Besides these varieties, there are still other combinations, relative to the specie itself. The money found in a country, may either be said to belong absolutely to the country, when neither the state itself, or the particular people of it, are in debt to foreigners; or only so by virtue of a loan. Now, whether it is borrowed or not, the property of it belongs to the country; but the difference consists in this, that when it is borrowed, the acquisition of the metals adds nothing to the national patrimony, that is to say, there is no acquisition of wealth thereby made; but when it is gained by industry, the money adds to the real value of the country, in consequence of the principles laid down in the 26th chapter.
May not a nation then, having very little gold and silver, open a subscription for millions, at so much per cent? Will not strangers lend to her; when her own subjects cannot? May she not yearly, by paying away the interest of the money borrowed, and by a heavy balance of trade against her, be constantly diminishing her specie, and yet by new contracts, keep up, and even increase the mass of the circulating value, to such a degree, as to be possessed of a greater proportion of specie than any of her neighbours? Farther,
Is it not certain, that all nations will endeavour to throw their ready money, not necessary for their own circulation, into that country where the interest of money is high with respect to their own, and where consequently the value of property in land is low; since they may either draw a high interest from it, or make the acquisition of solid property? Forbidding therefore the acquisition of solid property to strangers, is, in effect, a prohibition upon the gratuitous importation of specie. I allow there may be examples of people who make such purchases, with a view to draw the rents of the lands bought, out of the country; but whatever be the intention at the time of purchase, such however is the effect of an established fortune in a country, that, sooner or later, it draws the proprietor to it; and when this does not happen, a subsequent alienation commonly takes place.
Were the purchase, therefore, of lands permitted universally, and were it established, that property in land, to a certain value, should give a right to naturalization, no doubt large sums would be brought into those countries, where lands are found cheapest; and as no exportable commodity is given in return, the specie of such countries might mark the quantity of lands sold, as well as that of merchandize exported. For want of a sufficient extension of these and many other combinations, which it would be easy to contrive, Mr. Belloni, in his Dissertation upon Commerce, Chap. I. Sect. 5. falls into several mistakes, when he judges of the exportation of commodities of a particular country, by the quantities of money found in it.
Essendo adunque da ciòciò venuto (says he) che l’abondanza del danaro, ovunque si ritrovi, significa l’abodanza stessa delle cose, delle quali egli é misuramisura: perciò diviziosi meritamente sono stati detti quegli uomini, e ricco altersi quel regno, dove si ritrova gran copia di danaro. Dal altro canto poi, se si considera lo stato di un regno, ed il danaro, che è dentro di esso, tenendo sempre salda l’essenza della moneta (che altro non sia, che misura di cose, e prezzo, che viene in compenso di mercanzie) ovunque di essa vedrasi affluenza, ognuno ben vede, doversi subito necessariamente arguire, un gran traffico di quel dominio, con esito di merci, in uso degli esteri, e all’incontro ovunque questa venga a mancare, doversene dedurre grande introito di merci, che sieno subentrate nel luogo della moneta, e che l’abbiano fatta uscire.
These consequences are only just so far as money comes into, or goes out of a country, as the price of merchandize exported or imported. But how much money has not this author himself drawn into Rome from England, for the exportation of nothing but the bills of travellers?
On the other hand, may not a country, which is actually in possession of great quantities of gold and silver, call in these metals, and circulate, in their place, a symbolical money? May not a nation then, as well as a private person, employ this specie in a profitable foreign trade, and gain daily by it? May she not, after some time, withdraw her stock, by calling in her debts? And may she not also call in her paper, and remain with an additional acquisition of specie in her pocket? Consequently, during the circulation of the paper, no judgment can be formed as to the balance of her trade, by examining the state of her specie; because I can suppose that at this time every shilling of it may be in the hands of strangers. Consequently, the richest nation in Europe may be the poorest in circulating specie.
“The writings of Mr. Gee (says Mr. Hume, in his Political Discourse upon the Balance of Trade) struck all the nation with a pannic fear, by shewing from a long enumeration of particulars, that the balance inclined so much against us, and for so considerable sums, that in the space of five or six years, there would not remain one shilling in England. But happily twenty years are elapsed since, we have supported a long and expensive foreign war, and nevertheless, it is commonly believed, that money is at present as plentiful in the kingdom as ever.” I quote from the French translation.
Mr. Gee was in the wrong to conclude, that the balance of trade would have the effect of carrying off the coin: and Mr. Hume has been misled by this mistake, to conclude, that Mr. Gee’s calculations were false. I know nothing as to the matter of fact; nor whether Mr. Gee was a good or a bad judge of the question he treated; but from what has been said, I hope it appears, that the state of the coin in England, at the time Mr. Hume wrote, was no proof on either side.
