FOOTNOTES
[1] vol. iv. pp. 587-91.
[2] ‘The Reserve Division’ consisted of a 3rd battalion from some of the old regiments of the Valencian army, viz. 1st of Savoya, Avila, Don Carlos, Volunteers of Castile, Cazadores de Valencia, Orihuela. They were each about 1,000 strong, but averaged only 22 officers per battalion.
[3] See vol. iv. pp. 475-83.
[4] See vol. iv. pp. 540-1.
[5] Composed at this time of the 14th and 42nd and 115th Line, and the 1st Léger, the first two and last each three battalions strong, the other (115th) with four.
[6] The 24th Dragoons left about 140 men behind, the 13th Cuirassiers 50 only, the Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 124, but the 4th Hussars about 500, much more than half their force.
[7] See vol. iii. pp. 284-6.
[8] Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. p. 156.
[9] See Arteche, xi. p. 123.
[10] See vol. iv. p. 56.
[11] The battalions were the 2nd and 3rd of Savoya (the last a new levy) the 1st and 2nd of Don Carlos, and the 3rd of Orihuela, this last raw and newly raised like the 3rd of Savoya.
[12] Vacani says that the Teruel column was intended by Suchet as a mere demonstration, and was never intended to follow the high-road Teruel-Segorbe, but to take a cross-route over the hills, such as was actually used by it. But Suchet, in his Mémoires, makes no such statement (ii. p. 152), and speaks as if Harispe had taken the Ruvielos route on his own responsibility.
[13] The complete orders for the attack may be read in the first Pièce justificative in Belmas’s history of the siege, pp. 115-17 of vol. iv of his elaborate work.
[14] Vacani (v. p. 381) contradicts Suchet, saying that there was no Spanish patrol, and that the French pickets fired from nervousness at an imaginary foe.
[15] Vacani makes the losses 360 instead of 247, and it is possible that Suchet has given only the casualties at the main assault, and not those in the distant demonstrations. Vacani says that the Italians lost 52 men in their false attack.
[16] See Mahy’s letter to Blake on pp. 109-12 of vol. xi of Arteche. The General is writing very carefully so as not to speak too ill of his army: but his views are clear.
[17] Blake kept under his own hand in the lines the divisions of Zayas, Lardizabal, Miranda, and the Reserve.
[18] Vacani gives a long and interesting account of the siege (v. pp. 404-13) and attributes the weak defence to quarrels between the commander of the Italians and the French governor, Müller.
[19] Belonging to the 7th Line of Severoli’s division.
[20] Belmas, iv. p. 97.
[21] See narrative of Vacani, an eye-witness (vol. v. p. 399).
[22] To be found in print in Belmas, iv. pp. 124-8.
[23] This indictment of Suchet must be supported by details. In his elaborate table of casualties by corps at the end of his dispatch of Oct. 20, he only allows for 3 officers killed and 8 wounded, 40 men killed and 122 wounded—total 173. But the lists of officers’ casualties in Martinien show, on the other hand, five officers killed (Coutanceau, Saint Hilaire, Turno, Giardini, Cuny), and at least ten wounded (Mathis, Durand, Gauchet, D’Autane, Adhémar, Gattinara, Lamezan, D’Esclaibes, Maillard, Laplane), and probably three more.
Oddly enough, in his Mémoires (ii. p. 173) Suchet gives by name four officers killed at the breach (out of the five), while in his official report he had stated that there were only three killed altogether. We must trust rather Vacani, an eye-witness and a man much interested in statistics and casualties, when he gives the total of 300 for the losses, than Suchet’s table.
[24] Belmas, iv. p. 96.
[25] Which may be read in full in Arteche, xi. pp. 157-9.
[26] We are luckily in possession of the exact ‘morning state’ of Blake’s army, which is printed in the rare Spanish government publication of 1822, Estados de la Organizacion y Fuerza de los Ejércitos Españoles, pp. 184-7. Obispo had 3,400 men, Miranda 4,000, Villacampa 3,350, Mahy 4,600 infantry, under Montijo and Creagh, and 830 horse. This wing had 2 horse- and 2 field-batteries, 18 guns.
