On the 18th November, the main force moved from Maidan to Bagh, which was considered a better political and strategical centre; and on the 22nd, Sir William Lockhart accompanied thence a force which, under General Westmacott, started on a three days’ reconnaissance to Dwa Toi to explore the approaches to the Bara Valley and to punish the Kuki Khels. In all these expeditions our losses were not light, the rearguard being invariably followed up and harassed; the clans in general, and the Zakha Khel in particular, appeared irreconcilably hostile; and skirmishes and attacks on convoys were of almost daily occurrence. Foraging parties from Mastura camp were also attacked by the Orakzais, but it was evident that the back of the resistance of this tribe had been broken at Dargai, and, indeed, by the 20th November they had accepted our terms and paid their fines in full, both in rifles and in money. The greater part of Afridi Tirah had now been traversed and surveyed; the Chamkannis and westerly Orakzais were visited and punished as mentioned in Chapter XVI., and Sir William Lockhart now resolved to evacuate Tirah and attack the Afridis in their winter settlements near Peshawar.
Heavy baggage was now sent back from Bagh and Mastura to Shinawari, the base was changed from Khushalgarh to Peshawar, and on the 7th December the Maidan and Mastura Valleys were evacuated, the 2nd Brigade of the First Division rejoining its division detailed to march down the Mastura Valley. The Second Division withdrew by the Bara Valley, and experienced some of the heaviest rearguard fighting ever encountered in an Indian frontier campaign.
The march of the First Division was but little opposed throughout. On the 9th the 1st Brigade marched from Haidar Khel into the Waran Valley, destroyed a large number of fortified houses, and also the house of Saiyid Akbar, which had been partially repaired since destroyed by General Kempster’s brigade. In its retirement the Aka Khel and Zakha Khel pressed upon our rearguard, but the losses were not heavy. The remainder of the march down the valley was practically unmolested, and the division was concentrated at Ilmgudar near Peshawar on the 17th November.
General Westmacott’s brigade of the Second Division marched from Bagh on the 7th, through the Shaloba Pass to Dwa Toi, where it was joined on the 9th by General Kempster’s troops, whose march had been delayed, at the outset, by the necessity for destroying the defences of the Kambar Khel and Malikdin Khel, and, during its execution, by the state of the road rendered slippery by rain and congested by the baggage of the advanced brigade. On the 10th, the march of the two brigades was unopposed, but on the 11th, movement and communication were rendered difficult by a thick mist, touch was lost between the two brigades, and the Afridis following up closely, favoured by the mist and abundant cover, inflicted great loss among the transport and followers. Part of the rearguard did not get into camp at all that night, and, seizing some houses, the commander defended his rearguard and a large amount of transport against the attacks of the tribesmen, who kept up a fire all night. On the 12th the Second Division closed up and remained halted. On the 13th the march was resumed, and the tribesmen attacking with great boldness as soon as the rearguard of the rear brigade (General Westmacott’s) left camp, the fighting was continuous throughout the day. The enemy suffered heavily in his attacks on the baggage column and rearguard, but, nothing daunted, came on again and again, making most determined rushes. Firing was incessant throughout the night into the bivouac of Westmacott’s brigade, which encamped where darkness found it, and the brigade was again attacked at daybreak, but the enemy did not on this day follow the column very far or for very long. On the 17th December the two brigades of the Second Division had reached respectively Bara and Mamanai; here they remained for the present guarding the Bara Valley line, while the Peshawar Column and First Division advanced into the Khyber Pass and Bazar Valley.
On the 18th December the Peshawar Column reconnoitred the Khyber Pass as far as Fort Maude; on the 23rd Ali Musjid was occupied; and on the 26th the column marched to Lundi Kotal, finding villages deserted, barracks destroyed, and everywhere damage done to Government property. The Shinwaris living about Lundi Kotal, who had assisted in the early attacks on the Khyber posts, had by now paid up their fines and submitted, and proved their repentance by assisting in picqueting the hills and keeping off Zakha Khel raiders, and even restored some of the property taken away when the serai at Lundi Kotal was looted.
