A grave conflict of opinion now arose between the Queen and Lord John Russell. Lord John, like Lord Palmerston, was desirous of re-arranging the affairs of Italy in terms of an understanding with France. In other words, he was desirous of neutralising the Treaty of Zurich by getting one of its signatories to join him in breaking those of its conditions which were favourable to the other signatory. No doubt it was difficult to persuade the Central Italian States to abide by a treaty that handed them back to the oppressors whom they had got rid of. But the problem of reconciling the people to their petty despots was one which the Queen argued should be solved, not by England, who did not create it, but by France and Austria, who did. Again, after some controversy, she succeeded in overruling fresh plans for intervention which Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell had mooted,[54] and thus matters were left when the Court reached Balmoral on the 31st of August. Hardly had the first week of her holiday passed by when the Queen discovered that Palmerston had broached his project for annexing the Italian Duchies to Sardinia in a private letter to Walewski, who, however, frankly said such a proposal would prevent Austria from signing any treaty, and thus lead to a renewal of the war. She wrote to Lord John Russell condemning Palmerston’s indiscretion, and pointing out that Walewski himself suggested that annexation of Savoy to France would be the natural compensation for annexing the Duchies to Sardinia—a compensation which would be odious to England, but which would be justified on the ground, that Palmerston’s policy rendered it necessary. But Tuscany and Romagna desired annexation to Sardinia, and Napoleon accordingly suggested that a Congress should be summoned to consider the matter. Lord Palmerston agreed to this project, and though the Queen did not oppose Palmerston, she did not conceal her opinion that the object of the Congress was to induce England to do for the Italians what Napoleon had promised but had failed to do. She, however, induced the Cabinet to warn Napoleon that England would not take on herself his self-imposed duty to his clients in the revolted States. They, in the meanwhile, calmly carried on their government in the name of the Sardinian king, and in open defiance of the compact of Villafranca.

Save for these anxious diplomatic perplexities, the Balmoral holiday was a highly enjoyable one, notable for long mountain excursions, of which the Queen’s ascent of Ben Macdhui was one of the most striking. The Prince Consort’s address to the British Association at Aberdeen was well received, and it was followed by a Highland gathering of philosophers at Balmoral, whose fête was, however, marred by tempestuous weather. On the journey south the Queen opened, on the 14th of October, the great waterworks at Loch Katrine for the supply of Glasgow—works on a scale of magnificence not unworthy of the Roman Empire. After a pleasant, but brief sojourn in Wales, the Queen and her husband reached Windsor on the 17th, pleased to find that the Prince and Princess Frederick William proposed soon to visit them. They came on the 9th of November—when the birthday of the Prince of Wales was celebrated—and stayed till the 3rd of December. The last month of the year was spent at Osborne, till Christmastide came round, when the Royal Family removed to Windsor, where, writes the Prince Consort in his Diary, “we danced in the New Year.”

CHAPTER III.

THE COURT AND THE CABINET.

Although the new year (1860) opened brightly for commercial England, the political outlook was far from cheerful. The Cabinet and the Queen were by no means in harmony on Foreign affairs, and Ministers were themselves far from being agreed as to a Reform policy. Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Milner Gibson were violently anti-Austrian. They were so eager to win credit for establishing a free kingdom in Northern Italy, that they were easy dupes in the hands of the French Emperor, whose design it was to achieve this end, so that whilst the credit should be his, the risk should be theirs. The Queen, on the other hand, was profoundly distrustful of French policy. She persisted in seeing in it nothing save a scheme for getting England to “pull the chestnuts out of the fire” for France. Her view was that the Italian people were now masters of the situation. Their old rulers could not be restored save by force, which Napoleon did not dare to use, and which Austria, weakened in her finances, and menaced by a Hungarian rising, was also afraid to apply. The solution of the Italian question in the opinion of the Queen might be safely left to the natural course of events, and the duty of England was done when she frankly expressed her sympathy with the Italian struggle for constitutional freedom. Napoleon, however, after promising to make Italy “free from the Alps to the Adriatic,” could hardly leave her to free herself as she was doing. His engagements to Austria on the other hand rendered it difficult for him to interfere actively. But it would have suited his convenience admirably if he were able to interfere with an ally, and on the basis of a proposal which originated with England, for then he might be able to offer a plausible excuse for not abiding by the pact of Villafranca. The game of diplomacy during this period was played, by France insinuating projects of interference to Lord Palmerston, so that they might seem to have originated with him, and by Lord Palmerston putting them into Lord John Russell’s mind, so that Lord John, who was at

