We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.[684] Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution afterwards.[685]

Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than the Persian king.[686] The reports of Persian force and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction again Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic,[687] and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip’s secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war:[688] while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.