“With the exception of Twist and of my Adjutant Gowan, I have no other officers with pre-war training and experience, but we have been most exceptionally lucky in our temporary officers; for this, I think, I have to thank Ronnie Brook chiefly, and he would, I am sure, be interested to see the account of the operations, should you have it copied.—With all good wishes, yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.

“P.S.—The following coincidence of special interest has come to light. Among material captured by MacDonald on the knoll was a signaller’s telescope, which he gave to his signaller, Sgt. Burgess. The latter at once recognised it as the one he himself lost at Lajj on March 5th last year, when his horse was shot and he had to abandon his gun.”

Letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., 3rd May 1918.

“For the last fortnight we have been operating with the other Brigade in place of Col. Bridge’s Regiment, which is engaged on an independent mission....

“The Regiment has seen some smart fighting, including two charges, in the past week, and the outstanding feature of the operations, which has been very successful, and of which I am sending an account to B.P. [Sir Robert Baden-Powell], has been a gallant and brilliant charge by a troop of the 13th under MacDonald, a Scotch lad who joined us about 6 months ago.

“It is a matter of greatest pride, mingled with pleasant surprise to me, how they continue to roll up with these first-rate performances, once the opportunity presents itself, and I only hope I may never let them down.”

Extract from letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 7th Cavalry Brigade, M.E.F., 25th May 1918.

“After writing to you on the third of this month we continued our drive northwards for a matter of about 60 miles, the Turks pursuing their usual tactics—i.e., holding us up at strong positions with their big guns until dark enabled them to get away their valuable papers and other important stuff. In this way we made them evacuate the country as far north as Altum Kupri.

“I do not hesitate to give names now, as I see Reuter has published the message from Candler, the correspondent, in almost the identical words that I gave him—he was messing with us during that period—which is within striking distance, not more than 70 miles, of Mosul, the big Turkish base.

“Owing to the difficulties of transport we had been on half rations, but we got most glorious grazing for the horses in most places, so they did not suffer much until we struck the Jebel Hamrin with its brackish water and no grazing. Right up there the climate was really good, and we could work all day, though, of course, it was hottish, and on one or two nights we got wet through, for, of course, we had no tents. But in this case also, as soon as we struck the Jebel Hamrin on our return, the sun became very powerful and the sand-flies very bad.

“However, the operations were very interesting, although the Regiment had no opportunity of doing more than ordinary work, because Johnny Turk declined to come to grips; but as the Brigade put it: ‘You did just what I wanted you to, I could not ask you to do more,’ I don’t think we had any cause to grumble....

“When I wrote you from Mendali, in October, that we were short of food, I referred only to mess stores and extras; rations have always been good, especially when we were within measurable distance of the railway, when we got most excellent frozen beef. Indeed, I expect we are being much better fed than you poor people.”

Extract from Lance-Corporal Bowie’s Diary.