[27] There are terrible difficulties as to the timing of the battle of Saguntum. Suchet says that the first engagement was between Obispo’s flanking division, coming over the hills on the west, and Robert. Schepeler says that Obispo arrived too late altogether, and was practically not in the fight (p. 472). I think that the explanation is that Suchet took O’Ronan’s two battalions for Obispo, because they came from the direction where he was expected. I follow, in my timing of the battle, the very clear narrative of Vacani (v. pp. 440-1), who seems to make it clear that the main fighting on the French right was well over before that in the centre, and long before that on the left. Schepeler (who rode with Blake that day) also makes it certain that Lardizabal and Zayas were fighting long after Miranda, Villacampa, and Mahy had been disposed of. But difficulties remain, which could only be cleared up if we had a report by Obispo. General Arteche thinks that the action began fairly simultaneously all along the line, and follows Schepeler in saying that Obispo was late (xi. p. 174), the very reverse of Suchet’s statement that he came, and was beaten, too early.
[28] Burgos and Tiradores de Cadiz.
[29] Cuenca and Molina.
[30] O’Ronan’s two battalions went off in a separate direction, unpursued, and joined Obispo, not being in the rout.
[32] Quoted in Arteche, xi. p. 178.
[33] Mémoires, ii. p. 182.
[34] Mémoires, ii. p. 185.
[35] This account of the charge of the cuirassiers comes from the Mémoires of Colonel de Gonneville, who commanded their leading squadron. There is a curious point to be settled here. Marshal Suchet says (Mémoires, ii. p. 185) that he rode in person to the head of the regiment, and harangued it shortly on Margalef and other ancient glories, before bidding it charge. While speaking he was struck by a spent ball on the shoulder. But de Gonneville (who had read Suchet’s book, as he quotes it in other places) says distinctly (p. 208 of his Souvenirs militaires) that he received no orders, and charged on his own responsibility. ‘N’ayant là d’ordre à recevoir de personne, mais comprenant la nécessité d’arrêter cette masse de cavalerie qui arrivait à nous, &c. ... je donnai le signal.’ Was Suchet romancing about his little speech? Or was de Gonneville, who wrote his Mémoires forty years later, oblivious? Either hypothesis is difficult.
[36] Schepeler, p. 473.
[37] 2nd of Badajoz (two battalions) was almost exterminated, losing 17 officers, 21 sergeants, and 500 men, ‘mostly prisoners,’ out of 800 present. See its history in the Conde de Clonard’s great work on the Spanish army.
[38] The 16th Line (three battalions) alone, in fighting Zayas, lost just double as many officers as the seven battalions of Chlopiski and Robert in their engagement with Mahy, Miranda, and Villacampa!
[39] For details see Belmas, iv. pp. 140-3.
[40] A battalion or two left in Valencia, when the rest of the army went out to deliver Saguntum, must be added to the 20,000 men who came back from the battle. These corps were 2nd of Leon of Lardizabal’s division, and one battalion of Savoya belonging to Miranda.
[41] One battalion each of Badajoz, Burgos, and Tiradores de Cuenca—under 2,000 men in all.
[42] Four thousand strong at Saguntum, it surrendered on January 8th, 5,513 strong. Of its quality, the less said the better.
[43] Mahy to Blake quoted at length in Arteche, xi. p. 196, footnote.
[44] For details see Vacani, v. pp. 470-1.
[45] Correspondance de Napoléon, 18,267, and cf. pp. 590-2 of vol. iv of this work.
[46] See these dispatches printed in full in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 256-8. This wording is most important and should be studied with care. Note that Wellington’s sick have gone up from 18,000 to 20,000 in twenty-four hours, to oblige the Emperor.
