While the first campaign of 1814 was being fought out in France, the movement against Napoleon was becoming general. Bernadotte had after the victory of Leipzig been placed in command of the army in northern Germany. Full of the idea which had been suggested to him by the Emperor Alexander in 1812, that he might succeed Napoleon on the throne of France, Bernadotte did not wish to appear before his own countrymen in the light of an invader. He had occupied himself for some weeks after the battle of Leipzig with blockading Davout in Hamburg, and fighting the Danes in Holstein. Even if he could not obtain the throne of France, he was quite resolved to win Norway, and for this purpose he attacked the Danes, and after some fighting, compelled Frederick VI. of Denmark to sign the Treaty of Kiel on 14th January 1814, by which Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden, in exchange for Swedish Pomerania. Bernadotte even went so far as to negotiate with Davout, to whom he promised a free passage to France with all his troops as the price of the surrender of Hamburg. But the Emperor Alexander would not submit to this, and Bernadotte was imperiously ordered only to leave a blockading force before Hamburg, and to advance to the French frontier.

It was at this juncture that Bernadotte was deprived of his two finest corps d’armée, which were ordered up to the assistance of Blücher. But in addition to the danger threatened by Bernadotte’s army, Napoleon also met with serious opposition in the Netherlands. The Dutch people declared for the Prince of Orange, and Holland was quickly lost. A force under the command of the Prince marched into Belgium, and besieged Antwerp, which was defended by the former member of the Committee of Public Safety, Carnot, who, though neglected by Napoleon in the days of his greatness, had come to the help of France in the time of her distress. To assist the Prince an English division under Sir Thomas Graham had, as has been said, been despatched to Holland. Graham failed to take Bergen-op-Zoom on the 20th of February, but his presence in the Netherlands not only encouraged the Dutch, but prevented Napoleon from obtaining help from that quarter.

In the south, Marshal Augereau, whom the Emperor had placed in command at Lyons, was, as he himself said, no longer the Augereau of Castiglione. He had been directed to make a diversion against the Austrian left as it entered France with some conscripts and troops drawn from the former Army of Spain, but he remained inactive, and his operations were of no assistance to the Emperor. In the south-west corner of France, Soult was unable to do more than make head against Wellington and the Anglo-Portuguese army. After the battles of the Nive or of Saint Pierre, Bayonne was completely invested, and Wellington, leaving the left of his army to carry on the siege, marched eastwards against Soult. That marshal had been weakened by the detachments he had been ordered to send to Augereau, and to Napoleon himself. Nevertheless, he made a gallant stand at Orthez on the 27th of February, but was defeated and forced to fall back further into France.

In Italy the Viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais, who in the retreat from Russia had given evidence that he was a general of the very first order, offered a gallant resistance to the Austrians under General Hiller. But the defection of the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law, opened the passes of the Tyrol to the Austrians, and Eugène de Beauharnais was then compelled to retreat. At the commencement of 1814, Metternich entered into negotiations with Murat, the King of Naples. Through the influence of his wife, Caroline Murat, sister of Napoleon, with whom Metternich had been in most intimate relations when he was ambassador at Paris, Murat, in the hope of preserving his kingdom, issued a violent proclamation against his benefactor, Napoleon, and advanced to the banks of the Po, at the head of a Neapolitan army of 80,000 men. This movement caused Eugène de Beauharnais, whose fidelity to his stepfather shines out in bright contrast to the treachery of Murat, to fall back still further. He defeated the Austrians under Marshal Bellegarde on the Mincio on the 8th of February, but was unable to follow up his success owing to the position of Murat. In his rear, Lord William Bentinck had landed at Genoa and issued a proclamation promising independence to that city, and the support of England in securing the independence and unity of Italy. Napoleon at one time thought of calling Eugène de Beauharnais to his side, but his rapid victories over the isolated corps d’armée of the allies in February caused him to abandon this wise project.