“Fate decreed that we were not to finish this tournament, as on the following morning we were ordered out to take part in operations again. This was the 18th of April, and we had to leave camp some few hours later than ordered; owing to the extremely bad weather and the high floods having broken the pontoon bridge over the river, it was impossible to cross the Tigris till midday. Heavy rain continued to fall throughout the day, which made the going very difficult, and we finally arrived at Baqubah at about 8 P.M., where we picketed down for the night. Our transport arrived in at 9.15 P.M. Every one being so thoroughly wet through, and the weather being so bitterly cold, a rum issue was ordered, after which we were fortunately able to obtain shelter for the night in a rest-camp near by. Owing to the heavy rains which had fallen the column did not march for Abu-Jisrah until 10.30 A.M. the following morning, and after some very heavy going we made that place at about 3.30 P.M. Our transport experienced great difficulty in getting along, and did not arrive until some two hours later. The heavy rains continued throughout the night. The following morning, April 20th, it was found impossible to move in consequence of the exceedingly heavy rains, which continued till 2 P.M., and made the ground a perfect quagmire, and absolutely impossible for wheels, the men during these two days having a most uncomfortable time owing to the impossibility of erecting any sort of shelter. An incident worthy of note here was an impromptu football match, played amid a perfect sea of mud, in which the ball not infrequently became imbedded, whilst the rain poured down in torrents. All this, however, did not deter the players, who, after a most strenuous game, did obtain some little warmth from this exercise. At 11.30 A.M. on the morning of the 21st instant we continued our march to Sharaban, where we arrived about 4 P.M. Here we joined up with the 6th Cavalry Brigade, who were in bivouac there. During the next two days we remained in bivouac, whilst we endeavoured to free ourselves of some of the mud with which every one was plastered, grazing our horses meanwhile. Here also our squadrons were arranged to conform with the formation of the 6th Brigade; each squadron was to consist of three sabre troops and one Hotchkiss-gun troop. On the morning of April 24th the Regiment paraded at 9.30 A.M., but owing to heavy rain falling again we did not move off until 11 A.M., when we marched at the head of the Brigade crossing the Cutthroat and Auction Bridges; we halted at Ruz for a short time, and marching on again we crossed the Table Mountain Bridge over the Diala river at 1.30 P.M. Here we watered and fed our horses, afterwards moving off again with the 22nd Native Cavalry, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Young. We marched on to Abu-Haiar, arriving there about 5.30 P.M., and bivouacking for the night. The following morning at 11 A.M. we marched to Ain-Lailah, which we reached at 3.30 P.M. We bivouacked that night about 1½ miles south of the Pass. The Column commenced marching through the Pass at 3 A.M. the following morning, but the Regiment being Rear Guard did not march through till 7.30 A.M., and then proceeding on to the Nahrin river, where we watered and fed our horses. Resuming our march till 11 A.M., we joined the remainder of the Column, who were in bivouac at 12.15 P.M. Here one troop proceeded to reconnoitre the road over which we were to make a night march the same night, after which they returned to bivouac at dusk. Marching again at midnight, the Column proceeded to Tel-Sharia, arriving at about 4.45 A.M. The road was very difficult to find in many places, and the nullahs which we had to cross were very deep, many being almost full of water, owing to the recent heavy rains. After our patrols had located the enemy at dawn the Column moved forward some 2 miles and halted till 6.30 A.M., when the Regiment was ordered to advance another mile and halt. At 9 A.M. we received the order to advance on to the Kulawand position: accompanied by our armoured cars and some Lewis guns mounted on Ford cars, we proceeded to attack it at the west end. We experienced great difficulty in gaining the position, not through an enemy resistance, which strangely enough was not offered, but through the water-logged condition of the country and the very deep nullahs, and owing to this our armoured cars and Ford cars were unable to continue the advance. On us eventually gaining the position we found it to be unoccupied. The enemy, having retired during the night, were located by our airmen a little later, who reported them to be holding a position on the Tuz-Kifri road, close up to the foot of the hills. Although we had no support within 20 miles of us, it was decided to attack them at once. Having worked our way up to some large Moards [? mounds] some 1¾ miles from their main position, we took cover here to give [? save] our horses. Some few minutes later we drew our swords and trotted into the plain where the 10 squadrons were formed into an extended line in the formation of a scythe. As we rode on at this pace parties of the Turks started running down the road, while other groups took up positions in the rough ground and water-cuts, or kneeling in the high corn opened fire on us. Here the Turks showed some of their old spirit in the stand they made, but the sudden flash of our swords in the sun which made a wide arc of light seemed to take the heart out of them, and their fire was wild and high, and our casualties few. Our artillery kept up a creeping barrage on the village as we attacked, and our line maintaining this pace until within some 500 yards of the enemy, when we lowered our swords and charged into them. Our aeroplanes which took part in the action flew very low and increased the enemy’s confusion with bombs and machine-gun fire. Over 150 Turks were killed and 538 prisoners were taken, also 2 mountain-guns, very few of them escaping in the hills. Meanwhile Kifri-ain-Faris and Chanan-Keurri had been occupied by our other columns without opposition, and our movements were so rapid that 2 battalions of the enemy had to take to the hills in order to escape the net we were spreading for them. We afterwards heard that this force had been robbed and disarmed by the Kurds, who never lose an opportunity of revenging themselves on the Turk, and even those who escaped us in the Kulawand charge returned and surrendered to us rather than face these tribesmen. After sending back our prisoners we moved forward to reconnoitre Tuz, and we soon came under some very heavy accurate gun-fire until about 4 P.M., when orders were received to withdraw. We then moved back some ten miles and bivouacked behind our line of outposts for the night. At 6 A.M. the following morning ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons were sent to reconnoitre Tuz, the Brigade following some half an hour later, while the 21st Cavalry were despatched to find a ford over the river Aqsu at Khasradalah. ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons soon came under fire from Tuz and suffered some casualties. Meanwhile the remainder moved on to Khasradalah in an endeavour to surround Tuz, but were held up by enemy machine-guns in position on the banks of the Aqsu river; and the armoured cars being unable to advance along the Kifri-Tuz road, no farther advance was possible. We halted here for the night after having crossed the river, while ‘C’ Squadron and a section of the Machine-Gun Squadron were thrown forward on each side of the track; ‘B’ Squadron, having all the horses, were some 1500 yards in rear down by the river. Intermittent firing was carried on throughout the night. At 4.30 A.M. we stood to arms and saddled up, receiving word that our 2 Infantry columns would advance at dawn, one column advancing up the right bank of the river, and the other up the left bank, the latter with the object of taking the Heights of the Naffdach, east of Tuz. The enemy had been reinforced during the night by a battalion from Tauq, and was holding a front of 7 miles, stretching from Yanhah-Buyuk to Tuz-Khurmatli, and at Tuz they held a position covering the road and extending over the hills. At daybreak the Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘C’ Squadron opened fire from the trenches on the right bank of the river, and soon came under some pretty accurate shell-fire. Shortly after this B Battery, of the 66th Brigade R.F.A., galloped up beside them and opened up a heavy fire on the enemy’s position at about 6 A.M., the Infantry having deployed for the 2 main attacks on Tanijah from the south-west, and on Tuz from the south. We were ordered to withdraw and make a detour to the west. We circled behind the battery to join up with the 21st and 22nd Cavalry and get across the Tuz-Tauq road to cut off the Turks, who were already falling back before our Infantry, who were advancing with steadiness under machine-gun and artillery fire, right up to the guns which were in action until they were within two hundred yards of them. Meanwhile we were held up for a time by a nest of machine-guns some 1200 yards away on a small knoll. Two troops of the ‘B’ Squadron, under Lt. MacDonald, were ordered out as a scout line. They led off to the left of the knoll, and having got in line with it, wheeled sharply to the right and charged the position in the rear and the flank, all the enemy except two throwing up their hands to escape being cut down. The taking of this knoll opened the way across the plain, and we continued to advance, charging bodies of Turks here and there, either killing them or taking them prisoners. The largest body we found was between the Tauq road and the hills, and these put up some resistance for a time until charged from two sides by us and the 22nd Cavalry, the 21st Cavalry having wheeled towards Tuz to deal with other bodies, who at that time were shelling ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons, commanded by Captain Godfree. A number of the enemy made their way over the hills and were harassed by our fire. Soon after this the fire of the enemy died away, and by 9.30 A.M. all opposition had collapsed, the whole position having fallen to us inside 4 hours with a very slight loss. 1200 prisoners were taken, 25 machine-guns, and 12 field-guns that were in the position. The action having passed, we rested for some time where we were, and on ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons rejoining us in the afternoon we went into bivouac opposite Tuz at about 3 P.M. We remained in bivouac here for five days, during which we rested and grazed our horses. Whilst here, our Brigade Commander received the following wire from General Egerton: ‘Many congratulations to troops. Please convey my thanks to General Caley and General Hollen-Prior for their good work, and that of their officers and men. Cavalry charge must have been magnificent. Please accept my repeated appreciation of the performances of all ranks under your command.’ On the 5th May we moved off at the head of the Brigade at 8 A.M., and after crossing the bridge of the Tauq-Chai at about 5 P.M., we bivouacked for the night some 2 miles north-west of it. We moved off again at 8.30 A.M. the following morning in the direction of Taza, when shortly after our aeroplanes reported that the enemy had evacuated their position there. On receiving this information we were ordered to advance to catch the retreating enemy at the village of Taza-Kharatli. On arriving here at 11.30 A.M., after crossing the Oazah Chia on the Kirkuk road, we found the village unoccupied. Making a short halt here we moved off again at 1.45 P.M., marching on to Kirkuk. The armoured cars, after having been towed through the river, had preceded us along the Kirkuk road. At about 3.39 P.M., nearing Balban, we came under some shell-fire at long range, this we avoided by making a detour to the east. After sending out patrols, who were met by a very heavy fire, we galloped forward and dismounted for action against the enemy holding the trenches just outside Kirkuk. Finding the enemy so strongly entrenched, we were unable to advance, but hotly engaged them until dusk, when we were ordered to withdraw and form an outpost line about 3 miles from the town. This we did about 7 P.M., when a heavy storm broke out and very heavy rains continued to fall throughout the night, which, combined with the intense cold, made rest for us that night an impossibility. (The following names appeared on the Order for the day for gallantry in action: Capt. J. A. Jeffrey, Capt. A. M. Sassoon, Lt. J. J. Crystall, and R.S.M. Seekins, all being awarded the M.C.) Our outpost line was formed near Balban, on a track running east and west. The night was fairly quiet, except for several loud explosions which occurred in and near Kirkuk. The morning found the ground more or less a quagmire, and at 6.30 A.M. we received orders to advance on the town. ‘A’ Squadron moved off at 8 A.M., followed by the Regiment and the 21st Cavalry some half an hour later. No resistance was encountered, and at 10.30 A.M. the Regiment entered the town, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons, under Capt. Godfree, moving on to the high ground covering the north of the town. Several large hospitals were found here, one containing 358 patients, the population being in a starved condition. There were also several corpses of Turkish soldiers horribly mutilated. This was said to have been done by Arabs to avenge the raping of their women-folk. The whole place was in a filthy condition. At 3 P.M. the Column moved out of Kirkuk and bivouacked near Taziyan, some 3 miles down the Taza road, a heavy storm breaking over us just as we were pegging down our horses. Meanwhile ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons were sent forward to some hills some 4 miles north of the town to harass the retreating enemy, and to protect our own main body from attack. These two squadrons, after successfully hastening the enemy’s retreat, reconnoitred the road to Yarvali, rejoining the Column in bivouac about 5 P.M., bringing with them 2 prisoners. The Column remained in bivouac the following day, and at 12.30 A.M. we received orders to send 2 squadrons to reconnoitre the northern road to Alton-Kupri as far as Sakizli, ‘B’ and ‘D’ Squadrons doing this commanded by Capt. Godfree. They were also accompanied by a Company of the R.E.’s for the purpose of destroying enemy shell-dumps which were known to be in the vicinity. Two such dumps were located and destroyed near the village of Daraman, and at Sakizli 7 large motor-lorries with engines destroyed were found. These contained 2 mountain-guns, 2 