[634] Berthier to Marmont—writing from the Emperor’s personal direction—of February 18th, 1812, printed in Marmont’s Correspondence, iv. p. 332.
[635] Joseph to Soult of 29 July and August 2, Correspondence, ix. pp. 60-1.
[636] Wellington to Bathurst, Olmedo, July 28: ‘I think it probable that they [the Army of Portugal] will endeavour to join the King on the Upper Douro, if the King should continue on this side of the mountains, unless I should previously have it in my power to strike a blow against his corps.’
[637] This was the term that D’Urban used when describing, on July 30, the position of the French.
[638] Apparently two battalions of the Baden regiment, some Juramentados, and a regiment of dragoons, about 1,800 men.
[639] All these details are from dispatches of Wellington to D’Urban in the unpublished D’Urban papers, dated between July 30 and August 2, or from D’Urban’s report to Wellington.
[641] See Dispatches, ix. p. 320.
[642] Ibid., p. 321.
[643] Wellington to Maitland, Cuellar, August 3rd, Dispatches, ix. p. 327.
[644] Wellington to Bathurst, Dispatches, ix. p. 370.
[645] Letter in Sidney’s Life of Hill, p. 211.
[646] viz. the 2/4th, 1/5th, 1/38th, 1/42nd, which had arrived in time for the battle of Salamanca, the 1/38th on the very battle morning, and the 1/82nd which came up after the battle. They were all Walcheren regiments: 1/82nd came from Gibraltar, 2/4th from Ceuta, the other three from England direct. The 1/5th and 2/82nd went on to Madrid in September.
[647] Wellington to Bathurst, Cuellar, August 4. Dispatches, ix. p. 339.
[648] Memorandum for General Clinton, to be communicated to General Santocildes. Dispatches, ix. pp. 344-6.
[649] It is curious to find that while in the ‘Memorandum’ of August 4 Wellington states that it is ‘not very probable’ that Clausel will move, in a letter to Santocildes sent off the very next day, he remarks that an advance from Burgos into the kingdom of Leon, to relieve Astorga, is ‘most likely.’ I fancy that the former was his real opinion, and that the latter was spoken of with some stress in the directions to Santocildes, mainly because Wellington wished to impress on the Spaniard the duty of being cautious and retiring to the Esla without offering battle.
[650] The 1st and 7th Divisions alone were up to their usual strength. The 4th and Light Divisions were still showing very weak battalions, owing to their dreadful Badajoz losses; and the former had also suffered very severely (1,000 casualties) at Salamanca. The 5th and 3rd had comparatively moderate casualties at each of these fights, but the combination of the two successive sets of losses had reduced them very considerably.
[651] Dyneley’s diary in R. A. Journal, vol. xxiii. p. 454.
[652] Many of the brigades did not march through Segovia, but by crossroads around it: steep gradients and fatigue were thereby avoided. One route was by the deserted palace of Rio Frio, an old royal hunting-box.
[653] All this from D’Urban’s unpublished diary, as are also most of the details about the movements of the troops.
[654] Reiset’s Souvenirs, ii. pp. 358-60.
[655] The surrender-rolls show that there were also some small leavings of Marmont’s troops in the Retiro, notably from the 50th Line [of which there were no less than six officers]. Of the Army of the South the 12th and 27th Léger, and 45th and 51st Line were strongly represented.
[656] Treillard calls them only les lanciers in his report. Dyneley in his narrative calls them Polish lancers, but they were really the Westphalian Chevaux-légers-lanciers of the Army of the Centre.
[657] This was a squadron of the 11th, whose other squadron formed the reserve.
[658] Reizenstein and Marshalk.
[659] Colonel Lobo: the other colonel (the Visconde de Barbaçena) who was taken, had been so severely wounded that the French left him behind.
[660] Three in the 19th Dragoons, one in the 22nd, one in the Italian regiment. Oddly enough, of seventeen officers in the casualty list, only one (a chef d’escadron of the 13th) was killed. The sabre disables, but does not usually slay outright.
[661] Dispatches, ix. p. 354.
