[42. Analytical Summary.—1. A leading conception in Greek education is that of symmetry, or harmony; the ideal man, in Plato’s phrase, must be “harmoniously constituted”; all opposing tendencies must be reconciled; and while the physical, the intellectual, and the moral must each be made the subject of systematic training, there must be no disproportionate development in either direction.
2. The preoccupation of the Greek teacher was discipline or culture, rather than the communication of useful knowledge; and the final aim was a life of contemplation, rather than a life of action; ethical rather than practical; “good conduct” rather than mastery over what is material.
3. Physical training received great emphasis, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards mental and spiritual health; and knowledge was valued chiefly as the means for attaining moral excellence.
4. The staple of instruction was wisdom, i.e., ethical and prudential knowledge, which was the basis of right action; and teaching, especially according to the Socratic conception of it, consisted in causing the pupil’s mind to react on the materials supplied by his own mind. Socrates, says Lewes, “believed that in each man lay the germs of wisdom. He believed that no science could be taught; only drawn out.”
5. The great teaching instrument was dialectic, i.e., discussion, resolution, or analysis. Its use assumed that the subject-matter of instruction was already in the pupil’s possession, and that the highest office of the teacher was to liberate the thought which had been formed by the active energies of the pupil’s own mind. This is the maieutic art of Socrates.
6. The mode of mental activity which was chiefly brought into requisition was the reason; in a secondary degree the imagination and the emotions; and in a still lower degree, the memory.
7. The large place assigned to music by Plato and Aristotle shows that the culture of the emotions was an important element in Greek education. Æsthetic training was not only an end in itself, but was regarded as the basis of moral and religious culture.
8. In the writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, we see the first attempt to formulate a body of educational doctrine; we have the germs of a science of education based on psychology, ethics, and politics.
9. In the Republic, we see the theory of compulsion in both its phases: the State must provide an education suitable for State needs; and the young must accept this education because the State has ordained it. For the first time in the history of thought, the State appears distinctly and avowedly as an educator.
10. Practically, education was administered on the basis of caste; though in the construction of his ideal State, Plato made it possible for talent, industry, and worth, to find their proper level.]
[22] Upon this subject consult the excellent study of Alexander Martin, entitled Les Doctrines Pédagogiques des Grecs. Paris, 1881.
[23] Montaigne, Essais, I. I. chap. XXIV.
[24] The palestra was the school of gymnastics for children; the gymnasium was set apart for adults and grown men.
[25] Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, I. IV. chap. VIII.
[26] Aristophanes, Clouds.
[27] The reputation of the sophists has been considerably raised by Mr. Grote (History of Greece, vol. VIII.). For an entertaining account of a sophist of a later age, see Pliny’s Letters, Melmoth’s translation, Book II., Letter III. See also Blackie’s Four Phases of Morals, and Ferrier’s Greek Philosophy. (P.)
[28] The primitive meaning of the Greek word εἰρωνεία, irony, is interrogation. Socrates gave a jeering, ironical turn to his questions, and in consequence this word lost its primary meaning, and took the one which we give it at this time.
[29] The Socratic method for the discovery of truth can be employed only in those cases where the pupil has the crude materials of the new knowledge actually in store. Psychology, logic, ethics, mathematics, and perhaps grammar and rhetoric, fall within the sphere of the Socratic method; but to apply this method of instruction to geography, history, geology, and, in general, to subjects where the material is inaccessible, is palpably absurd. The Socratic dialogue, in its negative phase, is aimed at presumption, arrogance, and pretentious ignorance; but it is sometimes misused to badger and bewilder an honest and docile pupil. (P.)
[30] Memorabilia, I. II.
[31] Memorabilia, I. IV.
[32] Republic, 401, 402. I have quoted from the version of Vaughan and Davies. (P.)
[33] Dialectic, as used in the Republic, is neither philosophy nor logic. I doubt whether it can be considered a subject of instruction at all. It is rather a method or an exercise, the purpose of which is to subject received opinions, formulated knowledge, current beliefs, etc., to a sifting or analysis for the purpose of distinguishing the real from the apparent, the true from the false. The Socratic dialogues are examples of the dialectic method. Dialectic might be defined as the method of thought proper or the discursive reason in act. (P.)
[34] See the allegory of the cavern, Republic, Book VII. ‘In Plato’s scheme of education, knowing is to precede doing,’ thus following Socrates (Memorabilia, IV. chap. II.) and Bias (Γνῶθι καὶ τότε πράττε), and anticipating Bacon (“studies perfect nature, and are perfected by experience”). (P.)
[35] See especially Book VII. of the Laws.
[36] Compare also this quotation: “A free mind ought to learn nothing as a slave. The lesson that is made to enter the mind by force, will not remain there. Then use no violence towards children; the rather, cause them to learn while playing.”
[37] See particularly Chaps. VII. and VIII.
[38] See especially the Politics, Books IV., V.
[39] It seems impossible to comprehend the almost sovereign power which the Greeks ascribed to music, unless we conceive that the Greek was endowed with peculiar and extreme sensitiveness. Perhaps there is special significance in the story of Orpheus and his lyre. (P.)
[40] I think it may be doubted whether the disfavor shown by Plato and Aristotle to practical studies was merely a mean prejudice. Preoccupied as they were with the disciplinary value of studies, they may have seen that the culture aim and the utilitarian aim are in some sort antagonistic. (P.)