machine-guns, and a large quantity of shell ammunition of various sizes. At 5 P.M. orders were received by heliograph to proceed to Yarvali and search it for any documents the enemy may have left. Arriving there about 8 P.M., we discovered a number of documents, and also several aeroplane engines and drums of petrol, and a quantity of shell ammunition. It being necessary to destroy this material, the wing returned and bivouacked at 11 P.M. The Column rested, and we grazed our horses all the following day, and at 6 A.M. on the 10th May we marched on Alton-Kupri with the intention of driving the enemy over the Lesser Zab river and destroying the bridge there. We were preceded by 2 of our armoured cars, who at about 11.15 A.M. were held up by the enemy, who were in position on Guk-Tappah Hill, while the road was shelled by the enemy’s batteries in Alton-Kupri. The armoured cars succeeded in driving the enemy from Guk-Tappah, but were quite unable to advance farther owing to a deep canal which cut the road at this point. After observations had been made from Guk-Tappah, the Regiment received orders to make an encircling movement to the right, whilst the 21st Cavalry did the same to the left. The 22nd Cavalry advancing in the centre succeeded, by covered approaches, in getting within 2 miles of the village which was on the farther side of the river. The Regiment experienced considerable difficulty in advancing, owing to a considerable number of very deep nullahs, which were full of water at the time. The village was hidden from view by the high ground on this side of the river. We advanced by wings ‘A’ and ‘B’ leading in extended order. After advancing about 1 mile we were heavily shelled by mountain-guns, 14 pounders and 4.53, and considerable rifle and machine-gun fire was opened on us by enemy Infantry who were holding a series of trenches and rifle-pits on this side of the river. The Regiment immediately dismounted for action. The Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘A’ Squadron moving forward opened a very effective fire which was well supported by our batteries. This proved too much for the enemy, who retired to their second line of defence. On this side the Hotchkiss-gun troop of ‘D’ Squadron advanced about 1000 yards with ‘C’ Hotchkiss-gun troop in support. Meanwhile ‘B’ Squadron were endeavouring to get down to the river bank, but were unsuccessful owing to the heavy rains and accurate firing of the enemy’s batteries who were dug in on the opposite bank. We continued to engage the enemy until about 6 P.M., when orders were received to withdraw to Daraman. During our retirement the enemy shelled us with increased violence, and we sustained several casualties, but luckily the number was small in comparison with the terrific fire we were subjected to. One troop of ‘A’ Squadron was left near Guk-Tappah as escort to our casualties, whilst we continued our march back till 10.45 P.M., when we bivouacked for the night. Orders were received the next morning to return to Kirkuk. We did not move off until 2 P.M., and arrived at our previous bivouac near Kirkuk at about 6 P.M. The following morning a strong patrol left bivouac at 7 A.M. to reconnoitre a vast stretch of unexplored country between Taza and Telabw-Shahanah, whilst the remainder of the Regiment, moving off some half an hour later marched to Taza, some 9 miles distant, where they went into bivouac. It was whilst here that a small, but nevertheless fierce, caste riot broke out among the Indians who had the handling of our transport. This necessitated the whole of the Regiment having to turn out fully armed before it could be quelled. At 5.30 A.M. the following morning, 13th May, the Regiment commenced to march to Cemetery, where we were to join the 7th Cavalry Brigade again. To reach the above place we now had to cross some hitherto unexplored country, and so far not having received any reports from our patrol which had left us the previous day to reconnoitre this part of the country, we had to proceed with caution. Halting at about 10 A.M. to water and feed our horses, we moved off again at 11.30 A.M. Meanwhile our patrols had completed their reconnaissance, and got into communication with us by helio, sending us a message to the effect that an enemy column were rapidly disappearing into the hills. The Regiment not being strong enough to intercept them, the patrol was recalled and we continued our march, arriving at Cemetery, and joined the 7th Cavalry Brigade at 8 P.M., after marching some 50 miles. Resting till 4 P.M. the following afternoon, we moved through the Pass to Ain Nakhailah, some 4 miles distant, bivouacking about 1 mile south of the salt springs there. The following morning we continued our march on to Daur, which was some 20 miles over a waterless desert. This proved a very trying time for us, the little water which we were able to obtain before leaving the springs being very brackish and salty, which, combined with the intense [heat?], produced a thirst which was well-nigh unendurable. These arduous marches, coming on the top of our very recent hard fighting, tested our endurance to the utmost, several of our men falling out of their saddles from sheer weakness from want of food and rest. The sight of the river Tigris had a noticeable and stimulating effect on both man and horse, and on reaching the river both were jostling each other in their frantic efforts to quench their burning thirst. On bivouacking here many of us took the opportunity of having a much-needed dip in the river. Our way now lay alongside the river, and owing to the condition of both men and horses, it was decided to finish our march by easy stages. Accordingly, at 4.30 A.M. the following morning we trekked to Samarah, a distance of 12 miles, and bivouacked some 2 miles north of the town. Moving off at the same time the following morning to avoid the intense noonday heat, we marched a farther 13 miles and bivouacked at Khan Mifraji at 10.30 A.M. We trekked on to Akab, a distance of 15 miles, the following morning, crossing the pontoon bridge over the river Adhaim, and bivouacked about a mile distant on the other side. The morning after this, commencing at 5 A.M., we did another 17 miles on to Ktuwair, and went into bivouac there at about 12 noon. From here we moved off at 4.30 A.M. and marched to Baqubah, another 16 miles distant, where we arrived at about 11.30 A.M. Trekking a farther 12 miles the following day, we bivouacked at Conningham’s Post at 10.30 A.M.; the following day, the 22nd May, we again moved off at 4.30 A.M., and covered the remaining 16 miles to our summer camp at Chaldari, where we arrived at about 11 A.M., our strength on marching in being 19 officers, 315 other ranks, and 445 horses. On the morrow the following was published in Regimental Orders: ‘The Commanding Officer wishes to take the opportunity of expressing his keen appreciation of the conduct of all ranks during the recent operations on the north-eastern front which have so successfully attained their object. During the course of these operations the Regiment has encountered, apart from the enemy, many hardships and difficulties, and it is the cheery spirit in which these hardships have been met, and the constant courage with which these difficulties have been overcome, that have elicited once more the Commanding Officer’s admiration and pride.’

