It was known afterwards that a spy during the preceding night had entered the town, and his letters made General Robert immediately suspect the stratagem: disappointed of getting Van Halen into his hands, and of taking the Spanish officers in a counter-snare, he took the only vengeance in his power, by putting to death the wounded peasant who had brought the first forged letter. Eroles, meantime, not discouraged by this failure, lost no time in trying the same artifice elsewhere. Mequinenza had hitherto only been observed by part of one regiment; and the garrison, though reduced in number, made incursions for many leagues round, by which means they had laid in stores of provision for eighteen months, and kept the surrounding country in continual alarm. Eroles, on his way from Xerta towards Lerida, sent his adjutant, Don Antonio Mazeda, with Don José Antonio Cid, a member of the provincial deputation of Catalonia, to raise the Somatenes, and by this means cut off all communication with the place; and he dispatched before them a peasant with such another letter as that which at first had imposed upon General Robert. He halted that night a day’s journey from Lerida, having in his company Don Juan Antonio Daura, who forged the signatures, Van Halen, and Lieutenant Don Eduardo Bart, who spoke French so perfectly, that he was able to personate a French officer. Here they parted company, the two latter making for Torres del Segre, a place on the river of that name, six leagues from Mequinenza, and three from Lerida; there they remained in secret, coming out only at night to confer with Eroles, learn from him the state of affairs, and copy such papers as were required, none of which were forwarded till they had been examined by each of the party most carefully. The Baron himself proceeded to the blockading force before Lerida, and appearing there as Commandant-General of the blockade of that place, Monzon and Mequinenza, he reviewed the troops, inspected their posts, and made ♦Feb. 9.♦ dispositions for straitening the blockade; meanwhile the forged orders were sent in by a trusty agent to the governor, General Lamarque. Hither the spy from Mequinenza returned, bringing with him the reply of Baron Bourgeois, the governor, to Marshal Suchet, in which he acknowledged the receipt of his orders, said that he was preparing to obey, inclosed the returns of his force, the state of the military chest and the magazines, and thanked the Emperor for the grand-cross with which he had been pleased to honour him; the same messenger brought also a letter from Mazeda, saying that he had strictly blockaded the place. The reply from the governor of Lerida was in like manner brought him, and he thus obtained the exact returns which he wished, and understood also that both commandants were ready to fall into the snare.

He then set out for Mequinenza, with 300 foot and 40 horse, including a company of Mina’s division, which he met upon the way, and ordered to follow him. Van Halen was instructed to join him by a different road, which he did, in sight of the fortress, Eroles having first sent in dispatches, signed in D’Eschalard’s name, and sealed with the seal of the staff, informing the governor of the pretended armistice, and stating that the two aides-de-camp, Van Halen and Captain Castres, would go round to the fortresses with the necessary orders; he accompanied this with a letter in his own name, announced the arrival of an officer from Marshal Suchet, and requested to be informed what number of officers the French Commandant would bring out to confer with this officer in his presence, that he might present himself with an equal number; coming himself, if the Commandant came, or deputing one of his chief officers, if General Bourgeois should think proper to act by delegate: in either case, his troops should be drawn out at an equal distance with those of the French from any central point which the Commander might please to name. Time and place were accordingly appointed, and Van Halen in his French uniform, and Bart as his orderly, went to the conference without an escort, and with an effrontery which prevented all suspicion. Van Halen presented a letter as from Suchet, in which the Marshal was made to say how painfully he felt the circumstances which compelled him to give orders for evacuating places wherein, at the cost of so many sacrifices, they had planted their victorious banners. But unexampled defections had forced the Emperor to this measure; and his object now was, to preserve these brave garrisons, and place them once more in the first rank of his bayonets. His aide-de-camp was charged with verbal communications. Van Halen acted his part perfectly; and having arranged everything for the march of the troops, who were to evacuate the place on the following noon, Eroles hastened with his subtle agent to Lerida, there to repeat the stratagem.

The news that Mequinenza was recovered had already spread; but none of the circumstances were known, and the better to deceive the French, it was now necessary to deceive the Spaniards also. Eroles, therefore, issued an order of the day, stating that Mequinenza was that day to be evacuated, and that Lerida and Monzon were to be given up by the same treaty; and commanding the Spaniards not to molest the French during the twelve days’ truce, but to treat them with that generosity which characterized the Spanish nation. He had approached the blockading force amid the rejoicings of the people, who gathered round him on his way. General Lamarque’s suspicions were completely disarmed; and when he requested that Van Halen might be allowed to enter the place and confer with him, because his own orders did not permit him to go beyond a certain distance from it, Van Halen, relying upon his courage and his strength of countenance, ventured in. The governor met him on the bridge, and they retired into an adjoining house, where, after some searching questions, he produced a dispatch received, as he said, by an emissary who had recently arrived, in which the Marshal approved of some proposals for the further security of the place, and held out a hope of succouring him in the course of a few weeks. Van Halen answered by a reference to the date of his own letter, and the recent events which had produced an alteration in the Marshal’s views. The conversation turned upon the Spanish Generals, and the circumstances of the blockade; and Van Halen took occasion to represent that Eroles seemed hurt by the General’s declining to communicate with him in person, when he, in proposing such a meeting, had gone beyond the line of his instructions from General Copons. The French General, upon this, not to be outdone in ♦Feb. 14.♦ courtesy, sent to offer a meeting; and went accordingly beyond his own advanced posts with his treacherous companion. At this interview everything was arranged, and three o’clock on the following afternoon was fixed upon as the hour for evacuating the city. Van Halen was invited to return with the General, and be his guest that night; but he pleaded the necessity of hastening to Monzon as his excuse, and thither he departed with a Spanish escort.

