When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff:

1. The major portion of the troops, consisting of 60 infantry battalions, 65 squadrons, 2 sapper battalions, and 160 guns (total, 65,000 rifles and sabres), were to be sent into Southern Manchuria. The main body was to be concentrated in the area Hai-cheng–Liao-yang, and the advance guard[64] moved forward to the Ya-lu.

2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and 1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if necessary.

3. The garrison of Vladivostok was to consist of the 8th East Siberian Rifle Division (8 battalions of infantry), with 2 battalions of fortress artillery, 2 sapper companies, and 1 mining company.

4. That of Nikolaievsk was to be 1 fortress infantry battalion, 1 fortress artillery company, and 1 mining company.

This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions, was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff:

But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions, for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base for operations against it.

Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24) I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:

However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch of March 1:

He had already reported to the Tsar that—

As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:

Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the words “Quite so.”

I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the 28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and sotnias, and 140 guns. The distribution was as follows:

The Southern Force (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.

The Eastern (Advance) Force (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8 machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu.

The Mounted Force (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6 guns was operating in Northern Korea.

The Main Body was divided into two groups:

At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of 8 battalions and 24 guns.

At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns.

In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3 battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s Headquarters.

In Port Arthur were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12 battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3½ battalions of fortress artillery, and a sapper and mining company.

In Kuan-tung were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 sotnia of Cossacks.

On my arrival I approved the following scheme of engineering works: The fortification of the positions on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and at Liao-yang, Mukden, and Tieh-ling; the construction of roads across the passes to the Ya-lu, and of three parallel roads from Kai-ping to Mukden; the construction of crossings over the Liao River, and the hutting of three army corps. I at once took steps also to strengthen our advance guard on the Ya-lu, which was some 133 miles distant. Two regiments of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division were sent there, in addition to the third battalions for the regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. By the time, therefore, that the enemy began crossing the Ya-lu, the Eastern (Advance) Force had been increased to eighteen battalions, besides which the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment had been moved towards Ta-shih-chiao. The advance guard was under General Zasulitch. Meanwhile the units of the 1st Siberian Division were detained by Alexeieff in Harbin, so that, from the middle of March to the middle of April, the Manchurian Army did not receive a single battalion from the rear.

Notwithstanding the orders Zasulitch had received to avoid a decisive engagement with the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, on May 1 part of his force became hotly engaged in what developed into a serious fight at the Ya-lu, and after a disastrous finish his eastern force was withdrawn to the passes of the greater Fen-shui-ling range, which they reached on May 7. In this action only nine of our eighteen battalions took any active part, those of the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments showing great gallantry and determination. When asked why he had disobeyed the orders repeatedly given to him not to become entangled in a serious engagement, but to fall back on Feng-huang-cheng, Zasulitch gave as his reason that he had hoped to defeat the enemy. On May 5 the Japanese began debarking at Pi-tzu-wo, and a small force of all arms under General Zikoff was detached from the southern force in order to reconnoitre and ascertain the importance of this landing. The advance of this column incidentally enabled us to repair temporarily the portion of the line which the enemy had destroyed, and so to run a train-load of mélinite shells, machine-guns, and ammunition through to Port Arthur. The Emperor was fully alive to the danger of the situation caused by the dispersion of the Manchurian Army, and on May 11 telegraphed his orders for an immediate concentration. This was completed by the 14th, and the force was grouped on two points—Hai-cheng and Liao-yang. The former group consisted of twenty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons and sotnias, and eighty guns; the latter of twenty-eight battalions, six sotnias, and eighty-eight guns. The passes over the Fen-shui-ling range were guarded by small columns of infantry with guns, and advance and flank guards were thrown out. The independent cavalry, operating on our flanks east of the passes, was divided in two bodies, under Mischenko and Rennenkampf. West of Liao-yang was a small force under General Kossagovski, while five and a half battalions of the 1st Siberian Division lay at Mukden. At this time also, when the Viceroy returned to Port Arthur (after Admiral Makharoff’s death of April 13), the weakness of the place began to be shown up, and Alexeieff’s apprehensions as to its safety became acute. In a despatch of May 16 he questioned whether the place “would be able to hold out for more than two or three months, in spite of all the steps taken to strengthen its defences.” On April 25 the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff telegraphed to me that, owing to the inadequacy of the garrison, Alexeieff considered it essential that if the fortress were attacked, the field army should support it as energetically and rapidly as possible. Alexeieff was not singular in his pessimistic views, for Stössel also gave up hope of a successful defence of Port Arthur directly after he had so unnecessarily abandoned the Chin-chou position on May 27. On the 28th I received a telegram from him urging me to support him speedily and in strength. This opinion was again endorsed by Alexeieff, who telegraphed on June 5 that “Port Arthur cannot strictly be called a storm-proof fortress, and it is a question whether it can even stand a siege of the length indicated in my telegram of May 16.”

