The Grenadier Guards at Ypres.
Having completed its detrainment, the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck. Sir John French had now to make up his mind whether he would use it to strengthen his line, which was much longer than his numbers warranted, or send it to the north of Ypres. He decided that the greatest danger was that the Germans might carry out a wide turning movement on his left flank, and he sent the Corps north of Ypres accordingly. The French cavalry were to operate on Sir Douglas Haig's left, and the Third Cavalry Division, under General Byng, on his right.
After two nights in billets at Hazebrouck, the 2nd Battalion marched on the 17th to Boeschepe. Two days afterwards arrived Captain M. E. Makgill-Crichton-Maitland, Captain R. H. V. Cavendish, M.V.O., Lieutenant J. S. Hughes, Lieutenant I. St. C. Rose, and Captain C. R. Champion de Crespigny, who was appointed Staff Captain to the 4th Brigade.
The officers of the 2nd Battalion were now as follows:
It was a cold raw morning on the 20th, when the Battalion marched at 5 A.M. to St. Jean, a small village to the north of Ypres, where it was ordered to take up an entrenched position, with the Coldstream on the right, and the 5th Brigade on the left. Matters were complicated by the fact that the French looked upon this part of the line as theirs. However, eventually matters were arranged, and British and French troops settled down together to a pouring wet night.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.A. Smith C.M.G. Commanding 2nd Battalion. Died of wounds received at Festubert 19 May 1915.
There was another move next morning. The Battalion assembled at 5.30, and marched to a position near Hanebeek Brook, about two miles west of Zonnebeke, where the 4th Brigade concentrated. Then the whole Brigade advanced about half a mile towards Passchendaele with the 3rd Battalion Coldstream on the left, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the right—each battalion having two companies in the firing line, and the rest in support, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was in reserve.
About 2.30 Lord Cavan, finding that the two Coldstream battalions had drifted somewhat apart, ordered up the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers into the centre of the line. As they made their way across ploughed fields, they came in for a great deal of unaimed rifle-fire, but suffered very little loss.
About 400 to 500 yards east of Zonnebeke—Langemarck road the three battalions dug themselves in for the night, since news had been received that large German forces were advancing through Houthulst Forest. Before long the sky was lit up in all directions by the farms which the enemy was burning. By this illumination the Germans attempted a counter-attack, and came on shouting, "Don't fire, we are the Coldstream." It was characteristic of the German thoroughness of method to master this regimental idiosyncrasy, and say Coldstream and not Coldstreams. But the Battalion had not fought for two months without learning the enemy's tricks, and as spiked helmets could be distinctly seen against the glow of the burning farms, they fired right into the middle of the Germans, who hastily retired.
Before daylight next morning the companies in the firing line were relieved by those in support. The whole Brigade then set itself to improving the trenches and consolidating the position. It turned out that on the left the First Division had been held up, while on the right the 22nd Brigade was in a tight place. Consequently the situation was distinctly uncomfortable. The trenches, composed of isolated holes which held two or three men apiece, were exposed from the left to enfilade fire, but there the Battalion had to remain for two days, shelled intermittently. They suffered many casualties. While making his way down the firing line, Captain Maitland was forced to walk a great deal in the open, and was wounded in the head by a sniper, who succeeded in hitting several other men. In the evening Lieutenant Donald Miller, who had come out originally with the Battalion, and had fought all through the retreat, was killed by a high-explosive shell.
On the 24th the Second Division got orders to take up the ground occupied by the Seventh Division, from Poezelhoek to the Becelaere—Passchendaele road, and the First Division was relieved by French Territorial troops, and concentrated about Zillebeke.
At the same time the 4th Brigade was relieved by a Brigade from the Sixth French Army under General Moussy, and the men of the Grenadiers watched the French attack Passchendaele with much interest. Though the attack was met with a heavy artillery and rifle fire, and made but little progress, the personal gallantry of General Moussy himself and his staff, who exposed themselves freely while close up to the front trenches, made a great impression on all the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion. After dark this French Brigade took over the trenches, and the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers moved back about two miles to a farm, where the men managed to snatch a couple of hours' sleep. At 5.30 A.M. it started off again, and after a circuitous march of about six miles reached Eksternest, where it formed the reserve of the 6th Brigade. Here, at last, it had a thorough rest in barns, outhouses, and elsewhere, with plenty of straw to lie on, while a fowl-house constituted No. 3 Company Headquarters.