To judge of the balance of trade is one thing; to judge of the wealth of a nation as to specie is another. England may greatly increase her specie by her trade, and greatly diminish it by her wars: perhaps this may be the fact. She may also, at certain times, have a balance of trade against her; and great sums laid out in foreign wars, may be the means of making it return in her favour. Should that nation begin to pay off her debts to strangers, in ready coin, might she not soon diminish, perhaps exhaust, the specie she is now possessed of; yet surely none ever became poorer by paying off their debts. Nothing is so easy as to have specie, when one has solid property to pledge for it; and nothing can be worse judged, than to purchase specie from strangers, at the expence of paying an interest for it, when they can contrive a circulating value in paper money, representing the solid value which must have been pledged to strangers for the loan of their metals.
But still it may be asked, how it happens, that notwithstanding of the most unfavourable balance of trade, no nation is ever found to be entirely drained of her specie; and since we have proved, that the specie of a country may be diminished by a disadvantageous trade, what are the principles which prevent the total dissipation of it?
This is a very curious question, and opens a door to a multitude of new ideas, which will furnish abundant matter of speculation, when we come to treat more directly of credit. I shall here examine it in general, only for the sake of applying the principles we have laid down.
I. It may be said, that as common prudence prevents a private person from spending to his last shilling; so the like prudence commonly engages a people to put a stop to trade, before it has had time totally to drain them. Although most people drink wine, there is no reason why every body should be drunk.
II. Nothing is so complicated as the balance of trade, considered among many nations. The general wealth circulates from one to another, as the money which the farmer gives the landlord circulates back to the farmer. In the number of hands through which the money passes, some are of the class of the luxurious, some of the frugal; the first represents those nations who lose by the balance, the latter those who gain. But the most industrious nations of all, and those who, considered abstractedly from extraordinary accidents, appear in the way to swallow up the wealth of the rest, are, by the means of such accidents, made liable to terrible restitutions. How many millions, for example, has England restored to the continent, in consequence of her wars and subsidies? She then lays a foundation for many more years of favourable balance, and accordingly we see it return to her, as the money which the state spends within the nation, returns into the exchequer at the end of the year.
III. It may be asked, how it happens that no nation has ever spent to its last farthing, as many an individual has done? I answer, that I am far from believing that this has never happened; nay, I believe there is nothing more frequent or familiar than this very case, providing the riches of a country be here supposed to mean no more than the specie absolutely belonging to herself, not borrowed from other nations.
I have said above, that the acquisition of money by industry, increased the real value of a country, as much as the addition of a portion of territory: now what should hinder a people from spending their ready money, and, at the same time, preserving their land? Because a young gentleman, whose father has left him a fine estate in land, and ten thousand pounds in ready money, has spent the ten thousand pounds, does it follow, that he is without a shilling? Upon this view of the question, it will, I believe, be granted, that Dr. Swift’s idea that all the specie of Ireland would in a short time be exported, in consequence of an unfavourable balance of trade, is very far from being chimerical, and might be exactly true; although at this time there be six times more in circulation than ever; just as a person who is running through his fortune, has commonly more money in his hands than his father used to have, when he was acquiring it. Let Ireland pay her debts to England, and then count her specie. Let England pay her’s to all the world, and then weigh her gold and silver. Suppose that on summing up the accounts, there is not found one shilling in either country, is this any proof of their being undone? By no means: coin is one article of our wealth, but never can be the measure of it.
I know little of the state of Ireland; but if it be true, that paper money is increasing daily in that country, it is, I suppose, because the specie is daily exported to England, as the returns of estates belonging to people who reside there, and that the Irish, instead of buying it back again for their own use in circulation, augment their paper, in proportion to the progress of their industry; and only buy such quantities of specie as are necessary for paying the balance of their trade. Now by buying specie, I do not suppose, that they bring any over to Ireland, in order to send it back to England; but that they send over goods to the value, which the English merchants pay in specie, or in English paper, to those who are creditors upon Ireland, for the value of their rents, &c.
Suppose then, for a farther illustration of some principles, that all the lands of Ireland belonged to Englishmen residing in their own country, and annually drawing from Ireland the income belonging to them, what would the consequence be? As long as this portion of the produce of lands, which goes for rent, (and which, as we have said, is the fund provided for the subsistence of the free hands who purchase their own necessaries) could be bought and consumed by the Irish themselves, that is, in other words, while in Ireland there was a demand for this portion of the fruits, it would be paid for, either in coin, to the diminution of their specie, or in something which might be converted into money; that is, by the produce of their industry, and thus, by the means of trade, would come into the hands of the English proprietors, either in specie, or in any other form they judged proper.
That so soon as the demand for this portion of fruits came to fail, for want of money, or industry, in Ireland to purchase it, what remained on hand would be sent over to England in kind; or by the way of trade, be made to circulate with other nations (in beef, butter, tallow, &c.) who would give silver and gold for it, to the proprietors of the Irish lands. By such a diminution of demand in the country, for the fruits of the earth, the depopulation of Ireland would be implied; because they who consumed them formerly, consume them no more; that is to say, they either died, or left the country.