The result of this volte-face on the part of Alexeieff as to the powers of resistance of the place was that he pressed me to send part of the army at once to assist it, though we were by no means ready for such an enterprise. On May 21 he wrote that he considered the moment in every way favourable for the army to assume the offensive in one of two directions—either towards the Ya-lu, with the object of defeating and throwing Kuroki back across the river, detaching a force to contain him there, and then moving on to relieve Port Arthur, or else direct on that place.

It should be borne in mind that these instructions were given at a time when the position of only two of the hostile armies had been fixed. Of these, one—of three divisions and three reserve brigades—had forced the crossing of the Ya-lu, and the other—of three divisions—had landed near Pi-tzu-wo. Moreover, a landing, of the extent of which we had no information, was then being carried out at Ta-ku-shan. Consequently we did not know the destination of one-half of the enemy’s army, and were thus not in possession of two important pieces of knowledge which were necessary before any operations of a decisive character could be undertaken—namely, the position of the enemy’s main forces and their probable plan of operations. It was incumbent on us, therefore, to exercise great caution, and to keep our forces as far as possible concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three armies. Concerning the two directions in which the Viceroy advocated an advance, the following few points suggest themselves. For any operations towards the Ya-lu—bearing in mind the necessity for guarding our flank and rear against one hostile force landing at Pi-tzu-wo, and possibly others landing near Kai-ping or Newchuang—not more than sixty to seventy battalions were available of the ninety-four which in the middle of May constituted the army; the whole of the food for these troops had to be brought up by rail, owing to the exhaustion of the local resources—never very plentiful—in the hilly country between Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng: we had not got the transport to do this, for our ten transport trains could only have carried a three or four days’ supply for a force of this size; the usual May and June rains would have made the movement of our guns and baggage at first difficult, and then impossible, and we had at that time no mountain artillery or pack transport; we were by no means well placed in the matter of artillery parks: the horses for those of the 5th, 6th, and 9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Divisions were still en route to Harbin, while the 1st and 2nd Siberian Divisions had arrived without any. Finally, if Kuroki should fall back behind the Ya-lu without accepting battle, we should have been obliged to retire and leave at least an army corps to contain him. When the rainy season came on, this corps itself would have been obliged to withdraw, as with interrupted communications it would have been seriously threatened by Kuroki’s far larger force, well provided with both mountain artillery and pack transport. For these reasons an offensive towards the Ya-lu was impracticable.

Under the conditions laid down by the Viceroy as to keeping screens on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and leaving a reserve at Hai-cheng[66] until such time as fresh reinforcements had been received, a direct advance on Port Arthur could only be made with one corps of twenty-four battalions. In view of the possibility of Kuroki taking the offensive in superior force (after reinforcement by the troops already beginning to land at Ta-ku-shan) against our cordon, which extended along the Fen-shui-ling range for more than sixty-six miles, and in view of the possibility of the Japanese cutting off any detachment moving on Port Arthur by landing somewhere in its rear, the despatch of this corps 130 miles to the south could not but be considered a most risky and difficult operation.

As our numerical weakness absolutely precluded a general assumption of the offensive on our part, I pointed out that by such a movement for the relief of Port Arthur we risked disorganizing the whole army. I also drew attention to the fact that, according to the report of Captain Gurko, who had just arrived from the fortress, its combatant strength amounted to at least 45,000 men (including sailors), and that the enemy could not therefore have any very overwhelming superiority. My views upon the inexpediency of any movement towards Port Arthur were communicated to the War Minister in my telegrams (Nos. 692 and 701) of May 28 and 30. But in a telegram of the 31st the Viceroy urgently requested me to advance to the relief of the fortress, and expressed the wish that four divisions should be detailed for the operation; while on June 6 he quoted to me a message from St. Petersburg in which it was stated that the time was “ripe for the Manchurian Army to assume the offensive.”