The Battalion paraded, much refreshed, at 6.30 next morning, but did not move off till 9. It advanced towards the Six Cross Roads, and halted behind Polygon Wood. In the afternoon it was ordered to attack the enemy's position near Reutel, passing over the trenches held by the 5th Brigade, while the Irish Guards were to advance on the same position from the north-west. The Orders were:
The attack will begin at 3 P.M. 4th Guards Brigade will have for its objective the Reutel Spur. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards will commence its advance at once as far as the line of trenches now held by the 5th Brigade. At 3 P.M. its scouts will pass that line, and the battalion will endeavour to establish itself in such a position that it can by its fire materially assist the main attack which will be delivered from the south and south-west.
The 2nd Batt. Grenadiers will work round the stream at once as verbally ordered until their right reaches a point one company's length beyond the forks of the two streams. At 3 P.M. it will be prepared to attack the R. of Reutel from S.W. During this operation the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers will specially detail a half company to protect its right. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream will follow the Grenadiers and act in close support of them. They must also give special orders about their right flank. The 3rd Battalion Coldstream will be in reserve in a covered position at Six Cross Roads. It is quite understood that the time is short, but this operation must be carefully carried out without hurry. Brigade Headquarters will be at Six Cross Roads at 2.45 P.M.
Advancing in artillery formation, the Battalion came in for a great deal of rifle-fire, but fortunately no shells. Major Lord Bernard Lennox had taken advantage of the halt in the morning to reconnoitre the line of advance thoroughly, and was able to lead the companies to their destinations. There was no great difficulty in reaching the trenches, but when the Battalion advanced another 150 yards it came under a very heavy cross-fire; only one platoon of No. 2 Company actually crossed the 5th Brigade trenches. The other companies were held up before they reached the firing line. The Bedfords on the right, unable to carry on the advance, retired again to the trenches, and the Irish Guards on the left were also held up.
Darkness was now coming on, and it seemed madness to attempt to take a strong position in a thick wood where no one knew precisely the position of the trenches, or how strongly they were held. So Lieut.-Colonel Smith directed No. 2 Company to fall back and take over a trench from the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, with the Highland Light Infantry on the left and the Royal Scots Fusiliers on the right. A platoon of No. 1 Company was added to the right of No. 2. Its position was along the front edge of the private grounds of a fine château, which was then intact.
Three times during the night, which was very dark and windy and rainy, the Germans attacked—at 9 P.M., at midnight, and at 3 A.M. But the position was fairly secure, and each time they retired. It is doubtful whether they ever intended to press the attack home, and possibly they were only trying to locate the exact position of our trenches—not a very difficult task, as they were but 300 yards off.
That evening the following message was received from Sir John French:
The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief wishes once more to make it known to the troops under his command how deeply he appreciates the bravery and endurance which they have again displayed since their arrival in the northern theatre of war. In circulating the official information which records the splendid victory of our Russian Allies, he would remind the troops that the enemy must before long withdraw troops to the East and relieve the tension on our front. He feels it is quite unnecessary to urge officers, N.C.O.'s, and men to make a determined effort and drive the enemy over the frontier.
Digging started with a will in the trenches early next morning. It had come to be a regular habit with the battalions which had been through those first months of the war, at once to dig themselves in deep in any new position, no matter how soon they might have to move on. They had learned by experience that the labour was well worth while. On this occasion the trouble was that the deeper the men dug the wetter the ground became, and soon they were up to their ankles in mud. But the sun came out about mid-day, and helped to dry up the ground.