To conclude, a great part of the value of a country is its produce and manufactures; but it does not follow, as Mr. Belloni asserts, that these should as necessarily draw a proportional sum of the gold and silver of Europe into that country, as a shoal of small fishes draws water fowl, or as charity draws the poor, or as beauty draws admiration.
Quest. 2. Can no rule be found to judge of the balance of trade from the state of specie, or at least to perceive the effects of that balance in augmenting or diminishing the mass of riches?
Could it be supposed that specie never circulated between nations, but in the way of trade, and in exchange for exportable commodities, this would be a rule.
In nations where the earth produces neither gold or silver, and where these metals are imported as the returns of industry only, the balance in their favour, from the introduction of specie, to this day, would be measured by the quantity of it which they possess. Here Mr. Belloni’s opinion is just.
Farther, the consumption made by any nation for the same term of years, is equal to the whole natural produce and labour of the inhabitants for that time, minus the quantity of such produce and labour, as is, or has been equal in value to the actual national specie.
On the other hand, in nations where gold and silver are produced by the earth, the balance of trade against them, from the time these metals became the object of trade, to this day, may be estimated by the quantity of them which has been exported.
And farther, the consumption made by such nations, for the same term of years, is equal to the whole natural produce and labour of the inhabitants for that time, plus the quantity of such produce and labour, as is, or has been equal to the quantity of these metals exported.
These positions are by much too general to be laid down as principles, because trade is not concerned in every acquisition or alienation of specie; but they may serve, in the mean time, to illustrate the doctrine we have been considering, and even in many cases may be found pretty exact. For example,
If it be true, that in any nation of Europe, there be now just as much silver and gold as there was ten years ago, and if that nation during this period, has supported, without borrowing from strangers, an expensive war which may have cost it, I suppose, five millions, it is certain, that during this period, the home consumption must have been the value of five millions less than the natural produce, labour, and industry of the inhabitants; which sum of five millions must have come from abroad, in return for a like value of the production, labour, &c. remaining over and above their own consumption.
In this supposition, the national wealth (the metals) remains as before, the balance of it only is changed. How this change is performed, and what are its consequences, may be discovered by an application of the principles already laid down.
Quest. 3. What were the effects of riches before the introduction of trade and industry?
I never can sufficiently recommend to my readers to compare circumstances, in the oeconomy of the antients, with that of modern times; because I see a multitude of new doctrines laid down, which, I think, never would have been broached, had such circumstances been properly attended to. I have endeavoured to shew, that the price of goods, but especially of articles of the first necessity, have little or no connection with the quantities of specie in a country. The slightest inspection into the state of circulation, in different ages, will fortify our reasoning: but the general taste of dissipation which is daily gaining ground, makes people now begin to imagine, that wealth and circulation are synonimous terms; whereas nothing is more contrary both to reason and matter of fact. A slight review of this matter, in different ages, will set it in a clearer light than a more abstract reasoning can.
It is a question with me, whether the mines of Potosi and Brasil, have produced more riches to Spain and Portugal, within these two hundred years, than the treasures heaped up in Asia, Greece, and Egypt, after the death of Alexander, furnished to the Romans, during the two hundred years which followed the defeat of Perseus, and the conquest of Macedonia.
From the treasures mentioned by all the historians who have writ of the conquest of those kingdoms by the Romans, I do not think I am far from truth, when I compare the treasures of the frugal Greeks to the mines of the new world.
What effect, as to circulation, had the accumulation of these vast treasures? Not any to accelerate it, surely: and no person, the least conversant in antiquity, will pretend that the circulating specie in those times, bore as great a proportion to their treasures, as what is at present circulating among us, bears to the wealth of the most oeconomising Prince in Europe. If any one doubt of this particular, let him listen to Appian, who says, that the successors of Alexander, the possessors of those immense riches, lived with the greatest frugality. Those treasures were then, as I have said, a real addition to the value of their kingdoms; but had not the smallest influence upon prices. In those days of small circulation, the prices of every thing must have been vastly low, not from the great abundance of them, but because of the little demand; and as a proof of this, I cite the example of a country, which, within the space of fifty years, possessed in specie at one time, considerably beyond the worth of the land, houses, slaves, merchandize, natural produce, moveables, and ready money, at another. The example is mentioned by Mr. Hume, and I am surprized the consequence of it did not strike him. For if the money they possessed was greatly above the worth of all their property, moveable and immoveable, surely it never could be considered as a representation of their industry, which made so small a part of the whole. Athens possessed, before the Peloponesian war, a treasure of ten thousand talents; and fifty years afterwards, all Athens, in the several articles above specified, did not amount to the value of six thousand. Hume’s Political Discourses upon the Balance of Trade.
These treasures were spent in the war, and they had been laid up for no other purpose. Therefore I was in the right, when I observed above, Chap. 22. that war in antient times, had the effect that industry has now: it was the only means of making wealth circulate. But peace producing a general stagnation of circulation, people returned to the antient simplicity of their manners, and the prices of subsistence remained on the former footing; because there was no increase of appetite, or rising of demand upon any necessary article. So much for the state of wealth during the days of frugality.