the Foreign Office, might seem to the Queen to be the originator of them. There is reason to believe that the Queen quite understood her Prime Minister’s tactics. Mr. Greville gives a graphic sketch of her relations to her Ministers during this period of controversy, in his record of a conversation which he had with Lord Clarendon about a confidential visit he paid to Osborne in the previous summer. “The Queen,” writes Mr. Greville, “was delighted to have him (Clarendon) with her again, and to have a good long confidential talk with him, for it seems she finds less satisfaction in her intercourse with either Palmerston or Lord John. The relations of these two are now most intimate and complete. Palmerston, taking advantage of Russell’s ignorance of Foreign Affairs, used to suggest a project to him. Russell would bring this before the Cabinet as his own, and Palmerston would support it as if the case was quite new to him.” At Osborne Clarendon “was unfortunately attacked by gout, and confined to his room. He was sitting there with Lady Clarendon, when Lady Gainsborough came in and told him that she was desired by the Queen to beg he would, if possible, move into the next room [the lady-in-waiting’s room] and establish himself there; that the Queen would come in, when all the ladies present were to go away and leave

her tête-à-tête with him. All this was done, and she remained there an hour and a half talking over everything, pouring all her confidences into his ears, and asking for his advice about everything. He said he had endeavoured to do as much good as he could, by smoothing down her irritation about things she did not like. As an example, he mentioned that while the Prince was with him a box was brought in with a despatch from Lord John which the Prince was to read. He did so with strong marks of displeasure, and then read it to Clarendon, saying they could not approve of it, and must return it to Lord John. Clarendon begged him not to do this; that it was not the way to deal with him, and it would be better to see what it contained that was really good and proper, and to suggest emendations as to the rest. He persuaded the Prince to do this, advised him what to say, and in the end Lord John adopted all the suggestions they made to him. On another occasion the Queen had received a very touching letter from the Duchess of Parma, imploring her protection and good offices, which she had sent to Lord John, desiring he would write an answer for her to make to it. He sent a very short, cold answer, which the Queen would not send. She asked Clarendon to write a suitable one for her, which he did, but insisted that she should send it to Lord John as her own. She did so, Lord John approved, and so this matter was settled.”[55]

An “inspired” pamphlet on the “Pope and the Congress” had appeared in Paris, pointing to a re-arrangement of the Italian Provinces, that not only alarmed Austria, but caused her to decline to enter the Congress altogether, unless France would disavow her complicity with such schemes. The moment, therefore, was opportune for a fresh combination, and the Emperor’s new plan was one to settle the Italian Question by a triple alliance between England, France, and Sardinia, which would guarantee the latter Power against all foreign intervention in Italy. At a meeting of the Liberal Cabinet this insidious project was broached by Lord Palmerston[56] on the 3rd of January, who was willing to enter into it even at the risk of war. The compact was long an affair of mystery, but light is thrown on it by a letter from Lord Derby to Lord Malmesbury (January 15th, 1860), in which Lord Derby says, “I return the well-known handwriting enclosed in your letter of the 13th. The information there given tallies with what I have received from other quarters, among others from Madame de Flahault, whom I met at Bretby. The offer of a commercial treaty was, however, coupled, though she did not tell me so, with the proposal of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, and a joint guarantee of the independence of Central Italy! Cowley came here specially to urge the adoption of these two measures; but my latest intelligence is that they were debated in the Cabinet on Tuesday last, strenuously urged by Palmerston and J. Russell, who had confidently assured the Cabinet of their success, acquiesced in by Gladstone, by the double inducement of his Italo-mania and his Free Trade policy, but on discussion rejected by a majority of the Cabinet.”[57]

The enlightened obstinacy with which the Queen pressed her objections to this wild scheme caused it to be abandoned, and for the courage and tenacity with which she maintained her position at that crisis England can never be too grateful. She foresaw, what Palmerston ignored, the inevitable conflict between Prussia and France, which she hoped and believed would lead to the unification of Germany, and one almost shudders to think of the position Great Britain would have occupied in 1870, had this offensive and defensive alliance with France been consummated in 1860. Her Majesty had permitted herself to be dragged by Palmerston into a war with Russia “for an idea,” with France as an ally. She could not forget the harsh lesson which that blunder had impressed on her. She could not forget, as easily as did Palmerston, how that alliance left England with little control over her action in war, and still less control over the settlement of the peace which was forced on her by the sudden desertion of her ally. Thwarted at this point, Napoleon and Palmerston renewed the attack at another. Persigny came to Lord John Russell with a suggestion that Austria and France should both pledge themselves not to interfere in Italy unless under a European mandate in case of anarchy, and he proposed that this arrangement might be made “the basis of an agreement between France and England.” The Queen’s answer was crushing. “If,” she wrote, “France and Austria will both abstain from interfering in the affairs of Italy, it will be much the wisest course; but the Queen cannot see why this should require an agreement to be entered into between France and us, who ought not to interfere at all.”[58]

