ground of the Col and the sea, and this was done on the 17th. The left rested on the hills, which are almost inaccessible on that side; the ground in front, though level, was impracticable for cavalry, because it is intersected from the hills to the sea with gullies and deep ravines caused by the winter rains. The right extended to the shore, and was greatly protected by the gun-boats and the fire of the shipping. In this strong position he had resolved to wait the enemy’s attack, but in the forenoon it was ascertained that they had retired on both sides, Suchet toward Tortosa, and Decaen toward Barcelona, after throwing supplies into Tarragona. Sir John then assembled a council of war, in which it was concluded that as nothing farther in the way of offensive operations could be attempted by the army in its then state, and as no advantage could be expected from remaining where they were, and acting defensively, the most advisable measure was to re-embark and return to Alicante, there to re-equip the army.

In the afternoon of this busy day Lord William Bentinck, who had long been looked for, arrived from Sicily to take the command. The Mediterranean fleet, under Sir Edward Pellew, came with him, having quitted its station off Toulon in the hope of assisting the operations against Tarragona, either by its presence there, or by making a show of landing at and attacking Rosas. Lord William on assuming the command confirmed the opinion of the council of war, and ordered the troops to be immediately re-embarked. The weather being such as to raise a high surf, rendered this very difficult; nevertheless by great exertions on the part of the navy, every thing was got on board by ♦Fort at Col de Balaguer demolished.♦ the midnight of the 19th. At the same time the fort at Col de Balaguer, having been dismantled and ruined, was blown up; and on the ensuing day, Admiral Hallowell and the Anglo-Sicilian army made sail for Alicante from their bootless expedition, and Sir Edward Pellew returned with the Mediterranean fleet to his wonted station.

The explosion of the fort announced to the French that the English had abandoned all thought of any further operations in lower Catalonia, ... much to Marshal Suchet’s relief, who while they remained there deemed it necessary to observe their movements, and yet felt ♦Unsuccessful movements of the Spaniards in Valencia.♦ that he was wanted upon the Xucar. General Elio’s army, joined by that which Ballasteros had formerly commanded, but was now under the Duque del Parque, had endeavoured to take advantage of his absence with so large a part of his force. On the 11th they had attacked General Harispe’s rear-guard, under General Mesclop, when on the road from S. Philippe to its position on the Xucar, but were repulsed at the village of Rogla with some loss, and Elio himself was for a little while in the enemy’s hands, but he had the good fortune to escape without being recognized. The French then pursued their march without farther molestation to the bridge over the Xucar. On the 13th the Spaniards presented themselves in force there, and while a cannonade was kept up on that side, the Duque del Parque attacked Alcira by the two roads of Carcagente and of Gandia. General Habert let their principal column approach the suburb, then charged it at the moment when it began to deploy, threw it into confusion, routed it with the loss of 400 killed and more than 600 prisoners; and this in time for repairing to support his left on the Gandia road, and there also to defeat the assailants. Notwithstanding this success, General Harispe was far from feeling secure in his position. He informed Marshal Suchet that there were in his front not less than 28,000 of the least bad Spanish infantry, and from 2000 to 3000 cavalry in a good state; this, he said, the prisoners agreed in affirming, and the intelligence was not of a kind to make them feel more secure than they ought to be. The departure of the expedition from Balaguer Roads after the total failure of its object enabled the Marshal to hasten back towards the Xucar, and he did this with the more speed, because there was a report that its intention was to intercept him on his way to Valencia, by landing either at Puerto de los Alfaques, ♦The fleet suffers on its return to Alicante.♦ or at Castellon de la Plana. But the fleet had no other object in view than that of returning to Alicante, and in this it suffered much from storms. Eighteen transports were driven on the Alfaques; the troops were taken out, and fifteen of the vessels were got off, but the others were lost.