At the end of May the first reinforcements—the 3rd Siberian Division—began to arrive in the concentration area. This enabled me to increase the force detailed for the advance into Kuan-tung up to 32 battalions,[67] 22 squadrons and sotnias, and 100 guns. As a reserve to this force, the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division was placed in the area Kai-ping—Hsiung-yao-cheng, and to a brigade of the 3rd Siberians was allotted the duty of watching the coast from Newchuang to the latter place. To hold Kuroki and the troops under Nodzu that had landed at Ta-ku-shan in check, 40 battalions, 52 sotnias, and 94 guns were left on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), distributed over a length of more than sixty-six miles. The general reserve consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division at Liao-yang, and a brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division at Hai-cheng. Early in June the force detailed under General Shtakelberg for the operations towards Port Arthur began to concentrate at Te-li-ssu, with its advance guard at Wa-fang-tien. On the 13th the Japanese themselves began to advance from Pu-lan-tien, and by the evening of that day we had been able to rail two regiments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division into Te-li-ssu. On the 14th the enemy’s attack of our position there was repulsed, and on the following day Shtakelberg proposed to make a counter attack, having been reinforced at noon by the Tobolsk Regiment. However, the battle ended in our defeat, and we were forced to fall back. General Gerngross, who was in command of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, was wounded, but remained in action. Shtakelberg’s orders gave him freedom of action, but he was instructed not to accept decisive battle if the enemy were in superior numbers. Simultaneously with the enemy’s advance from the south, Kuroki moved forward on the 14th to the Ta Ling[68] (Pass) from Hsiu-yen, where three (according to some reports four) Japanese divisions were concentrated. Their 12th Division and three reserve brigades were left to watch our eastern force, and a further movement on Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, or Hai-cheng was quite likely.

In order to be in a position to check the combined advance of the two Japanese groups, I thought it advisable to strengthen our southern force, and therefore so rearranged our dispositions that 87 out of 110 battalions were massed on the southern front, in the area Kai-ping—Hai-cheng, against Oku and Nogi. Fortunately for us, the critical position of our eastern front during the operations at Te-li-ssu was not appreciated by Kuroki, which fact favoured Count Keller’s demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng in the middle of June. Otherwise Kuroki might have seized Liao-yang. On the 25th the enemy’s advance against our eastern force was commenced. On the 27th Keller withdrew some of his troops from the Fen-shui Ling (Passes) without opposition, and by July 1 the main body was concentrated seven miles east of Lang-tzu-shan and twenty-seven from Liao-yang. On June 27, without any serious engagement, but under pressure from the enemy, we abandoned the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), which they at once occupied. A few days previously—on June 23—about a division of the enemy had been located by Rennenkampf to the east of Sai-ma-chi. Believing that Hai-cheng constituted our greatest danger, as the enemy might, if they gained a success there, cut off Shtakelberg’s force close by, on the 29th I concentrated forty-one battalions and eighteen sotnias under Zasulitch at Hsi-mu-cheng, intending with them to hurl back the enemy on to their Hai-cheng line of advance. However, on the same day we discovered that those of the enemy who had moved at first from the Ta Ling (Pass) along the Hsi-mu-cheng road had again retired to it.

This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the 24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards Hu-chia-tzu.[69]

By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling (Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang, had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho. Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts.

With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should, according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as, in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo) were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications. Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the 17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July 23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the 17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think of at once assuming the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly, but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng. On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was diminished by twenty miles.

On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng. On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu. Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of the fight.

The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles, and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after the July fighting:

1. The Japanese superiority in numbers.

2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport.

3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership.

4. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and

5. The lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance of what we were fighting for).

Every moment gained at the beginning of August was of great importance to us, as the units of the 5th Siberians, which the Viceroy agreed to send to the front—instead of into the Pri-Amur district, as was proposed earlier—should have been beginning to arrive in Liao-yang. Orders were therefore issued to fortify an advanced position half a march from Liao-yang in addition to the main position at that place, and for this time was required. Still, in spite of the obvious and immense importance of every day we gained by delaying the enemy’s advance, General Bilderling, who had taken over the command of our eastern front from July 31, wrote that it was necessary to withdraw his troops immediately without fighting to Liao-yang itself, while Sluchevski urged that the army should be concentrated still further north—in the area Liao-yang–Mukden. These officers reiterated the same opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of moving their troops towards Liao-yang became greatly increased by the heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port Arthur by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stössel’s highly alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist the fortress and make an advance of some sort—though it were only a demonstration—towards Hai-cheng.

