Marmont commenced his retreat at midnight, as if, said the Spaniards, he had only come thither to witness the capture of his fort, and see the illumination made by it when on fire. At daylight their column was nearly out of sight, and their rear-guard moving off the ground. During this tarriance the French, considering that part of Spain no longer as a subjected but as a hostile country, had acted in the same spirit of disgraceful barbarity as had rendered their name execrable in Portugal; and when they departed they left the villages of Castellanos de los Moriscos, Huerta, Babila Fuente, Villoria, and Villaruela in flames: where they did not burn the villages they sacked the houses, and murdered those who had ventured to remain in them; and where they did not trample down the standing corn, they set fire to it. The popular feeling had been strongly manifested during the operations against the forts: not only were all necessaries and accommodations for the wounded abundantly supplied, but women of all ranks offered their services to attend on them. High mass was performed this day in the Cathedral, at which Lord Wellington and most of the general officers attended. Lord Wellington gave a dinner in Salamanca, and the Junta a ball in the evening; but some of the principal inhabitants absented themselves because they were partisans of the French, and others from a prudential fear, lest the enemy should return and again obtain possession of the city.

The French withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired towards the Douro in three columns ... one upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allies broke up the next day, following their march, and encamped upon the Guarena. On the morrow Marmont had collected his force, as if with an intention of making a stand on the right bank of that river; his rear was on the hills in front of Alaejos: they moved off before the advanced guard could come up. The allies bivouacked every night in an open country, without a tree to shade them, and where it was necessary to seek for wood at the distance of several miles, the inhabitants frequently using straw for fuel. The enemy continued to fall back toward the Douro, closely followed by one who would let no opportunity escape him. On the 2nd of July their cavalry were on the plain toward Tordesillas, and they had a considerable force of infantry in Rueda; but they were compelled to withdraw from thence, and the town was occupied by the advance of the allied army. On the following day, this part of the army was ordered into the plain, as if with a view of attacking Tordesillas; while the left column, strengthened by the brigades of Generals Bock and Le Marchant, moved on Pollos, where there is a ford. There was some cannonading on the part of the enemy there, and an affair of light troops; and some of the allies passed the river, but they were withdrawn at night: it was then seen that there was no intention of forcing the passage, and orders were given for the distribution of the army. Lord Wellington fixed his head-quarters at Rueda. The French occupied Tordesillas in force: they had a considerable bivouac in the rear of that town, and the bridge there was fortified.

After the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, Marmont could not be surprised that the forts at Salamanca fell, even if he had known with what scanty means they had been attacked; and as he had not been brought to action, his army took credit to themselves for having braved a superior force. The French had lost much of their confidence in battle against the English, but they still relied upon their skill in manœuvring; and Marmont, knowing that he should soon have the advantage in numbers, availed himself of all the opportunities which the nature of the country afforded him for gaining time. ♦The Douro.♦ He was in possession of the line of the Douro. That river rises in the Sierra de Orbion, in Old Castille, issuing from a large and deep tarn, high on the mountain: passing the site of Numancia, it comes to Soria, and so to Berlanga, Osma, and Santesteban de Gormas: in this part of its course its banks are remarkable for the jessamine with which they are profusely clothed. Having left Aranda, it passes by the Cistercian monastery of Valbueno, a place denoting by its name the happy circumstances of its position, and where the monks used to account among the goodly things which had fallen to their lot the barbel and trout with which the Douro supplied them. The Pisuerga, having already received the Arlanza and the Carrion, joins it by Simancas; and though it brings the larger body of water to the junction, loses its name there. The Douro then makes for Tordesillas: for the first ten leagues of its way its course is s. s. w., then westward till it reaches this old city, where it bends to the southward for a few leagues, passing S. Roman de Hornija, the now obscure burial-place of Chindasuintho, one of the most powerful of the Wisigoth kings; then it resumes its western course, waters Toro and Zamora, cities of great name in the Spanish annals, and having collected all the rivers of Leon on its way, enters Portugal. Of all the rivers in the Peninsula, the Douro has the longest course. From its junction with the Pisuerga, till it receives the Tormes on the frontier of Portugal, it flows through a wide valley, the right bank for the most part skirting the heights. The French were in possession of all the ♦Colonel Jones’s account of the war, 2. 100.♦ bridges, and from the mouth of the Pisuerga to Zamora there is but one point favourable for passing an army from the left in presence of an enemy: that point is three leagues above Toro, at Castro Nuño, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantages of ground. There could be little hope, therefore, of striking an efficient blow against Marmont so long as he kept his force concentrated behind the Douro, and it was in his power to cross the river at any of its bridges or fords whenever he might think that opportunity invited.