No regular attack was made that day, though there was constant shelling, and the Battalion therefore had comparatively few casualties. German snipers were very busy, but did little damage; our men took every opportunity of retaliating; and Lieutenant I. Rose was reported to have been particularly successful in accounting for the enemy marksmen. The howitzers paid less attention to the trenches than to the Château. On this unfortunate building the high-explosive shells dropped with monotonous regularity, but the little tower still remained standing. The Battalion Headquarters, which were behind the Château, had a decidedly warm time, getting the benefit not only of the shells from the howitzers, but of all the stray bullets that went wide of the trenches.
Most of the next day was spent in mending the line and consolidating the position, for there were weak spots, which the Divisional Staff discovered, usually between Brigades. Barbed wire was now to be had, and orders were issued for entanglements to be put up in front of each trench. In the afternoon the companies of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers in reserve were sent to take over the trenches of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream, and to stay there until they were relieved by the Black Watch at midnight. Both these reliefs were carried out successfully and without any casualties, though the task was by no means easy, owing to the thickness of the wood and consequent bad communications.
Sir John French had now placed what remained of the Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig, who redistributed the line thus:
(A) The Seventh Division from the Château east of Zandvoorde to the Menin road.
(B) The First Division from the Menin road to a point immediately west of Reutel village.
(C) The Second Division to near the Moorslede—Zonnebeke road.
The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers now moved back about a mile to Nonne-Bosschen Wood, and having slept there returned the next morning under howitzer fire across two fields to the northern edge of Polygon Wood, where it remained until the 6th Brigade passed through it to attack Reutel Ridge. Then it moved forward in support, and dug in round a farm. Before it had gone far the 6th Brigade was fiercely attacked, and succeeded in driving the enemy off with some loss, though unable to advance farther itself. The 4th Brigade was not wanted, and spent a quiet afternoon near the Farm—"quiet" in this case being a comparative term, denoting that they were not directly under fire, for our own howitzers were only twenty yards off, and kept firing ear-splitting salvos all day.
Having received orders the night before to be ready at a moment's notice, the Battalion was under arms soon after dawn next day. But it was not until much later that it got instructions to move to the other side of the Racecourse Wood, and entrench a position almost at right angles to the line of trenches in front. It turned out that the Seventh Division on the right had been driven back, and though most of the ground had been regained there was still a risk of the Germans pushing through. Meanwhile, Captain Ridley was ordered to take No. 4 Company, and support the Cameron Highlanders near the Château. He sent up two platoons into the trenches on their right, and kept the rest in support. They came in for a good deal of shell-fire, but were not seriously attacked.
Except for No. 4 Company the Battalion was in Corps Reserve next day with the Irish Guards, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream were in the trenches. But about 3 P.M. the Brigadier, Lord Cavan, got news that there had been a serious break in the line about two miles to the right, i.e. the south, and was instructed to send up the battalions, which he had in reserve, to report to General Bulfin, commanding the 2nd Brigade.
Lord Cavan went himself to see General Bulfin at his Headquarters, and was directed to despatch these battalions southwards to protect the right flank of the 2nd Brigade. Accordingly the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, Irish Guards, and Oxfordshire Light Infantry marched off from Polygon Wood towards Klein Zillebeke, and Captain Ridley was ordered to withdraw No. 4 Company and join the remainder of the Battalion as it moved off. The orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Smith were to reinforce the cavalry, which was holding a line very lightly north of the Château de Hollebeke.
By dusk these battalions were astride of the Klein Zillebeke—Zandvoorde road, the Grenadiers on the right and the Irish Guards on the left, with their left thrown forward a little, to keep touch with the right of the 2nd Brigade. Lord Cavan went on ahead with his Staff, to see that the whole line was made continuous. On going forward to inspect the position which the cavalry was holding, Lieut.-Colonel Smith found that it was on a forward slope, which seemed to him untenable, and he thought this a good opportunity for making a fresh disposition. So he arranged with the cavalry that it should continue to hold its line, while the Battalion dug in, in its rear. A new line, which consisted as usual of a series of deep narrow holes with no parapet, was accordingly made, with the right on the railway, and the left on the Klein Zillebeke road.