Monzon had been besieged by part of Mina’s troops since the end of September, to the great distress of the inhabitants, who were under the guns of the fortress. The besiegers attempted to mine the rock on which it was placed. There was but one man belonging to the engineers in the place, and he was a simple miner; but, being a man of great ability, the commandant and the garrison confided in him; and the ♦Suchet, 2. n. pp. 371, 372.♦ works which were executed under his direction were so skilfully devised, that they baffled all the attempts of the assailants, and they had in consequence converted the siege into a blockade. Here Van Halen had two difficulties to overcome with the Commandant: a report had reached him that there was a Spaniard at this time with Eroles who had served as aide-de-camp to Suchet; and, the place being held under the orders of the governor of Lerida, he could not surrender it, without sending to receive his instructions. The suspicion which the report ought to have excited seems to have been removed by the confidence with which Van Halen presented himself. And the second objection was easily disposed of: the false aide-de-camp, though he might reasonably judge that the real purport was to discover whether or not there was any fraud in the business, knew that Lerida had by this time been delivered up; he prevailed upon the blockading force, therefore, to let an officer pass with this commission, and required the Commandant to hold himself in readiness for marching as soon as he should return. The officer accordingly arrived before Lerida on the night after its surrender. Eroles affected anger when he heard his errand, and declared that, if there were any further delay, the treaty as it respected Monzon should be annulled, and he would march against it and reduce it to ashes. The officer, finding him in possession of Lerida, was confounded, made what excuse he could for his superiors, and faithfully promised that Monzon should be given up immediately on his arrival there; and this was done.

Monzon was at this time stored for seven months, Mequinenza for eighteen, and Lerida for two years. By the recovery of these places, 40,000 inhabitants were saved from the miseries of a siege, and 6000 Spanish troops were rendered disposable for other service. The navigation of the Ebro, the Cinca, and the Segre was restored, and the most fertile part of Catalonia delivered, Aragon secured, and a direct communication opened with Lord Wellington’s army. The next business was to secure the garrisons who had been thus deceived, amounting to more than 2300 men. As soon as Eroles had taken measures for preserving order in Lerida, which, under such circumstances, required extraordinary care, he set out with two battalions of infantry and 200 horse in the rear of the French, Colonel Don Josef Carlos having gone before them with an equal force. The intention was to intercept them in the defiles of Igualada; but they made a forced march, and frustrated this part of the plan. Upon this, lest they should succeed in effecting a junction with the troops in Barcelona, part of the blockading army was sent for; and when they arrived at Martorell, they found themselves surrounded there. General Lamarque was then informed that he had been deceived by a stratagem of war; and that nothing remained for him but to lay down his arms, give up the public treasure, and to submit to fortune. Eroles expressed his personal esteem for the General, and his sorrow that the misadventure should have fallen upon him; he promised that the officers should be sent to Tarragona, and receive every attention which could alleviate their imprisonment; and he observed, that the General himself could not but in his heart approve a stratagem by which so much bloodshed and misery was prevented, as must have attended the reduction of these places, whether by siege or by blockade. Lamarque upon this asked if Van Halen was a Spaniard; and Bourgeois remarked upon the answer, that in truth he had rendered a great service to his country. The former said he had been dreaming for the last five days, and hardly knew if he were yet awake.7

Chagrined as Marshal Suchet was by the success of what, though he might justly deem it treachery in the agent, he could not but consider to be an allowable stratagem on the part of an injured, enterprising, and ever active enemy, ... it was even more mortifying for him immediately afterwards to make overtures, by order of ♦Suchet dismantles Gerona and other places. Suchet, 2, 374.♦ the minister at war, to General Copons for evacuating all the places which he yet retained, Figueras only excepted; and to find the allies so confident of speedily obtaining them unconditionally that his proposals were disregarded, in retiring from the vicinity of Barcelona he had destroyed his works at the bridge of Molins del Rey, and in the pass of Moncada, and at Mongat; he now found it necessary to demolish the fortified posts at Besalu, Olot, Bascara, Palamos, and other smaller places; and even to dismantle Gerona, evacuate it, and retire with the remains of his army to the neighbourhood of Figueras. Jaca, too, about the same time was compelled to surrender to a part of Mina’s army.