On landing at Alicante, Lord William received intelligence of the battle of Vittoria. Suchet had apprehended no such tidings. Buonaparte seems to have entertained till the last a blind persuasion that his schemes of ambition in Spain and every where else must finally be successful, and the instructions which he had sent to the Marshal were that he should endeavour to gain time, and lose no ground, till the affairs of the north should be finished, when, if it were then necessary, dispositions would be made in favour of the armies in Spain. The Marshal, however, knew that he must lose no time in retiring from Valencia; that province therefore was delivered by the battle of Vittoria, as Andalusia had been by the battle of Salamanca. He thought to retain upon it a hold which would enable him at any time to return by leaving a garrison of 1200 men in Murviedro, stored for twelve months, the place having been materially strengthened during the eighteen months which had elapsed since the French obtained possession of it: 500 men were also left in Peñiscola, 120 in Denia, and as many in Morella, that little fort commanding a mountain-road, by which a corps of infantry without cannon could at any time re-enter Valencia from Aragon. Looking forward therefore to the probable resumption of their conquests, with the hopefulness which characterizes the French character, and with the confidence which he might justly feel in his own ability of improving all circumstances to the best advantage, he commenced his retreat with the less reluctance because Clausel apprized him that he had arrived at Zaragoza with 14,000 men, and would establish himself ♦Suchet’s Mémoires, 2, 310–324.♦ upon the Gallego, in readiness either to co-operate with the army of Aragon, or with the Intruder, if the army on that side should resume the offensive.

A junction between Clausel and Suchet was what Lord Wellington apprehended as soon as he heard that the expedition against Tarragona had failed, and that consideration made him at once give up his intention of laying siege to Pamplona. Unwelcome as the tidings were, this change of purpose may have compensated for the failure, ... Pamplona ♦July.♦ being so much stronger than it was at that time supposed to be by the allies, and the British army still so defective in its engineer’s department, that the siege might probably have proved unsuccessful. Resorting therefore to the surer method of blockading a city, which there was reason to believe was not provided for a long siege, he intrusted that service to the Spaniards, and ordered works to be thrown up on every side, to prevent the escape of the garrison, and to cut them off from all supplies; and he determined to besiege St. Sebastian’s, where farther means of attack could be obtained by sea. The service was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, with 10,000 men.

But the failure in Catalonia was soon compensated by the events which took place in Aragon. Clausel, not waiting for Marshal Suchet’s movements, nor to consult with him, left his artillery at Zaragoza, and made for France by way of Jaca. The Spaniards supposed that his chief motive was the desire of securing the riches which he had amassed. Mina was marching upon the same point with a far inferior force, in the hope of intercepting some of this booty, when he ♦Duran invites Mina to act with him for the deliverance of Zaragoza.♦ received orders which suspended his progress. Duran at the same time, as commandant in Lower Aragon, was instructed to take such opportunity as might offer for acting against the enemy in Zaragoza. This veteran, who was then at Ricla, sent Colonel Tabuenca to inform Mina of Clausel’s retreat, and to confer with him upon a plan of speedy operations for the recovery of that capital, where there were no other troops remaining than a not numerous garrison, and against which he should immediately move. Tabuenca was then with his regiment at Borja; Mina was supposed to be at Gallud: not finding him there, Tabuenca hastened to Pedrola; but there he found D. Julian Sanchez, who directed him to look for Mina at Alagon; and from Alagon Cruchaga directed him to Las Casetas, and there at one in the morning Tabuenca arrived and found him. Upon delivering his dispatches, he stated that General Duran had selected him to be the bearer, because, being a native of Zaragoza, and having been present during both sieges, he could give him the fullest local information, upon which their combined operations might be concerted. Mina replied, that their forces were not sufficient for such an enterprise. He had approached the city, he said, upon an assurance that the enemy had evacuated it; but an intercepted letter had just been brought him, in which the governor, General Paris, ordered the garrisons on the left of the Ebro to maintain their posts, because succours were on the way to them from Marshal Suchet.

Tabuenca had not expected such a reply. He represented that the united force of the two divisions amounted to from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry, and 1500 horse; that the garrison did not at the utmost exceed 5000, including invalids; that when with that number so wide a circuit was to be covered, various false attacks might distract their attention, and an entrance be effected where they least apprehended it: and that when once the Spaniards should have set foot upon the walls, they might count upon as many brave soldiers as there were men of Zaragoza. The reinforcements which the governor looked for were, he said, far off, and could not, if time were made good use of, arrive till they would be useless. There was more reason to fear that Clausel might march back; but even in that case they could maintain themselves in Zaragoza. Paris could not defend the city, if he were vigorously assailed: and though he might bring off the garrison by the bridge over the Ebro, the French could not carry off their booty. Mina replied, that he had only three regiments of infantry on the right of the Ebro, and cavalry was of little use; but in the morning he expected information from the place, and would then determine whether to remain or to retire. Tabuenca observed, that the regiments on the left bank would not be useless if they were made to approach, and that the cavalry might be dismounted; and he requested him at least to bring down the regiments which he had at Alagon and Pedrola, that the enemy’s attention might thus be drawn toward Las Casetas, when Duran came with his division, as he would do, to Maria or Cadrete. To this Mina consented.