It has been said that one effect of Napoleon’s victories was to break up the Congress of Châtillon. It had been suggested that a congress should meet at Mannheim at the time of the Proposals of Frankfort, but Napoleon’s delay prevented it from assembling until after the invasion of France was an accomplished fact. The success of this invasion altered the attitude of the allies towards France. They saw that the French nation was not going to arise in its might as it had done in 1793. They heard through sure hands that the people were almost in open rebellion against the Emperor. The Legislative Body had dared to oppose his wishes. Everywhere the conscription was evaded, and there was a muttered feeling throughout France that the country had had enough of war and that it was time that the blood-tax on the French youth should cease. Even the army itself was beginning to despair. The Emperor had lost his prestige in Russia and at Leipzig. His soldiers were not the veterans of his former wars; his generals and his marshals began to murmur and to fear that a war à outrance would end in their personal ruin. Under these circumstances the Congress of Châtillon met on the 3d of February 1814. The French plenipotentiary was Caulaincourt, the most upright of Napoleon’s statesmen. The other powers nominated, not their chief ministers, Metternich, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh, although they were all at headquarters, but subordinate diplomatists, namely, Count Philip Stadion, the predecessor of Metternich, for Austria, William von Humboldt for Prussia, Razumovski for Russia, and Lord Cathcart, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart for England.

At Châtillon very different conditions from the Proposals of Frankfort were offered. The main stipulation was that France should return to her limits before the Revolution. England haughtily declared that the naval question with regard to the rights of neutrals was not to be mentioned, and everything was made subject to the great question of the French limits. Caulaincourt disputed the proposals on the ground that it was unfair that France should be reduced to the limits she had held in 1789 while the other powers had been so vastly increased by the rearrangement of Germany and the partition of Poland. Nevertheless he was most anxious that Napoleon should accept these proposals. He granted that they were worse than the Proposals of Frankfort, but argued that if the war continued they were likely to be worse still. Napoleon, however, looked upon the Congress as an opportunity for gaining time. He believed that by his military successes he would avert the disasters which threatened him, and on the day of the battle of Montereau, the 18th of February, he wrote that he was only willing to agree to a peace on the basis of the Frankfort Proposals, and in his own handwriting he added to his despatch to Caulaincourt, ‘Sign nothing.’[13] It is worthy of note that in the Proposals of Châtillon nothing was said about Napoleon himself. The Emperor Francis assumed that his son-in-law would remain upon the throne of France, and Lord Castlereagh expressed no view to the contrary. But the English Minister was absolutely determined not to yield to Napoleon’s demand for the natural limits of France. England was the paymaster of the coalition, and Castlereagh having just promised £10,000,000 to pay the military expenses of 1814 felt that he had the right to insist on his demand. Napoleon in after years declared that his persistence in retaining Belgium was the reason for his refusal to accede to the Proposals of Châtillon. ‘Antwerp,’ he said to Las Cases, ‘was to me a province in itself; it was the principal cause of my exile to Saint Helena, for it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the terms offered at Châtillon. If they would have left it to me peace would have been concluded.’[14] Metternich wrote to Caulaincourt pressing the acceptance of the Proposals of Châtillon, but Napoleon obstinately refused, and the Congress had practically failed by the beginning of March, though it did not actually break up until the 19th of that month.

The fact that the French nation did not rise in arms against the invaders has been mentioned as the primary cause for the difference between the terms offered at Frankfort and at Châtillon. Nothing proves more completely how thoroughly Napoleon had extinguished the spirit of the Revolution than the lukewarmness with which his call to arms was received in 1814. In 1793 the invasion of France had caused a frenzy of patriotism. The people had submitted to the Reign of Terror, because it meant a strong government which could expel the English, Prussians, and Austrians. France was at that time hemmed in by difficulties infinitely greater than those which she had to face in 1814. Then she had no great general. In 1814 she possessed one of the greatest generals the world has ever seen. In 1793 she was torn by civil war in La Vendée and by brigands in every sparsely populated district. In 1814 she had enjoyed fifteen years of internal tranquillity. In 1793 her finances were utterly disordered, her industries were destroyed, and the whole country a prey to anarchy. In 1814 she had been for years the chief nation in Europe, and the wealth of other countries had been drained to enrich her. But the difference was that in 1793 and the succeeding years the French people felt that they were fighting to ward off the interference of foreign nations in their internal affairs, whereas in 1814 they were called on to defend the power of a single man who had infringed the rights and the freedom of other nations. By his bureaucratic system Napoleon had crushed out the power of popular initiative which had been the strength of the Republic; by his suppression of individual liberty he had made the majority of the French people disaffected to his Empire.