On the Biscayan coast Santona was the only place which still remained in the enemy’s power; the garrison were blockaded; but they contrived to get supplies by sea, sometimes by successful runners from the opposite side of the bight, sometimes by capturing traders that approached too near, for they had one or two armed vessels in the port; but more by means of smugglers, who ran in for the sake of a good market, and in the spirit of their illicit occupation cared not with whom they dealt. The British depôts had been removed from Bilbao and S. Sebastian’s; and, notwithstanding the stormy season, the army was always abundantly supplied, except with fodder; when this failed, bruized furze was used: the horses ate it with avidity, and kept in excellent condition. The men, during this inaction, suffered more; some of the corps were very sickly; and one regiment, which lost many men by a fever, was sent into the rear, both for change of air, and that it might be removed from intercourse with the rest of the army. The rain sometimes rendered it difficult to communicate with the more distant corps: a Portugueze brigade belonging to Sir Rowland was once four days without bread or meat, a rivulet, small at other times, being so swoln as to become impassable. But in general, money was the scarcest article: dollars, which were exchanged at so low a rate after the spoils at Vittoria, sold now for eight shillings each.

The disposition of the French towards the Bourbons could at this time be so little doubted, that though the allies did not yet openly support their claims, dies were made to cut out fleurs-de-lys for scarfs, to be worn on the arms of those who might be willing to declare in favour of the old loyal cause. During the weeks of inactivity which the season occasioned, preparations were made for crossing the Adour, investing Bayonne, and carrying the war into the heart of France. The snow on the lower range of the Pyrenees had visibly lessened on the 6th, and in the course of a week had wholly disappeared. On the 14th of February, Sir Rowland put the right of the army in motion, drove in the enemy’s piquets on the Joyeuse river, attacked Harispe’s position at Hellete, and compelled him to retire with loss towards St. Martin. That General then took up a strong position in front of Garris, on the heights of Le Montagne, where he was joined by troops from the enemy’s centre, and by Paris with his division, who, having commenced their march toward the interior of France, had been recalled because of the danger in this quarter. On the same day the detachment of Mina’s troops in the valley of Bastan advanced upon Baygorrey and Bidarrey, and blockaded St. Jean de Pied-de-Port, Sir Rowland having cut off the direct communication of the enemy with that fort. On the ♦Feb. 15.♦ morrow, Morillo, after driving in their advanced posts, was ordered to move toward St. Palais, by a ridge parallel to that on which they had taken their position, that he might turn their left, and cut off their retreat upon that road by the bridge of St. Palais, while the second division under Sir William Stewart should attack in front. The day was far gone before the attack could be commenced, and the action lasted till after night had closed: the position, though remarkably strong, was carried without much loss on the first effort; many gallant attempts were made to recover it, and as gallantly resisted; the struggle was more obstinate in the darkness than it had been while daylight lasted, and the French being encountered in all their charges with the wonted resolution of British troops, more men were bayoneted than usual in proportion to the numbers engaged. The enemy at length gave up the contest, and retired with considerable loss, leaving ten officers and about 200 men prisoners; but they reached St. Palais before Morillo could arrive, and crossed the Bidouze during the night, and destroyed the bridges. The right of the centre made a corresponding movement with the right wing on these two days, and the allied posts were this evening on the Bidouze. The bridges were repaired; Sir Rowland crossed the next day, and on the following drove the enemy across the Gave de Mouleon. They attempted to destroy the bridge at Arriverete, as if it were their intention to dispute the passage, but time was not allowed them to complete its destruction; and a ford having been discovered above the bridge, the 92nd, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, crossed there, covered by the fire of Captain Beane’s troop of horse artillery, which was advantageously placed; this regiment made a gallant attack upon two battalions of French infantry in the village of Arriverete, and drove them out with much loss. The enemy retired in the night across the Gave d’Oleron. Sir Rowland’s posts were established on that Gave the next day; and the French took up a position in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, where they were reinforced. The position was very strong, and covered in front by a broad and rapid river; but it seemed now as if no position, however advantageous, could give the French confidence; they had been driven during the last four days from a country of peculiar difficulty, where frequent rivers afforded them great opportunities for defending it; and when Marshal Soult understood with how little success it had been defended, he directed his whole attention to that side, destroyed all the bridges over the Adour, which were not protected ♦Feb. 22.♦ by Bayonne, left that place to its own resources, and, concentrating his forces behind the Gave de Pau, fixed his head-quarters at Orthes.