As a matter of fact, Austria formally intimated she had no intention of interfering, and French troops in Rome and Lombardy were the only foreign troops at the time on Italian territory. But the recklessness of Palmerston’s intrigues with France cannot be justly appreciated, unless it is kept in view that Napoleon was now entering into another arrangement for settling the Italian Question. At Plombières he had promised Cavour to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic on condition that Sardinia would cede Savoy and Nice to France. This bargain Cavour repudiated when the Emperor failed to make his word good at Villafranca. On the 16th of January Victor Emmanuel recalled Cavour to the head of affairs, and a new compact was made by which Sardinia would cede Nice and Savoy, as the price of Napoleon’s consent to her annexation of the revolted Duchies. It is hardly necessary to say that had Lord Palmerston, who was in ignorance of this compact, contrived to entangle England in alliance with France, the storm of indignation which swept over England when the cession of Nice and Savoy was intimated would have brought about the fall of his Ministry. But when Parliament opened on the 24th of January, and when Mr. Disraeli, in speaking to the Address, elicited very plainly the strong feeling of the House against compromising engagements with France, Lord Palmerston was fortunate in being able to say that his Government “was totally free from any engagement whatever with any Foreign Power upon the affairs of Italy.” He did not deem it necessary to add that for this stroke of luck the Cabinet owed him no thanks.

The points in the Queen’s Speech which attracted attention after the Italian Question were the hostilities with China and the Commercial Treat with France, which Mr. Cobden had negotiated during the fall of the preceding year. The Treaty with China was to have been ratified at Pekin. But when our Ambassador attempted to proceed thither he found the Peiho river blocked, and the Chinese forts not only opened fire, but repulsed our squadron. A joint expedition was fitted out in conjunction with France to avenge this defeat, and compel the Chinese Government to ratify the Treaty at Pekin, and complaints were made that Parliament had not been consulted before the joint expedition had been decided on. The history of Mr. Cobden’s Commercial Treaty has been told at great length elsewhere,[59] so that we need do no more than say it was signed on the 29th of January. Manchester immediately hailed Napoleon III. with the same effusive admiration that it bestowed on Peel in 1846. The English press, foreseeing an era of extended trade and permanent peace, ceased its attacks on the French Emperor, and complimented him so violently, that M. Baroche told Mr. Cobden its flattery would make the Treaty unpopular in France. The Treaty was at this stage merely the skeleton of a reciprocal fiscal arrangement. England gave France coal and iron duty free. England further agreed to reduce import duties on French wines and various articles of French manufacture. France, on the other hand, engaged not only to limit her customs duty to thirty per cent. on the value of English goods, but by the 13th Article she agreed to convert ad valorem duties into specific duties by a supplementary convention. The extent to which, under this Article, duties were reduced would of course measure the usefulness of the Treaty.

The Treaty, along with the changes in taxation which it would involve, was explained by Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons on the 10th of February. His Budget estimates showed a deficit of over £9,000,000, to meet which he not only continued the tea and sugar duties, but levied an Income Tax of 10d. in the pound on incomes over £150 a year, and 7d. on incomes under that amount. One part of his scheme was to abolish the Paper duty, but in this he was thwarted by the House of Lords. The French Treaty compelled him to lower the duty on French spirits and wines, and to abolish duties on manufactures not subject to excise in England. He struck 370 articles out of the Tariff list, and reduced and readjusted those that he retained, which were forty-eight. “The whole of our recent fiscal history,” according to a high authority on financial questions, “is a complete vindication of the policy of remitting and reducing duties, so that nothing should remain on the tariff which did not contribute a substantial sum to the revenue, and in order that it might do so, should bear no duty high enough to preclude its passing into general consumption. By the remissions of 1860 that ideal was nearly attained. As an example of how the remissions worked, I may mention that the imports of French wines increased at once by 127 per cent. on the reduction of the duty. On the whole of the articles on which the customs duties were repealed in 1860 the immediate increase on the import duty was 40½ per cent., although the year 1861 was in some respects a highly unfavourable one in which to judge of the purchasing capacity of the nation.”[60] This brilliant and successful policy, however, was opposed bitterly by the Tories and a few Peelites, like Sir James Graham; and some Whigs, like Lord Clarendon,