Early in the morning, Tabuenca’s regiment, which had followed him, arrived at the Puente de la ♦Affair before Zaragoza.♦ Claveria, where he joined it, and proceeded on the right of the canal of Tauste toward the Puente de la Muela, meaning to give the men some rest there, while he went in search of Duran. They had scarcely been an hour upon the way, when a fire of musketry was heard on the left toward Las Casetas, and an orderly of Mina’s came in all haste to recall them, because the enemy had attacked him. Tabuenca, confiding in his own knowledge of the ground, represented to Mina, that instead of obeying this order, it would be better that he should occupy the Puente de la Muela, whereby he should divert the enemy’s attention, if, as might be expected, more troops should issue out, and at the same time secure that point in case Duran should make for it. Mina approved of this suggestion. The alarm had been occasioned by a body of horse, some 150 in number, who had been sent on an exploring party; they were charged by Mina’s cavalry, and compelled to retreat with all speed; but other bodies presently sallied to their support, and one of about 1000 foot and 100 horse made for the Puente de la Muela. Tabuenca, who had with him about 1400 men, quickened his pace and anticipated them; and seeing this they halted, hesitated, and then fell back. Their main force advanced against Mina upon the road to Las Casetas; troops also came to his support, and his men behaved with their wonted gallantry. The enemy were superior both in horse and foot, and when the body which had been disappointed in their intention of occupying the bridge of La Muela joined them, the Navarrese could with difficulty keep their ground; but Tabuenca hastening with part of his men, approached the enemy on their left flank, under cover of some olive yards, and opened upon them a fire as opportune as it was unexpected; taking advantage of the movement which this occasioned among them, Mina charged with such effect, that they retreated hastily till they were under the fire of their works. Mina then encamped his troops between the Casetas and the heights of La Bernardona, ... he had now with him 4000 foot and 1500 horse; and Tabuenca regarding this affair as a preliminary to the recovery of Zaragoza, ordered his regiment to march immediately upon the Casa Blanca and the Torrero, while he took the same course with the detachment which had been engaged. These posts, which had been so obstinately disputed in the former sieges, were abandoned by the French at their approach; and the Spaniards entered them, rejoicing in their success, and in being enabled to rest, after a march of four-and-twenty hours, during which they had had no other refreshment than a hasty meal at Grisen.

Between four and five in the afternoon the French sallied a second time and in greater force. They attacked Mina’s division, which was supported by D. Julian Sanchez with his Castilian lancers; but while thus engaged, Tabuenca, leaving just troops enough in the works which he had taken to cover his retreat should that be necessary, attacked the enemy on their left and in their rear, and the result was that they were driven into the city, leaving some two hundred killed. Mina’s loss in killed and wounded amounted in ♦Duran arrives before the city.♦ the course of the day to 115; Tabuenca’s to 28. Duran arrived after the affair, just as evening was closing; that morning, as he was about to march from Muel for Cadrete, he was informed that a French detachment had gone from Zaragoza to bring off the garrison of Almunia which a party of his troops were blockading; and he was preparing to intercept them when a dispatch from Tabuenca made him hasten with all speed to the more important scene of action. Early on the morrow, Mina and Julian Sanchez came to confer with him in the Casa Blanca, and Duran proposed that they should assault the city on the following night: the wall, he said, might be escaladed at many points; the enemy’s attention might be distracted by false attacks, and they were sure of assistance from within. This veteran had frequently distinguished himself by assaulting towns that were imperfectly fortified; Mina was less accustomed to such service, and more disposed to watch for and profit by any opportunity that might be offered him in the field: he was of opinion that they ought to remain before the city and collect thither the remainder of their forces; and in that opinion he persisted when Duran on the following evening renewed the proposal: for he judged rightly, that by a little delay success would be rendered more certain, and obtained at less cost of life.