Major Lord Bernard Lennox with No. 2 Company was on the right, Major Hamilton with No. 1 in the centre, and Captain Powell with No. 3 on the left; one platoon from No. 4 under Sergeant Hutchings was posted on the Klein Zillebeke road; and the rest of the company went to Battalion Headquarters, north-west of the wood between the railway and Klein Zillebeke. Supplies and ammunition were brought up, and by 1 A.M. the Battalion was well dug in. The cavalry then withdrew from the trenches in front and retired. Meanwhile the Irish Guards had dug trenches, prolonging the line to the left.
Sir John French in his despatch describes the afternoon of October 31 as the most critical moment in the whole battle. By sheer weight of numbers the Germans endeavoured to break through the line, and their immense superiority in guns encouraged them to hope that they would be able to beat down any opposition. The greater part of the Second Division was still on the Moorslede—Zonnebeke road, on the left of the First Division, while the three battalions detached under Lord Cavan remained on their new line.
After a long wet night in the trenches, the 2nd Grenadiers were to have a still longer day's fighting—a day, too, in which they were most of the time "holding on by their eyelids." As soon as day dawned, they were deluged by a rain of shells, to which our artillery could make no sort of reply. Some troops of the French Ninth Corps tried to advance through the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and Irish Guards, and attack the enemy's position, but the shell-fire was so intense that they never succeeded in getting beyond the line of trenches. Most of them took refuge in the trenches, while some dug new ones.
The shells came crashing through the trees continuously, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith decided to move the Battalion Headquarters back about one hundred yards. Particularly violent was the bombardment of No. 2 Company, of which the trenches, being near the railway, were no doubt easily located by the enemy's artillery, directed with deadly effect by a captive balloon. Two high-explosive shells landed in one trench, and killed and buried a number of men. Lieutenant Rose had a marvellous escape. He was actually buried, but was dug out just in time. Major Lord Bernard Lennox wisely withdrew part of his company into the support trenches for a time, and no doubt thus saved many lives.
About 11 A.M. Lord Cavan sent the following message:
Keep on repairing your trenches. If any quiet intervals, begin communication trenches zigzag to your rear, so that to-morrow infantry can keep out of main trench during heavy shelling hours and easily man it when required. Can you possibly push an Observation Post forward to any point from which it could see and report?
It looked as if the Germans were going to attack this part of the position about mid-day, but eventually they moved northward. Early in the afternoon Lieut.-Colonel Smith received a message from Lord Cavan that the enemy had broken through the line to the left of the Irish Guards. Soon afterwards came this further message:
The situation is extremely critical. You are to hold your ground at all costs. Sir Douglas Haig relies on the Grenadiers to save the First Corps and possibly the Army.
After such a call as that, Lieut.-Colonel Smith at once determined to put every available rifle in the trenches. The few men that still remained in reserve were accordingly sent up to the front trenches. No. 3 Company was very much extended, although a platoon from No. 4 had already been sent to support it. Captain Powell sent a message to say that he might not be able to stay without more support, and Colonel Smith replied that he must hold on at all cost. Lieut.-Colonel Smith then reported the measures he had taken to Lord Cavan, who replied:
Splendid. Hang on like grim death. You may yet save the Army.
It was undoubtedly a case of hanging on, while this terrific bombardment continued, but the Grenadiers had not wasted their time the night before, and had dug themselves in deep. It was to their good digging that Lieut.-Colonel Smith afterwards ascribed the fact that they never gave an inch, although it was certainly an advantage to them that the position was partly concealed owing to the nature of the ground. The enemy plastered the whole locality with shells, but only in a few cases were they able to locate the actual position of the trenches. The Germans were reported meanwhile to have driven back the First Division from Gheluvelt, thus exposing the left flank of the Seventh Division. The Headquarters of the First and Second Divisions had been shelled, General Lomax had been mortally wounded, and several Staff Officers killed. Such heavy casualties among the Staff, in the middle of a battle, naturally dislocated the machinery of the Higher Commands. However, about 2 P.M. Lord Cavan sent word that the situation was easier, and that he was sending up the Oxfordshire Light Infantry on the left of the Irish Guards.
Constant anxiety had been felt about the right of the position occupied by the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers. A high railway embankment, beyond which was a small wood, made it very difficult to keep up communication, especially when the shelling was so severe, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent a message to Lord Bernard Lennox: "Is your right still in touch with 4th Hussars? Brigadier pressing for a reply." To which Lord Bernard answered, "Yes."