“The same day the General ordered that our horses were to have three weeks’ rest. On the 25th May the following extract from a letter to our Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. J. J. Richardson, from our Colonel-in-Chief, Lt.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell: ‘I was delighted to see so many of the Regiment mentioned in despatches the other day, and I want to offer my best congratulations and good wishes to Twist, Steele, Barrett, Gowan, and Williams, and also to the N.C.O.’s and men who gained distinction. It is a great delight to us all at home to know that the Regiment has done so well.’

“The following extract also appeared in the same orders. Extract from Order of the Day, No. 105, dated 18/5/18: ‘Awarded the M.C. Lt. H. MacDonald. Awarded the M.M. Sgt. J. Cunningham, L.-Cpl. Kitcher, and Pte. Owen.’ Two days later after this we received the news that Pte. Owen had died from his wounds.”

CHAPTER XXI.
THE AUTUMN OF 1918—LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS—CLOSE OF THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

The summer of 1918 having come to an end, the British army in Mesopotamia prepared for another advance.

The general aspect of the Great War had by that time undergone a sudden and promising change, for the Germans had failed in their fierce offensive against the Allies on the Western Front, Austria had shattered herself against their lines in Northern Italy, and Bulgaria was firmly held by the Salonika force, while in Asia the exhaustion of the Turks was now very evident. They had completely failed to stop General Allenby’s victorious advance in Palestine and Syria, and were hastily withdrawing troops from the Persian frontier and the Caucasus. In Mesopotamia they were still trying to show a bold front, but it seemed clear that they were no longer in strength sufficient to withstand a determined attack by the large and eager British army opposed to them.

“This, then,” says General Marshall, “seemed the moment to take the offensive against the Turkish 6th Army, covering the approaches to Mosul, and it was with great pleasure that on the 7th October I received orders to carry out this movement.”

The main body of the enemy’s troops, now reduced from long fighting and other causes to about 9000 men with 59 guns, held a formidable position astride the Tigris, at the Fatha Gorge—some thirty-five miles above the British railhead at Tekrit. The position had been thoroughly prepared for defence during the past eighteen months, and was of great natural strength. The Turkish right flank rested securely on two ranges of rugged hills which projected into the waterless desert, and therefore could not be turned by slow-moving Infantry. Their left extended for about five miles along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin, and was strongly entrenched.

To attack such a position by direct advance up the Tigris was a difficult matter, and General Marshall would have preferred to move his main force by way of Kirkuk in the north-east, but this was impossible. A large part of his transport had been taken away by the operations in Northern Persia and the necessity for collecting the harvest, so that there was not enough to subsist a large body of troops at such a distance from the railway. The only available route for the main force, therefore, was the line of the Tigris, by which supplies could be pushed up, and this was perforce the one selected. Even so there was only transport enough to make mobile his Cavalry and half his Infantry.

The plan adopted was to work up the eastern bank of the river and turn or force the enemy’s left. If that could be done, the intention was to cut his line of retreat on Mosul by means of Cavalry working round his left, and light-armoured motor-cars moving round his right through the desert. A small column was sent up towards Kirkuk under Brigadier-General Lewin to keep off any attack upon the British right.

But the reduction of the Turkish position proved to be an easier task than any one had expected. On the night of the 23rd October, when all was ready for the general attack on the Fatha Gorge, a British column pushed along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin against the enemy’s left, while the 7th Cavalry Brigade, to which the Thirteenth had now returned, moved round the north of the range. “The vigorous action of these two columns,” says General Marshall, “caused the Turks to abandon the very strong Fatha position before daylight,” and to retreat up-stream.

Then followed some days of manœuvring and fighting, the Infantry pressing steadily upon the retreating Turks in spite of great difficulties, for the enemy had destroyed the road through the hills on both banks of the river, and a Brigade of Cavalry under General Cassels trying to work round into the enemy’s rear. In this attempt the Cavalry were successful. Moving wide of the Tigris, they rode right round the enemy’s left, and on the 26th October, coming back to the river, they struck a ford opposite Hadraniya, fifteen miles above Shergat, the point where the Turks intended to make their real stand. This movement was masked by the other Brigade, the 7th, under Brigadier-General Norton, who demonstrated on the line of the Tigris.

The Hadraniya ford was a bad one, for it crossed three channels of the river, one of which was nearly five feet deep, with a strong current; but Cassels got his regiments over, and, directly he had done so, sent one of them at a gallop to seize an important gorge five miles down stream, between him and the Turks, who were retreating upon him. By the morning of the 27th October the bulk of the Brigade had taken up a strong position blocking the road to Mosul, and it had been joined by the light motor-cars, which had got round through the desert.

It was a daring move, for Cassels had only three weak regiments of Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery, while below him was the retreating Turkish force, and above him to the north an unknown number of Turkish reinforcements from Mosul coming down to join it. But this was the one chance of capturing the main body of the enemy, and the Brigade meant to hold its position at all costs until supported.