even condemned the policy of the Treaty as unsound.[61] The Queen was not sanguine about the matter, and the Prince Consort saw in the Treaty only a device for giving France the supply of coal and iron which she needed to compete with England in the markets of the world, whereas England surrendered valuable sources of revenue, without any adequate compensation. The strongest point against the Treaty was made by Lord Derby. He complained in the House of Lords that though the arrangement was based on the assumption that there would be peace between France and England, the general policy of the Cabinet, as tested by Mr. Gladstone’s estimates, assumed that war between the two nations was imminent. On a motion in the House of Commons asserting that it was not expedient to diminish sources of revenue or add a penny to the Income Tax, the whole policy of the Treaty and the Budget was challenged, and the opposition to both defeated by a majority of 116. The theoretical objections to commercial treaties generally were overcome by Mr. Gladstone’s argument that by making a small sacrifice of revenue England gained a vast extension of her export trade. But the real difficulty, of course, lay in fixing the limits of the duties under the 13th Article of the Treaty. A Commission was sent to Paris, on which Mr. Cobden agreed to serve, for the purpose of beating down the duties from the thirty per cent. maximum to a minimum of as nearly as possible ten per cent., and it was while this Commission was haggling with the French Commissioners that Cobden found himself thwarted by the secret hostility of the Foreign Office, and embarrassed by the bellicose policy of the Cabinet, which naturally produced ill feeling in France. He resented this action so bitterly, that he could not bring himself to accept from the Government the slightest reward for his services as a negotiator after he had carried out his mission with triumphant success.[62]

At the same time, it is only fair to say that the conduct of Napoleon at the time was singularly indiscreet. He made it plain that he was about to annex Nice and Savoy, although when he went to war in Italy he had protested that he did not seek for extension of territory. The Central Italian States, however, by voting through their assemblies in favour of annexation to Sardinia, furnished the French Emperor with an excuse for annexations, which were only necessary to recompense France for her expenditure of blood and treasure in the war with Austria. It was obvious that a great Italian kingdom would now be created in North Italy, and the Emperor held that he could not leave in its hands the passes by which France might be invaded. To secure his Alpine frontier, then, the Emperor insisted on taking Savoy and Nice. The provoking matter was this: the suggestion that the Central States should by a new vote in their Assemblies declare their intentions as to their future came from England. “We are asked,” wrote the Queen, in a sharp letter to Lord John Russell, “to make proposals about Italy, ‘to lay the basis for a mutual agreement with France, upon that question, and to enable the Emperor to release himself from his engagements with Austria.’ In an evil hour the proposal is made, and is now pleaded as the reason for France seizing on Savoy.... Sardinia is being aggrandised at the expense of Austria and the House of Lorraine, and France is to be compensated. If the passes of the Alps are dangerous to a neighbour, the weaker power must give them up to the stronger!”[63] The Queen, in fact, feared that on the same pretext the French Emperor might be led to demand a rectification of his Rhenish frontier, a demand which she knew must lead straight to a disastrous European war. A discussion raised by Lord Normanby in the House of Lords on the 7th of February stirred up the forces of public opinion against France. As for Cavour, he was helpless. The consent of France to the enlargement of Sardinia could not be bought save by the cession of Nice and Savoy, and so they were ceded to France, despite Cavour’s reluctance, on the 24th of March.

But the Commercial Treaty was not the only project of the Government which English mistrust of France imperilled. The Ministry was pledged to bring in a Reform Bill, and at a time when folk were brooding over the growing restlessness of France, there was little chance of carrying it. On the 1st of March Lord John Russell expounded his scheme to the House of Commons for reducing the franchise from £10 to £6, and taking twenty-five seats from small constituencies returning two members, and giving them to large constituencies deserving increased representation. The scheme fell flat in the House of Commons and in the country. It was cautiously attacked by Mr. Disraeli, who, though he declined to oppose the Second Reading, suggested that the Bill should be withdrawn. The supporters of the Ministry had no love for the measure, because if passed it involved a dissolution. The Second Reading was taken without a division, but before the stage of Committee was reached Lord John Russell withdrew the measure, and thus the question of Reform was shelved for several years to come. Lord John at last admitted that he had been mistaken in supposing that there was any widespread enthusiasm for Reform in the country. He, however, failed to see that the withdrawal of the Bill rendered Palmerston’s tenure of office a little precarious, for the party of Reform, knowing it could expect no more from him, had no strong motive for supporting him any further against the Tories.