D. Julian Sanchez removed with his lancers that evening to the Casa Blanca. The enemy allowed no one to go out of the gates: they had suffered too much in the two sallies of the preceding day to venture upon a third; and their vigilance was such that eager as the inhabitants were to communicate with those through whom they expected now to obtain the deliverance for which they so long offered up their prayers, they could convey no intelligence: neither, indeed, was it easy for them to determine what were the intentions of the French; for though they had their plunder packed up for removal and the carriages laden with it, and though they mined the stone bridge over the Ebro, they made at the same time other demonstrations, which were intended to show that it was not their purpose to abandon the city. A little before eight in the evening two guns were fired, which were the signal for a general movement, ... coaches, carts, and sumpter beasts were collected about the Puerta del Angel, and the troops began to file over the stone bridge. This movement was succeeded by stillness, and just before midnight the bridge was blown up. Duran was presently informed by his outposts where the explosion had been, and that the French had abandoned the city; immediately he sent D. Julian Sanchez and Tabuenca to ascertain what damage had been done to the bridge, and whether it were possible to pursue the enemy: he charged them also to give immediate directions for rendering it passable, and not to enter the city unless it should be absolutely necessary, nor suffer any soldier to enter it, that there might be no opportunity for any of those excesses which on such occasions were so likely to be committed; for the same purpose he posted guards at all the gates. The Ayuntamiento however deemed it best, that Sanchez should enter with his lancers, and with a patrol of the citizens maintain order: the principal streets were presently illuminated, the people waiting for no orders or concert, but acting with one common feeling; and the Coso was crowded to see the entrance of the deliverers.

Duran had lost no time in apprizing Mina of what had occurred, and requesting to see him that they might arrange their joint entrance. The Ayuntamiento, between one and two in the morning, came to the Casa Blanca, bringing the keys to Duran, and informing him that the enemy had left about 700 men in the Aljaferia, whose presence, they added, could not prevent him from entering Zaragoza and giving the inhabitants a day of jubilee. Duran replied, that he waited for General Mina to enter with him; but Mina neither appeared, nor any messenger from him, till about seven in the morning, when, passing by the Casa Blanca, without alighting, or turning aside to the building in which the Ayuntamiento and Duran were awaiting him, he sent a chaplain to inform the old general that he was going on to the Torrero. Not a little surprised at this, they all went out in hope of speaking with him, but it was too late; and when one of the Ayuntamiento was deputed to seek him at the Torrero, and let him know that they were waiting for him, he was not found there. The forenoon was far advanced before he, with some of his chief officers, approached the Puerta Quemada, where Duran with his division and the Ayuntamiento were expecting them; his cavalry was at that time fording the Ebro; and merely saying to Duran that he was about to pursue the enemy with them, he rode away. Even noble minds are not always free from infirmity, and this conduct was ascribed to a jealous desire of engrossing to himself the glory of having delivered Zaragoza; for which reason he did not choose to enter with Duran, who was an older camp marshal, and as such, and also as commandant-general of Lower Aragon, must have entered at the head of the troops. But if this unworthy feeling existed, there were fairer motives that mingled with it; he thought it better that his infantry should remain encamped than that they should be quartered in the city; and the pursuit of General Paris was certainly an object of no trifling importance. Two of Mina’s regiments thinking that they were following Paris toward Leciñena, fell in with him unexpectedly, and were attacked by him in the rear, and found it necessary to take up a position, first upon a height near that place, and then near the Ermita de Magallon. The French, whose business should then have been rather to secure themselves by a rapid retreat, than to seek for trivial advantages, lost some time in vainly endeavouring to dislodge them. Giving up the attempt, at last they took the road to Alcubierre; the Spaniards then pursued, harassed their rear, and compelled them to abandon, at the foot of the mountain there, the greater part of the coaches, calesas, and carts, laden with spoil which they had brought from Zaragoza. Paris meantime accelerated his retreat, and effected it, but not without losing the greater part of his convoy, all his artillery, and considerable numbers in killed and wounded, and some fifty prisoners, of whom about twenty were Spanish traitors. Mina arrived with his cavalry after the spoil had been taken, and when it was too late to continue the pursuit.