For the next two days, the 27th and 28th October, Cassels was in serious danger, for though to conceal his weakness he boldly attacked, he was soon attacked himself from the south by a very superior force of Infantry and guns, which made repeated attempts to break through, while the Turkish reinforcements from Mosul moved against his rear. But though hard pressed he managed to hold his ground, and on the afternoon and evening of the second day support began to arrive. First came a battalion of Infantry which had made a forced march of thirty-three miles from the eastward, and then after dark the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which after a march of forty-three miles crossed the Tigris by the difficult Hadraniya Ford. In doing so they lost several men and horses drowned, but their arrival made all the difference. Cassels was now too strong to be easily overwhelmed.

Still the position was critical, for the main body of the Turks, though retreating, had not been beaten, and the British troops were nearly worn out. The Infantry “had been marching and fighting for four days under most arduous conditions,” while Cassels and his own Cavalry Brigade had been continuously in action for seventy-two hours, and all the force now at his disposal had made long marches. But if the Turkish force was to be held, there must be no rest for the troops, in spite of exhaustion and darkness, for the enemy saw that he was trapped, and would be sure to fight desperately for freedom.

He certainly did so. During the night of the 28th he tried again and again to break out northwards, and though he did not succeed, he fought on all through the 29th, and all through the night that followed; and some of his counter-attacks against the British Infantry who were pressing him from the south were by no means easily stopped. It was a splendid defence, and rightly called forth the admiration of his assailants.

The end of the battle may best be told in General Marshall’s words:—

“Meanwhile a serious threat from Turkish reinforcements (5th Division troops) moving down from the Mosul direction developed against Cassels’ right flank. These troops established themselves with guns and machine-guns on the high bluffs near Hadraniya, but were promptly dealt with by the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The Thirteenth Hussars galloped across the open, dismounted under the bluffs, and, led by their Colonel, carried the position by assault, many Turks being accounted for with the bayonet.

“Mounted pursuit by the remainder of the 7th Cavalry Brigade cleared away further menace from the north, and resulted in the capture of 1000 prisoners, with 2 guns and 12 machine-guns.

“The enemy’s avenues of escape northwards were now effectively blocked, thanks to the skilful and resolute handling of his detachment by General Cassels, and the firm determination of his troops, who repulsed every attempt by the enemy to break through.

“Gripped as in a vice, with his men packed in ravines which were raked by our guns from across the Tigris, Ismail Hakki, the Turkish Commander, found himself in a hopeless position. All attempts to break through had failed, communication with the Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Mosul had been rendered impossible, and no relief was in sight. At dawn on October 30th, just as our troops were about to renew the attack, white flags appeared all along the Turkish lines, and later on Ismail Hakki surrendered in person.”

So ended the last battle fought in the Great War by a Turkish army. It had been gallantly contested, but the victory was as complete as a victory could be. The Turkish 6th Army had been not only defeated but captured.

Immediately after the surrender, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars pushed rapidly along the Mosul road and made a considerable addition to the number of prisoners. The 14th (Indian) Lancers, charging with the lance, captured a convoy and 500 men, while the 13th Lancers captured a Turkish battalion. Altogether the Turks lost on the 30th October over 11,000 prisoners and 51 guns, besides great quantities of machine-guns, animals, and military material of all kinds.

By the first of November both Cavalry Brigades had got within twelve miles of Mosul, when they were met by a flag of truce informing them that an armistice had been concluded between Great Britain and Turkey. Hostilities ceased, and the long campaign in Mesopotamia had closed with a dramatic success.

At Shergat, as elsewhere, the bulk of the close fighting had of course been done by the Infantry, but General Marshall reported that “the daring and brilliant leadership of the Cavalry Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Cassels and Norton contributed largely to the final result,” and it may safely be affirmed that no Regiment in those Brigades had more right to be proud of its share in the work than the Thirteenth Hussars.

The extracts appended give details of its movements during the last period of the campaign, and especially of the affair at “Richardson’s Bluff,” as the scene of the fight at Hadraniya came to be called.

Account by General Norton, commanding 7th Brigade.

“The Brigade left Fathah at one o’clock on the night of the 27th-28th October, crossed the Lesser Zab at about 8 A.M., and reached the Hadrani-Yah Ford over the Tigris at 4.30 P.M. on the 28th, having marched about 50 miles since 1 A.M., the last 30 under a very hot sun, and about 70 miles in the last 36 hours.

“The leading Regiment (13th Lancers) immediately commenced to cross to the right bank, and got over without accident, but as the ford was a difficult one, there was considerable delay, and, by the time it came to the turn of the 13th Hussars, it was practically dark. The ford, which had been difficult in daylight, became positively dangerous after dusk, and a number of men, particularly those leading pack-horses, got into difficulties, and were carried down-stream. Hampered as they were by their ammunition and other equipment, their situation was a very precarious one, but most of them fortunately managed to scramble out on one bank or the other.

“When the roll was eventually called, it was found that three men, viz.:—

and two horses, were missing. With the exception of Private Newman, whose dead body was found by the Infantry several days later some distance down-stream, no trace of these men has ever been found.

“In the whole Brigade, 21 men were carried away by the strong current, and drowned while crossing this ford.