During these operations the left wing of the army continued to observe Bayonne, with the 4th division, also, which occupied the heights of Monguerre, communicating with the left on the Nive, and resting its right on the Adour, and thus preventing the enemy from drawing any supplies for the fortress from that side of the river. Preparations had been made for passing that river, and for throwing a bridge over it, both below Bayonne, ... enterprises so difficult, that though Soult had witnessed the passage of the Douro, he seems not to have apprehended that they would be attempted. His attention had now been withdrawn from that side by Sir Rowland’s movements; the 4th division moved to the right to support that larger part of the allied army which was now assembled on the Gave d’Oleron; the 5th replaced it in the position of Monguerre, and was itself replaced by Lord Aylmer’s brigade of the first, and the Portugueze under Colonel Campbell: thus making room for Freyre’s Spanish division, which had been cantoned within their own frontier, and now, to the dismay of the inhabitants, re-entered France. The people lamented the departure of the English, and dreaded the arrival of the Spaniards; and knowing their vindictive spirit, and the long provocation which it had received, they expressed their earnest hopes that some English authorities might be left for their protection.

Adour is like Gave, a name common to many rivers in the Pyrenees, both simply meaning water in some of those primeval languages, the remains of which are still widely preserved in the appellations of rivers and mountains. The greater and noted streams, into which the others are received, has its sources in the county of Bigorre, under the Pics du Midi and d’Espade, two of the highest mountains in the chain; it passes by Campan, Bagnères, Montgaillard, and Tarbes, and begins to be navigable near Grenade, a small town in the little county of Marsan; having been joined by the Douze on its right below Tartas, it inclines to the southwest from its junction, passes Acqs, and then holds an almost southerly course to meet the Gave de Pau, which brings with its own waters those of the Gave d’Oleron, into which the Gave de Mauleon has been received. The Adour is then joined by the Bidouze, and lastly by the Nive. Formerly it made a turn to the northward, after that junction, at Boucaut, below Bayonne, and held for about six leagues a slow and winding way, parallel with the coast, before it entered the sea at Cape Breton, its direct course having apparently been obstructed by an accumulation of sand. But towards the latter part of the sixteenth century, Louis de Foix, whose water-works at Toledo were then among the wonders of machinery, and who built the lighthouse at the mouth of the Garonne, (the Smeaton and the Telford of his age,) opened the present channel, ... an arduous undertaking, in which he was more than once foiled. His intent was, by erecting a dam across the river at its curvature, to force it into a straighter line, and make it clear a way for itself through the sands: the river again and again swept away his embankments, but he, with a just confidence in his own theory, persevered in the attempt; at length, on the day of St. Simeon and St. Jude, in the year 1579, such torrents poured down from the ♦Pierre de Marca. Histoire de Bearn, p. 28.♦ Pyrenees, that Bayonne was in danger of being destroyed by an inundation; the Adour took then, with its increased weight of water, a straight course, and the engineer was rewarded for all his anxieties by beholding the complete triumph of his art. The Bayonnese, however, ascribed the whole ♦Thuanus, l. 80. T. 3. p. 619.♦ merit, not to him, but to the two joint Saints of the day, and appointed a commemorative thanksgiving to be celebrated annually from that time forth upon their festival. An excellent port would now have been formed in the Adour, if the constant tendency of the sea to throw up a bar at its entrance could have been overcome. With this view the French government constructed massive stone embankments on both sides, from Boucaut to the sea; it was hoped that by thus confining the stream, its current, which at ebb tide runs about seven miles an hour, would with its own force and weight of water keep always a clear channel; but the effect was only to remove the bar somewhat farther, without lessening the difficulty or the danger of the entrance. These were so great, that the enemy at this time relied on them. They had the Sappho corvette anchored so as to flank an inundation which protected the right of their intrenched camp; they had many armed boats on the Adour, above the town, to protect the convoys of provision which came down the river, and sometimes succeeded in getting in; the mountain guns of the allies, which were the only ones that could be removed, now and then exchanged shots with these: below Bayonne they had some gun-boats in the bend of the river, by the village of Boucaut, stationed there, as it seemed, to strengthen their intrenched camp by a flanking fire; but the only precaution that the enemy had taken to impede the passage, was that of removing the signal-staff on the left bank, which marked the line for vessels to steer by, in making for the mouth of the river.

