“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian,—of extreme rudeness and brutality,—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse,—interrupted me and exclaimed,—‘Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

“To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. ‘You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbor!’ I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—‘Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then,—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.’”

Such is the graphic and impressive description,[1033] given by Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B. C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha[1034]—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.[1035] On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.[1036]

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons with Æschines placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.[1037] None were put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities,—but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians,—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech[1038]—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.[1039] So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—“Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war.” But his predictions were cried down as allusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.[1040] Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;[1041] a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized burst of ill-temper from some rude individual.—Though Æschines had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective. Both the Senate, and the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.[1042]

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens—nor any from Thebes; a fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary, states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried.[1043] The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. “If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons[1044]), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer.” The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

At the autumnal meeting[1045] where this fatal measure of calling in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. Æschines[1046] was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty.[1047] What part Thebes took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.[1048] It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation.[1049] Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

His march from Thermopylæ whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to reëstablish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium,[1050] the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different—or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her coöperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof—he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.[1051]

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about coöperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians—Eubulus—Aristophon—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.[1052] Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.[1053] The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes[1054]) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible.[1055] To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic allies who were now accompanying his march.[1056]

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica.[1057] If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or Agis.[1058]

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—“Who wishes to speak?” Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it again and again; yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. “Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favor—that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip’s partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well-grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honor as well as of policy.”[1059]

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition.[1060] Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.[1061] According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.[1062] Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Bœotia. “If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of war.”[1063]

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the preëstablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;[1064] by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence[1065]—though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any references to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even favorable to Thebes, as being mere exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.[1066]

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them.[1067] The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial coöperation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.[1068]

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendency to Demosthenes, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.[1069] So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.[1070] But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.[1071] As far as we can judge they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia, during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.[1072] To Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of one thousand drachms.[1073] Demosthenes was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.[1074]

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in reoccupying and securing their towns.[1075] Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii[1076] and others, that it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.[1077] These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world.[1078] Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus[1079] had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.[1080] But respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry;[1081] and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Corinthians.[1082] As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts.[1083] The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;[1084] but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization after the continued improvements of his twenty years’ reign—would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.[1085] It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place.[1086] The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.[1087]

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighboring fields.[1088] His numbers are stated by Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known.[1089] We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the war.[1090] All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.[1091] Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference[1092] as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace,[1093] and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes “became out of his mind”[1094] (such is the expression of Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander[1095] here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks,[1096] while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, “Let us pursue them even to Macedonia.”[1097] It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.[1098] Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.[1099]

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip’s improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field;[1100] we may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chæroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.[1101] The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achæan.[1102] But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the Dikastery.[1103] What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Chares—who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenes[1104] also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days’ march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle.[1105] The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,[1106] wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;[1107] enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence.[1108] This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications.[1109] Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment.[1110] Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres[1111]—as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistokles.[1112] The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.[1113] By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defence.[1114]

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Ægean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,[1115] and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea.[1116] Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days’ march from the field of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.[1117] At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.[1118] According to another account, the demeanor of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.[1119] However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip’s power, who put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippizing Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one.[1120] The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus, and Platæa, probably also Thespiæ and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.[1121]

At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers,[1122] who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself.[1123] He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion.[1124] Among them was Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald to the same effect, had been previously refused.[1125] Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.[1126] At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a farther cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions of headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians.[1127] But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It ensured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was prostrated by the battle of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore, that—with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well-played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.