“Only three squadrons of the Regiment crossed on this night, the remaining squadron (‘A’ Squadron, under Lieutenant H. C. D. FitzGibbon, M.C.) being ordered to remain on the left bank as escort to the Battery, which could not be got across in the dark.

“The Brigade, less the battery, this squadron, and the 13th D.C. Lancers, bivouacked on the river bank; the 13th Lancers, as soon as they were across, had been sent forward to support the right of the 11th Brigade, which was occupying a ridge of hills S.W. of the ford, parallel to the river, and about 3000 yards away from it.

“The night passed without incident, although there was a considerable amount of firing from the position occupied by the 11th Brigade and the 13th D.C. Lancers.

“Before daybreak on the 29th, the Brigade was moved into a covered position under the river bank, and orders were issued for the battery and the remaining squadron of the 13th Hussars to cross to the right bank as soon as there was sufficient daylight.

“The moment the squadron commenced to cross, the Turks shelled the ford heavily and accurately from 2 guns on high ground about 3000 yards to the N.W.

“The squadron managed to get across, fortunately without casualties, but it was obviously impossible for the battery to do so until the hostile fire had been subdued.

“About 7 A.M., V Battery, R.H.A., came into action on the left bank, and the Turks shortly afterwards withdrew their guns.

“About this time a squadron of the 13th D.C. Lancers, which had been ordered to push up the Mosul road at daybreak, encountered heavy shell and M.G. fire, and was compelled to fall back to the Cemetery, where it held its own with difficulty.

“It was clear now that the enemy were holding the high ground to the N.W. in considerable force, and did not consist, as reported by aero reconnaissances, of merely a few scattered groups of Infantry.

“Their position was on a range of hills approximately parallel to the river, and at about 3000 yards from it. At the southern extremity of this range was a high bluff, which will be referred to as Hadraniyah Bluff. Farther to the south again was the range held by the 11th Brigade and 13th D.C. Lancers, and between Hadraniyah Bluff and the river, and some 1000 yards to the S.E. of the former, was a fair-sized isolated hill on which was a Mahomedan cemetery.

“After a personal reconnaissance of the position, so far as was possible, the Brigadier at 8.15 A.M. issued orders for the 13th Hussars, supported by the 24th Jat Lancers, and covered by the fire of V Battery, R.H.A., from across the river, and the Vickers guns, a subsection of which was now in action on the Cemetery Hill, to gallop across the open from their covered position near the river, dismount under the Bluff, and carry the position by a dismounted attack.

“It should be explained that the contour of the hill made it obvious, that unless the Turks came out of their trenches, which were none too well sited, and advanced a short distance down the hill, there must be a considerable amount of dead ground at the foot of the slope, which would give cover to the horses, and enable the troops to form for the dismounted attack. It was hoped that the gun-fire would make it impossible for the Turks to leave their trenches for the purpose of covering this dead ground.

“On debouching from their covered position on the river bank, in accordance with the above orders, the leading squadron at once came under a hot fire from the Turkish machine-guns on the hill, and the squadron leader (Captain Evans, 21st Lancers) fell severely wounded.

“This caused the squadron to lose its direction: it inclined slightly to its left, and halted under the cover of Cemetery Hill.

“The remaining squadrons followed it, and eventually the whole Regiment was concentrated behind this hill.

“By this time, it was clear that the guns had not yet succeeded in subduing the Turkish fire, and the further prosecution of the attack was held up to allow a further artillery preparation.

“Brigade Headquarters was now on Cemetery Hill, and the F.O.O. of the Battery was also established there with his signallers.

“About this time—viz., 10 A.M.—a Field Battery, No. A/33, R.F.A., having crossed the ford, was placed at the disposal of the Brigadier, and came into action some 2000 yards to the S.E. of Cemetery Hill.

“At 12.30 P.M. the Brigadier personally gave orders to Lieut.-Colonel Richardson to renew the attack on the Bluff at 1.20 P.M., and detailed arrangements were made for the attack to be closely supported by both Batteries and all available Vickers guns.

“In accordance with these orders, the Regiment, in column of wings with extended files, debouched from under cover of Cemetery Hill, and galloped straight for the Bluff. The ground was flat and open, the only obstacle being a rather deep dry nullah about half-way, which caused a little crowding and delay. The moment the leading squadron debouched, the Turks opened a heavy fire with all their machine-guns, but the accurate fire of our two batteries and the Vickers guns made it impossible for them to leave their trenches, and the squadrons soon got into the dead ground under the Bluff.

“During this phase of the attack, although these galloping squadrons were absolutely exposed for at least 500 yards to the fire of 12 machine-guns and 1000 Infantry, at ranges from 1500 to 500 yards, not a single man was hit, and only one or two horses.

“Had the Turks put down a machine-gun barrage on some point, such as the afore-mentioned nullah, and kept it there, our casualties must have been considerable; but they were evidently disconcerted by the heavy shelling, and there appeared to be no central control, each machine-gunner firing as he pleased.

“Having reached the foot of the Bluff, the Hussars lost no time in dismounting and forming for attack. Having fixed bayonets, they swarmed up the almost precipitous hill, gallantly led by their Commanding Officer.

“All this time, both batteries, using ‘gun-fire,’ were bursting their shells with beautiful accuracy along the crest of the Hill, and the Vickers guns were also keeping up a heavy fire on the trenches.