Paris’s orders had been to make for Mequinenza if he were compelled to leave Zaragoza; this he found impossible, and was glad to effect his escape by Huesca and Jaca. Marshal Suchet, after leaving a garrison of 4500 men in Tortosa, under Baron Robert, moved toward the frontier of Aragon, with the double view of saving Paris, and of enabling a detachment to rejoin him which he had sent to destroy the castles at Teruel and Alcañiz, and bring off the garrisons. The detachment having arrived at Caspe, Suchet pushed his columns to Fabera, and had now his army on the right bank of the Ebro ... having its right at Caspe, its centre at Gandessa, and its left at Tortosa. Here he received intelligence that Paris was driven upon Jaca; that Clausel, who had moved down from Jaca with a view of securing Zaragoza, finding it too late, had again retreated, and retiring still further, had taken a position with his corps upon the frontier of France, and that the whole of Aragon was lost. Nothing remained for him but to draw off the garrisons of Zuera, Gurrea, Anzanigo, Ayerbe, Huesca, Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, Bujaraloz and Caspe, and to think only of combining his operations with General Decaen for maintaining Catalonia. He crossed the Ebro therefore at Mequinenza, Mora, and ♦July 15.Suchet’s Mémoires, 2, 329–331.♦ Tortosa; and in passing between Hospitalet and Cambrils, was cannonaded by the English fleet. To maintain the line of the lower Ebro after the deliverance of Aragon was impossible; it was equally so to feed his army in the sterile environs of Tortosa, where he was also in danger of having the defiles in his rear occupied by the enemy, who might come by sea, and interpose between him and the strong places in Catalonia; he determined therefore upon moving on Reus, Valls, and Tarragona.

Meantime Duran, manifesting no displeasure at the discourtesy which had been shown towards him, made his entrance into Zaragoza. His first business was to march through the rejoicing streets to the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, and here offer up thanksgiving; his second was to lay siege to the castle. The heavy artillery of his division was sent for, and approaches regularly made; and the Zaragozans, after having so often seen the Spaniards who had been made prisoners in Aragon or Valencia, marched through their streets, had now the satisfaction of seeing a French garrison brought prisoners thither in their turn from La Almunia, where they had surrendered to a detachment of the Sorian division. During the first days of the siege, Mina, finding it in vain to pursue General Paris, returned, and took up his quarters with his troops in the suburb; and this was supposed to be a farther indication of jealousy towards Duran, because by remaining on that side of the Ebro which appertained to his own district of Upper Aragon, he was not under his command; it was deemed more strange that he took no part whatever at this time in the operations of the siege, but left it wholly to be carried on by the Sorian division; in fact, he was daily expecting to be appointed to the command of the whole province. Before that appointment arrived, intelligence came that Suchet had advanced to Fabara and Caspe; upon which he crossed the bridge, began his retreat to Las Casetas and to Alagon, and sent orders to Tabuenca to follow him with his regiment: Tabuenca replied that he was under General Duran’s command, and could not leave Zaragoza without his orders. And Duran, as soon as he was informed of this, sent to Mina, saying he could not allow the regiment of Rioja to accompany him in his retreat (a retreat of which he was no otherwise informed than by the orders which had been sent to its colonel), because being determined to defend the city, he required its presence, and indeed he requested the support of some of his troops also; for if the enemy should advance to Zaragoza, which he did not expect, the retreat of the Spanish troops would have a most prejudicial effect upon the public mind; the two divisions were strong enough to meet the French and give them battle, and this they ought to do; but for himself, with his single division, he could defend the city. This indeed Duran at that juncture could well have done; but if the alternative had been to meet Suchet in the field, or to retreat, the course which Mina followed, in pursuance of his usual system, would have been unquestionably the most judicious.