[662] There are very full narratives of Majalahonda to be got from D’Urban’s correspondence, Reiset’s memoirs, and the letters of Dyneley, who was lucky enough to escape a few days later and rejoin his troop. Schwertfeger’s History of the German Legion gives the facts about the part taken by the K.G.L. Light Battalion, whose service Wellington ignored in his dispatch—wrongly stating that it was not engaged. Treillard’s dispatch is a fine piece of exaggeration, but useful as giving the official French view of the affair.
[663] Dispatches, ix. p. 351.
[664] Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, p. 27.
[665] To Lord Bathurst, August 13. Dispatches, ix. 355.
[666] The second eagle is in error described in Wellington’s dispatch as that of the 13th—which was in Russia at the time.
[667] For the ‘siege’ of the Retiro see (besides the official sources) Burgoyne’s Diary, i. pp. 208-9, and the narratives of Green of the 68th and Wheeler of the 51st. For the use of the French uniforms see the Dickson Papers, ed. Major Leslie, ii. pp. 738-9.
[668] Grattan’s With the Connaught Rangers, p. 275.
[669] Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, Dispatches, ix. p. 169, same to same of June 1, Dispatches, ix. p. 197, Wellington to Hill (June 6th), Dispatches, ix. p. 215, and more especially the last paragraph of Wellington to Henry Wellesley of June 7th, Dispatches, ix. p. 219, and same to same of June 10th, Dispatches, ix. p. 224.
[670] To quote Wellington’s own rather heavy but quite explicit phrases: ‘I am certain that the enemy will move into Estremadura upon Hill, as soon as it is known that I have moved: and I hope everything will then be done by Ballasteros, and the Army of Murcia, and the troops in Cadiz, to divert the enemy from their intentions upon Hill.’ And, on the other hand, in a letter differing in date from that first cited by three days, ‘The Spanish government have desired that in case of a movement by Marshal Soult on General Ballasteros, General Hill should make a movement to divert his attention from Ballasteros. I have directed this movement, in the notion that the Conde de Villemur [the Spanish commander in Estremadura] will also co-operate in it.’ The see-saw of alternate distractions is clearly laid down—but Ballasteros (as usual) proved a difficult factor to manage.
[671] 9th Léger, 96th Ligne, a battalion of the 16th Léger, and the 5th Chasseurs.
[672] Figures in Los Ejércitos españoles, p. 128.
[673] Possibly more—the casualty list of officers in Martinien’s admirable tables is very heavy—9 officers hit in the 9th Léger, 13 in the 96th Ligne, 3 in the 16th Léger, 5 in the 5th Chasseurs à cheval. Thirty officers hit might very probably (but not certainly) mean 600 casualties in all.
[674] See vol. iv. pp. 187 and 437.
[675] See Ainslie’s History of the 1st Royals, p. 133.
[676] Including one officer killed and four wounded.
[677] See Slade’s report in Dispatches, ix. pp. 242-3. Tomkinson (p. 174) says that Slade’s report to Cotton, commanding the cavalry, was ‘the best I ever saw. He made mention of his son having stained his maiden sword!’
[678] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, ix. p. 238.
[679] Letters of D’Erlon to Jourdan on June 9th, and of Soult to King Joseph June 12, copies from the Paris archives—lent me by Mr. Fortescue.
[680] In this report (the copy of which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) Drouet says that Soult had told him to expect reinforcements to the total of some 15,000 men, but that Barrois brought him only 3,500 infantry and 1,500 horse, and Daricau 4,500 infantry and 1,000 horse, so that his reinforcements were only 10,500 men instead of 15,000. Drouet stated his own force, horse and foot (his own division and Lallemand’s cavalry) in a preceding letter of June 9th at 6,000 of all arms, so that the concentration would only give 16,000 men. I fancy that he is deliberately understating Barrois, for that general had 7,000 men in March, and 5,000 still in October at the end of a long and fatiguing campaign, and Pierre Soult too. Drouet’s object in giving these figures to Joseph was to prove that he was so weak that he could make no detachment towards the Tagus, as the King had directed him to do. Was it for the same purpose that he always over-stated Hill’s army? Or did he really believe that the latter had 30,000 men arranged opposite him, as he repeatedly told Soult?
[681] Cf. Wellington to Hill of July 11th. Dispatches, ix. p. 280.
[682] See chapter i above, pp. 309-10.
[683] Joseph to Soult, May 26, intercepted dispatch in the Scovell ciphers.