A number of Spanish chasse-marées had been collected at Socoa for forming a bridge; materials also were ready for a boom to protect it. The naval part of the operation was under Admiral Penrose’s direction, and the 21st was the day appointed for the attempt; but the weather proved unfavourable, and it was not possible for the vessels and their convoy to get out of Socoa. Sir John Hope, however, would not delay his movement, and resolved to attempt the passage without naval co-operation; the troops, it was thought, might be towed over upon rafts formed of pontoons, and carrying about 100 men each. On the evening of the 22nd, the troops were ordered to be in readiness for marching at midnight; they had with them a brigade of 18-pounders, and a rocket detachment which had arrived at Passages a few days after the passage of the Nive. There was a prejudice in the army against this weapon, which had hitherto not been used in the field; the opinion seems to have been, that if it had been an efficient means of destruction, it would sooner have been borrowed from the East Indian nations. Lord Wellington, however, was willing that they should be tried; and some experiments which were made at Fontarabia gave reason for supposing that they might be found useful on the Adour. The direction of this new arm was assigned to Sir Augustus Fraser, but the trial was to be made under all the disadvantages of inexperience; for the corps was composed of men hastily brought together, and entirely ignorant of the arm they were to use; and the rockets themselves were equipped in five different ways, and consequently liable to as many failures. Altogether the enterprise was one of no ordinary hazard; the entrance of the river was frequently impracticable, and always perilous; its width where it was to be bridged was 270 yards, and the tide and the ripple were there so formidable as to preclude the use of anything smaller than decked vessels of twenty or thirty tons burthen; the navigation from Socoa was uncertain; and there were the corvette and the flotilla of gun-boats to assist a garrison which consisted of more than 10,000 men. Yet even those who fully understood the difficulties of the operation had nevertheless full confidence that it would succeed.

Soon after midnight the troops were in motion; when within a short distance of Anglet, they turned by a crossroad toward the coast, marching in strict silence along the skirts of the enemy’s outposts. It was a dark night, the road narrow, deep in mud, and with ditches on either side; one of the 18-pounders was drawn too near the edge in the darkness, the side of the road gave way under its weight, and it sunk into the ditch, dragging the near horses after it. This delayed the march for some time, till, by the greatest exertions, the gun was drawn up out of the deep mud; but no ill consequence arose from this mischance; the enemy were not on the alert, and the troops arrived before daylight on the sand-hills which border the coast from the vicinity of Biaritz to the mouth of the Adour: the tract between these hills and the intrenched camp is almost wholly covered by the pine-wood called the Bois de Bayonne. At daybreak, two light battalions of the German legion patroled through the wood, and dislodged the enemy’s piquets, which retired from thence, and from the village of Anglet, into the intrenched camp. The first brigade of guards, under Colonel Maitland, debouched from the wood near the place where the signal-staff, known by the name of the Balise Orientale, had stood, which was on a high sand-hill nearly opposite Boucaut. The ground here could not be reconnoitred till the enemy’s piquets were driven in; and this of course was avoided till the last moment, that no alarm might be given. It had been supposed that the guns might be brought within 700 or 800 yards of the Sappho, and that they might sink her, lest she should be employed against the bridge; but, when they had been brought with great labour through the deep sandy ground, it was necessary to place them where they were sheltered from the guns of the intrenched camp, and this was in a situation 1500 yards from the corvette. There they were placed in battery, and the brigade was posted behind some sand-hills, close to the marsh which protected the front of the camp. Don Carlos d’España meantime made a demonstration on the heights above Anglet, to prevent the enemy from detaching any troops.

As soon as the French saw the brigade debouching from the pine-wood they commenced a cannonade against it from their gun-boats. This had been foreseen; the rocket-corps had, therefore, been divided into three parties, one of which went, with the first division, towards the mouth of the Adour, and the other two accompanied the 18-pounders to be employed against the flotilla. There were twelve boats to assist the Sappho; but when a few rockets had been discharged, the terrified sailors took to their oars, and made all speed up the river; the effect, indeed, of these weapons was most terrific; they dashed through the water like fiery serpents, and pierced ♦Batty’s Campaign, p. 119.♦ the sides of the boat, burning apparently even under water with undiminished force. The guns meantime opened upon the corvette, and fired about 400 rounds at her, some toward the conclusion with hot shot. This failed to set her on fire; and when the three-coloured flag was shot from the flag-staff, the enemy presently nailed it to the mast-head; but after some hours the French retired from the contest, under the protection of the citadel, their captain having been killed, and 34, out of a crew of 40 men, killed or wounded, ... sacrificed, as it should seem, in a display of courage which could be of no avail. The action had served as a spectacle for the inhabitants of Bayonne, who came out from the promenade which skirts the river, to witness, and apparently to enjoy it, ... the day being remarkably fine, and the action itself, with all its circumstances, as described by an eye-witness, more resembling some festival display than the dreadful reality of war; the spectators, too, thought themselves at safe distance, till one poor fellow came rashly within range of the guns, and had his head carried off by a shot which passed completely through the corvette.