It was soon ascertained that Suchet had retreated, upon which Mina returned to Zaragoza; he then took up his quarters in the city, and the siege of the Aljaferia was carried on jointly by the two divisions; and on the fourth day after his return, the commission which he had looked for arrived, appointing him Commandant-General of all Aragon. The same day brought orders for Duran to join the army of Catalonia, leaving, however, such regiments as Mina might think proper to detain. Mina took two out of four regiments, and one of three squadrons of cavalry; with the remainder Duran departed for Catalonia, leaving to Mina the reputation of effecting the deliverance of Zaragoza, which certainly was not due to him, and was not needed for one who had rendered more signal services to his country, when its fortunes were at the lowest ebb, than any other individual. Duran was remarkable among all the partizans who distinguished themselves in this war for the

♦Reconquista de Zaragoza, pp. 23–84.♦ discipline which, as an old officer, he introduced among his troops, and which he maintained by means that made him equally respected and beloved. Father, or grandfather, were the appellations by which they called him, and which he deserved by the care which he manifested on all occasions for them. On ♦The Aljaferia surrendered.♦ the second day after his departure a redoubt was blown up, in which the commanding officer of the artillery, and 28 men who were in garrison there, perished. This was said to have been his own act; and it was said also that another artillery officer intended to set fire to the powder-magazine, but was prevented by the soldiers, who with their besiegers must otherwise have been destroyed, and with them no small part of the city. The motive assigned for this insane desperation was resentment against the commandant of the place for determining to capitulate, though the works had sustained little injury, and were abundantly provided for a long defence. Immediately after this the garrison surrendered.

Thus, after four years of captivity, Zaragoza was delivered from its detested enemies. During the greater part of that time no tidings but those of ill fortune had reached the Zaragozans, ... the defeat of their armies, the capture of one strong hold after another, some having yielded through famine, others to the strength and skill of the besiegers, and more having been basely or traitorously given up. And though they well knew that the journals of the Intrusive Government, like those in France, were conducted upon a system of falsehood, suppressing every thing which could not be made appear favourable to Buonaparte’s views, they could not doubt the substance of these tidings, nor, in some of the worst cases, the extent of the national loss. The prisoners who were taken in Blake’s defeat before Murviedro, and the still greater number who surrendered with him at Valencia, had been marched through the streets of Zaragoza, in the depth of winter, and in a condition which would have moved any soldiers to compassion except those of Buonaparte and of the generals whom he employed in Spain: without shoes and stockings, foot-sore, half naked, half famished, they were driven and outraged and insulted by an enemy who seemed, together with the observances of civilized war, to have renounced the feelings of humanity. At such times the Zaragozans, without distinction of rank or sex, crowded about their unfortunate countrymen to administer what consolation they could, to weep over them, and to share with them their own scanty supplies of clothing and of food. On such occasions, too, all the respectable families, as if by one consent, kept days of mourning and humiliation1, each in their houses: and more earnest prayers were never offered up than they breathed in bitterness of soul for the deliverance of their injured country, and for vengeance upon their merciless and insolent oppressors.

At the time of the deliverance, and long after, the city and its environs bore miserable vestiges of the two sieges. Ruined houses were to be seen far and near on every side, and the broken walls of what once had been fertile inclosures. Some streets were merely ruins; in others, the walls of the houses were literally covered with the marks of musket-balls, and in some places large holes had been made in them by the numbers which had struck there. Most of the churches and convents were nothing but heaps of ruins; the Capuchin’s convent had been so totally demolished, that only a solitary cross remained to mark the spot where it had stood. Nothing had been repaired except the Aljaferia and such of the fortifications as the French re-fortified for their own security. Much of this material destruction was reparable; but precious monuments of antiquity had been destroyed, ... precious libraries and precious manuscripts, which never could be replaced; and upon most of the inhabitants irreparable ruin had been brought. The loss of life which had been sustained there may be summed up: broken fortunes and broken hearts are not taken into the account; but the sufferers had the proud and righteous satisfaction of knowing that they had not suffered in vain. The two sieges of Zaragoza, that in which it was overcome, not less than that which it successfully resisted, contributed more than any other event to keep up the national spirit of the Spaniards, to exalt the character of the nation, and to excite the sympathy and the admiration of other countries. And the good will not pass away with the generation upon whom the evil fell. There is no more illustrious example of public virtue in ancient or modern history than this of Zaragoza. Such examples are not lost upon posterity; and such virtue, as it affords full proof that the Spanish character retains its primitive strength, affords also the best ground for hope, not only that Spain may resume its rank in Christendom as a great and powerful kingdom, but also that the Spaniards may become, religiously and politically, a free and enlightened nation; not by the remote consequences of a sudden and violent revolution, which always brings with it more evils than it sweeps away, but by the progress of wisdom and truth, working their sure though slow effect in God’s good time, among a patient, thoughtful, and devout people.