[47] Berthier to Marmont, January 23, 1812. Printed in the latter’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 297-9.
[48] Though King Joseph had said that if Marmont took over the whole of La Mancha, he could then reinforce d’Armagnac up to 8,000 men. This he never really accomplished (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 26).
[49] Date fixed by Marmont’s letter to Berthier of Feb. 6.
[50] ‘Sa Majesté (writes Berthier) pense que, dans cette circonstance, vous avez plus calculé votre gloire personnelle que le bien de son service,’ Jan. 23, letter quoted above on the last page.
[51] Each division had about 4,000 or 4,500 men: the light cavalry about 1,700, so the whole would have made about 10,000 sabres and bayonets.
[52] Apparently four or five battalions of the German division gathered from La Mancha, and a brigade of dragoons. Joseph calls it in his Correspondance 3,000 men, when describing this operation (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 12, 1811).
[53] D’Armagnac’s obscure campaign will be found chronicled in detail in the narrative of the Baden officer, Riegel, iii. pp. 357-60, who shared in it along with the rest of the German division from La Mancha.
[54] So Suchet’s narrative (Mémoires, ii. pp. 214-15). Belmas says that only one bridge was finished when Harispe and Musnier passed—the others after dawn only.
[55] For Blake’s opinions and actions see the record of his staff-officer, Schepeler (pp. 502-3).
[56] Napier says (iv. p. 30) that the gunboats fled without firing a shot. Suchet and Schepeler speak of much firing, as does Arteche.
[57] No less than three of the Italian colonels were hit, and thirty-four officers in all.
[58] Only Miranda voted against a sortie, and thought that nothing could be done, except to hold out for a while in the walls and then surrender. Arteche, xi. p. 241.
[59] Not 5,000 as Napier (probably by a misprint) says on page 31 of his 4th vol. Apparently a misprint in the original edition has been copied in all the later fourteen!
[60] See the long procès verbal of the Council’s proceedings translated in Belmas, iv. pp. 203-6.
[61] The proposal of exchange came first to Mahy at Alicante; he called a council of generals, which resolved that the release of so many French would profit Suchet overmuch, because many of them had been imprisoned at Alicante and Cartagena, and had worked on the fortifications there. They could give the Marshal valuable information, which he had better be denied. The proposal must therefore be sent on to the Regency at Cadiz. That government, after much debate, refused to ratify the proposal, considering it more profitable to the enemy than to themselves.
[62] Some notes about his captivity may be found in the Mémoires of Baron Kolli, the would-be deliverer of King Ferdinand, who was shut up in another tower of the castle.
[63] See the dispatches printed in full in Belmas, Appendix, vol. iv, pp. 218-20, and 226-7 of his great work.
[64] For which see vol. i. p. 68.
[65] The names of all seven friars are given by Toreno and Schepeler.
[66] Can the frightful figure of 600 be a mistake for 60?
[67] See Toreno, iii. p. 28.
[68] See his pages, iv. 33.
[69] On February 1st Freire’s infantry division, though it had suffered much from desertion in the meanwhile, still numbered 3,300 men present, and his cavalry 850 sabres. See tables in Los Ejércitos españoles, pp. 149-50.
[71] According to Joseph’s letter to Montbrun (Correspondence of King Joseph, viii. p. 294) a battalion or two may have joined Montbrun, as he tells that general that he is glad to know that the troops of his army have given satisfaction.
[72] Suchet, Mémoires, ii. p. 234, for dates.
[73] Marmont accuses Montbrun exactly as Napoleon accuses Marmont!
[74] On his first appearance he sent to summon Alicante, and received the proper negative answer. But Schepeler, who was in the place, says that the governor, General de la Cruz, showed signs of yielding. Fortunately the other generals did not. It would have been absurd to treat seriously a force of 4,000 infantry and 1,500 horse with only six light guns! (Schepeler, p. 520.)
[75] It is alluded to in a dispatch of the Emperor to Berthier on that day. ‘Le duc de Dalmatie a l’ordre d’envoyer une colonne en Murcie pour faire une diversion.’ St. Cloud, Nov. 19.
[76] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 27, 1812.
[77] See Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. pp. 237-8.
[78] These were Chinchilla, 2nd of Murcia, and a new locally raised battalion called 2nd of Alicante. He was in March handed over also Canarias, Burgos, and Ligero de Aragon, which had belonged to Freire till that date.
[80] See vol. iii. pp. 503-4.
[81] Suchet says that the captain of the boat threw his letters overboard at the last moment, but that they floated and were picked up by the French. Was this a farce? Or is the whole story doubtful?
[82] Napier, Peninsular War, iv. p. 38.
[83] See letter printed in Belmas, iv. p. 248.
[84] See notes on discussions of this sort in Sir Edward Codrington’s Memoirs, i. pp. 264 and 277. He had seen much of the evils of both kinds of organization, and leaned on the whole to the irregulars, from a personal dislike for Lacy.
[85] Who called the raid an ‘insult’—Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Feb. 29, 1812, and compare letter of March 8.
[86] There is an interesting account of the combat of Villaseca in Codrington’s Memoirs, i. pp. 254-6: he was present, having chanced to come on shore to confer with Eroles as to co-operation against Tarragona. An odd episode of the affair was that, when the French surrendered, they were found to have with them as prisoners Captains Flinn and Pringle, R.N., whom they had surprised landing at Cape Salou on the previous day.
[87] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 25, after the receipt of the news of the fall of Valencia.
[88] Details may be found in the dispatches of Feb. 29, and May 1st and 8th.
[89] See vol. iv. p. 215.
[91] The exact loss is uncertain, but Bourke himself was wounded, and Martinien’s lists show 15 other casualties among French and Italian officers: Vacani (vi. p. 65) says that the 7th Italian line alone lost 15 killed and 57 wounded. A loss of 16 officers implies at least 300 men hit.
[92] For numerous anecdotes of Eroles and lively pictures of his doings the reader may refer to the Memoirs of Edward Codrington, with whom he so often co-operated.
[93] Napoleon to Berthier, March 8th, 1812.
[94] Apparently about the same time that Villacampa and his division came up to replace him in Aragon.
[96] For all this see Schepeler, pp. 570-1; King Joseph’s Letters (Ducasse), viii. pp. 291 and 305; and Toreno, iii. pp. 81-2.
[97] There seems to be an error of dates in Napier, iv. p. 172, concerning Mina’s operations, as the surprise of the convoy at Salinas is put after Mina’s escape from Pannetier at Robres. But Mina’s own Memoirs fix the date of the latter as April 23rd, 1812, while the former certainly happened on April 7th. Toreno (iii. p. 87) has got the sequence right.
[98] There is a curious and interesting account of this in Mina’s own Memoirs, pp. 31-2, where he relates his narrow escape, and tells how he had the pleasure of hanging his treacherous lieutenant, and three local alcaldes, who had conspired to keep from him the news of Pannetier’s approach.
[99] Napoleon to Berthier, Dec. 30, 1811, speaks of the order to march having been already given. The two regiments were in Castile by March: when precisely they left Drouet I cannot say—perhaps as late as February.
[100] See Schepeler, p. 172.
[102] One case is noted of a captain of the ‘Juramentado’ detachment at Badajoz who blew himself from a gun when he saw the place taken (Lamare’s Défense de Badajoz, p. 260). Carlos de España shot the other five Spanish officers captured on that occasion (Belmas, iv. p. 362).
[103] See vol. iii. pp. 594-5.
[104] After the 28th went off, the flank-companies were those of the 2/11th, 2/47th, and 1/82nd, two from each battalion.
[105] 2/47th (8 companies) 570 men, 2/87th (560 men), 1 company 95th (75 men), 70 2nd Hussars K.G.L., 1 field-battery (Captain Hughes) 83 men, or in all 1,358 of all ranks.