There must be considered also the exhaustion of actual physical resources. In the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, it is estimated that nearly 750,000 Frenchmen were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Before that time the Grand Army had been slowly destroyed on many a field of battle, and there simply were not sufficient men of military instinct and physical strength to fill the ranks. In 1813 Napoleon enrolled the conscripts whose turn would have come in 1815—mere boys of sixteen, who had melted away after the battle of Leipzig—and the men he called to the ranks in 1814 were those who had been passed over by the conscription in previous years, and were too long inured to civil life to be willing to serve as soldiers.

To the feeling that resistance to the invaders was not a national duty, must be added a general indisposition to support the Empire. The opinions which had found vent during the French Revolution had not been extinguished by the Empire; they had only been suppressed; and all the educated part of the nation was united in desiring representative institutions so as to exercise a share in directing the policy of the government. This opinion showed itself in the Legislative Body which was summoned in December 1813. Napoleon had announced that his cause was the cause of France; but in return the leaders of the Legislative Body only begged him to make peace. A paragraph was inserted in the report of the Legislative Body upon the Proposals of Frankfort, which contains the following words: ‘It belongs to the Government according to the Constitution to propose the most effectual means to repel the enemy and secure peace. These means will only be effectual if the French people are convinced that their blood will be shed only to defend the country and our protective laws. It appears, therefore, indispensable that at the same time that His Majesty shall propose the most prompt and efficacious measures for the safety of the State, the Government should be besought to maintain the entire and constant execution of the laws which guarantee to the French people the rights of liberty, security, and property, and to the nation the complete enjoyment of its political rights. That guarantee appears the most effectual means for restoring to the French people the energy necessary for their defence in the present crisis.’ Napoleon was much irritated by this attack on his arbitrary authority, and although this paragraph was expunged from the report by 254 votes to 223 he nevertheless dissolved the Legislative Body in a rage.

Neither at the Congress of Châtillon nor in the Legislative Body was a single word said about restoring the Bourbons. They had lost all credit during their exile. The French people did not want them. The allied powers did not care about them. By Lord Castlereagh’s orders Wellington received the Duc d’Angoulême, son of the Comte d’Artois, in his camp in the south of France, but he distinctly refused to recognise him in any way whatever. The English general went further and issued a proclamation in which he declared that the war was being waged for security to Europe, not for a change of dynasty in France, and that no interference was either intended or would be permitted in the free decision of the French people with regard to their internal government. When the Duc d’Angoulême was favourably received in Bordeaux and the Mayor of that city hoisted the white flag, Wellington wrote to the Bourbon prince defining his attitude and censuring the assertion in the Duke’s proclamation, that he was supported by England.

