“The night of the 28th-29th passed rather cheerlessly, most of the men having got wet to the waist, and in many cases their blankets and warm coats also having been soaked in fording the river the previous evening, and before dawn we moved down under cover of the river bank, where we were practically immune from the shell-fire which was opened on us soon after daylight and continued until about 7 A.M. About this time I received orders to gallop the Regiment and get a footing on a plateau rising almost sheer from the plain, on which several emplacements could be seen. I asked for and got the co-operation of V Battery, which put a strong barrage on the plateau from 8 A.M. to 8.15 A.M., at which hour we emerged from the river bank, supported on either flank by a subsection of 18 M.G.’s, commanded respectively by Lt. Noel and Lt. Foley. The following is a rough sketch showing disposition of Regiment and ground to be covered.

“As the Regiment reached the open, the four squadrons took up a diamond formation—‘B’ Squadron under Capt. Evans, 21st Lancers, leading, ‘C’ on left flank, ‘D’ on right flank, and ‘A’ Squadron (Lt. Fitzgibbon) bringing up the rear. I rode in the centre, and on either flank were the Hotchkiss guns of two squadrons co-operating with the subsection of machine-guns—i.e., ‘B’ and ‘D’ on right, under Lt. Parkes, and ‘A’ and ‘C’ on left, under Lt. Hartigan, M.C.

“As soon as the Regiment came into sight in the open a very hot fire from M.G.’s, rifles, and camel guns (9-pounders) was opened on it, and when about 1000 yds. from its objective, Capt. Evans was very seriously wounded, and the troop leaders of the Leading Squadron led their troops to the cover of the Cemetery Hill, where the remainder of the Regiment quickly concentrated. I quite agreed with their action at the time, and looking back two days afterwards with the knowledge gained since, I am convinced that it was the right course to take. The crest of the plateau was very much more strongly held than had ever been anticipated, and sufficient time had not been allowed for the artillery barrage.

“We occupied the Cemetery Hill and tried to gain ground to the west, but the glacis was quite bare and exposed to M.G. fire from the plateau and from trenches to the west. The Brigadier visited us about 11.30 A.M., and I suggested to him that we should try again to get the hill if the artillery would plaster the plateau and the known trenches until we had gained a footing on the crest. This they did with great effect at intervals until 1.30 P.M., at which time I led the Regiment from the cover of Cemetery Hill in two waves, ‘A’ and ‘D’ Squadrons (Mr Fitzgibbon and Capt. Jeffrey, M.C.) in the first, and ‘C’ (Mr Norton) and ‘B’ (Capt. Howey) in the second under Capt. Godfree.

“The first wave reached the foot of the bluff with only one casualty, a man whose horse fell in jumping a deepish nullah which lay across part of our course—dismounted to climb the almost precipitous cliff-side, the footing on which was made the worse by the loose rolling gravel surface; how the men scaled that cliff carrying their Hotchkiss guns and ammunition-bags will always remain a marvel to me.

“Meantime the second wave had reached the hill, also without casualties, and taken position on the right of the first. As we appeared on the crest fire broke on us from all sides, but the moral of the Turks had been so severely shaken by the Artillery that our casualties were very slight, and by bringing our right forward we were soon able to bring enfilade fire on the trenches to our front, and about 1.45 the first white flag was hoisted. The other trenches did not take long to follow their example, and in less than half an hour after leaving Cemetery Hill we were in complete possession of the plateau, and prisoners, whose numbers eventually mounted to 722, were being marched in batches from every side to a central spot. A few undoubtedly escaped, but the Indian Cavalry Regiments took up the pursuit and brought back 200 or 300 and a camel gun. The booty in arms was very large, at least 20 machine-guns and several thousands of rounds being taken.

“Our casualties were one, Sergt. Holloway, killed, and the following N.C.O.’s and men wounded—viz., Sergt. Barnard, Cpls. Vinall and Hill, Ptes. Little, Patrick, and Tranter (Cpl. Vinall has since died of wounds).

“Sergt. Leeman had been killed with the following wounded whilst we were on Cemetery Hill: 2nd Lt. Russell, Ptes. Powell, Gerrard, and Winter.

“Pte. Harvey was wounded by shell-fire at the ford early in the morning, and the following were drowned whilst crossing the river on the previous evening—viz., L.-Cpl. Bartlett, Ptes. Newman and Donoghue.

“It transpired later that the Turkish troops opposed to us on the Bluff were the three Battns. of the 13th Regiment who had recently come down from Lake Urmia to reinforce the troops on the Fathah position, and that they were preparing to attack the ford at 4 P.M. that afternoon, when our assault destroyed their plans.

“The fight was short and sharp and the victory complete; we owed our almost complete immunity from loss to the excellent shooting of V Battery and A 337, and it was, I must admit, some consolation to know that the troops which brought off the coup were all British.”

Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Mosul, 12th November 1918.

“My dear General,—Herewith the sketch (from memory) of the position assaulted by the Regiment on October 29th and the numbers of the Regiment taking part in the assault; these were omitted from my letter of last week; I hope before we leave these parts to get a proper surveyed sketch of the position,—for the purposes of history.

“We heard to-day that the Armistice with the Huns had been signed and commenced yesterday, as we take it that this is tantamount to a surrender which is practically unconditional on their part. I hope it may not be long before we say good-bye to this God-forgotten country.—Yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.