But the French, according to the barbarous system which Buonaparte pursued, were without magazines, and trusted to their command of the country for subsistence: Marmont therefore had this anxious object to distract his attention; and the Guerrillas were actively employed both upon his flanks and rear in intercepting his supplies, and in occupying troops who would otherwise have reinforced him. Two parties under Sorniel and Bourbon, with 700 cavalry were on the right; D. Julian Sanches, with 500, on the left; while Porlier displayed his usual activity on the side of Asturias; and Mina and Duran in Navarre and Aragon: on that side their efforts were effectual: but General Bonnet joined him from the north, and increased his force to 47,000 men, thus making it numerically superior to that of the allies. Lord Wellington’s situation was at this time an anxious one: he had counted upon the aid which the Gallician army might have given him in occupying some of the enemy by besieging Astorga; in that undertaking, however, they were more dilatory than had been intended; and he was now aware that the force intended to co-operate with him by acting upon the eastern coast was upon so small a scale, that he could place little hope upon it, and no reliance. The French suffered at this time nothing for want of magazines or means of transport, because they took what they wanted, and preyed upon the country. The British Government would not, even in an enemy’s territories, carry on war upon so inhuman and iniquitous a system; but it exposed its army to privations, and its general to perplexities and difficulties which might have paralysed any weaker mind than Lord Wellington’s, by the parsimony with which it apportioned his means. When he advanced from Salamanca, there were but 20,000 dollars in the military chest: the harvest was abundant, but how was bread to be obtained without money? ... and the same want would be felt in bringing his supplies from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in the rear of that fortress. The very difficulty of removing his wounded to the frontier of Portugal was sufficient to deter him from seeking an action on the Douro.

On the 15th and 16th, Marmont concentrated his troops between Toro and San Roman: two divisions crossed the bridge at Toro on the evening of the 16th, and Lord Wellington moved the allies that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal, intending to concentrate them on the Guarena. But it was ascertained next day, that during the night the enemy had repassed the bridge, and destroyed it after them; then making forced marches to Tordesillas, which is six leagues above Toro, crossed again there, and early on the morning of the 18th were on the Trebancos. Marmont might well applaud himself both for the celerity and the skill of these movements: he had marched forty miles; had opened his communication with the army of the centre, which was then moving from Madrid to support him; and by advancing in force on Castrejon he endangered the light and 4th divisions, with Major-General Anson’s brigades of cavalry, which there had not been time for calling in. The enemy commenced a very heavy cannonade against the cavalry; they were scattered about in squadrons, and so escaped without much loss; and immediate measures had been taken to provide for their retreat and junction. The troops at Castrejon maintained their posts till the cavalry joined them; then they retired in perfect order to Tordesillas de la Orden, and thence to the Guarena, having the enemy’s whole army on their left flank or in their rear; and the French getting possession of the heights above that river, before the allies had crossed, brought forty guns to bear upon them, under the fire of which they joined the army on the left bank. Four streams which unite about a league below Canizal, form the Guarena: the French crossed at Castrillo, a little below the junction, and manifested an intention to press upon the left of the allies; with this view they endeavoured to occupy a ridge above Castrillo, but Lieutenant-General Cole’s division advanced to meet them with the bayonet; they gave way; the cavalry charged, General Carrier and between 300 and 400 men were made prisoners, and one gun taken. In the course of the day, the allies lost about 100 in killed, 400 wounded, and 50 prisoners; but the check which Marmont received made him more circumspect in his movements.