In spite of his real weakness Napoleon was so infatuated by his successes in February 1814 that, as has been said, the Congress came to an end, but he was not far wrong in his estimation of the effect of his victories upon the allied monarchs. So profoundly was Schwartzenberg terrified by the destruction of Blücher’s army and the victories of Nangis and Montereau that he wished to retreat from France. Differences between the powers at this juncture threatened to break up the coalition, and it was only the determination of Lord Castlereagh that kept them together. The English minister on the 1st of March 1814 concluded the secret Treaty of Chaumont. By this treaty the relations of the allied monarchs to each other on several points were defined, and though many fresh causes of dissension arose at a later date, it was the Treaty of Chaumont which kept the powers together until the overthrow of Napoleon, and which laid the basis of the final settlement at Vienna. By this treaty the four great powers, England, Russia, Austria and Prussia, bound themselves, if France refused to return within her ancient limits, to form an offensive and defensive alliance. Each member of the coalition was to maintain 150,000 men in the field, and England bound herself, in addition to paying her own contingent and maintaining her navy, to contribute a subsidy of £5,000,000 a year to be divided equally amongst the other three contracting parties. As England by this arrangement offered more than twice as much as any other country, Castlereagh practically became the master of the coalition. After peace was concluded each of the powers was to furnish a contingent of 60,000 men if any one of them were attacked. The resettlement of Europe was to be arranged on the following bases: that the German Empire should be restored as a federal union; that Holland and Belgium should be united into a monarchy under the House of Orange; that Spain should be restored to its ancient sovereign; that Italy should be divided into independent states; and that Switzerland should be guaranteed as independent and neutral by all the great powers.

The result of the Treaty of Chaumont was to stiffen the attitude of the allies in France. All thought of retreat was abandoned and both the Austrians under Schwartzenberg, and the Army of Silesia under Blücher recommenced their advance upon Paris. Napoleon pursued the tactics which had been crowned with success in the month of February, and prepared to strike at each of the invading armies in turn. His first movement as before was against Blücher. The Army of Silesia had been reduced by the actions of Champaubert, Montmirail, etc., from 60,000 to 30,000 men, but it was now increased to more than its former number by the arrival of Saint Priest’s Russians and of the two corps of Bülow and Wintzingerode which had been detached from Bernadotte by Lord Castlereagh. Napoleon was not aware of the extent of these reinforcements, and he therefore with his army of barely 30,000 men ventured to attack Blücher. On the 7th and 9th of March, the severe actions of Craonne and Laon were fought. Neither side won victories, but Napoleon failed to repeat his former successes, which was tantamount to a defeat. After the battle of Laon both Blücher and Napoleon reviewed the armies at their disposal, and the disparity of their strength is shown by the fact that whereas Blücher reviewed 109,000 men, Napoleon found that including all reinforcements, he had but 46,000. Having failed to check the Prussians, Napoleon turned to attack Schwartzenberg’s army. On the 20th of March he fought an action at Arcis-sur-Aube, in which the Russians repulsed the French attack. The Emperor then resolved on a final effort. He determined to attack the lines of communication of the invaders, and marched towards the Vosges Mountains. But the invaders were in too strong force to be terrified by this manœuvre. A few divisions only were left to watch him, and the main armies continued their advance on Paris. On March the 30th, Schwartzenberg and Blücher arrived in front of the French capital. They had under their command about 200,000 men, whereas Marshals Marmont and Mortier, who had been charged with the defence of Paris, could not get under arms more than 28,000 including the National Guard. In spite of this enormous difference of strength the two marshals took up a position and prepared to defend Paris. But after the most obstinate resistance the allies carried the French position after ten hours’ fighting on the 30th of March, and on the following day the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia entered Paris. Napoleon rapidly followed the allied army, but the occupation of Paris was fatal to his cause. He was ready to continue the war, but his marshals were not. On the 4th of April Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and Lefebvre had an interview with the Emperor, and told him that the army would fight no more. Napoleon was obliged to give heed to their remonstrances, and he sent Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to make what arrangements might be possible with the allied monarchs.

On entering Paris the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William proceeded at once to the residence of Talleyrand. That astute statesman quickly decided upon a definite policy. He understood that the allies had hitherto treated with Napoleon, and that they were not favourably disposed to the Bourbons. He knew that the French nation did not desire the return of the former dynasty. But he felt that the only method which would enable France to take up a logical position on the Continent was by the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. If Louis XVIII. were accepted as King of France, it would be a contradiction in terms to their professed belief in hereditary rights, and their hatred for the results of the Revolution, for the allied monarchs to attack the unity of France. For this reason Talleyrand persuaded Alexander that it would be inadmissible either to accept the government of the Empress Marie Louise in the name of her son, the King of Rome, or still less to recognise Alexander’s candidate, Bernadotte. In his own words to the Emperor: ‘Any attempt to create a Regency or to appoint Bernadotte is a mere intrigue; nothing remains but Bonaparte or the Bourbons.’ Alexander then declared that he would no longer treat with Napoleon, and Talleyrand as Vice-Arch-Chancellor of the Empire summoned the Senate to meet upon the 1st of April.

The Senate at once elected a Provisional Government consisting of Talleyrand as President and the Comte de Bournonville, former War Minister of the Republic, the Comte de Jaucourt, a former leader of the Legislative Assembly, the Abbé de Montesquiou, a former leader of the Constituent Assembly, and the Duc de Dalberg, nephew of the Prince Primate of Germany. The Senate then resolved that, whatever government should be adopted, the sale of the national and ecclesiastical estates in the days of the Revolution should be ratified, the liberty of worship and of the press established, and a general amnesty declared. On the following day the Emperor Alexander addressed the Senate. He said: ‘It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has led me hither; my armies have only entered France to repel unjust aggressions. Your Emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions when I only wished for peace. I am a friend of the French People; I impute their faults to their chief alone; I am here with the most friendly intentions; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You are charged with one of the most glorious missions which generous men can discharge,—that of securing the happiness of a great people, in giving France institutions, at once strong and liberal, with which she cannot dispense in the advanced state of civilisation to which she has attained.’ Alexander in conclusion, as a sign of his goodwill, declared that he would release the 150,000 French prisoners of war then in Russia.

That evening the Senate solemnly declared Napoleon to be no longer Emperor, and formed a Provisional Ministry, including Comte Beugnot, Minister of the Interior, Baron Louis, Minister of Finance, and General Dupont, who had been disgraced for the Capitulation of Baylen, Minister for War. Matters had reached this stage when Napoleon’s emissaries Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt, arrived at the headquarters of the allied monarchs. These faithful adherents proposed that Napoleon should abdicate in favour of his infant son. This offer, which would have been gladly received some days before, was now rejected, owing to the influence of Talleyrand, and on April the 6th, when Napoleon received the news of this rejection, he unconditionally abdicated at Fontainebleau. This step was made necessary by the fact that the faithful marshals could not even speak in the name of the whole army on behalf of Napoleon. Marshal Marmont, who had distinguished himself in the great battle before Paris, had made separate terms for himself and placed his army at the disposal of the allies. The desertion of Marmont deprived Napoleon of the greater part of the forces on which he relied, and rendered his unconditional abdication necessary.

The abdication of Napoleon was followed by the arrival of Lord Castlereagh in Paris. The English minister had since the breaking up of the Congress of Châtillon remained at the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria at Dijon. It was there that he had entered into intimate relations with Metternich, relations which were to lead to most important results. On the 11th of April 1814, the Provisional Treaty of Paris was signed. It was essentially a treaty between the Emperor Napoleon, through his plenipotentiaries, and the allied monarchs. It was not a treaty with France, for Louis XVIII. had not arrived from England, or been recognised as king, and the Provisional Government could only enter into provisional arrangements. By this treaty, which was signed by Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh, Napoleon renounced for himself and his descendants the Empire of France and the Kingdom of Italy. He was, however, to retain the title of Emperor; the island of Elba was erected into an independent principality for him, and an income of £180,000 a year was granted to him. The duchies of Parma and Piacenza were secured in full sovereignty to the Empress Marie Louise, and after her decease to the King of Rome, and the divorced Empress Josephine was given an annuity of £40,000 a year. On the day before this treaty was signed, April 10th, 1814, the Battle of Toulouse was fought. Wellington after his victory of Orthez had rapidly followed Soult into the heart of Southern France. When he attacked the French positions in front of Toulouse, he was ignorant of the great events which had been passing at Paris and at Fontainebleau, and it was only after his entrance into the city that he perceived the white cockade was being worn.