[106] A battalion each of Irlanda and Cantabria, and some light companies of cazadores, with 120 gunners and 25 cavalry, amounting to about 1,650 men (sick included).
[107] For details of these operations see the anonymous Defence of Tarifa (London, 1812), and letters in Rait’s Life of Lord Gough, i. pp. 69-70.
[108] This was the famous knight who, holding the place for King Sancho IV in 1294, refused to surrender it when the Moors brought his son, captured in a skirmish, before the walls, and threatened to behead him if his father refused to capitulate. Guzman would not yield, saw his son slain, and successfully maintained the fortress.
[109] For these precautions, the work of Captain Charles Smith, R.E., see the anonymous Defence of Tarifa (p. 62), and Napier, iv. pp. 59-60.
[110] See vol. iv. pp. 101-2.
[111] Two battalions each of 43rd Line and 7th and 9th Poles, and 16th and 21st Dragoons.
[112] Three of 16th Léger, two of 54th Line, one each of 27th Léger and 94th and 95th Line.
[113] Two of 63rd and one of 8th Line.
[114] 51st Line.
[115] For details of this toilsome march see Belmas, iv. pp. 15-17.
[116] The breaching battery on the lower slope with four 16- and two 12-pounders: the upper battery with four howitzers for high-trajectory fire against the more distant guns of the besieged and the island, and two 12-pounders.
[117] According to some authorities he also spiked a 32-lb. carronade. See Defence of Tarifa, p. 63.
[118] The author of the Defence of Tarifa pretends not to know the real story (p. 63), saying that the spiking caused much ‘indignation, apprehension, and discontent,’ and that ‘whence the order proceeded is unknown.’ For the explanation see the letter from an officer of the garrison in Napier, iv, Appendix, p. 438.
[119] Gough speaks of his reply that ‘evacuation would be contrary to the spirit of General Campbell’s instructions,’ as if given at an earlier date, but, the 29th seems fixed by King’s letter to Napier in appendix to the latter’s Peninsular War, iv. pp. 443-4, quoted above.
[120] See especially the notes from officers on the spot in Napier’s appendix to vol. iv. pp. 442-4.
[121] ‘Sin duda ignorará V.S. que me hallo yo en esta plaza, cuando se prononce á su gubernador que admite una capitulacion. Á la cabeza de mis tropas me encontrará V.S. y entonces hableremos.’ See Arteche, appendix to vol. xi. p. 524.
[122] For this, see Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 477, from which Napier copies his narrative, iv. p. 55.
[123] Their part in the defence must not be denied to the Spaniards. Napier, with his usual prejudice, remarks (iv. p. 60) that Skerrett ‘assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spaniards, and if Smith had not insisted upon placing British troops alongside of them this would have ruined the defence, because hunger and neglect had so broken the spirit of these poor men that few appeared during the combat, and Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.’
[124] Skerrett and Copons estimated the loss of the enemy at nearly 500, no doubt an exaggeration. But Leval’s 207 seems far too few. The commanding officer of the 51st Ligne reports from his four flank-companies 7 officers and 81 men hit (Belmas, iv, Appendix, p. 58). Of the sapper detachment which led the column, from 50 men 43 were hors de combat (Belmas, iv. p. 31). It seems incredible that when 23 companies took part in the assault 5 of them should have suffered 131 casualties out of a total of 207. Martinien’s tables show 18 officers killed and wounded on Dec. 31, a figure which proves nothing, for though at the usual casualty rate of 20 men per officer this would imply a total loss of 360, yet it is well known that in assaults the officers often suffer a loss out of all proportion to that of the rank and file. Eighteen officers hit might be compatible with a loss as low as 200 or as high as 400 in such a case.
[125] Defence of Tarifa, p. 47.
[126] See the letter in Belmas, iv. pp. 55-6.
[127] Defence of Tarifa, p. 75.