On August 25 the enemy again advanced, and on the 26th attacked us on the eastern front, but their onslaught on the 3rd Siberians at Lang-tzu-shan and the attempt made to turn our right flank failed. Ivanoff (who was in command of the corps) handled his artillery most skilfully, and all units of this corps behaved well. The reserves sent up by Bilderling arrived in good time, but the enemy obtained a position on the left of the 10th Corps which enabled them to menace the retirement of this corps along the Tang Ho. In the hot fight on the 26th again several units of the 10th Corps did splendidly. At this time a strong turning movement was discovered being developed against the left flank of our An-shan-chan position; but by delaying and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy on the Lang-tzu-shan and An-ping positions, all the corps were able to fall back on the advanced positions at Liao-yang, where the army was concentrated on August 29. At the beginning of the action there the army was short of its prescribed strength by 350 officers and 14,800 men. Excluding the men detailed for extra duty (on the communications, etc.), the average strength of our companies was only 140 to 150 rifles, and those companies that lost most heavily in the previous fights could muster less than 100.

The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000 rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the 10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of one of two alternatives: either—

1. To contain Kuroki with a small force and advance to the south against Oku and Nodzu; or—

2. To fall back on the main Liao-yang position, leave as few troops as possible to defend it, and then attack in force that portion of Kuroki’s army which was moving round our left, and endeavour to crush it by driving it back on the Tai-tzu Ho, which at that time of the year was unfordable except at a few points.

As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu, they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties, and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division (total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy [this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations led to the adoption of the second alternative.

On the 31st, under cover of darkness and without being pressed, we began the evacuation of the advanced positions, which had already been of value to us, inasmuch as the enemy had been weakened by the losses incurred in attacking them. By the following morning as many as 100 battalions, with artillery and cavalry, had crossed on to the right bank of the river. The Japanese did not occupy our abandoned positions till the evening of that date, when they began to shell Liao-yang. The general disposition of the army was as follows: 56 battalions, 10 sotnias, and 144 guns (under Zarubaeff) were still on the left bank; 30 battalions, 5 sotnias, and 84 guns were on the right for the defence of Liao-yang itself. In addition to the small columns detailed to guard our flanks and rear, the remainder of the army, totalling 93 battalions, 73 squadrons and sotnias, and 352 guns, were told off to attack Kuroki. But in making this calculation as to the number of battalions available, it is essential to explain a very important factor. During the whole period of the war from its commencement till August only 6,000 men had been received at the front as drafts to repair wastage, and, as I have said, we began the fighting round Liao-yang with a shortage of 15,000 men. The result of this, taken in connection with the great number of men that had to be detached for various non-combatant duties, and also our losses in the fighting that had already taken place in the neighbourhood, was that the actual strength of the ninety-three battalions was, on September 1, only from 50,000 to 55,000 rifles. For instance, the twenty-one battalions comprising the 10th Corps (which took part in the affair of September 2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army, on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000 to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot, the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been cleared in the kao-liang crops. The consequence was that, in the early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right. Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the Erh-ta-ho heights.

Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed in a perfect sea of kao-liang, and were fired on from front and flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north, had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day.

Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve, and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass), sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division, and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards. As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of Mukden, which had been already fortified.

As regards the first alternative, it seemed possible that we might, by an immense effort and skilful manœuvring, be able to hold on to Liao-yang and throw Kuroki behind the Tai-tzu Ho. But for this it was essential to draw in the force that had crossed to the right bank, and to deploy it on a fresh line farther to the north, so that we might be able to attack the enemy’s position on the heights near the Yen-tai mines from the north as well as from the west. Such a movement would have exposed our right, and would have isolated the position still held by the 17th Corps on the right bank of the river. The Japanese might drive it in and issue in rear of the troops at Liao-yang, for that place was only eleven miles distant from the position to which the 17th Corps would have had to retire if it were driven back. The defenders of Liao-yang, being then attacked by Oku and Nodzu combined, would be in a critical situation. As regards the second alternative, a retirement on Mukden presented great disadvantages and dangers. It increased the distance to Port Arthur; it would have to be carried out under pressure from the enemy in front and on the left, and the roads had been so much damaged by rain that it was doubtful whether we should succeed in getting our transport or even artillery to Mukden. The abandonment of Liao-yang could not fail both to depress the troops who had so gallantly defended it and encourage the enemy. But, on the other hand, we should be extricated by such a retirement from a situation in which we were threatened in front and flank. A successful withdrawal would also give time for the 1st Army Corps to come up, and, what was not less important, for us to replenish artillery ammunition, of which we were very short. Besides this, the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho were specially unsuited for our troops, as they were almost entirely covered with kao-liang. Our men were unused to this, lost their heads whenever they got into it, and were very liable to panic.

On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed.

A general account of the operations round Liao-yang, and a statement of all the considerations which led to our retirement, were telegraphed to the Emperor on September 11. On the 14th the army was made happy by the following gracious message, which I received from His Majesty: