[173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

[174] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

[176] Diodor. xvii. 7.

[177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

[178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

[179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

[180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

[181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

[182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon’s policy; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon’s ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

[183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.

[184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

[185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.

[186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν κατειλημμένοι, etc. “prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit.” Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.

[187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed. The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.

[188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

[189] Diodor. xvii. 19.

[190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα, ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.

[191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας, under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

[192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον κέρας ... ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement in échelon, as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of others.

[193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself) ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete Arrian’s description of the battle had before been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under Parmenio. We discover from these words that all the τάξεις of the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander’s half, but also the three in Parmenio’s half) passed the river nearly at the same time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.

[194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

[195] Diodor. xvii. 21.

[196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

[197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

[198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

[199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

[200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p. 273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.

[201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch. l. c.) said that there were slain, among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

[202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

[203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

[204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 seqq.

[205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

[206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

[207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

[208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

[209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander’s invasion.

[210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

[211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

[212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

[213] Diodor. xvii. 22.

[214] Diodor. xvii. 23.

[215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.

[216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

[217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

[218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

[219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.

[220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.

[221] Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.

[222] Both Arrian, (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

[223] Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.

[224] Diodor. xvii. 25.

[225] The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is what stands described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtes at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors; in whose view eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtes and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtes drove back the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his work in which it ought to have been narrated, is lost. On this, as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses, obstructions, and losses, of Alexander’s career. His authorities probably did so before him.

[226] Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1. viii. 2. ... οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ ... τοῖς μὲν φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη νενικηκέναι....

[227] Arrian, i. 22, 5.

[228] Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.

[229] Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii. 7; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

[230] Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.

[231] Diodor. xvii. 28.

[232] Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.

[233] Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, etc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

Plutarch’s words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did not boast so much of this special favor from the gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

[234] Arrian, i. 27, 1-8

[235] Curtius. iii. 1, 8.

[236] Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.

[237] Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18; Justin, xi. 7.

[238] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[239] Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.

[240] Diodor. xvii. 29.

[241] Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. “Nondum enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur.”

[242] Diodor. xvi. 31.

[243] Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops, after he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.

[244] Curtius, iii. 2.

[245] Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. i. 38; and Cyropæd. viii. 8, 20.

[246] Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.

[247] Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.

[248] Arrian, i. 29. 6.

[249] Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.

[250] Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 20 of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one, the easternmost descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et Barrault, p. 243).

Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.

[251] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2. 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.

[252] Curtius, iii. 4, 11.

[253] Curtius, iii. 4, 11. “Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suam”, etc.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathokles (son of Lysimachus) holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtes.

[254] Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to Arsames the intention of executing what had been recommended by Memnon before the battle of Granikus—to desolate the country in order to check Alexander’s advance. But this can hardly be the right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian’s account seems more reasonable.

[255] When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

[256] This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii. 4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to contrast the generous confidence which he displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel prejudgment and torture of Philôtas four years afterwards.

[257] Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

[258] Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the gates of Kilikia and Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Vol. IX. Chap. lxix. p. 27 of this history.

[259] Arrian, ii, 5, 11.

[260] Arrian, ii. 6.

[261] Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

[262] Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

[263] Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

[264] From Æschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens, received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was “caught and pinned up” in Kilikia. Demosthenes (if we may believe Æschines) went about showing these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

[265] Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.

[266] Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8, p. 103, 104. I have given in an Appendix to this Volume, some explanatory comments on the ground near Issus.

[267] Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, etc.

[268] Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli and Anchilaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance, not less than eight days of ordinary march. If during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would have been just between them, and would have cut them off one from the other. It was Alexander’s good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

[269] Arrian, ii. 7, 8.

[270] Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.

[271] Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is certainly overstrained.

[272] Kallisthenes ap. Polybium, xii. 17.

[273] Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.

[274] Compare Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17.; and Arrian, ii. 8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little facility in moving. Kallisthenes did not notice them, as far as we can collect from Polybius.

[275] Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly, p. 280, about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498; Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.

[276] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18).

[277] Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.

[278] Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, ξὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, etc.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22), and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous: moreover the Persian kings were habitually in the centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxes.

After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the honor of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it (Plutarch, Artax. 16).

[279] This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society, 1838, p. 194]. These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

[280] Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenes stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery. Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if the Macedonian phalanx could not cross the Pinarus—converting a difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).

[281] Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

[282] Arrian, i. 11, 11; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii 20.

[283] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. Curtius (ii. 11, 27) says that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130 foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).

[284] Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

[285] Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν εὑρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.

[286] Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).

[287] Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40. The “Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani”, are mentioned by Cicero (ad Famil. xv. 4) When commanding in Kilikia he encamped there with his army four days.

[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot. vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.

[289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.