“This barrage did not lift until the Hussars were within a few yards of the crest, and there is no doubt that the splendid accuracy and rapidity of fire of these guns was a most important factor in making the attack the success it was.

“From Brigade Headquarters on Cemetery Hill, it was clear that the Turks in the trenches, having seen the squadrons moving towards them at a gallop, and being unable to see what was happening at the foot of the hill, were becoming anxious. Individual men and small parties could be seen getting out of the advanced trenches and moving to the rear, many being caught by the barrage as they did so.

“As the barrage lifted, the Hussars, still led by their Colonel, charged over the crest, shot or bayoneted such Turks as still confronted them in the trenches, and then rapidly forming line to the right, swept along the crest to deal with the Turks who were still holding their position at the north end of the hill.

“As soon as the Hussars’ attack had gained the crest, the 13th D.C. and 14th Jat Lancers quickly mounted, and galloped round to the west and north, captured the enemy’s two guns, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry retiring before the attack of the 13th Hussars.

“Seeing their retreat entirely cut off, the whole Turkish force surrendered.

“In this successful operation, 2 mountain-guns, 12 machine-guns, and 982 unwounded prisoners were taken, and there was a considerable number of Turkish dead and wounded on the hill.

“This enemy force consisted of the whole of the 13th Regiment which had been sent from the 5th Division in Persia to reinforce the army of Haqi Bey.”

Extract from Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell.

“7th Cavalry Brigade,
In Camp outside Mosul,
4th Nov. 1918.

“My dear General,—I must send you a line to tell you of another fine performance by the Regiment—a performance which our Brigadier (Gen. Charles Norton), the Commanding Officers of the other Regiments of the Brigade, and other eye-witnesses describe to me as the finest thing they have ever seen. I myself agree that not only as a spectacle but in its complete and immediate success it is the finest performance put up by the Regiment during the war, but as a test of discipline and tenacity I would place Lajj first: there we were on the verge of annihilation, and yet managed to put up a fighting front to the enemy; here it is true we were foiled in our first attempt, but the sqdns. reached cover in perfect order, and the failure of the early morning only made them the keener to score in the afternoon. I enclose a copy of the dry sober account of the day, which I made in my note-book two days after the occurrence, so I will only give you here a brief outline of the events which led up to our being where we were, and of the few days after the 29th which led us to the occupation of Mosul.

“Since an armistice, in the nature of a complete military surrender by Turkey, has been arranged and signed, I hardly suppose that the censor will seriously object to numbers of Brigades and Divisions being given, but I will not risk more deletion than is necessary for the tale.

“Well, the original objective was the reduction of the Fathah position—a very strong natural position formed by the passage of the Tigris through the range of hills known on the left bank as the Jebel Hamrin and on the right bank as Jebel Makhul—about thirty miles N. of Tekrit, held on both banks by some 3000 rifles and 40 guns. Two Cavalry Bgds., ours and Cassels’, had made a long turning movement over the Hamrin, and were in position to the N. and N.E. of the Turkish position by dawn of day, and our feelings were rather mixed when we learnt about 8 A.M. that Johnny Turk had evacuated the position a day or two earlier, and retired mostly along the main road to Mosul on the right bank, which ran through a series of strong natural defensive positions against which the Infantry could make only slow progress against the Turk, who is a past-master in the art of rearguard fighting: so obstinate was he in holding on to a position opposite the confluence of the Lesser Zab river with the Tigris that we were hurried one night to the Fathah Gorge, which we bridged with a pontoon, to go up the right bank and create a diversion in favour of our Infantry; on arriving at Fathah, however, the position had changed—the Turk had retired, and we were no longer required on the right bank; but in the meantime Cassels’ Bgde. had crossed the Tigris some twenty-five miles north of the Lesser Zab, and had taken up a position astride the line of retreat of the Turks, and reinforcements to the latter were said to be closing on Cassels’ rear, so after a few hours’ halt we were hurried back to the Zab and beyond it to the ford, which we reached at dusk on the 28th, having covered 40 miles since 1 A.M. that day. The ford was deep and unmarked; I was riding my biggest horse, and the water was over my knees; on many men it was up to the waist, and we were unfortunate in losing three men, of whom no trace could be found in the dark.

“The events of the 29th I have described in the attached account. The Bgde. that night (29th) bivouacked on its fighting ground, and next morning moved S.W. to a position on Cassels’ right, where about 10 a.m. we learnt that the Turks caught between the Infantry and Cassels had surrendered: we therefore turned our heads northward, and about 2.30 P.M. came up with the Turkish rearguard, who surrendered after a few rounds from the battery, and the 13th Lancers pursuing brought back a lot more, making the total captures of the Bgde. up to about 2500 for the two days.

“Next day we continued our advance northward toward Mosul, but about 11 A.M. met Turkish envoys in a car, who came to tell us that an armistice had been signed.

“We have been on half rations or less for many days, and hardly get a scrap of outside news, but these days must be fraught with intense interest and excitement at home, and these details must in comparison fade into insignificance; but, hereafter, they will be of interest to all concerned with the Regiment, so I will not labour at further excuses for writing.”

Enclosure in Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, of the 4th November 1918.

“The Storming of the Cliff and Plateau near Hadraniyah, afterwards called (in Brigade Orders) Richardson’s Bluff, by the Thirteenth Hussars, on the 29th October 1918.