[685] Soult to Joseph, printed in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 31-3.
[686] Drouet to Joseph, Villafranca, July 3, Paris Archives [paper communicated to me by Mr. Fortescue]. Cf. Drouet to Jourdan to much the same general effect, of June 18, in King Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 36-7.
[687] Espinchal says that the 2nd Hussars captured a Portuguese gun: I have no corroboration for this.
[688] Details of all this in Soult’s dispatch to Joseph of July 10, in Espinchal’s Mémoires (he served in Vinot’s brigade), and in the diaries of Swabey of the R.A. and of Stoltzenberg of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., printed in full in Schwertfeger’s History of the K. G. Legion, ii. pp. 257-8.
[689] All this from Hill’s dispatch to Wellington of July 4, from Los Santos.
[690] See Wellington to Hill of July 11 (Dispatches, ix. p. 280) and Hill to Wellington of July 9. The text of the order is in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. p. 41.
[691] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, July 11.
[692] There is plenty of detail about these quite unimportant movements in Espinchal, ii. pp. 26-33.
[693] Not, however, the bulk of Morillo’s division, which was at Medina de las Torres near Zafra, as the general’s correspondence of that date shows [Villa’s Life of Morillo, ii. p. 224].
[694] The best account of all this is in Schepeler, pp. 661-3.
[695] Letter of August 4 in Sidney’s Life of Hill, p. 210.
[696] Soult to Joseph, August 8, Paris Archives (lent me by Mr. Fortescue).
[697] Soult to Joseph, Seville, August 12, in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 67-8.
[698] There had been such intrigues between the King and persons in Cadiz (see above, p. 140), but they had been opened by Napoleon’s own advice, in order to sow seeds of dissension among the patriots.
[699] The point of this insinuation is that Bernadotte and Joseph were brothers-in-law, having married the two sisters Clary.
[700] Printed in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 68-70.
[701] Minus four companies left at Tarifa.
[702] Two from the 2/95th, those of Cadoux and Jenkins.
[703] Skerrett in his dispatch (Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 108), speaks of attacking San Lucar with 800 men: but this was not his whole force.
[704] Toreno (iii. p. 151) and other historians tell the tale how Downie, finding that none of his men had followed him, though they had reached the other side of the cut, flung back to them his sword, which was the rapier of the Conquistador Pizarro, presented to him by a descendant of that great adventurer. It was caught and saved, and he recovered it, for he was left behind by the French a few miles from Seville, because of his wounds. They stripped him and left him by the wayside, where he was found and cared for by the pursuing Spaniards.
[705] The defence of Seville seems mainly to have been by the French 63rd Ligne, which lost eight officers in the fight.
[706] For a curious story of the contents of a captured carriage, which turned out to be stuffed with silver plate, see the Memoirs of Harley of the 47th, ii. p. 24.
[707] ‘Confound all spiritless and dilatory generals,’ writes Swabey of the R.A. in his diary, ‘... Sir W. E. actually halted while four squadrons and 400 infantry were doing what they liked in Ribera, though he had the Hussars, the 9th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Dragoon Guards and our guns, and he might have had the 71st regiment also, though it did not arrive till all was over. The transaction was calculated to dispirit the soldier, to discontent the officers, and to take away all confidence in the general.’
[708] Swabey’s diary, p. 307. There is an interesting account of Strenowitz’s capture and release in Espinchal’s Mémoires, ii. pp. 36-40, as also of the long skirmish of this day.
[709] Schepeler says that he scared the French rearguard out of Cordova on September 3 by lighting fires along the mountain slopes, and giving out that Hill was behind him with his army. See p. 666 of his history.
[710] Napier, iv. p. 371.
[711] Soult suggested that the less efficient of Joseph’s troops should go on garrison duty, and set free a corresponding number of his own best battalions.
[713] In and about Santander, 2 battalions of the 130th, 2 squadrons of gendarmes, &c. In Santoña, 93 officers and 1,382 men of the 28th, 75th, and 34th. In Burgos, 2 battalions of 34th Line.
[714] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7.
[715] The Venerable (his flag-ship) and the Magnificent. The Magnificent went home with prisoners some weeks later, and was replaced for a time by the Abercrombie, from the Brest blockading squadron.