The Bazar Valley, which is one of a series of parallel valleys running almost due east and west, is only about twenty miles long, with an average breadth of between eight and twelve miles from watershed to watershed, and lies at an elevation of 3000 feet. On the north the Alachi Mountains separate it from the Khyber, and on the south the Sur Ghar Range divides it from the Bara Valley. Through the valley the Bazar stream runs almost due east till it joins the Khyber stream at Jabagai. The east end of the valley is narrow, and just before its final debouchure into the Peshawar Plain it contracts into an almost impassable defile. The west end, on the other hand, is comparatively wide and open, and climbs gradually up to the snow-capped range of the Safed Koh, the lower ridges of which form the boundary of the Bazar Valley. The Zakha Khel own this upper portion of the valley. It consists of two main branches, each about two miles broad, enclosing between them an irregular spur. This spur, running out from the main watershed in a series of relatively small hills, ends in an abrupt peak just above China. About two and a half miles east of China the two branch valleys unite, and in the apex of their junction, closing the mouth of the China plain, is an isolated hill known as Khar Ghundai.
Through the circle of mountains to the south-west and west go four main passes—Mangal Bagh and Bukar leading into the Bara Valley, and the Thabai and Sisobi, or Tsatsobi, into Afghanistan. The former give communication to neighbours, the latter form back-doors or “bolt-holes” into Afghanistan, and the existence of these back-doors constitutes the real difficulty of dealing effectively with the Zakha Khels. The “front-door” is over the Alachi Range, crossed by the Chora, Alachi, Bori, and Bazar Passes, and of these the first named is the easiest, but it leads, as has been already stated, through Malikdin Khel territory.
On the 25th the First Division entered the Bazar Valley in two columns from the immediate vicinity of Ali Musjid, where it had concentrated the day previous. The 1st Brigade moved by the Alachi Pass to Karamna, and the 2nd by way of the Chora Pass to Chora; neither was seriously opposed, but the roads were found to be very difficult. On the 26th the 1st Brigade was only able to march as far as Barg, no more than two and a half miles, but a road presenting extraordinary difficulties to the progress of troops and almost impassable to transport. The same day the 2nd Brigade was advancing to China, with its rearguard harassed all the way; it returned next day to Chora, followed up on both flanks, and reached the Khyber on the 28th and Jamrud on the 29th. The 1st Brigade supported, on the 27th, the retirement of the 2nd Brigade from China, moved back to Karamna on the 28th, and on the next day returned to the Khyber, the rearguard, furnished by the Derbyshire Regiment, being persistently followed up nearly to Lala China in the Khyber.
During the latter part of December and beginning of January 1898, the Peshawar column was frequently engaged with the Zakha Khels about Lundi Kotal, and on all sides punitive measures, accompanied by desultory and indecisive fighting, continued as before. Many of the Afridi clans—the Malikdin Khels, Kambar Khels, Sipah and Kamar Khels—had sent in asking for peace, while bewailing the severity of our terms; but the Aka Khels were obdurate, and the Zakha Khels as defiant as at the very commencement of the campaign, their two most recalcitrant maliks, Khwas Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, from the secure haven of Afghanistan, exhorting them to stand firm and to continue to resist.
The last action of the campaign took place at the Shinkamar Pass on the 29th January, when all the four brigades combined to endeavour to surround the Kajurai plain, where the Afridis were reported to be again grazing their cattle. Few of the columns employed experienced any opposition, but one operating from Mamanai, and belonging to General Westmacott’s brigade, when about to retire was hotly engaged by the enemy, and sustained some seventy casualties; these were chiefly among the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 36th Sikhs, the last-named regiment losing a splendid frontier soldier in their commanding officer, Colonel John Haughton.
Before the end of February nearly all the Afridi clans had submitted or were making advances towards a settlement; the Khyber Pass had been reopened to kafilas, but the Zakha Khels evinced no real intention of giving in. On the 17th March, therefore, preparations were made for a spring campaign; Sir William Lockhart returned to Jamrud, fresh transport was distributed among the troops, and one of the brigades of the Second Division made a short advance towards the Bara Valley. The effect upon the Zakha Khels was immediate. By the 3rd April all the clans had definitely submitted and given hostages for fines still due; hostilities then ceased and demobilisation commenced, but for some months regular troops were retained in occupation of the Khyber posts.