The allies took up a position for the night on the Guarena, from Castrillo on the left, to beyond Canizal on the right. The enemy occupied the opposite side of the valley with their whole force. Both armies ♦July 19.♦ remained quiet till two in the afternoon of the following day, when the French withdrawing all their troops from the right marched by Tarrazona, as if with an intention of turning the right of the allies. Counter-movements were consequently made; the artillery fired at the enemy’s advance, and in that dry season the corn took fire in several places, and burnt for a mile in extent. Lord Wellington expected a battle on the plain of Vallesa in the morning, and made every preparation for it; the men bivouacked in two lines in order of battle, and stood to their arms at daybreak, ready to receive an attack; but as soon as it was light, the enemy were seen moving in several columns to their left, on Babilafuente; the allies made a correspondent movement to the right: at any moment either commander might have brought on a general action; but it was a game of skill in which they were engaged, not of hazard. Marmont’s march was estimated at five leagues, that of the allies at four, being in the inner circle; they moved in parallel lines, frequently within half cannon shot. The enemy encamped that night at Babilafuente and Villamela; the allies at Cabeza Vellosa, the 6th division and a brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea ♦July 21.♦ Lengua. On the following day, the French crossed that river by the fords near Alba and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening the allies crossed also, part by the bridge at Salamanca, part by the ford of Santa Martha. A dreadful storm came on of thunder and lightning with heavy rain; the different divisions of infantry were seen by the lightning marching to their ground, their muskets reflecting the flashes. The 5th dragoon guards had just got to their ground; many of the men had lain down; their horses were fastened together by their collars for the night, but terrified by the lightning, they set off full gallop and ran over the men, eighteen of whom were hurt; and two and thirty horses were lost, having probably gone to the enemy’s lines.

It was evident from Marmont’s manner of manœuvring, that he did not mean to attack the allies, unless at such advantage as might seem to render his success certain; and it seemed not less evident, that by pursuing this system, turning their flank and keeping possession of the heights, he would drive them to the frontier if they continued to act upon the defensive. All the stores which were at Salamanca were ordered to the rear of the army, and the inhabitants were in the utmost consternation, apprehending, not without good apparent reason, that they should presently be brought under the yoke of the French again. Lord Wellington had placed the troops in a position, the right of which was upon one of two heights called the two Arapiles; and the left on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha. The enemy had still a large corps above Babilafuente, on the right of the river; for this reason, the 3rd division and Brigadier-General D’Urban’s cavalry were left on the same side at Cabrerizos; and Lord Wellington thought it not improbable, that when Marmont should find in the morning that the allies were prepared for him on the left of the Tormes, he would alter his plan, and manœuvre by the other bank. In the course of the night he was informed that the cavalry and horse-artillery of the army of the north had arrived at Pollos to join Marmont, and that they would effect a junction with him the next day, or the day after at latest. During the night the enemy took possession of Calvarasa de arriba, and of a height near that village called Nuestra Señora de la Peña; the allied cavalry were in possession of Calvarasa de abaxo, which is between three and four miles from the upper village, and near the river.

The last night’s storm had not cleared the atmosphere, and the morning rose threateningly, in clouds. The French were early in motion, and from the manner in which they marched and countermarched their troops, it was impossible to divine what might be their intention. Soon after daylight detachments from both armies attempted to gain the yet unoccupied Arapiles hill; but the enemy had been concealed in the woods nearer that point, and their infantry were discovered on the summit when the allies were in the act of advancing to it: their detachment was also the strongest. By occupying this point they materially strengthened their own position, and were the better enabled to annoy that of the allies. Early in the day the light troops of the 7th division and the 4th caçadores of General Pack’s brigade were engaged with the enemy on the height of N. Señora de la Peña, which they gained and kept through the day. But the possession of the farther Arapiles by the French made it necessary for Lord Wellington to extend the right of his army to the heights behind the village of that name, and to occupy that village with the 4th division under Lieutenant-General Cole. Doubtful as Marmont’s intentions still were, the British commander judged that his objects were on the left of the Tormes, and therefore he ordered the 3rd division and D’Urban’s cavalry from the other bank, and placed them behind Aldea Tejada.