That vessel had not been destroyed, but the attack on it, and the other demonstrations in front of the intrenched camp, had the desired effect of occupying the enemy’s whole attention; a bend which the Adour makes on the seaward side of the town, and the pine-wood, which extended almost close to its banks, prevented them from seeing the movements of the allies on that side, and they kept little watch there, because they apprehended no danger. But meantime the whole of the first division, except the brigade of guards which accompanied the artillery that attacked the Sappho, had marched to attempt a passage near the mouth of the river. With this force there were eighteen pontoons and six small boats, forty rocketeers, and an officer with a few artillerymen, destined to spike the guns of a battery on the enemy’s side of the water. The intention was, to construct six rafts, each upon three pontoons, by which, in two passages, 1200 men might be passed across before the day should dawn; 1200 more being ready to follow, while these held their ground, supported by twelve field-pieces from the left bank. But, owing to the difficulty of getting the pontoons on, it was found that only three of them could be brought to the water’s edge before daylight; and therefore it was deemed advisable by the officers in command to withdraw the troops behind some sand-hills, where they were quite concealed, and collect the pontoons. Some of the officers, meantime, before day broke, examined the shore, to see where would be the most favourable points for putting the rafts into the water; the sentry on the opposite bank challenged them, but no answer was returned, and no alarm taken. Sir John Hope came to the spot at daylight, but afterwards sent orders to attempt the passage, at all hazards, when the tide would permit. A little before noon the river became passable, the tide, still running out, being nearly slack. At this time the fleet from Socoa was in sight, but at considerable distance, and with an unfavourable though not a strong wind, rather losing than gaining ground. The river at the point where the passage was to be attempted appeared to be about 200 yards wide at low water. The British made no show of men, and could only see a small piquet of the enemy’s on the other side; this piquet appeared at a loss what to do, and as soon as the first boats were carried to the water’s edge on men’s shoulders, they fairly ran off, without discharging a single shot, the piece of their advanced sentry having missed fire. The six boats were soon on the water, each carrying only six soldiers; and the tide coming in soon increased the labour of the passage. A rope was passed from one side to the other, and three rafts were put together with all speed, each carrying from 50 to 60 men; but, after two or three passages had been effected, the tide came in with such force that it was found impracticable to get the raft either backward or forward from the middle of the current, where it remained tide-bound, the united strength of all who were on board not being sufficient to haul with any effect upon the hawser. About five o’clock they ceased working, the few seamen whom they had, and who were all Portugueze, being exhausted with fatigue. By that time 500 of the guards had been ferried across, the rocketeers having been the last, with Captain Lane of the artillery, who came out with them from England. All was at this time quiet, and apparently the day’s work was done. But a little before dusk the enemy pushed down two regiments from the citadel; they came on with apparent spirit, beating the charge. Colonel Stopford posted the guards behind some low sand-hills, with their right on the river, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank; but a well-directed discharge of rockets made the French hastily retreat: the effect of this weapon was more terrible because they had never before witnessed it, and they retired with all speed into the citadel.

The troops bivouacked that night on the ground which they occupied; those who were in the wood felled trees and kindled fires. As soon as the tide served more men were passed across, the pontoons being used as row-boats, carrying fifteen men at each turn: it was bright moonlight, the weather perfectly still, and there was no enemy to offer any opposition. ♦Feb. 24.♦ The wind sprung up for the flotilla during the night, and at morning it was seen, ... about threescore vessels, including boats of all kinds, some of them near the mouth of the river, standing off and on. The Admiral was in the Porcupine frigate: he had been apprized, through the naval agent at Socoa, how anxiously the entrance of the vessels for the bridge was desired. The surf had increased in proportion as the wind became favourable; and the bar, which extends from the right bank, nearly across the river, shifting with the change of wind and tide, and at all times dangerous, was at this time more than usually formidable. The agent, who set off in his boat from Socoa as soon as he received the last night’s advices, had no pilot on board, and mistaking the channel where he should have entered the river, beached himself on a spit of sand; fortunate, however, in his mishap, for the boat cleared the sand by great exertion, and having been pulled, sails standing, over the spit, got into deep water. One boat, which had the principal pilot on board, and therefore was selected as the safest, led the way, and was overset, several of the crew perished, and most of those who saved themselves were dreadfully bruised. Captain O’Reilly, who had command of the flotilla, was on board, and Captain Faddy (who had charge of 50 artillerymen sent in five gun-boats), both with great difficulty escaped: a second succeeded in reaching the beach; the larger vessels then put off, to wait the chance of the next tide, it being, as the Admiral declared, scarcely possible that one in fifty could then have effected the passage. Some small boats, however, attempted it, and were swamped; what boats were on the river were sent to pick up those who were struggling for life, but without success; some who regained their own boats, and clung to them, were swept off into the sea, and only one man was saved.