By November 1898 the arrangements for the government of the Khyber previously in force were practically re-established.
The total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853 wounded and ten missing.
It was hoped that the settlement effected, coupled with the knowledge the Afridis now possessed that no part of their country was inaccessible to British troops, would have proved satisfactory to both sides; and it was noticed as a favourable sign that the enlistment of Pathans, and especially of Afridis, into the regiments of the Indian Army, had never been brisker than during the months immediately succeeding the close of hostilities. It was hardly to be expected that individual raids and outrages would cease, and had any such expectations been cherished they would have speedily been disappointed; but at any rate for a brief term of years it was not considered necessary to undertake military operations against any of the Afridis. But among these tribesmen the mullahs appear to be specially inimical to the British Government—as they probably would be to any civilised administration—while there is also always present in Afghanistan a faction opposed to British interests, and from this faction disaffected tribesmen can safely reckon upon a large measure of support. In 1904 a number of Afridis visited Kabul—whether by invitation or not is not certain—were accorded a very friendly reception, and seem to have returned determined—especially the Zakha Khel members of the deputation—upon a policy of opposition to the British authorities. During the next four years raids, ever increasing in audacity, were committed on and within our border by the Zakha Khels, culminating on the 28th January, 1908, in a raid carried out by some seventy or eighty men upon the city of Peshawar, whence property valued at a lakh of rupees was carried off, the raiders getting clear away. Tribal allowances were stopped in the endeavour to force the more well-behaved tribesmen to undertake the coercion of the Zakha Khel, but they declared their inability to restrain the clan—and their impotence was recognised—while suggesting to the British authorities the occupation of the Bazar Valley, as the only means of dealing effectively with a situation which was rapidly becoming intolerable, since security of life and property on the Kohat and Peshawar borders was seriously menaced.
By the beginning of 1908 the Government of India saw that military operations must inevitably be undertaken, and proposed that three brigades (one in reserve) should be mobilised in view of an expedition into the Bazar Valley; and on the 13th February Major-General Sir J. Willcocks, who had been appointed to command, moved out from Peshawar.
The three brigades were thus constituted:
The main force, under General Willcocks, left Peshawar on the 13th February, and on the 15th, marching by the Chora Pass, entered the Bazar Valley. The Second Brigade, with some divisional troops, pushed on rapidly through Malikdin Khel country, accompanied by little or no transport and all ranks carrying three days rations on the person, and bivouacked that night near Walai. The latter part of the march was opposed. The First Brigade followed more leisurely, escorting the baggage and supply columns of both brigades, and halted for the night at Chora, sending forward next day the Second Brigade baggage and supplies. On the same day a small column under Colonel Roos-Keppel, political adviser with the force, and composed of a wing of the 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas and the Khyber Rifles, left Lundi Kotal, and, marching by the Bazar Pass, arrived that evening at China. There was no opposition en route, but the camps, both here and at Walai, were subjected to the usual “sniping” after nightfall.
The Walai camp was particularly well chosen; it was well covered, was surrounded by a circle of hills admitting of effective picqueting, had a secure line of communication with Chora, and, commanding as it did the whole valley, was especially well placed for carrying out punitive operations among the Zakha Khels.
From the 17th to the 24th the troops were engaged in destroying towers and defensive enclosures, and in collecting wood and fodder; the columns were always followed up by the enemy, who, however, usually suffered heavily; the whole of the Bazar Valley was visited and important surveys were completed; sniping occurred on most nights; but already by the 23rd the resistance offered was no more than half-hearted, and that afternoon a tolerably representative jirgah came in professing anxiety to effect a settlement. An agreement was rendered difficult by the presence about the Thabai Pass of a gathering of Shinwaris and Mohmands, who had come to offer their services to the Zakha Khels, but these were prevailed upon to withdraw; and after protracted negotiations, lasting from the 25th to the 27th, a satisfactory settlement was arrived at. On the 29th the force withdrew wholly unmolested to the Khyber and Peshawar, the Afridi jirgah having undertaken the punishment of raiders, responsibility for future good behaviour, and restitution, as far as possible, of stolen property.
The casualties in this short and successful campaign amounted to three killed and thirty-seven wounded.