During these movements the French kept up a heavy cannonade and fire of light troops. The day, meantime, had cleared. Their force was formed in columns of attack in rear of the Arapiles hill, the left resting upon an extensive wood; thence they could either by a rapid march interpose between Lord Wellington and Ciudad Rodrigo, or wait an opportunity for debouching from behind the Arapiles, and separating the corps of his army. Marmont was too skilful a tactician himself not to perceive that all his movements were watched by one who well knew how to counteract them; nevertheless, hoping to deceive his antagonist, he marched a strong force to the right and formed columns of attack opposite the 5th division, which was in rear of the village of Arapiles. Lord Wellington soon perceived that nothing serious was intended by this manœuvre, and returned to direct the operations of his right, which he now threw back to that side of the Arapiles, forming nearly a right angle with that which he had occupied in the morning. About two in the afternoon the French Marshal perceiving that his last demonstration had produced no effect, pushed forward his columns rapidly to the left, with the intent of turning the right flank of the allies, and interposing between them and Ciudad Rodrigo. Till now the operations of the day had induced a belief in the British army that it was intended only to meet manœuvre by manœuvre, and to continue their retreat as soon as it was night. Indeed the army of the centre, with the Intruder at its head, was on the way to join Marmont within three days’ march, and a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery was still nearer. But Lord Wellington had anxiously been looking for the opportunity which was now presented him: he was at dinner when information was brought him of this movement, which was made under cover of a heavy cannonade, and accompanied with skirmishers in his front and on his flank, and with a body of cavalry who made the British dragoons and light troops give way before them. But the generals of division had either misunderstood or ill executed their commander’s intentions, and they weakened their line by dangerously extending it: Lord Wellington at once perceived this; he rose in such haste as to overturn the table, exclaiming, that Marmont’s good genius had forsaken him: in an instant he was on horseback, and issued his orders for attack.

The right he reinforced with the 5th division, placing it behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th, and with the 6th and 7th in reserve. These having taken their stations, he ordered Major-General Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd and General D’Urban’s cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy’s left on the heights, while Brigadier-General Bradford’s brigade, the 5th division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, the 4th, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th and 7th under Major-Generals Clinton and Hope, and D. Carlos d’España’s Spanish division; Brigadier-General Pack, with the 1st and 16th Portuguese regiments, was to support the left of the 4th division, by attacking the hill which the enemy held. The first and the light divisions occupied the ground on the left of the Arapiles in reserve.

As soon as the formation was effected, the attack commenced from the right. Major-General Pakenham moved along a valley at a quick rate, crossed the extended left of the enemy, almost before they were aware of his intention, drove them back in confusion and overthrew everything before him. Brigadier-General D’Urban’s Portugueze cavalry and Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey’s squadrons of the 14th, supported him in the most gallant style, defeated every attempt which was made upon his flank, cut in upon the enemy’s broken infantry, and put numbers of them to the sword. The attack in front was made with equal ardour: the fifth division had been exposed for about an hour to a continued and heavy cannonade; no orders were ever more welcome to the soldiers who were stretched on the ground to avoid its effects, than those which bade them advance against the enemy. The distance was more than a mile, up a steep height crowned by twenty pieces of cannon, and their left had to pass through the village which formed a considerable obstruction; they advanced in perfect order, not firing a shot till they had gained the summit, from whence the guns which had annoyed them were hastily withdrawn, nor till they had received the fire of the enemy, who were formed into squares to resist them. When they were within some thirty yards the word was given to fire and charge; this instantly threw the squares into disorder; the heavy cavalry coming up on the right increased their confusion; they fled then, and in their flight fell in with the remains of their extreme left, flying before Major-General Pakenham’s division. Lieutenant-General Leith was severely wounded in the act of breaking into the squares. Pakenham and the cavalry constantly bringing up their right, so as to outflank the points on which the French attempted to make a stand, drove them from one height to another and made above 3000 prisoners. The 4th and 5th divisions acquiring in like manner strength upon the enemy’s flank in proportion as they advanced, carried height after height, till at length the enemy’s left rallied on their centre; and on the last height, after its crest had been gained, one division of their infantry charged Cole’s division, which, after a severe contest, in which Cole was wounded, gave way.

This temporary success was owing to the failure of Pack’s attack upon the Arapiles; it was bravely made, but the Portugueze failed to carry it against the disadvantage of such strong ground; the attempt, however, was not without some good effect, for it occupied troops who would otherwise have been engaged against General Cole in his advance, and who were not now at leisure to oppose him, till, notwithstanding this temporary success, it was too late. Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed a brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and bring its fire on the enemy’s flank; while thus engaged he was wounded. Three British generals had thus been disabled, and in a most successful charge against a body of infantry, Major-General Le Marchant was killed, at the head of his own brigade. Lord Wellington now ordered up the 6th division under Major-General Clinton. That division marching under a heavy fire deployed at the foot of a hill, and beginning then to fire regular volleys, suffered severely as it advanced; it was vigorously attacked by a body of cavalry which had been concealed behind the Arapiles, and for some minutes the contest appeared doubtful; but when Clinton was enabled to form his two right battalions into line, and charge, the French again lost heart, and abandoned the important point which they had till then maintained. Their right still resisted, having been reinforced by the troops who now withdrew in good order from the Arapiles, and by those who had fled from the left.

They re-formed and took up their ground with equal promptitude and skill almost at right angles to their original front, the infantry along the crest of the hill in line, supported by heavy close columns in reserve, the cavalry in masses on their flanks, and the artillery posted at the advanced knolls, so as to sweep the whole face of the height. The 1st and light divisions were ordered against these, with two brigades of the 4th, to turn their right, while the 6th supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. Clinton advanced up the rocky and steep height inline, without firing a shot, and under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery: but he charged with the bayonet, drove them from a commanding conical eminence, and captured two guns. Their flank was attacked at the same time; and then, beaten at all points, they fled through the woods towards the Tormes, cavalry, infantry, and baggage all mixed together. The defeat was complete, and so would have been the destruction, if darkness had not opportunely covered their flight. Lord Wellington, with the 1st and light divisions, and Major-General William Anson’s brigade of the 4th, and some squadrons of cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, pursued them towards Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, as long as any of them could be found together; but night soon put an end to the pursuit, and enabled great numbers who had been taken prisoners to escape. A sentinel mistook Sir Stapleton Cotton in the dark for an enemy, fired, and wounded him.

This memorable battle, which lasted from three in the afternoon till ten at night, took place within sight of the city; the ground with its heights rising gradually one behind another, forming, as it were, a fine theatre for such a spectacle. On the part of the allies, nearly 5000 were killed and wounded. General Le Marchant’s loss was greatly regretted: he was a native of Guernsey, who having served in the light dragoons under the Duke of York in the years 1793 and 1794, applied himself with zeal and ability to the study of his profession, introduced the Hungarian sword exercise into the British army, and drew up a manual for the use of the cavalry, which was published by the war-office. The royal military college was in great measure planned by him; he was appointed lieutenant-governor of that institution, and discharged the duties of the office till 1811, when he could no longer retain it, being promoted to the rank of Major-General. He then joined the army in Portugal in command of a brigade, but had not been long in that country, when the unexpected death of his wife rendered it necessary that he should return to England for the arrangement of his domestic affairs: that mournful business having been performed, he rejoined the army, and shortly afterwards fell, being in the 47th year of his age. His eldest son, who was an ensign in the guards, was at his side when he fell. The Prince Regent manifested with proper munificence his sense of General Le Marchant’s worth, by granting a pension of £300 to that son, £100 to each of three younger sons, and £120 to each of his five daughters.... The loss of the French was very great; besides the dead and wounded, they left 7000 prisoners on the field. Eleven guns and two eagles were taken: it is said that more than ten were captured, but that there were men base enough to conceal them, and sell them to persons at Salamanca, who deemed it good policy as well as a profitable speculation, to purchase them for the French. Marmont was disabled early in the action, Bonnet also was wounded, and the command then devolved upon General Clausel, who was wounded also, but not so as to incapacitate him. Generals Ferey, Desgraviers, and Thomieres were killed.

At break of day, the pursuit was renewed with the same troops, and with Major-General Bock and Anson’s brigades, which had joined them during the night. The first and light divisions were ordered to the ford of Huerta, Lord Wellington having supposed that the enemy must make their passage there, because the castle at Alba de Tormes was occupied by the Spaniards; but the troops who garrisoned it had, without his knowledge, been withdrawn, so that Clausel, making a most rapid march during the night, crossed the river there without molestation. Having crossed in pursuit, the cavalry came up with the enemy’s rear-guard of horse and foot between Garci Hernandez and Peñarandilla: a detachment from the 11th and 16th dragoons charged their cavalry, which fled, and left the infantry to their fate. Major-General Bock, then, with the heavy brigade of the King’s German legion, attacked them, when posted upon a hill in square, and in what is described as one of the finest charges that was ever seen, rode completely through them. The whole body, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners, the brigade losing in the charge 30 killed and nearly 50 wounded. In the course of the day, the enemy were joined by 1200 cavalry belonging to the army of the north, who, though too late to be of any greater service, covered the retreat of their centre to Peñaranda de Bracamonte: one column went by Macotora; the other which had crossed the Tormes at Encina and Huerta moved on El Campo and Cebolla. They had their head-quarters at Flores de Avila, ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours on the second night, and hastened from thence by Arevalo, towards Valladolid. Their dead were found in many places by the road-side, and their stragglers met with as little mercy from the peasantry as they had been accustomed to show; yet many of their rear-guard were taken without arms, having thrown them away as impediments in their flight.