The Romans subdued all those kingdoms of the Greeks, and drew their treasures to Rome. The republic went to destruction, and a succession of the most prodigal Princes ever known in history succeeded one another for about two hundred years. Those monstrous treasures were then thrown into circulation, and I must now give an idea of the effects produced by such a revolution.
I have already observed (Chap. 28.) that in consequence of the great prodigality of those times, the prices of superfluities rose to a monstrous height; while those of necessaries kept excessively low. The fact is indisputable, and any one who inclines to satisfy himself farther, may look into that valuable collection of examples of antient luxury, wealth, and at the same time of simplicity, found in Mr. Wallace’s Dissertation upon the Numbers of Mankind in antient and modern Times, p. 132. et seq.
But how is it to be accounted for, that the prices of superfluities should stand so high, while necessaries were so low? The reason is plain, from the principles we have laid down. The circulation of money had no resemblance to that of modern times: fortunes were made by corruption, fraud, concussion, rapine, and penury; not by trade and industry. Seneca amassed in four years 2,400,000 pounds sterling. An augur was worth 3 millions sterling. M. Antony owed on the Ides of March, 322,916 pounds sterling, and paid it before the calends of April. We know of no such circulation. Every revolution was violent: the powerful were rapacious and prodigal, the weak were poor and lived in the greatest simplicity: consequently, the objects of the desires of the rich were immensely dear; and the necessaries for the poor were excessively cheap. This is a confirmation of the principles we have laid down in Chap. 28. that the price of subsistence must ever be in proportion to the faculties of the numerous classes of those who buy: that the price of every thing must be in proportion to the demand made for it; and that in every case, where the supply can naturally increase in proportion to the demand, there must be a determined proportion between the price of such articles and that of subsistence. Now in the examples given by Mr. Wallace, of such articles as were found at monstrous prices, we only find such as could not be increased according to demand: here is the enumeration of them. Large asses brought from Spain, peacocks, fine doves, mullets, lampreys, peaches, large asparagus, purple, wool, jewels, carpets, vestes Byssinæ, slaves skilled in the finer arts, pictures, statues, books, and rewards to those who taught the sciences. By casting a glance upon the catalogue, we may easily perceive that the extraordinary price must have proceeded from the impossibility of augmenting the supply in proportion to the demand; not from the abundance of the money, which had no effect in raising the price of necessaries. The cheapness again of these, did not proceed from vast plenty; but because the price must have remained in proportion to the faculties of the numerous poor; and because the augmentation of the wealth of the rich never could increase their consumption of any necessary article. Had the Roman empire been governed with order and tranquility, this taste of luxury, by precipitating money into the hands of the numerous classes, would, in time, have wrought the effects of multiplying the number of the industrious, by purging the lands; consequently, of increasing the demand for vendible subsistence; consequently, of raising the price of it. And on the other hand, the adequate proportion between services and rewards given by the public, would have checked the other branch of circulation which produced those monstrous fortunes, to wit, rapine and corruption: and industry receiving a regular encouragement, every article of extraordinary demand for delicate aliments, birds, fishes, fruits, &c. would have been supplied with sufficient abundance; and consequently, would have fallen in its price. But when either despotism or slavery were the patrimonial inheritance of every one on coming into the world, we are not to expect to see the same principles operate, as in ages where the monarch and the peasant are born equally free to enjoy the provision made for them by their forefathers.
I shall now come nearer home, and examine a very remarkable difference between the oeconomy in practice some hundred years ago, and that of the present time, with regard to the method of levying men and money.
This change is a consequence of trade and industry, and as I have been preparing the way for the introduction of other matters which equally owe their existence to them, it may not be improper, in this last chapter, to point out the natural causes of this change in modern politics. When people consider effects only, without examining the causes which produce them, they commonly blame rashly, or fall into an idle admiration of fortune. It is only by tracing natural causes, that we come at the means of forming a solid judgment of the nature of every abuse, and of every advantage.
The general taste for the extension of industry, is what has brought such loads of money into circulation; not the discovery of America. We read of treasures in antient times which appear to rival the wealth of modern Europe. Appian, as cited by Mr. Hume, mentions a treasure of the Kings of Egypt, of near two hundred millions sterling; and says, that all the successors of Alexander were nearly as rich, and fully as frugal. Frugality then is compatible with the greatest wealth. Therefore the wealth of America, has not been the cause of European refinement; but the extension of civil liberty has obliged the possessors of treasures, which in all ages have been coveted by man, to open their repositories, in order to procure the service of those who formerly made a branch of the property of the most wealthy. This is the foundation of trade and industry.
Why, therefore, has trade and industry laid the foundation of taxes and standing armies, which appear so contrary to the one and the other?