At 2.40 Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent the following request to the Headquarters of the 4th Brigade:
Wood just short of D E near Canal is full of Germans, also Château de Hollebeke. Can you turn on guns, please? My advance posts have been driven in.
The Canal was dry, and formed no obstacle; and though there were a few British cavalry this side of the embankment, they were not enough to stop an attack. The French were said to be coming up to strengthen this part of the line, but they did not arrive. Of all this fortunately the Germans knew nothing, and instead of attacking this weak spot, they directed their energies to the centre of the section of the line held by the Grenadiers.
About 3 o'clock the enemy advanced in force through the wood near the railway, but was met with such a withering fire from No. 1 Company that he did not succeed in getting very far. An hour later Lord Cavan sent this message:
Well done. If absolutely forced back, retire as on parade with your proper right, that is your left retiring, on line of railway. Put up the best fight you can on edge of wood.
There was no need to retire, however, although there was one moment at which the situation seemed critical, for the Germans brought up some field-guns, and plastered the trenches with every conceivable kind of shell.
The shelling stopped shortly after dark, and the men were able at last to look out over their trenches, and survey the scene by the lights of a farm which was blazing in the centre of the line. They saw a spectacle, which later on grew more and more familiar. What had once been a field was now a mass of trenches; the whole place had been ploughed up by shells, and the hedges were all torn up and burnt and blown to bits.
During the night the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was relieved by a regiment from the French Sixteenth Corps, and retired at 4 A.M. to the rear of Zwarteleen, where the men thought they were going to get some rest, but before very long they were on the move again. Sir Douglas Haig had sent a message which Lord Cavan circulated as follows:
The German Emperor will arrive in the field to-day to conduct operations against the British Army. The G.O.C. First Corps calls upon all ranks once more to repeat their magnificent efforts and to show him what British soldiers really are.
All the enemy's efforts were now concentrated on smashing the left of the Irish Guards' trenches with high-explosive shells, and firing with wonderful accuracy they gradually blew the trench in bit by bit, and knocked out their machine-guns. At 3 P.M. Lord Cavan heard a report that the Irish Guards were retiring, and that they had only about 200 men left. He sent orders at once that they were at all costs to hold on to the wood 200 yards in rear of their old line. The French were told to stay where they were, as in the event of a withdrawal the whole British line was to pivot on them on the elbow of the Canal. The highest praise was afterwards given by the British Generals to the French for the way in which they held their trenches all day, in spite of the fact that their left was in the air.
An urgent appeal for help now reached Lord Cavan from one of the Corps Staff, stating that the Northamptonshire Regiment was being driven back and needed support. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was immediately sent off with orders to report itself to General Bulfin, who was to be found in a wood three-quarters of a mile south-west of Herenthage. But by the time the Battalion arrived there General Bulfin had been wounded, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith could not find out what it was he was expected to do.
In the meantime Lord Cavan received orders to assume command of the whole section from the east edge of the wood to the French left. In these strenuous days it was no uncommon thing for an officer to be told in the middle of a battle to take over command of a force during a difficult operation—a war ordeal, for which peace training had supplied no practice. To take over the command of a Division is no easy matter at any time, but to do it at a critical moment, with heavy fighting going on, demands a man of more than ordinary capacity. Lord Cavan galloped up with his Brigade-Major, Major the Hon. W. P. Hore-Ruthven; on arrival at General Bulfin's Headquarters he found that everything had been momentarily disorganised by the sudden departure of the wounded General. Officers of all sorts were asking for orders. The Germans were breaking through. Perplexing problems of every description were submitted for instant solution. Shells were falling in the immediate neighbourhood of the Divisional Headquarters. Very slowly Lord Cavan drew out his cigar-case, and having carefully selected a cigar, proceeded to light it, turning it round to see that it was evenly lighted. This had a wonderful effect on all present, for it not only enabled Lord Cavan himself to concentrate his thoughts on the problem, and to see clearly the most pressing needs of the moment, but it also inspired all the officers with confidence. As a Staff Officer, who was present, said afterwards, that cigar saved the situation.