The pursuit was continued on the 24th; but the enemy made exceedingly long marches, and had little to encumber them while hastening to their resources both in men and means, and the pursuers having to bring up their supplies far from behind could not keep up an equal pace. On that day they only came up with the rear-guard, which hastened away at their approach. On the following the advance halted for the army to close up; Colonel Arentschild’s brigade entered Arevalo; and a non-commissioned officer’s patrol captured two officers and 27 men of Joseph’s own cavalry, in Blasco Sancho, between Arevalo and Avila. The Intruder had reached that place, hastening with the army of the centre to join Marmont upon the Tormes; he was met there with tidings of the defeat, and then turned towards Segovia, as if retreating upon Madrid: soon however receiving fuller advices, he endeavoured to divert the pursuers by threatening an advance upon their flank. The routed army, meantime, whose movements were conducted with great ability by Clausel, concentrated themselves on the right bank of the Douro, between Puente de Duero and the other bridge at Tudela de Duero; they crossed the river as soon as the allies advanced towards them, hastened to Valladolid, and making no tarriance there, continued their retreat to Burgos. Lord Wellington entered Valladolid on the 30th amid the acclamations of the people. There he discontinued the pursuit, and prepared to march against the Intruder, with the intention of either bringing him to action, or driving him from Madrid.

Meantime, a squadron under Sir Home Popham which sailed from Coruña, to co-operate with the Guerrillas, and occupy the enemy upon the side of Biscay, rendered all the service which had been expected from it. Sir Howard Douglas and General Carrol embarked in the Venerable with Sir Home. They arrived off Lequeitio on the 18th of June, where the French had possession of a hill-fort, commanding the town, and strong enough to resist any body of infantry; they had also 200 men fortified in a convent within the town, and into this the garrison retired when the Pastor D. Gaspar Jauregui arrived with his party to act in concert with the squadron. The convent might have been destroyed by the ships, but the town must in that case have suffered also; it was determined, therefore, to attack the fort, which was so situated that the enemy thought it quite inaccessible to cannon. They knew not what British seamen are capable of on shore. At a time when the sea broke with such violence against the rocks at the foot of the hill, that it was doubtful whether a boat could reach the land, Lieutenant Groves succeeded in landing a gun there. It was hove up for a short distance by a moveable capstan; but this was too tedious an operation, and it was dragged to the summit by six and thirty pair of oxen, 400 of the Pastor’s men, and 100 seamen, headed by the Honourable Captain Bouverie. It was immediately mounted; the first shot was fired at four in the afternoon, and so well was it served, that by sunset a practicable breach was made. The Guerrillas volunteered to storm; they were repulsed in the first attempt, but succeeded in the second, and such of the enemy as escaped on the opposite side got into the convent. In the course of the evening the sea had abated, a landing was effected upon the island of S. Nicholas, from whence the convent could be battered without damage to the town; three carronades were planted there; at dawn, a 24-pounder was brought to the east side of the town, within 200 yards of the convent, and another was in the act of being landed upon the island to bombard it, when the French commandant beat a parley, and surrendered with 290 men. The Guerrillas had lost 50 in killed and wounded, not a man belonging to the squadron was hurt. The muskets, stores, and three small guns, which were found there were given to the Pastor. Two 18-pounders in the fort were rendered useless; the fort itself was demolished and the convent blown up. The next morning a column of 1100 men were seen which had arrived within two leagues of Lequeitio, but hearing from the peasantry that the English had disembarked 2000 men, they retired. Some intercepted letters were now transmitted to Sir Home, by which the commandant at Guernica was instructed to prepare rations for a French general and 2600 of the Imperial Guards.

The squadron was now to have co-operated in an attack upon Bilbao, but the wind proved unfavourable for getting round Cape Machichago, and part of the ships fetched the anchorage of Bermeo. The enemy had retired from that place, leaving a small magazine of provisions ♦June 23.♦ in a fortified convent; these were distributed to the poor; and the battery on the hill and all the fortified places which the French had occupied were destroyed: the works at Plencia were in like manner demolished, and the batteries on each side of the ♦June 24.♦ inlet below the bar of the Ybeyzabal, or Narrow River, the beautiful and tranquil stream which forms the port of Bilbao: on one side were the castle of Galea, and the batteries of Algorta and Begona; on the other the batteries of El Campillo, Las Quersas and Xebiles. Early on the following morning some parties of the enemy entered the destroyed batteries of Algorta, but retired upon the squadron’s making a disposition to stand up the inlet; they then formed in the plain, and were found to consist of 2000 men at Algorta, while 400 were sent to Puerta Galetta. Three of the British sloops closed with the fort there, silenced it, and drove them from thence. It was supposed that this was the corps for which rations had been ordered at Guernica, and that it had been thus drawn off from its original destination.

The squadron then made for Guetaria; two companies of marines were landed for the purpose of reconnoitring the place, previous to an intended attack, but the Guerrillas who were expected to co-operate were engaged with the enemy in a different quarter; parties of the French were seen crossing the hills; the intention, therefore, was relinquished, ♦July 6.♦ and the marines re-embarked without loss. Sir Home then sailed for Castro, where Sir George Collier had landed a company of marines to assist Longa in a concerted attack. Longa was there at the time and place appointed; more marines were landed, and guns with hearty exertions of well-directed skill were drawn up heights that might have seemed inaccessible to men less earnest in their duty. They were placing them in a battery to the east of the town, when 2500 of the enemy appeared on the heights of S. Pelayo; the parties upon this were re-embarked, and Longa found it necessary to change his ground, after which he sustained an action, in which no advantage was gained over him. Somewhat disheartened by this, the French marched into the town that evening, and were driven out of it on the morrow by the fire of the squadron: they then took post on the hills, and under favour of the night retired towards Laredo. The castle then surrendered with 150 men, and having been put in a state of defence, was garrisoned by ♦July 10.
July 11.♦ the marines and Spanish artillerymen of the Iris. Their next attempt was a combined attack upon Puerta Galleta, which was abandoned because the enemy were found to be in greater strength than had been expected; the French on their part failed equally in endeavouring to recover Castro. Their moveable column had now been drawn by a feint to Santona; from thence it could not reach Guetaria in less than four days; another attempt therefore was made upon that place in concert with the Pastor, and with one of Mina’s battalions. The latter, after two days’ severe march, did not arrive till it was too late; for when the enemy’s guns on one side had been silenced, ♦July 19.♦ and a battery was ready to open upon them on the other, intelligence was received that a considerable body of French troops was hastening thither by forced marches. The Guerrillas maintained a brave action against them, till the superiority of the enemy’s numbers was ascertained, and made it necessary for them to retreat; but this action prevented the re-embarkation of the British in time, so that two guns were in consequence destroyed, and 32 men made prisoners.

These operations of Sir Home Popham’s squadron were of service in many ways. Troops were thus occupied who would otherwise have joined Marmont before the battle of Salamanca; the corps which relieved Guetaria was recalled from that direction, and Caffarelli was prevented from sending the infantry who were to have assisted in driving the English into the Tagus. The ports which were liberated lost no time in conveying supplies to the free parts of the kingdom, and vessels from them arrived daily at Coruña laden with corn and wine. And the Guerrillas, as well as the regular troops of Spain, received a countenance and support which enabled them to hold towards the enemy the language of confident hope. Renovales, who was Commandant-General in Biscay, addressed a letter to the French Governor of Bilbao, General Roquet, remonstrating against the cruelties which General Mouton had committed with his column: “for the security of a fortress,” he said, “or to prevent an insurrection, the rules of military precaution might render it proper to put some few persons of respectability in confinement, but that cottages and private dwellings should be outraged, and that peaceable persons should be tortured by stripes, by the bayonet, and by fire, was what no laws of war could justify. The Spaniards were a people who might be softened by generosity though not subdued by it; but if this system of terror were persisted in towards them, ... if it were still to be war at the knife’s point, the Biscayans, instead of yielding a foot to him, would meet him half way in such warfare. Four and twenty officers were in his hands, and should suffer for the next act of cruelty on the part of the French. He concluded by assuring Roquet that the day was not far distant when Bilbao would be delivered, and that he, Renovales, would then, at the head of 10,000 Biscayans, fulfil his duty as he had hitherto done, and first of all towards himself.