I answer shortly, that very little change has been made as to things themselves by that revolution; but with respect to the order of things, the difference is great. Trade and industry cannot flourish without method and regularity; taxes and standing armies are only a systematical execution of the old plan, for preserving the power, safety, and independence of the nations of Europe.
Taxes are no more than the liquidation of those services which formerly were performed in kind. Standing armies are become necessary, that the call of the rich luxurious, who are insatiable in their demand for the service of the poor, may not be able to engross also the hands necessary for the defence of the state. Personal services were the taxes of former times. Let no man imagine, that ever any state could subsist without the contribution of its subjects. But a more authentic proof of this opinion is, that in the year 1443, while Charles the VIIth was engaged in the long war with the Kings of England, who disputed with him the monarchy of France, the services of the vassals of that kingdom (by the edict of Saumur of the 14th of September) were formally converted into the perpetual Taille; and this may be considered, as the foundation of the regular military force of the French nation. No body, in those days, imagined such an imposition to be oppressive or unjust: and if those who remain subject to it, appear under oppression at present, it is only because they continue in their antient situation. Personal services are the heaviest of all impositions.
Quest. 4. Why, therefore, are taxes so generally cried out against, why do they appear so new an invention, and why do people flatter themselves, that there is a possibility of putting an end to so general an oppression? I answer, because people commonly attend to words, and not to things. In former times, the great bulk of the inhabitants lived upon the lands, and were bound to personal service. This kind of imposition was familiar, general, and equal; every class of the people was bound to services analogous to their rank in the state. The industrious who lived without any dependence upon the lands, and who did not enjoy the privileges of cities and corporations, were so few, that they were not an object of public attention. Farther, most privileges then known, were in consequence of land-property; consequently, those independent people were in a manner without protection, they were vassals to no body; consequently, had no body to interest themselves for them; consequently, were a prey to every one who had power, and no body was sorry to see a rich fellow, who had got plenty of ready money, and who seemed to do nothing for it, plundered by a lord who appeared in the service of his country. We see in the time of the croisades how odious all those money gatherers were; these were what we now call traders, it was principally in hatred to them, that the borrowing of money at interest was declared antichristian; because the Jews were principally in those days the merchants or the money lenders.
In the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Princes began to take a taste for magnificence, finding no body, almost, within their own country capable to supply them, they used to send to Flanders and Venice, the great trading states in those days, for many kinds of manufactures. This is the fountain of foreign trade in Europe. These two states perceiving the great benefit resulting to them from this new taste of dissipation, gave great encouragement to the industrious. Had they begun to impose high taxes upon them, they would have ruined all. Industry, then, was encouraged at first, and little loaded with any imposition. This is perfectly consistent with our doctrine. Some Princes, perceiving the daily diminution of their wealth, made efforts to restore this antient simplicity, by forbidding this hurtful trade; others, such as Francis I. of France, and Henry VIII. of England, endeavoured all they could to establish industry in their own states. For this purpose, great privileges were granted to the industrious, who thereby increased daily. But this revolution naturally purged the lands, and by that operation diminished the number of personal service-men; or, as in France, where personal service was at an end, the number of those subject to the taille. I shall not trace this progress very minutely, but come directly to the period of extensive taxation. When industry was fairly established, and when nations began to be well clothed with the produce of their own soil, wrought up in a thousand different forms, by their own industrious subjects, Princes soon perceived their treasures to melt away, and saw plainly, that without a method of drawing back the money from this new class of inhabitants, the whole wealth of the state would come to center in their hands; but the means of coming at money was extremely difficult. The proprietors of the riches had no solid property in proportion; and their money was inaccessible. Some betook themselves to violence, and others to fraud: the one and the other produced the worst effects. The violence destroyed industry, and rendred the industrious miserable: for we have observed, that when inhabitants are once purged from off the lands, they have no resource left them but their industry; whereas let a peasant be robbed ever so often of his money, he still has the earth to maintain him. The fraudulent corrupted the great; the ministers of Princes became the terror of every man who had money; they enriched themselves by accepting of compositions, and the state remained constantly in want. At last, the scheme of proportional taxes took place: but for this purpose it was necessary to obtain the consent of the whole state; for no Prince’s power extended so far, and they were not come to the time of being able to enlarge their prerogative. Such impositions, therefore, were first introduced in republics, and mixed governments. In monarchies they were established with more difficulty; because the great were equally affected by them with the small. But when long and expensive wars rendred supplies of money absolutely necessary, then were taxes consented to; and the Prince who had not power enough to establish them, easily found means to keep them up, when once introduced.
From this progress we may easily discover the reason why taxes are cried out against. The system appears new, because we remember, in a manner, the doubling of the impositions, and we see them daily gaining ground; but we never reflect on the change of circumstances, and seldom attend to the consequences of that new species of circulation, which is carried on between the public and those employed by it. The state now pays for every service, because the people furnish it with money for this purpose.