“The numbers of the squadrons:—

Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Zacho, 75 miles N. of Mosul, 30th November 1918.

“My dear General,—Just a line in continuation of my letter of the 12th to tell you that we have been given the following Immediate Rewards in recognition of our work on the 29th October, viz.:—

“A batch of honours of which any Regiment may well be proud, as I think you will agree; and indeed we are all very proud of them, and myself not the least proud!

“We were pushed off here with 2 guns of V Battery and a subsection of M.G. at short notice on Monday last to stop reported rioting by retiring Turks and to see them over the border, which is only some 7 or 8 miles from here, and we did the 75 miles in 31 hours. The Turks had heard of our coming and quitted—very wisely; we are well in the hills here in a pretty valley, and snow-covered hills are less than 50 miles away. Rather a change from the Baghdad temperature of July!

“On the 26th we heard that the M.M. had been awarded to Sergt. W. H. Burgess and L.-Cpl. Lomas: these I gather are the outcome of the last despatch.—With all good wishes, yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. J. Richardson.”

Letter from Lance-Corporal George Costello (56799) of 15th Squadron M.G.C., 7th Cavalry Brigade, to Mr and Mrs Wallace—parents of James Wallace.

M.E.F.,
14th November 1918.

“Dear Mr and Mrs Wallace,—It is with a sad heart, and with the deepest sympathy, that I write to you of Jim’s presumed death. Jim and I were staunch friends together ever since we were in France, and shared one another’s hardships and joys all the way through. Some time back ‘A’ Section was split up; Jim went to ‘C’ and I to ‘B,’ so at the actual time of crossing the river (Tigris) we were apart, as my section was about one hundred yards in front. From 12 midnight the night previous to crossing, we had been marching, and crossed at 6.30 P.M. the following evening, and during that period we had covered a distance of 57 miles, which was a pretty stiff march, and men and horses were feeling a bit done up. When we got in the water some of the horses were restless and started plunging and rearing. This is what happened to Jim: I learnt it from men who were near him at the time. His horse reared and Jim came off. The current of the river was very swift at the time, and it was also dark. We have lost four men in the squadron in the same way, and nothing has been heard of any of them since. The next morning we got into action! The 13th Hussars formed line and charged up a hill at the Turks. The hill was too steep to get up, so when they got half-way up they did a dismounted action, and within a quarter of an hour the Turks on the top of the hill showed the white flag, and over one thousand surrendered; by late in the afternoon the 7th Cavalry Brigade had beat the whole of that force, capturing nearly three thousand prisoners. The finest piece of work the Brigade has done during the war. I am sure poor Jim would have delighted in it. We then proceeded on towards Mosul, and came in contact with, and captured, two hundred and fifty reinforcements with 7 machine-guns and some big guns. Towards the evening, with one Regiment of Indians (14th Lancers) and one section of 16th Squadron M.G.C., we overtook and captured between two and three miles of convoy and thirteen hundred prisoners. We are now in Mosul. When about 20 miles from Mosul an aeroplane dropped a message which said that the Turks had surrendered Mosul, and that hostilities with Turkey had ceased. Jim has left behind him a memory which one can never forget. Loved and respected by all who knew him, as he was always ready to offer his help and sympathy to any one in trouble. And you have cause to be proud of having had a son who kept up the traditions of a Britisher to its highest level, and was a true and noble soldier to the core. You might please write to Mr Justice Eve and let him know, as I am sure that Jim would wish it, as he held his late squadron leader, Capt. Eve, 13th Hussars, in the highest esteem, and I know that a short time ago Jim wrote to Mr Justice Eve thanking him for the photo. I hope that Jim’s brother who was wounded has quite recovered by now. Well, bear up, and try and look on it for the best, as I know that all your trouble has come in a heap lately. I unfortunately lost my mother in an air-raid since I have been out here.—From Jim’s old Chum, 56799, George Costello.

“P.S.—If I should gather any information I will write and let you know at once.

“56799 L.-Cpl. Costello,
15th Squadron M.G.C.,
7th Cav. Brigade,
Mesopotamia.”

Extracts from letter from Private E. Cleary (6759 “B” Squadron) to Miss E. FitzPatrick of Accrington, Lancashire.

“Mesopotamia,
25th November 1918.

“Dear Lizzie,—I don’t know how to start answering your letters—I have received that many from you for the last 4 days; they all came of a rush, the reason of it was they were in the country, and could not reach us on account of the shortage of transport....

“Well, we had some hard fighting for about a fortnight, but we managed to get round them and capture the lot; we were very lucky, for they nearly captured us instead, but we managed to get a good mounted charge in on them, and that was the turning-point of our last battle out here. Our Regt. alone captured 1300 prisoners, but it was a good job they did surrender to us, for they could have wiped out every man of us if we fought on, because our Regt. was not near up to strength: we lost a good many. It was hard lines on them, for it was our last fight; they surrendered Mosul to us the next day, and a good job too, for we were about done; we went 2 and 3 days at a time with no rations except a pound of dry flour per man, and you may know what a big feed one can get out of a pound of flour (I don’t think), and that flour was ground barley. You would laugh to see us cooking it: we used to get a bit of tin, make a fire under it, then mix the flour up with some water into a dough, then roll it out into little flat cakes and put it on a tin and bake it, so you may know what nice bread it was (I don’t think), but still I was glad of it; they kept us going all right, and even now, although we are in Mosul, all we are living on is what we buy off the inhabitants, but of course everything will come right again as soon as we get settled down a bit. We were within 15 miles of Mosul when word came through that they had surrendered the place, so we stopped where we were until next day, and then news came through that Turkey had packed up altogether; it was taken very quietly, every one was that fed up, not even a cheer was given. Then we marched into the City and took over all that was there: they had plenty of stuff—food, guns, and men: it seemed so strange we were fighting them a few hours before, and then all that was to be seen was our officers and their officers shaking hands and making much of one another; but it wasn’t so in the case of the men—if our fellows had their way they would have been scrapping them, for we haven’t forgotten some of the tricks they done to our fellows; but still, thank God! it is all over. Well, we had been in Mosul for about a week when the news came through of Germany packing up: even that was taken very quietly, for it was raining as hard as it could, and we didn’t have a bit of shelter, so the only remarks that were passed was, it’s a bloody good job it’s over; so that is how we enjoyed the good news: of course every one was delighted but didn’t show it. Well, Lizzie, you will think I have gone mad on the war, so I will change the subject. I don’t know if you have heard much about Mosul or not; well, it is supposed to be one of the great Sacred Cities out here—they say it’s mentioned several times in the Bible (but as I don’t know much about the Bible I cannot say); it is much the same as Baghdad, but a little more up to date: there is a couple of Catholic Chapels here; of course all Armenians are Catholics, and besides, there is some French here too, but give me one corner of Accrington and they can keep all this country. Just outside Mosul is the ruins of Ninevah, the great city in olden days that was swallowed up by the great earthquake: it is a big mound now, but there is big holes made in it that a man can crawl through, and you can see the ruins of the City beneath: I have been in them many a time, for we find Guards on it every day; so that is how we pass the time away going through it. If you ask one of the Priests they may be able to tell you about it (but I shall be glad to see the back of it). The climate up here is just like England—in fact it feels colder to me: it has rained ever since we’ve been here, and I can tell you it’s none too comfortable, for all we’ve got is one blanket and no other shelter of any kind. Well, Lizzie, it’s time now I came to thank you for all the trouble I have put you to; first of all, I don’t know how to thank you for getting me that Roll of Honour, as you say it is a nice thing, but the reason I wanted it mostly was because I had a good few mates who were on there. God rest them! Mr Rolfe was my Troop Officer, he led us in the charge, and the Turk that killed him was also killed by one of our fellows, so that was one consolation; if you look on there you will see Private Stones’ name; he came from Whally. Pte. M‘Nulty came from Birkenhead, Pte. Cole from Halifax, and Tpr. Spicer from Dublin: he was only about 18 years old. I shall tell you all about them when I go to see you at No. 41. It was very kind of Mr Eve for writing such a nice letter; his son was a nice fellow and a fine leader. I seen him get killed, he was shot right through the head. It was good of you getting them framed. Again I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Now I must thank you for sending Xmas card, and above all, I was most delighted at getting poor Dan’s Memory Card. God rest his soul. It’s the only thing that grieves me, is he did not live so as to have the pleasure of meeting him again. I was always looking forward to having a good time with him if both of us had the luck, but as you say God knows best.”

Extracts from letter from Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon, Thirteenth Hussars.

“Field.

“My dear Olive,—Well, my goodness, a lot of things have happened since my last letter to you. Peace! what an extraordinary word: it is hard to believe the whole thing is over. I will try and tell you all since my last letter.

“The Brigade was in its summer camp, just a few miles north of Baghdad, when I got back from leave. You remember I sent you a word saying we were going out once more. The idea was to take the Fahta position. The Turkish forces were then holding the gorge where the Tigris runs through the Jebel Hamrin. It was supposed, and is, a very strong position, with a desert on one side and a range of hills on the other. He, however, did not hold all the passes, enabling us (the Cavalry) to get over and behind his position. We night-marched round, and at dawn attacked, but to find he did not like the look of the thing and had gone in the night. We next met him on a rather strong position he had taken up on the Lesser Zab. He held us up there for about three days, and started to retreat on Mosul. We, or rather Cassels and his Brigade (with the 7th Hussars) were rather too quick for him, and had got between him and Mosul, dug themselves in, and held them up. A most gallant performance. We were then hurried up to reinforce him as he was not strong enough for the job, and would undoubtedly have failed had we not come up. Two days after we had the lot prisoners, about 10,000. My Regiment had rather a fine chance. About 900 Turks were holding a fairly strong position on some hills with a very large field of fire in front of them. We got Archies to clear up that position. The only way to do it was mounted at the gallop over the open and dismount under the crest of the hills. We formed up in two lines, Jeffrey’s and my squadrons in the first line and the other two in the rear, and off we went. Those who saw it said it was as fine a show as they had ever seen. The line was as good as on parade. We crossed the open at full gallop, dismounted under the crest, fixed bayonets, and before you could say knife had a good footing on the crest. The whole thing was so quick that the Turk was rather taken unawares, and we had cleared up the whole position and taken the lot in no time. My squadron at the time, the same as the others, was only sixty strong—that is to say, about 40 dismounted men. The Colonel led the first line himself, and got a bar to his D.S.O. for it—not bad!!!

“After that we were hurried up the Mosul road. We took another 1800 prisoners, reached a place called Hammam Ali about 15 miles south of Mosul, and for the first time heard of the Turkish Armistice. I then had a rather interesting time, as I went into Mosul with General Cassels to interview the Turkish Commander. It was rather a unique experience, the whole thing in French. To cut a long story short, they were obliged by the terms to evacuate the Mosul Villayat. We marched into the town, a very dirty but rather interesting place. A lot of people speak French. We were camped outside with very few tents and a very wet and cold climate, and no warm clothes to put on. The Regiment was then detailed to send a squadron up to a place on the border called Zakho, about 80 miles north of Mosul, to keep order, and here I am Lord and Master of my little Kingdom.

“It is rather funny being so far away from everybody, but rather nice in a way. I have got two officers with me, Stirling and Hartigan. The first you know of, and the other, also, is one of the best. We are living for the first time for 2½ years in a house, not a bad one at all, and even my men have got them into a large building, so on the whole we are rather comfy. It is very pretty; the village is in a beautifully fertile valley, with high snow-capped mountains in front of me. Plenty to eat and lovely water to drink, and so good for one!!! and I am the Lord and Master of the district. We are well out of Mesopot, and well into Kurdistan. Kurdish is an extraordinary language, but quite a lot of people speak French. Their dress is quite pretty, in a way rather like the Dutch with big trousers. The day before I left Mosul, news came in that Germany had thrown in. It was early in the morning, we were in a very small tent; I was shaving at the time: it was received with great calm and indifference. News came in later the same day that owing to the rain carts could not get up to us, and we were put on half rations. Less indifference was shown to this bit of news.

“I can’t send this letter for a day or two, so will go on with it to-morrow. Me voila encore une fois!...

“It is extraordinary to think war is over! though I am afraid it will be a long time before they let us all go. What a lot of mothers and wives must be thankful. I suppose the sights at home must have been wonderful.

“I had a very interesting time yesterday. The mine only just started is full of coal, and if worked with method I should say worth any amount of money. The tribes in the hills are the most extraordinary thing in the world: they know no law, and obey no master but the chief of their tribe. Every man is armed with a rifle, and a modern one at that. Their villages are in such places that only a goat can get at them, so they can laugh at the whole world in general. The chief I had lunch with is a well-known brigand who robs everybody who passes anywhere near him.

“I had rather a funny complaint last night: A man came round most beautifully dressed, started off with a long-winded speech about the British and how just they were, &c., ending up by saying that the headman’s servants had found his wife in the bazaar and soundly beaten her, and did the British allow that sort of thing?”

The Thirteenth Hussars’ Charge at Hadraniyah, by an Eye-Witness.

“It can be given to few to watch from a vantage-point, in near vicinity, a spirited cavalry charge. All cavalrymen live for the day when they may take part in this most exhilarating of all the movements of war, and next to being a participator is the privilege of seeing a charge take place.

“At midday on October 29th, 1918, the situation near Hadraniyah was critical—to the south, Cassels’ Brigade was still engaged delaying the retreat of Haqui Bey’s Army; linked with him 2½ miles to the north, Norton’s Brigade had, since dawn, been opposing the advance of the reinforcements that were hurrying to the Turkish Commander’s assistance.

“Almost due west of Hadraniyah Ford, in crossing which at nightfall on the 28th the Brigade had lost twenty men drowned, stands ‘Richardson’s Bluff.’ This Bluff is the culminating point of the ridge which forms the old bank of the Tigris; it lies some 2000 yards from the present river bank, and rises almost precipitously from the plain to the height of some 150 feet. Just to the south of the Bluff there is a re-entrant in the ridge, sweeping round which the latter continues to the south, at first at a lower elevation, but gradually rising till it reaches Huwaish Gorge, along the edge of which was Cassels’ position. The plain between the Bluff and the river is as flat as the palm of the hand, save for two mounds to the south and south-east, on the nearer of which, some 900 yards distant, is a Mahommedan cemetery. At dawn the reconnoitring squadron of the 13th Lancers had been driven back by gun and machine-gun fire from the Bluff, and had taken cover on Cemetery Hill.

“At 8.15 A.M. the Thirteenth Hussars had endeavoured to gallop the Bluff, but owing to the leading Squadron Commander, Captain Evans, having fallen severely wounded, his squadron had lost direction and, inclining to the left, had arrived at Cemetery Hill and relieved the squadron of the 13th Lancers, and there it was joined by the remainder of the Regiment.

“Shortly after this the left was prolonged by the 14th Lancers, who were disposed so as to intercept a junction between the enemy that were opposing the 7th Brigade and those that were engaged with Cassels.

“In support, in rear of the centre of our position, the 13th Lancers were placed, while on the farther bank of the river, 3000 yards to the east, was V Battery, R.H.A., in action against the enemy guns. At 10 A.M., having forded the river, 337 A Battery, R.F.A., came into action in our support, from about 2000 yards to the south of Cemetery Hill. The combined fire of the two batteries soon silenced the enemy guns, and General Norton, realising that the Bluff was the vital point, decided to make a further attempt to wrest it from the enemy.

“It was evident by this time that the hostile force on the Bluff was considerably stronger than had been previously reported. Our position on the lower ground was very precarious, and a successful decisive attack by the Turks would have driven us into the open, rolled up Cassels’ flank, and taken him in the rear. The terrain prevented an accurate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position being made. It remained for General Norton to take the responsibility of ordering a direct attack to be made on the Bluff, supported by the guns.

“Orders were issued, the Thirteenth Hussars concentrated on their right, while both batteries heavily shelled the enemy’s position.

“The concentration of the Thirteenth Hussars was evidently seen by the enemy, and occasioned a heavy outburst of fire, which revealed the fact that they were in possession of more machine-guns than up to then had been calculated. In consequence of this General Norton ordered the attack to be postponed while further artillery preparation took place.

“At 12.45 P.M. the General decided that further delay would be dangerous, and that the effort must be made. Our helio winked a message to the batteries that the Thirteenth Hussars were to attack at 1.20 P.M.; and that they were to increase their rates of fire. Both batteries redoubled their efforts—admirably directed by Lt. Sutton (V Battery, R.H.A.), both ranging and fuses being beautifully accurate; they plastered the Bluff with H.E. and shrapnel. A slight delay in the arrangements made it impossible for the attack to take place till 1.30 P.M. In the interval the Thirteenth Hussars quietly formed up in column of wings under cover of Cemetery Hill.

“As the zero time approached urgent messages came from Major Greenshields, commanding V Battery, that his ammunition was running low. It was an anxious moment: on the crest of Cemetery Hill the Brigade Headquarters Staff lay, taking what cover they could behind the gravestones—down below the Hussars were quietly falling in, resolute but serious, as all knew that much depended on the coming assault, while its result was in the hands of the gods—on our left the 13th and 14th Lancers were ready to ‘Mount’ and ‘Pursue,’ if the attack was successful, or extricate their comrades if it was a reverse.

“On the Bluff was a veritable inferno—the H.E. bursting in black clouds, the shrapnel in fleece-like puffs, both hurling death on the doomed Turks—one continuous and awful roar swept the threatened area.

“Deafened by the noise and rendered dizzy by the concussion, Turks in the advanced trenches on the crest of the hill could be seen getting up and running in a drunken manner to the rear; some caught by bullets while en route, fell; others disappeared in the burst of an H.E. shell, and nothing remained when the black cloud cleared away.

“And then the Hussars advanced; it was a glorious sight—the first line led by their gallant Colonel, in perfect order, as if one on a drill parade, swept round the edge of Cemetery Hill—the pace increased—on they went with a loud inspiring cheer. Then equally steady followed the second line.

“The enemy’s machine-guns rattled furiously—ours replied viciously—on, on went the Hussars—then to our horror we saw a check, and we realised that, straight across the front of the Hussars, between them and the Bluff, ran a nullah.

“What is going to happen? Is it too wide? Can they cross it? Another Omdurman or Shabkadr? were among the agonising thoughts that flashed through our minds.

“A little crowding—a horse down—then a cheer rose to our lips as we saw the Colonel thread his way across, and then, on his heels, scrambling, hustling, thrusting, scarcely checking, the first line crossed and went on.

“By this time the onlookers on the Cemetery Hill were mad with excitement, and quite oblivious of the bullets still whistling over them, they were standing up wildly cheering on the gallant Hussars. Now they had reached the foot of the Bluff—so close was it to us that we could distinguish individuals.

“Off they get—fix bayonets—up the hill they scrambled, with their Colonel still at their head; the barrage lifts beautifully in time—and the Hussars clear the crest and, spreading like a fan, on they go. A machine-gun is rushed—then a Hussar was seen to fall—bayonet work begins....

“‘By God, they are counter-attacking!’ bursts from the Brigade Major’s lips, as a party of Turks drive back a troop of the Hussars; but, steady as rocks, the Hussars meet the new attack—a few shots, and then the bayonet. On our left there is a thunder of hoofs—a host of lance-pennons dotted o’er the countryside shows the 13th and 14th Lancers are hurrying forward in support, lance in rest ready for the pursuit. This is the final act in the drama, and then all sobriety is forgotten; our helmets fly in the air as we cheer and cheer again, as on all sides white flags of surrender are raised by the defeated Turks.

“From every direction, in a few minutes, small bodies of the enemy, marshalled by the gallant Hussars, can be seen marching in—and the affair was over.

“It was with a choke in the throat that, a few minutes later, we shook hands with the gallant ‘Jimmy,’ and congratulated him on his splendid success, and ourselves on having been privileged to watch and in some way partake of it.”

Transport fording the Tigris, 1918. Major A. Cooke, Q.M.

“On October 31st, the transport, which had been left at Huwaish on the left bank of the river Tigris, received orders to march at 6 A.M. and join the Brigade at Quayirah.

“After marching about 4 miles the ford was reached—apparently the one described in Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall’s despatch of 11th April 1919, by which the 11th Cavalry Brigade, under Br.-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., D.S.O., had crossed.

“Two channels of the river had to be crossed before reaching the main stream. Entering the latter, the ford followed a narrow ledge in mid-river (the water here was about 4½ feet deep) which ran for a distance of about 500 yards up-stream; it then turned to the left through fairly shallow water to the right bank. To the right of the ledge the water was at least 5½ feet deep, to the left flowed the rapid and deep main stream of the Tigris.

“If a vehicle got off the ledge into the deeper water on the right, it was extremely difficult to get the animals to start again; but if they got off to the left there was little or no hope of recovery.

“The crossing was commenced, taking about 15 yards interval between vehicles. Soon there came a check; the animals of one waggon, tired of pulling against the rush of ice-cold water, came to a standstill. The next waggon tried to pass to the right, but got into the deeper water, and stayed there until extra animals could be hitched in—this, in itself, proving a most difficult task.

“The column was again got moving, but several similar stops occurred, until a limbered waggon and a water-cart of the 14th Lancers got off the ledge to the left and were lost, two of the four drivers and all the mules being drowned.

“All the transport of the Regiment, except the mess-carts, crossed without trouble; these, being very light, had great difficulty in stemming the swift current, and one was carried off the ledge and swept down-stream.

“The driver of this cart was Pte. Harding, a good old soldier who was mentioned in despatches during the South African War for great gallantry (‘Regimental History,’ volume ii. pp. 129 and 207). He was accompanied in the cart by an Indian cook.

“Every one who saw them carried away thought they were certainly lost. Harding, however, kept his head, and, whilst being floated down the river at a great pace, sat and handled his reins as though he were driving along a hard road. The horse swam with the stream, the well-laden cart floated evenly on the water, and the whole lot went down-stream for about 800 yards before coming to a standstill. While in deep water, Harding gradually steered towards the bank, and at length guided the horse to where he could just scrape his feet along the shingly bottom, and come to a halt, standing.

“The horse was dead-beat, and it was feared that they would again be carried away by the rush of water, when an Indian Artillery driver rode into the river and reached the cart-horse’s head. By seizing the rein and assisting and encouraging the horse, he eventually got it to shallower water, where aid was forthcoming to get the cart ashore.

“It was a most daring and gallant feat on the part of the Indian driver, and his conduct was brought to the notice of the Army Commander. Private Harding received the cheers and congratulations of all assembled there, and was recommended for a reward.

“This may not appear very exciting in print, but when it is remembered that the Tigris is about 300 yards wide, with such a volume of water rushing down that no communication by shouting is possible, except at very short distances, and that men and animals were struggling and drowning at the time, the writer thinks that all who read this account will agree that fording the Tigris with the transport afforded not the least of the many thrilling incidents of the closing days of the war.”

CHAPTER XXII.
SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN. THE SHARE IN IT OF THE THIRTEENTH HUSSARS.

The bearing of the campaign in Mesopotamia upon the issues of the Great War has already been examined in the course of the narrative; but at the risk of some repetition it seems desirable to sum up here the achievements of the British in this part of the world, and to see what effect they had upon the general situation.

No one was in a better position to give a correct view of the subject in a few words than the Commander who had the thoroughly deserved good fortune to complete the overthrow of the Turks and the conquest of the country. General Marshall, in his despatch of the 1st February 1919, writes as follows:—

“The campaign in Mesopotamia has lasted just four years. From small beginnings, when Fort Fao was captured on November 6th, 1914, the ration strength of the force when Mosul was occupied had grown to some 420,000, including labour battalions.

“The area of territory of the Turkish Empire which has been conquered and occupied amounts to 114,000 square miles. The sphere of operations has included Trans-Caucasia and Trans-Caspia, and detachments furnished by the force are being employed over territory extending from Deir-as-Zor on the Euphrates, 330 miles north-west of Baghdad, to Merv in Trans-Caspia, some 1450 miles north-east of Baghdad.

“Actual captures since the beginning of the campaign amount to 45,500 prisoners and 250 guns, together with vast quantities of war material of all descriptions.

“These results have been achieved in a country destitute of shade in summer, and impassable owing to floods in wet weather, and are a lasting record of the gallantry and endurance of the officers and men, both British and Indian, who have fought uncomplainingly in spite of heat, thirst, rain, and discomfort, for four years in Mesopotamia.”

This no doubt is a true and in some respects a striking presentment of the case; but it is a modest one, and more might have been said without exaggeration.

Mention has been made in earlier chapters of the scheme of world dominion conceived by the Germans, and of the part which Turkey was to play in it. Germany aimed not only at becoming the Paramount Power in Europe, but at the supreme control of the East. The two things were parts, and equally important parts, of the great conspiracy. They were, so to speak, the twin pillars upon which the whole vast superstructure of German dominion was to rest. For the Eastern part of the scheme Turkey was essential. Upon the geographical situation and the military power of Turkey, supported by German gold and German military science, supported also by the Sultan’s influence as the spiritual head of Islam, everything depended. Through their vassal Turkey, the Germans were to strike down their most formidable enemy—England, whose fleet stood between them and the dominion of the world. This is not mere surmise. Germany made little secret of her intentions, or of the means by which they were to be fulfilled.

When Turkey proceeded to declare war against the Allies and to carry out her part in the German scheme, she was very soon able, after beating off an attack on the Dardanelles, to throw her whole weight into Asia. From the nature of things her military effort then resolved itself into an advance upon three fronts. On her left she struck at the Russians in the Caucasus, in the centre she struck at both Russians and English in Persia, and hoped to work through Persia upon Afghanistan and India. On her right she struck at England in Egypt. All these countries—the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian Frontier, Egypt—were mainly or largely Mahomedan, and the Koran was to give weight to the blows of the Turkish sword.

Before very long Russia broke up, and England stood practically alone, so that in Western Asia it became a duel between her and Turkey. The struggle was fought out on all three of the Turkish fronts, but mainly in the centre and on the Turkish right. On both these fronts England, though dangerously weak at first, grew stronger and stronger as time went on, until eventually she overwhelmed her enemy. Instead of being attacked and beaten in Egypt, she advanced from Egypt and crushed the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria. Instead of being attacked and beaten in Persia and India, she advanced into Mesopotamia, and planted the British flag upon the citadels of Baghdad and Mosul. Under these tremendous blows the Turkish military power collapsed, and with it collapsed the Eastern part of the German world-scheme. Perhaps more than this might be said; for the fall of Turkey was no doubt a heavy shock and discouragement to Turkey’s masters, struggling hard themselves to carry out their conquest of Europe. But it is enough to know that the British armies in Mesopotamia and Palestine brought Turkey to her knees.

It is not necessary to inquire which of the two had the leading share in this great feat of arms. They were portions of one Imperial Army, and though fighting hundreds of miles apart, with a vast desert between them, they were enabled, through England’s command of the sea, to afford each other some support. The Mesopotamian Army more than once sent large forces round by sea to join the army in Palestine, and Allenby’s victories in Palestine reacted with immense effect upon the situation in Mesopotamia. It was a signal instance of the influence of sea power in war, for it did much to neutralise the great advantage given to Turkey by her central position against her widely-parted enemies. The two of them, striking separately, yet in a sense together, from their common base, the sea, overthrew and ruined her.

It was the same sea power that enabled England to make each of them efficient in itself. Not only did the sea bring them their hundreds of thousands of fighting men, but the sea brought them everything needed to let their men fight with success. As to the Mesopotamian campaign, it was, as its very name implies, a river campaign, and the utilisation of the Turkish rivers, especially the Tigris, was the first essential of success. Nothing was so remarkable in all the history of the campaign as the way in which the Tigris was broken in and transformed from an almost insuperable obstacle into a great military highway. By a hard and sustained effort, impossible for any nation but the mistress of the seas, the turbulent undisciplined river was tamed and enlisted in the service of the invaders, and its carrying power was increased nearly a thousandfold. When Maude began his advance, its surface was swarming with steamboats that had found their way, thanks to the daring and skill of British seamen, from the Hughli and the Irawadi and the Thames, until they were numerous enough to carry a large army into the heart of the Turkish Empire, and to keep it supplied with all the multitudinous necessities of modern war.

The river steamers were supported by rapidly constructed railways and roads, and all manner of engineering works; new irrigation channels were made or ancient channels reopened; many of the wild Arab tribes were gradually brought to see the advantages of order and service; crops were raised and gathered; altogether the activities of our people were innumerable, and the conquest of a country almost as large as the United Kingdom went hand-in-hand with the measures necessary for making it prosperous and contented.

What its future will be no one can say. To take over such a country, with its turbulent population and unsettled frontiers and outlying responsibilities of many kinds, is a formidable task; but in any case the conquest of it, from such an enemy as the Turk, was no small contribution to the work done by the British Empire in the Great War. It was performed at a distance from England, among scenes unfamiliar to Englishmen, and, partly owing to Press restrictions, it did not greatly appeal to the country’s attention, which was naturally enough fixed upon the progress of the conflict in Europe; but it was none the less a great achievement, and one of which all concerned in it may well be proud.

Among those concerned in it was the Regiment whose history forms the subject of this book, and there remains to be considered now the part which the Regiment played in the campaign.

The Thirteenth were perhaps fortunate in that they did not come to Mesopotamia until 1916, when the first half, and the most trying half, of the Mesopotamian Campaign was over. They had no part in the earlier fighting, when the British force was small and ill-found, and its difficulties great. They were spared the troubles and sufferings endured by the troops who conquered the lower part of the country; they did not march up with Townshend to the bloody field of Ctesiphon, or share in the desperate efforts to break through to his relief when he was shut up in Kut. When they landed at Basra all that was over. Horrified at the losses and sufferings entailed by its attempt—one of its customary attempts—to make a small force do the work of a large one, the nation had suddenly woken up to the needs of Mesopotamia; and, blaming every one but those chiefly to blame, itself and its statesmen, was now pouring in without stint Regiments and guns and river steamers and every kind of war material. It could not bring back to life the thousands of men sacrificed, or undo the injustice done to some of its best soldiers, but it was determined that the Mesopotamian force should for the future fight with reasonable chances of success; and though its attention was soon diverted again, it certainly made a fine effort, the result of which was to endure. The Thirteenth came in on the turn of the tide, and though they had before them two years of hard work and hard fighting, they were never to know the bitterness of defeat.

Nevertheless the work was severe, and the issue of the fighting was often doubtful for a time. That it uniformly ended in success, and eventually in complete triumph, was proof of very high qualities in the men who led and the men who followed. For the Turk is a stubborn enemy. He was once acknowledged, by general consent, as the best soldier in Europe; and if time has deprived him of some of his reputation, it still stands deservedly high.

As in the Palestine campaign, so in Mesopotamia, the Cavalry found its chance. There, as in all modern war, it was no doubt the Infantry and guns which mainly decided the fate of battles; but the Cavalry had much to do for the armies both before and after battle, in reconnaissance, in sweeping the country for supplies, in pursuit, and in the turning movements which at times brought about the enemy’s ruin. Even in the actual shock of battle they were not wholly excluded from a share of fighting and honour. Some tributes to the value of their services in Mesopotamia have already been recorded in earlier chapters. There is one service which perhaps has not been sufficiently brought out. The whole plan of General Maude’s attack upon the Turkish army which faced him on the north bank of the Tigris, when he began his advance in December 1916, was to push up the south bank, and keep threatening their rear from that side until they had so extended the line held by their troops that they were no longer strong enough to hold it all securely—to prevent his forcing a passage at some point and getting in behind their main body. As he put it in a letter to General Symons: “The Turks were very sticky and would not go for a long time, but we gradually stretched them and stretched them till owing to their casualties they were much weakened, and then we struck boldly at their tail across the Tigris. I had been hammering at this for two months, and the fact that they would not give up Sannaiyat, and consequently placed themselves in the dangerous position of having a line of communication in prolongation of their battle front, was their undoing.”

And the Cavalry had much to do with this stretching process. In his despatch giving an account of the whole advance to Baghdad, General Maude writes:—

“The work of the Cavalry had been difficult. The flat terrain intersected with nalas obstructed movement without providing cover, and the state of the country after heavy rains made progress even for short distances laborious. The absence of water, too, away from the river, limited its radius of action. Nevertheless its reconnaissance work and the blows delivered against the enemy’s communications helped in no small way to bring about that dissipation of his forces which was so essential to our success, and the pressure applied after the passage of the Tigris to the retreating enemy was instrumental in completing his final rout.”

The Thirteenth, working from their camp on the Hai river, did their full share of the Cavalry work so described.

During the subsequent march on Baghdad, to quote again General Maude’s letter to General Symons: “Your old Regiment did splendidly,” and in the course of it, at Lajj, they had their first chance, while pressing the pursuit, of delivering a real Cavalry charge, mounted and sword in hand.

This charge, “a brilliant charge,” as General Maude called it, was the first of several which have been described in earlier chapters. At Tekrit, at Kulawand, and at Tuz Kermatli the Regiment got in with the sword; and if the final onslaught at Hadraniya was made on foot with the bayonet, it was none the less a hand-to-hand attack, after a gallop across the open to the foot of the bluff on which were the Turkish trenches. Nor is an assault with the bayonet less creditable than a mounted charge. Naturally a Cavalry Regiment will always long for that, and rejoice in it if it comes; but, as many leading soldiers have now recognised, Cavalry under present conditions, to be thoroughly efficient, must be able to fight on foot as well as on horseback. Ever since the American Civil War this has become clearer and clearer. The Thirteenth in Mesopotamia, as other Cavalry Regiments in this war, have in a measure reverted to their old rôle as Dragoons, to whom the firearm of the Infantry is as familiar as the sword.

Far from lessening the honour due to them, the fact that both at Lajj and at Hadraniya the Thirteenth showed they could fight either way, is very much to their credit. There was no lack of the Cavalry spirit. Their whole inclination was to charge on horseback, sword in hand. But, if necessary, they could do something more.

To conclude, perhaps the most valuable singly of all the services rendered by the Cavalry during the campaign, was the one of which the Hadraniya charge was only a part—namely, the long march round into the enemy’s rear and the closing of his line of retreat, which led to the surrender of his whole force. The credit of this daring feat is due in the first place to Cassels and his own 11th Brigade, but the 7th Brigade too deserved much credit, for it may be doubted whether without their timely help Cassels and his men could have held their own against the repeated and desperate attacks of an enemy so superior in numbers.

Altogether, the Thirteenth Hussars did their duty well from the beginning to the end of their stay in Mesopotamia, which lasted for two years and a half. During that time they gained much honour at a heavy cost. Of their officers, eight were killed in action or died on service, two were disabled and taken prisoners, and fourteen were wounded. In other ranks the numbers were 90, 2, and 176. It is an honourable record.

CHAPTER XXIII.
RETURN TO ENGLAND—CONCLUSION.

The Thirteenth remained in and about Mosul throughout the months of November and December 1918; but early in January 1919 they were ordered to return to Baghdad, and marching on the 11th of the month, arrived in Baghdad on the 29th.

There they remained in camp for some weeks, when the welcome order was received to embark for England. On the 10th March, the Regiment went on board a river steamer, and started on their journey down the Tigris. It was a large vessel, and with them were their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars. Trans-shipping at Basra to the Etna, and at Bombay to the City of Sparta, they arrived on the 29th April in the Mersey, and on the following day went ashore at Liverpool. On the 5th May they marched into the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot, where they were to be quartered.

Here this History of ‘The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War’ naturally comes to an end, for though the war was not formally concluded, the Regiment was now in England again, and its share in the military operations was over.

But so much has been written and spoken during the last few years regarding the value of Cavalry in modern war that, as remarked in the introductory chapter, it seems desirable, before leaving the subject of the services performed by the Regiment, to say a few words upon this question. It is one about which professional soldiers only can have an opinion of any value, and I therefore confine myself to quoting the opinion of professional soldiers.