Had the bar been smoother, the tide was now too low for vessels to attempt the entrance; but a pilot was landed to the south-west of it, that he might walk to the Adour, and make signals from within the bar, to guide the vessels into the safer parts, supplying thus the signal-staff which on that side had been removed, for from the sea there appeared only one long and heavy line of surf. Meantime the troops continued to cross as they could, about 100 yards above the mouth of the river, some on rafts, some in a pontoon-boat which carried only twelve at a time; and when the tide presented least difficulty, a few cavalry by swimming. When the tide had risen sufficiently, the vessels boldly stood in, the pilot who had been landed having set up a halberd, with a handkerchief fixed to it, as a signal for directing them. The master’s mate of the Lyra led the way; his boat was lost, and himself and the whole of the crew. Several vessels shared the same fate. One who was on the shore, close at hand, and who had been accustomed to fields of battle, declared that he had never beheld a scene so awful. The boats were so agitated as they attempted the passage, sails flapping, oars apparently useless, and all steerage lost, that it seemed as if each must inevitably be wrecked. Two vessels were stranded, but almost all their crews were by great exertion saved. A gun-brig also was driven ashore; Captain Elliot, of the Martial gun-brig, was swamped in his boat; his surgeon was picked up by this gun-boat, but upon her striking the ground the shock threw down a 24-pounder, which fell upon him and killed him. Three transport boats with their crews were lost; every exertion was made to save those who were struggling for life in the surf, literally within ten yards of their countrymen on shore; but though there were men with ropes tied to them on the beach, who spared no endeavour for assisting them, and who when the waves retired appeared as if they were close to them, not a soul could be saved: some who actually obtained footing on the ground were carried back by the receding surf, and swept away for ever. But the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen will overcome all obstacles that are not absolutely insuperable: officers and men on this occasion displayed gallantry which could not be surpassed, and skill which has seldom been equalled; vying with each other they essayed the passage; and happily the wind towards evening gradually died away, and about thirty vessels got in.

The passage of the troops, meantime, had been continued; it was quite dark before the last party were ferried over, and the tide was then running out so rapidly, that the most strenuous rowing hardly prevented the boat from being drifted out to sea. The whole of General Howard’s division, about 6000 in number, were then on the right bank. They bivouacked on the sand-hills where the enemy on the yester-evening ♦Feb. 25.♦ had been discomfited by the rockets. On the morrow they advanced towards the citadel, their right flank resting on the Adour, the left extending to the great road leading from Bayonne to Bourdeaux. Closing in to the verge of a deep and marshy ravine, which separates the high ground about the citadel from the surrounding country, they cut off the enemy’s communication with the open tract to the north of the river, and completed the investment of the fortress and its camp; a feint attack being kept up the while on the opposite side by Lord Aylmer’s brigade, the 5th division, and the Spaniards. By great exertions the bridge was finished on the following day. The point fixed upon for it was near the village of Boucaut, where the river is 270 yards wide. It consisted of six-and-twenty chasse-marées, anchored each at the bow and stern so as to resist both the ebbing and the flowing tide; to many of these, as a substitute for anchors, the heavy iron guns were used which had been taken in the redoubts on the Nive. The vessels were lashed together both at bow and stern. Five cables were stretched by capstans across these vessels from shore to shore, and oaken planks were laid athwart upon these, and secured to the two outer cables, so as to form a platform strong enough to bear the passage of artillery, yet pliant enough to adapt itself to the motion of the vessels with the tide. On the right bank the cable ends were fastened to some of the heaviest iron guns which had been taken in the camp of the Nivelle; on the left they were wound round capstans, which were firmly fixed by large stakes driven into the ground; and by these the tension of the platform could be increased or lessened as the rise or fall of the river might require. A little way above the bridge a boom-chain was laid down for its protection; and above this the gun-boats were anchored, in readiness to engage those of the enemy, should any attempt be made upon the bridge by sending them down the river. The piers on both sides were wide enough for carriages of all descriptions; and that on the right bank was used for the artillery, in a part where the ♦Batty’s Campaign, 126, 127.♦ water is admitted at flood through apertures, and where a road could not have been formed without great expense of labour and of time.

This bridge was of the greatest importance, not only as affording a communication between the troops upon both banks during the blockade and intended siege of Bayonne, but also because it opened a way to the chaussées on the right of the river, whereby the army in its advance towards the interior could be much more easily supplied than by the bad roads in the exhausted country along the skirts of the Pyrenees, and where the Gaves and other tributary streams of the Adour were to be crossed. The inhabitants of Boucaut and of the adjacent villages had been ordered to take up arms against the allies; they had refused; and in consequence, the French troops upon leaving them committed some excesses. The contrast indeed was so great between the treatment which they experienced from their own soldiers and from the allies, that the peasantry volunteered to repair the roads for their uninvited, but now not unwelcome visitors.