If the blood therefore be let out, in modern times, at a thousand orifices of the body politic, there are just as many absorbitories (if I may be allowed such an expression) opened to receive it back. From this last circumstance I imply the perpetuity of taxes, while this system of political oeconomy prevails. We have not as yet seen an example of any state abolishing them, though many indeed have had such a scheme in view. But to resume my former comparison, I may suggest, that if all the orifices through which the blood issues, should be bound up, all the absorbitories which are fed with the returning blood, must be starved. But more of this in its proper place.
Quest. 5. Why are standing armies a consequence of trade and industry?
In the first place, armies in all ages, past, present, and to come, have been, are, and will be calculated for offensive and defensive war; while therefore war subsists among men, armies in one way or other, will be necessary.
The advantage of regular armies has been known in all ages; and yet we find, that for many centuries they appeared in a manner discontinued; that is to say, we read neither of legions, nor of regiments, nor of any denomination of bodies of warlike men, kept up and exercised in time of peace, as was the custom while the Roman empire subsisted: and now, since trade has been established, we see the antient Roman military oeconomy again revived. Let us therefore apply our principles, in order to account for this revolution also.
During the Roman empire, there was a very great flux of money into the coffers of the state, which proceeded more from rapine than from taxes. Consequently, it was an easy matter to keep up large bodies of regular forces.
With these they subdued the world, as I may call it, that is, all the polite nations then known; the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Asiatics. Had they remained satisfied, their empire might possibly have subsisted; because people who are rich, luxurious, and polite, are commonly peaceable. But nothing could satisfy their ambition: they conquered Gaul, and stretched the boundary of their empire from the streights of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Rhine. All was peaceable on that side, and in two or three centuries, both Spain and Gaul had adopted the spirit, language, and manners of the Roman people. But when they passed the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates, they found mankind still less cultivated, and very little known. Their enemies fled before them, and left a territory which was not worth possessing. This of all barriers is the strongest. By carrying on war against such people, the match was very unequal; those nations had every thing to gain, and nothing to lose; the Romans had all to lose, and nothing to win. Those wars continued until the Barbarians learned the Roman discipline, and became warriors. It was the most profitable trade for them, as well as the only means of safety. That this was the plan of their oeconomy appears plainly from the form of government every where established by them. Where every free man was a soldier, there was no occasion for a regular militia.
Men are governed by prejudice more than by reason: to this I attribute the sudden change in the government of Europe. In place of one man governing the world, as was the case of the Emperors, the new spirit was, that all soldiers were equal, and a King was but primus inter pares. The sudden revolution had the effect of ruining every thing: learning, industry, politics, all went to wreck. One hundred years of barbarity must ruin the effects of a thousand centuries of politeness. This is the date of the annihilation of standing armies. A powerful Prince, such as Charles the Great, who acted in a high sphere, and who made the world his own, might, during his lifetime, establish the old oeconomy. But the general establishment of the feudal form of government, which, no doubt, was the best for preserving a great empire, filled with barbarity every where, joined with the weakness of that Prince’s successors, introduced a new form less barbarous than the former, but equally compatible with a numerous standing militia. Every Baron became a sovereign, and his vassals were bred to arms; but as they were forced to attend the plough for subsistence, as well as the camp; wars were carried on consistently with agriculture. Certain months of the year were appropriated for war; others for peace. This was easily accomplished: war was constantly at the door; a campaign was finished in a week, because every man’s nearest neighbour was commonly his worst enemy.
Europe remained in this general state of confusion for some centuries. Princes had, during that period, a most precarious authority, and when any nation chanced to be under the government of one who had talents to unite his subjects, he became so formidable that there was no possibility of resisting him. In those days, it was a hard matter to form an idea of a balance of power; because there was no rule to determine the force of nations. Under the Otho’s, Germany threatned Italy with chains; under Edward and Henry, England seemed on the road of adding all France to her monarchy; Ferdinand the catholic, laid the foundation of the Spanish greatness, and his successors bid fair for the universal monarchy of Europe. In our days, the acquisition of a small province, nay of a considerable town, is not to be made by conquest, without a general convention between all the powers of Europe, and those who are conversant in foreign affairs, can estimate, in a minute, the force of Princes, by the troops they are able to maintain; nothing is so easy as to lay down, on a sheet of paper, a state of all the armed men in Europe. A Prince can hardly add a soldier to a company, but all the world is informed of it. Excepting the extent of their credit, and the talents of their generals and counsellors, every thing relative to power is become the object of computation. Hence the balance of power, formerly unknown, is now become familiar. So much is sufficient for the matter of fact; let us now examine why trade and industry have given rise to so regular a system of war.