On the left the Sussex Regiment was in touch with the Seventh Division, and stood firm. The Northamptonshire Regiment, Gordon Highlanders, and Oxfordshire Light Infantry had all been pressed back from their advanced trenches, though the enemy had not got beyond them. Lord Cavan at once ordered the Grenadiers to leave their packs at the farm in the rear of the Brown Road, and to clear the wood south-east of that road at the point of the bayonet.
Thereupon Lieut.-Colonel Smith launched the Battalion with fixed bayonets into the wood. It was very thick in places, and there was always a risk of some company getting lost. The Germans, it was found, had left the wood, but only recently, as was evident from the number of dead. That the difficult manoeuvre, entrusted to the Battalion, was carried out most successfully was due to the excellent manner in which the four Captains led their men. One platoon of Major Hamilton's company, which went beyond the wood and was enfiladed by machine-guns, had to remain under cover of a bank till dark, when it retired and joined the main line. With this exception the companies—No. 1 under Major Hamilton, No. 2 under Lord Bernard Lennox, and No. 3 under Captain Powell—all managed to reach the edge of the wood in perfect order. No. 4 under Captain Ridley was in support.
This advance had the excellent effect of establishing confidence. Lord Cavan was able to reorganise the line of defence for the night, and, by blunting the salients of the wood facing south-east, to reduce the garrison. The result was that he withdrew two battalions—one, the Sussex Regiment, was placed in reserve; the other, the Gordon Highlanders, was sent back to the 20th Brigade, to which it belonged.
As soon as it was dark, the Germans tried to set the wood on fire, but fortunately did not succeed, though there were isolated fires in various parts of it. It was an awkward position and very difficult to hold, as the Germans were so close, but orders were received for the battalions to dig in where they were. To officers, who had been taught from their early youth that one of the essentials of a trench line was a good field of fire, this digging in a thick wood, where the field of fire was never more than from fifteen to twenty yards, seemed an absurdity. But ideas on this subject had been considerably revised by the war—besides, in a long line of trenches running several miles, battalions of course must join up with each other, and cannot choose a position for themselves.
At 10 o'clock that night, No. 4 Company, under Captain Ridley, was directed to take over the position held by a company of the Gordons on the left, but finding that the trench had almost vanished after a day's work by the German artillery, it dug a new one slightly in rear, which was not finished until 3 A.M.
This was the situation on the Monday morning: the Northamptonshire Regiment was in touch with the Seventh Division on the left; the Oxfordshire Light Infantry and Grenadiers, slightly intermingled, were in the centre, and the Irish Guards on the right—all holding the south-east edges of the wood. Four vigorous attacks on the line—at 8.45, 11, 2, and 5.45—were delivered by the Germans, preceded by heavy shelling, especially on the left. The attack at 11 looked dangerous at one time, when the Germans got within twenty-five yards of our trenches, but our fire was very steady, and they could make no farther headway. The 2 o'clock assault partially developed, but the one at 5.45, just after it got dark, was the most serious.
It was directed against Captain Ridley's Company and against the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, and the enemy advanced with a beating of drums and blowing of horns. The night was cold, with some light from the moon. As the enemy came on, an incident that was never explained took place. The firing almost died down, and this message, sent from no one knew where, was passed along the line: "Don't fire. The Northamptons are going to charge." It so happened that Lieut.-Colonel Smith and Major Jeffreys were in that part of the trench at the time, and directly they heard the mysterious message they realised it was a German ruse. They yelled at the men to go on firing. The fire was at once taken up and continued, while the attack died away. Next day Lieut.-Colonel Smith tried to discover where the fictitious order started, but in vain.
All night the enemy could be heard digging away, in some places near to our trenches. At 1 A.M., No. 4 Company was sent back in reserve, being relieved by a company of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, which next morning reported that 300 dead had been found in front of the trench. Some were found within a few yards of our line.