While Bayonne was thus being invested by the left wing of the army, the two divisions which had hitherto observed that place between the Adour and the Nive joined the main body; and Lord Wellington, as soon as the troops were closed up, continuing his operations to the right, made a general advance. Marshal Beresford, who had remained since Sir Rowland’s movement with the 4th and 7th divisions and with Colonel Vivian’s brigade on the lower Bidouze, attacked the enemy on the 23rd in their fortified posts at Hastingues and Oyergave, on the left of the Gave de Pau, and made them retire within their tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade. On the 24th, Sir Rowland, with the light, the 2nd, and the Portugueze divisions, under Baron Alten, Sir William Stewart, and Camp-Marshal Lecor, passed the Gave d’Oleron, by a ford near Ville-nave, without opposition. Sir Henry Clinton passed in like manner with the 6th, between Monfort and Laas; and Sir Thomas Picton with the 3rd made demonstrations as if he would have attacked the enemy’s position at the bridge of Sauveterre, upon which they blew up the bridge. Morillo at the same time drove in their posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place, which was fortified strongly enough to require battering-artillery for its reduction. Immediately after the passage of the Oleron Gave, Sir Rowland and Sir Henry Clinton moved towards Orthes, and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town; and the enemy retiring from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau in the night, destroyed the bridges upon that river, and assembled their army near Orthes on the 25th. The allies continued to advance that day, and on the following Beresford crossed the Gave de Pau below its junction with that of Oleron, at some fords about four miles above Peyrehorade; these were not discovered till after some unsuccessful attempts, and the current there was so rapid, that the infantry of General Walker’s division could hardly support each other against it, and for some minutes there was reason to fear that the column would be carried down the stream. The Marshal then moved along the high road from Peyrehorade toward Orthes, on the enemy’s right. Sir Thomas Picton had found a ford below the bridge of Berenx, where he crossed with the 3rd division, and Sir Stapleton with the cavalry as Beresford approached; the 6th and light divisions made a flank movement to support them, and Sir Rowland occupied the heights opposite Orthes, and the high road leading to Sauveterre, on the left bank of the Gave. His corps advanced directly upon the bridge of Orthes, with the hope of forcing it; but, being without artillery, and finding the approach defended by loop-holed houses, and by a tower strongly manned against them, they desisted from their intent.

Orthes, which before the territorial arrangement of France was revolutionized, was the capital of the Senechalry of the same name, is supposed by Scaliger to have been the ancient city of Bearum, the Beneharnus of Antoninus, and the Benarnus of writers in a later age; but this opinion seems to have been satisfactorily ♦Ramond’s Tr. in the Pyrenees, p. 92.♦ disproved. It stands upon the Gave de Pau, there a considerable river, and remarkable, because its accessible source is a waterfall, higher, except one in America, than any that has ever yet been measured; it springs from a height of 1266 feet, and being twice broken on the way by projections of the precipice, falls upon a bed of perpetual snow, under ♦P. de Marca. Hist. de Bearn, L. 1. c. 6. § 4. 14.♦ which it works its passage. Orthes was the residence of the Princes of Bearn during some 200 years from the middle of the 13th century, when Gaston de Moncada built the Chasteau Noble there, upon the plan of his hereditary castle in Aragon, and in a like situation, on an eminence commanding the town, and overlooking a wide circuit of country. In that castle Froissart was entertained by Gaston Phebus, the twelfth Count of Foix, and Lord of Bearn, and there he was informed concerning the affairs of Castille, Portugal, Navarre, Aragon, Gascony, and England, Gaston himself communicating to him what he knew, and telling him that the history which he had undertaken to write would be esteemed above all others, because more marvellous deeds of arms had been done in the world within the last fifty years than in three centuries preceding. There the good old chronicler was as happy as splendid hospitality, and the diligent use of favourable opportunities, could make him; the thing which he most desired being to collect information for his great work, and having at his wish there, lords, knights, and squires, ready and willing to inform him. In this castle Gaston Phebus kept his treasure, and it is said to have amounted at one time to no less a sum than three million florins, raised by taxation, which was borne cheerfully, because he maintained order in his dominions; neither English nor French, nor robber nor rover, harassed his people; and he had the reputation of being as liberal as he was just, not heralds and minstrels only, but strangers who came there having cause to praise him for his bounty. Froissart had been in many courts of kings, dukes, princes, earls, and great ladies, but never in any, he says, that so well liked him as the Castle Noble of Orthes; and he had seen many knights, kings, and princes, but none like this Count of Foix for personage, nor of so fair form, nor so well made; for in every thing he was so perfect, that he could not be praised too much, loving what ought to be beloved, and hating that which ought to be hated. Yet so accustomed were men to the most atrocious actions, in that which was the brightest age of chivalry, that this very Gaston committed a murder in this castle as much in violation of honour and of hospitality, as of laws both human and divine; tortured innocent persons to death upon mere suspicion, and with his own hands killed his own son at the close of a frightful tragedy, of which this castle was the scene; and the faithful historian who thus extols him has related all these things! The ruins of the Chasteau Noble are yet to be seen, and the tower in which Gaston kept his treasure was standing in the last century. Orthes ceased to be the residence of the Counts in 1460, when they removed their court to Pau; and their removal was not compensated by the short-lived university which about a century after Queen Jeanne of Navarre founded there for the Huguenots, and endowed from the church property in her dominions.