The reason is, because in a state where those are introduced, every thing must be made regular, or all will go to wreck. The keeping up of large armies, is the remains of that turbulent spirit which animated royalty for so many centuries. All literature is filled with warlike sentiments, from.the books of Moses to the news papers of this day. A young person cannot learn to read without imbibing the fire of war. But as nothing is so evident, from the consideration of the total revolution in the spirit of the people of Europe, as that war is inconsistent with the prosperity of a modern state, I sometimes allow my imagination to carry me so far as to believe the time is at hand when war will come to cease. But there is no such thing as predicting in political matters: general peace is a contingent consequence which a thousand accidents may prevent; and one among the rest is, that the whole plan of modern policy may be broken to pieces, before Princes come to discover that it is their interest to be quiet. The ambition of one, arms all the rest, and when once they are at the head of their armies, want of money only assembles a congress, not to make peace, but that the parties may have some years to gather new force.
It is not therefore trade and industry which have given birth to standing armies, they have only rendred war impossible without them. It is the ambition of Princes to extend their dominion, and even sometimes to extend their commerce, which gives occasion to war. And we see daily how difficult it becomes to provide troops for this purpose, from no other reason so much as from the progress of trade and industry. Those who have the money cannot have the men, those who have the men cannot have the money. Do we not see how the greatest monarchy in Europe, the Prince who has the most millions of subjects, cannot preserve the rank of power he has prescribed to himself (his political-necessary for war) without a body of above thirty thousand strangers, in the time of the most profound peace, and after the greatest reduction judged consistent with the safety of the country? These cost vastly more than national troops, and brave men of all countries are alike; so that the only reason for keeping up so large a body of foreigners, is to facilitate augmentations when occasion requires it; and not to spare the subjects who are willing to serve, but to spare agriculture and industry, after the superfluities of these have fallen in, to compleat that body of troops which experience has determined to be proportioned to such superfluities.
From this short exposition let me deduce a principle. That since every state has occasion, according to the present system of Europe, for a certain number of armed men for their defence, the first care of a statesman, is, to discover to what number those of his subjects, who willingly prefer the conditions offered for military service to the occupations of industry, may amount. If he finds these exceed the number wanted for recruiting the army, it is a good reason to diminish the pay; until the encouragement comes upon a level with the supply demanded. If on the contrary, the number of volunteers falls below the standard required, he must examine the state of the balance of work and demand, before he can give any farther encouragement. If this balance stands even, he must take care that the pay given to soldiers be not carried so high, as to engage those of the lowest class of profitable industry to desert it.
What measures, therefore, can be fallen upon? There are two. Either to hire foreign troops, as many states do; and I suppose for good reasons, only because it is done. But I should prefer another method, which is to create a new class of inhabitants, appropriated for supplying the army, upon the principle above laid down, that he who feeds may have as many mouths as he pleases.
I would therefore fix the military pay at a rate below the profits of useful industry, and accept of such as should offer. For the augmentation of this class, I would receive all male children who should be given or exposed by their parents. These should be bred to every sort of labour for which the state has occasion, and their numbers might be carried to twenty per cent. above that which might be judged necessary in time of the hottest war. Out of this class only, the standing forces might be recruited: those who remained might be employed in every public service; such as working in arsenals, docks, highways, public buildings, &c. By taking care of the children of this whole class, their numbers would rise to whatever height might be judged necessary. The same spirit would be kept up; they might serve by turns, and all become disciplined. This is a good scheme, in many cases, and is an improvement upon the distribution of the inhabitants: the execution is gradual; therefore no sudden revolution is implied. But it is fit only for a state which can augment its numbers, without seeking for subsistence from without. It would spare the land and manufactures, and be a ready outlet for all supernumeraries in every class.
This subject shall be resumed in the fifth book, when we come to the application of the amount of taxes. At present it has found a place, only because the support of a national force has been ranked among the objects of attention of those statesmen who are at the head of rich and luxurious nations which have lost their foreign trade.
Quest. 6. What are the principles upon which the relative force of nations is to be estimated?
Without some limitations, no question can be more difficult to resolve than this; it must therefore be examined only in so far as it comes under the influence of certain principles. It is as impossible to estimate the real force of a nation, as it is to estimate that of any considerable quantity of gun-powder, and for the same reason. The nation cannot exert all its force at once, no more than the powder can be all inflamed at once, and the successive efforts of a small power, are never equally effectual with the momentous shock of a great one. In proportion, therefore, as the spirit of individuals is moved to concur with the public measure, a people become powerful; and as I know of no principle which can regulate such affections of the mind, we must throw them quite out of the question, and measure the power of nations by the quantity of men and money at a statesman’s command, in consequence of the oeconomy he has established. Let me then suppose two nations, where the number of inhabitants, and weight of gold and silver are absolutely the same, military genius and discipline quite equal. From what has been said, we must determine that nation to be the strongest, which, without disturbing the oeconomy of their state, can raise the greatest proportion of men, and draw the greatest proportion of money into the public coffers.
When the number of inhabitants is given, the first thing to be known is the nature of the produce of the country, whether mostly in corn, wine, or pasture: the more the ground is laboured, and the more crops it yearly produces, the fewer free hands it will maintain in proportion to the whole, this computation must then proceed upon the principles laid down above, Book I. Chap. 8.