On Monday evening, the night of the attack, this special order from the Commander-in-Chief was circulated:
The Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief has watched with the deepest admiration and solicitude the splendid stand made by the soldiers of His Majesty the King in their successful effort to maintain the forward position which they have won by their gallantry and steadfastness. He believes that no other Army in the world would show such tenacity, especially under the tremendous artillery fire directed against it. Its courage and endurance are beyond all praise. It is an honour to belong to such an Army.
The Field-Marshal has to make one more call upon the troops. It is certainly only a question of a few days, and it may be of only a few hours, before, if they only stand firm, strong support will come, the enemy will be driven back, and in the retirement will suffer losses even greater than those which have befallen him under the terrific blows by which, especially during the last few days, he has been repulsed.
The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that he does not make his call in vain.
J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief to the British Army
in the Field.
A comparatively quiet interval followed. There was intermittent shelling next day, though nothing very serious, and the snipers on both sides kept up a lively fusillade. The trenches meanwhile were deepened and improved. Some new orders with regard to the coming fighting were also issued. Each battalion had two companies in the firing line and two in support, and the captains were told that they must rely on their own supports if they wanted any help. There was a Cavalry Brigade in reserve, but Lord Cavan did not wish to call on it unless it became absolutely necessary. Another warning against the enemy's tricks was sent to the men in this message from G.O.C. First Corps:
First Cavalry Division reports that in the attacks on them the Germans wore British uniforms, especially kilts, and when approaching our trenches shouted, "Don't fire; we are short of ammunition," and similar expressions. All troops in the trenches are to be warned of this practice by the enemy.
An instruction was issued also for the making of circular redoubts, about twenty-five yards in rear of the existing line of trenches, with the object of stopping a rush if the line should be pierced.
An artillery duel—rather one-sided—occupied the next two days. A German aeroplane having located the trenches, the enemy's guns became very busy, though mostly against the support trenches, chiefly with the object of "searching the ground." Early in the afternoon the First Division reported that the enemy was attacking from the direction of the woods south of Gheluvelt. The artillery had been turned on them, and preparations were being made to meet the attack, but nothing came of it. The shelling stopped at nightfall, and the Battalion settled down to a pitch-dark, pouring wet night in the trenches, which were all in wet clay and marshy ground, and the men's sole consolation was that the Germans must be having just as bad a time.
By the 5th it began to be thought in the firing line that the enemy had abandoned all attempt to break through the line, but in reality he was waiting only for reinforcements. He had succeeded in making a dent in the line near Messines, and was now determined to throw the whole weight of his superior numbers on Ypres. He chose for his point of attack Klein Zillebeke, the junction between De Moussy's French Division and the 4th Brigade, or rather the four battalions under Lord Cavan.
Shelling began with renewed vigour as soon as the sun had cleared away the next morning's mist, and just before mid-day significant instructions were received from Lord Cavan:
"Your position must be retained at all costs," he said in a message sent out at 11.50. "Redoubts must be occupied, every spare man and tool employed to make secondary trench. I trust you after splendid defence of last few days to maintain it to the end."
And in a second message a few minutes later:
"Have asked Seventh Division to do everything possible to help you with artillery fire."
Evidently the Brigadier expected a determined attack on that part of the line, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith made his dispositions accordingly. Early in the afternoon he got a report from the Irish Guards that the French Division on their right had been driven in. Immediately afterwards came a message from Major Hamilton that the Irish Guards themselves had been driven in, and that his right was consequently in the air.
Major Hamilton's Company was now bearing the brunt of the attack, and was in a very critical position. Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent word to ask him whether he needed any help. He replied: "Hughes only wants a few men, and I have sent him up one section. Bailey is lining road 200 yards to my front. O.C. Oxfords promised support if necessary."
Shortly afterwards it was reported that the Germans had reached Brown Road, and were advancing round the right rear of the Battalion. Lieut.-Colonel Smith at once posted Lieutenant Tufnell with one machine-gun on the Brown Road, to guard the ride through the wood across which the enemy would have to pass, to get behind our line of trenches, telling him to use his own discretion as to the position he should take up. Lieutenant Lord Congleton was also sent with one platoon to stop the Germans from getting through a gap which was reported to the right rear of the Battalion. Lieutenant Tufnell apparently decided that he would be able to get a better target for his machine-gun, and at the same time guard the ride, if he accompanied Lord Congleton. He accordingly took up a position from which he could command the advancing enemy, but had not been there long before he was mortally wounded.