[716] Medusa, Isis, Diadem, Surveillante, and Rhin. The Belle Poule looked in for a short time later in the season.
[717] Sparrow and Lyra.
[718] So says Popham in his dispatch at the Record Office: though Napier (iv. p. 246) says that the Spaniards attacked and were repulsed. But Popham must have known best! Sir Howard Douglas corroborates him, Life, p. 168.
[720] One of them, Sir George Collier, commanding the Medusa.
[721] Popham’s prescience is shown by the fact that his papers relating to Burgos began to be drawn up as early as July 26. He cross-questioned not only Porlier but other Spanish officers. Their answers did not always tally with each other. See all Popham’s dispatches of the time, in the Admiralty Section at the Record Office—under the general head ‘Channel Fleet!’ They have this misleading heading because Popham was under Lord Keith, then commanding that fleet.
[724] The 2/67th and a part of the foreign Regiment of de Watteville, also a British battery, from Cadiz.
[725] See Mémoires, ii. pp. 283-99.
[726] See vol. iii. p. 307.
[729] Schepeler, pp. 609-10.
[731] This is Suchet’s own view, see his Mémoires, ii. p. 251.
[733] See notes in Vidal de la Blache’s L’Evacuation d’Espagne, 1914, which reaches me just as this goes to press, for anecdotes concerning his doings.
[734] About the same time a still more dreadful plot was said to have been formed in Barcelona, with the knowledge and approval of Lacy—arsenic was to be mixed with the flour of the garrison’s rations by secret agents. [See Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. p. 256, and Arteche, xii. p. 353.] How far the plan was a reality is difficult to decide. There is a large file of papers in the Paris War Office concerning experiments carried out by a commission of army-doctors, in consequence of a sudden outbreak of sickness among the troops in July. One or two soldiers died, a great number were seized with vomiting and stomach-cramps; poison being suspected, the doctors took possession of the flour, attempted to analyse it, and tried its effects on a number of street dogs. A few of the animals died: most were violently sick, but got over the dose. Poison was not definitely proved, and dirty utensils and bad baking might conceivably have been the cause of the outbreak. Some Catalan writers say that there was a poisoning-plot, or I should have doubted the whole story. See the Appendix to Arteche, xii. p. 483.
[736] 1/10th, 1/81st, 1/58th, 4th and 6th Line battalions K.G.L., and parts of the foreign battalions of De Roll, Dillon, and the Calabrian Free Corps. See table in Appendix XIV. The total was 248 officers, and 6,643 rank and file.
[737] Clarke’s dispatch with the information was dated June 9th.
[738] Two of them dated July 22 and August 12 did ultimately fall into his hands, but only after the victory of Salamanca. See below, pp. 617-18.
[739] See Schepeler, pp. 617 and 623.
[740] Of the 44th Line.
[741] The 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons.
[742] The 116th Line, 2 battalions.
[743] The 1st Léger, 3 battalions.
[744] The 7th Line, 2 battalions.
[745] Cuenca, of Montijo’s brigade. Schepeler, p. 619.
[746] This is the figure given by Suchet in his contemporary dispatch to King Joseph, of which a copy lies in the Scovell papers. In some French accounts the number is cut down to 70.
[747] Vol. ii. p. 260.
[748] 7th Line, about 1,200; 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons, about 1,000; one battalion 44th, about 650; artillery, &c., about 150 = 3,000 in all. The 1st Léger and 116th Line were practically not engaged.
[749] This seems to have been Codrington’s view, see his Memoirs, i. p. 278, and he knew Lacy and the Catalans well.
[750] See above, pp. 487 and 488.
[751] See Wellington to Maitland, Dispatches, ix. p. 386, dated Aug. 30.
[752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Dispatches, ix. p. 364.
[753] Same to same, Dispatches, ix. p. 373. He was particularly indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in 1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures, and an impediment to all business.’
[754] Dispatches, ix. p. 370.
[756] Dispatches, ix. p. 377.
[757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1.
[758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of Murcia. Dispatches, ix. p. 388.
[759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid. Dispatches, ix. p. 390.
[760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the 21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the 17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the 30th (Swabey’s diary).
[761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division—British, 7,000; Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of all ranks.
[762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of Elvas, and the 22nd.