When once you come at the number of free hands, you must examine the state of luxury. Luxury is justly said to effeminate a nation, because the great multitude of hands taken up in supplying the instruments of it to the rich, diminishes greatly the number of such as can be employed in war. If manufacturers and folks accustomed to a sedentary life, are at a certain age taken from trades, to compose armies, they will make bad soldiers; and the strength of a nation lies chiefly in the valour and strength of the soldiery. Luxury therefore effeminates a nation in general; but it does not follow from hence, that the most luxurious are the most effeminate, and most improper for war; on the contrary, they are found to be the bravest and most proper. The effeminacy and baseness of mind, in point of courage, are found in the sedentary multitude. The truth of this might be proved from many examples in antient history, if the present situation of Europe left the smallest room to doubt of it.
The more therefore that luxury prevails in a country, the fewer good troops can be raised in it, and vice versa. But it is not sufficient to have men for war, the men must be enabled to subsist, and in the modern way of making war, their subsistence and other expences require large sums of money. We must then examine what proportion of the general wealth may be applied to this purpose.
If in any country the riches be found in few hands, the state will be poor; because the opulence of the public treasure depends greatly upon a right and proportional distribution of wealth among the inhabitants. Riches are only acquired three ways. First, Gratuitously, as by succession, gift, or the like; secondly, by industry; and lastly, by penury. Those who are poor are seldom enriched gratuitously, never by penury, and always by industry; when a poor man grows rich in any state, he changes in so far the balance of wealth, for what is added to him is taken from another. When a spirit of industry prevails, the balance is always turning in favour of the industrious, and as it is a pretty general rule, that the rich are not the most laborious, so the balance is generally turning against them. This being the case, the more that industry prevails, the quicker will this revolution be brought on. By such revolutions, wealth becomes equably distributed; for by being equably distributed, I do not mean, that every individual comes to have an equal share, but an equal chance, I may say a certainty, of becoming rich in proportion to his industry. Riches which are acquired by succession, or any other gratuitous means, do not in the least contribute to circulation, the owner, as has been said, only changes his name. Those made by penury or hoarding, instead of adding to, evidently diminish circulation. It is, therefore, by industry alone that wealth is made to circulate, and it is by its circulation only, that money is useful. When large sums are locked up, they produce nothing; they are therefore locked up not to be useful while they remain secreted; but that they may be useful when brought out in order to be alienated. In a state, therefore, where there are a few very rich and many very poor, there must be much money locked up; for without money none can be rich, and if it were not locked up it must fall into the hands of the poor. Why? Because the rich will not give it to the rich, gratuitously, nor will they labour to acquire it; either then the common people must be lazy and unwilling to work, or the rich must be so penurious and addicted to hoarding as to keep it out of the hands of the poor. In both which cases, if there be money in the country, it must be found in coffers.
From these positions it may be concluded, that wealth which produces nothing to its owner, cannot be supposed to produce any thing to the state: consequently, that state in which there is the quickest circulation of money, is, cæteris paribus, that in which the greatest proportion of the general wealth may be raised for the public service. This is all that is necessary to observe at present: when we have examined the nature of credit and taxes, and the principles upon which they may be levied in different countries, and under different forms of government, we shall discover more rules for estimating the force of different states.
The principles of industry have been so interwoven with those of trade, through all the chapters of this second book, that it is now proper, before we dismiss the subject, to examine a little into the nature of the first, considered more abstractedly, and more detached from its relation to the equivalent given for it, which is the proper characteristic of trade, and from which proceeds the intimate connection between them.
The object of our enquiry hitherto has been to discover the method of engaging a free people in the advancement of the one and the other, as a means of making their society live in ease, by reciprocally contributing to the relief of each others wants. Let us next examine some farther consequences. We are now to cast our eyes upon another view of this extensive landscape, where the personal advantages, immediately felt from this gentle band of mutual dependence, are not to fix our attention so much as the effects produced by industry upon the face of things, and manners of a people.
The better to transmit this idea, which I find a little dark, let me say, that hitherto we have treated our subject, according to the principles which should direct a statesman, to advance trade and industry, by engaging the rich to give bread to the poor. Now we are to examine the consequences resulting from the execution of this plan; and compare the difference between a country which has been inhabited by a people abundantly provided for without industry and labour, and one occupied by another who have subsisted by these means: and farther, we are to examine industry as producing effects more or less hurtful to the simplicity of manners, and more or less permanent and beneficial, according as it has been directed towards different objects.
I can easily suppose a nation living in the greatest simplicity, even going naked, but abundantly fed, either with the spontaneous fruits of the earth, or by an agriculture proportioned to the wants of every one, and where very little alienation or exchange takes place. From this primitive life, as I may call it, the degrees of industry, like imperceptible shades, may be augmented; and the augmentation, as I apprehend, is to be measured, not so much by the degree of occupation which the inhabitants pursue, as by the quantity of permutation among them; because I think permutation implies superfluity of something[N].