At this point Lieut.-Colonel Smith reported to Lord Cavan that it was urgently necessary that a farm to his front should be destroyed, as there were machine-guns firing from it. He received the reply that if it were humanly possible the howitzers would do as he asked.
Two companies of the Sussex Regiment were now sent up to support the right of the line, and helped to hold things together, but the situation was most critical. The enemy had driven back De Moussy's French infantry, and consequently there was a bad dent in the line. Lord Cavan's troops were still holding on with their right in the air when the Household Cavalry was called in to retrieve the situation. Lord Cavan sent off Captain R. C. de Crespigny, his Staff Captain, at full gallop to Sanctuary Wood with orders to the Household Cavalry to come up at once. Colonel Wilson immediately ordered his men to mount, and galloped round by Maple Copse to within 500 yards of Brigade Headquarters, where they dismounted and fixed bayonets. Into the midst of the Germans they dashed, headed by Colonel Gordon Wilson.
Throwing in the cavalry at the critical moment to save the situation has from time immemorial been a recognised tactical manoeuvre, but in this case the Household Cavalry fought as infantry, and very splendid infantry they made. They swept forward to the attack with all the precision of an infantry battalion, and soon Klein Zillebeke was filled with British, French, and German troops fighting at close quarters. When it came to hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans could not stand up against the splendid men of the Household Cavalry, and they were gradually driven back till the line was restored. This gallant charge of the Household Cavalry on foot, Lord Cavan afterwards said, not only prevented the 4th Guards Brigade from being cut to pieces, but also saved Ypres. Colonel Gordon Wilson and Colonel Hugh Dawnay were killed, and the Household Cavalry lost a large number of men, but the situation was retrieved.
While this was going on, No. 1 Company Grenadiers, which was on the right, had been practically wiped out. Since the withdrawal of the Irish Guards, almost every man had been killed or wounded by shell-fire. Sergeant Thomas, who commanded the right platoon of No. 1, remained at his post after the Irish Guards had gone, until he had only three men left, when he withdrew to Brown Road. During that time he was twice buried by shells, and had three rifles broken in his hand. Sergeant Digby was mortally wounded, and was never seen again.
Lord Cavan telephoned: "Hang on tight to Brown Road. Try and get touch with half battalion Sussex Regiment sent to farm at Irish Guards H.Q." Lieut.-Colonel Smith passed this on to Captain Powell, adding: "Are you in touch with the Sussex?" to which Captain Powell replied: "Yes, I am in touch with Sussex, who prolong my line to the right, bent back to right rear."
In the meantime, Lieutenant Lord Congleton, finding how weak the right of the line was, had moved his platoon to the right of the Sussex. He had lost a number of men, but at the same time had managed to collect several Irish Guardsmen. They had no rifles or ammunition, but he placed them at intervals among the men of his platoon, and went and collected rifles for them himself from the casualties. Then he went round a second time with an orderly and collected ammunition. By this means he was able to hold the gap all through that night, and next day was specially mentioned by Lieut.-Colonel Smith, who wrote that the intelligent way in which he handled his platoon on his own initiative was beyond all praise.
Much help towards keeping the right of the line intact was also given by Colonel Davies, commanding the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who throughout the afternoon kept sending up any men he happened to have in reserve.
When darkness fell Lord Cavan gave Lieut.-Colonel Smith these directions:
Can you establish a line between the Brown Road and your original line so as to keep touch for certain with battalions on your left? I want to make sure that my line for the night is in touch all along. I have ordered two battalions to establish the line of the Brown Road up to south-west edge, where I hope to establish touch with the French. I have told General Kavanagh he can withdraw his Cavalry Brigade directly the whole of the Brown Road is established.
The new line was arranged about midnight, and at 1 A.M. the men began to dig, although they were dead tired. The trenches were completed by 4 A.M.—a fine performance on a pitch-dark night, with the additional handicap of the trees.