On the 20th of April 1814, Napoleon bade farewell to the Guard at Fontainebleau, and started for Elba, and on the 24th his successor, Louis XVIII., who had not entered France since his escape in 1791, landed at Calais. The new King was eminently fitted by his natural character, which had been matured by his long exile, for a constitutional monarch, but unfortunately he was surrounded by men who had shared his exile, and who did not share his placable disposition. On the 2d of May, when he had reached the neighbourhood of Paris, Louis XVIII. published what is known as the Declaration of St. Ouen. In this declaration, he promised a constitution to the French people, which should provide among other things for a representative government with two chambers, complete liberty of worship and the press, the right of the representatives to grant taxation, the inviolability of all property, including national and ecclesiastical estates, which had been sold during the Revolution, the responsibility of the ministers, irremoveability of the judges, and complete equality before the law. On the following day, he entered Paris amid general rejoicings, for the French people had forgotten their grievances of olden time in the memory of their more recent sufferings in the latter years of Napoleon. He was not in any way treated with by the Provisional Government; his return was tacitly accepted as inevitable; and he returned to the Tuileries as of divine right, without any bargain being made with him.

The first important duty which fell to Louis XVIII. was the signature of a definitive treaty of peace with the allies. The evacuation of French territory by the invaders had been arranged with the Provisional Government on the 23d of April, and the foreign troops were already beginning to retire. By the definitive Treaty of Paris, which was negotiated by Talleyrand on behalf of Louis XVIII., it was agreed that France should return to her limits of 1792. By this arrangement, the early annexations of the Revolution before the outbreak of war were secured to France. These additions included Avignon and the County of the Venaissin, which had formerly belonged to the Pope, and several districts in Alsace, of which the most noteworthy were the Principality of Montbéliard formerly the property of the King of Würtemberg, and the Republic of Mulhouse. France also received Chambéry, and part of Savoy, with certain rectifications of the frontier in the neighbourhood of Geneva, and on the north-eastern border. All the former French colonies, except the islands of the Mauritius, Tobago, and Saint Lucia, were restored to France. With regard to other countries, it was agreed, as had been laid down in the Treaty of Chaumont, that Germany was to become a Confederacy instead of an Empire, that Holland and Belgium were to be united, that Italy was to be divided into independent states, and that the independence of Switzerland was to be guaranteed by all the great powers. At the same time that this treaty was signed, a secret treaty was agreed to between the four invading powers, without consulting France. This secret treaty dealt largely with the future apportionment of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine which had been administered by France ever since 1794. It was roughly agreed that these provinces should be annexed to Prussia, and it was further laid down, that Austria should possess the whole of Lombardy, and that Genoa should be united to Sardinia. The details of this arrangement, and the many other questions which were certain to arise were adjourned, and it was settled that they should be considered at a great congress which was to meet at Vienna.

The two nations which had done the most to overthrow the excessive power of Napoleon were England and Russia, and the two men most conspicuously concerned were the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh. The two rival German powers, Austria and Prussia, naturally inclined to different sides. Prussia was the declared ally of Russia; the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William had formed one of the romantic personal friendships which Alexander loved; and the Russian and Prussian ministers were in perfect accord in desiring to punish France and her allies, and to aggrandise themselves. Austria on the other hand naturally inclined to support England. Both feared the increasing preponderance of Russia; both felt that enough had been done in deposing Napoleon, and did not desire to wreak vengeance on France; both were inclined to be moderate in their demands. This rivalry between Russia with Prussia, and Austria with England had appeared in its incipient stages before the Treaty of Chaumont, and it was to rise to its height during the Congress of Vienna. The return of the Bourbons to France was to have an important result on the rivalry between the allies, and it is a significant proof of the inherent power of France, and of the greatness of the ascendency which she had won, that she was enabled at Vienna to act the most decisive part. The overthrow of Napoleon had not really weakened France; she had lost her natural territorial limits of the Rhine and the Alps which she might have obtained but for the stubbornness of Napoleon; nevertheless, she was still strong enough to be feared, and in the day of her greatest disaster she was able to exert a greater influence in the affairs of Europe than she had ever done since the time of Louis xiv.