In the meantime France was beginning to hint that Prussia should play the part of Sardinia in Germany. The consent of France, of course, could be obtained on the same terms as those which Cavour paid for it—the cession to France of territory on the Rhine. Clearly, it was argued, Napoleon would give Europe no rest till he had rectified the frontier assigned to France in 1815, after the fall of the First Empire. Very soon it became necessary to proclaim that England had no part in these schemes, and when, on the 26th of March, Lord John Russell declared in the House of Commons that there was no longer an exclusive alliance with France, the Queen congratulated him on what was really the triumph of her own policy. According to her view, a belief that this alliance existed made the European Powers at all times chary of cooperating with England. Unfortunately, Lord John Russell’s speech irritated

public opinion in France, and the recriminations of the Press in both countries caused Persigny to warn Palmerston that war between them would soon be inevitable. Count Flahault and Lord Palmerston held a conversation on the subject, in which they discussed the chances of war in the frankest manner—each vaunting the undeniable superiority of his country in battle.[64] Count Flahault is supposed to have been impressed with Palmerston’s demonstration that victory in such a struggle must rest on English banners, and to have succeeded in soothing down the angry feeling against England, which then raged at the French Court. The real reason why all danger of a rupture passed away was that Persigny’s favourite argument—namely, that war with England meant the

destruction of the dynasty—prevailed. Moreover, Napoleon saw plainly that as every European Power was afraid of France, and as no European Power had anything to dread from England, Europe in a war between England and France would not be on the side of the latter Power. But no sooner did France suggest that the Treaty arrangements of 1815 might be rectified, than Russia hinted that the same process might be applied with advantage to the Treaty of 1856. The old pretext for opening up the Eastern Question—namely, the oppressiveness of the Turkish Government—lay ready to Russia’s hands. The English Cabinet, in reply to Russia’s communications on the subject, insisted that the plots of foreign intriguers in Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Servia were really at the root of the miseries of the people. Russia, in raising this question, had assumed that France would help her. But Napoleon’s eyes were fixed not on the Danube but on the Rhine; so Russian hopes of aid from France were doomed to disappointment. The next move on the European chess-board justified the anticipations which the Queen held out after Lord John Russell’s speech of the 24th of March. Finding that England no longer leaned solely on France, Austria and Prussia suggested that they should come to an understanding with England, by which they bound each other to oppose every future disturbance of frontiers in Europe—a step, however, which her Majesty shrank from taking. At her suggestion, the Cabinet agreed to a compact that each of the Powers should give the others warning of any projected disturbances of territory as soon as they were heard of, and frankly discuss their bearings; and of these disturbances one was already imminent in Southern Italy.

“Naples,” Lord Malmesbury writes in his Diary on the 17th of March, “is in a dreadful state. The tyranny of the present king far exceeds that of his father, and the exasperation is so great that a revolution may take place at any moment. But events in the north of Italy have much to say to these feelings, and naturally encourage the Neapolitans to imitate them.” In fact, Francis II. had obstinately refused to make the slightest concession to the popular party in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Heedless of the revolution in North Italy he upheld in all its baneful integrity the arbitrary system of his father, King “Bomba.” Hence in April an insurrection broke out, as Lord Malmesbury predicted, in Palermo and Messina with the avowed object of joining Sicily to the new kingdom of Northern Italy. On the 5th of May General Garibaldi, who, after the cession of his native province of Nice to France, had renounced all connection with Cavour, sailed from Genoa with 2,000 men to succour the Sicilian insurgents. “‘Italy and Victor Emmanuel!’” he said in his proclamation, “that was our battle-cry when we crossed the Ticino; it will resound to the very depths of Etna.” Landing at Marsala, he proclaimed himself Dictator in the name of the King of Sardinia, and Cæsar’s Veni, vidi, vici, might well be the record of his triumphal march to the north. On the 27th he captured Palermo, and then the Island of Sicily soon passed under his control. Every road was swarming with patriotic volunteers eager to join Garibaldi’s army, and the Royal troops, disgusted with the cowardice and incapacity of their leaders, were wavering in their allegiance to the King. They made a final stand at Melazzo, after which they took refuge in the citadel of Messina, where they remained undisturbed at the end of the year. “If we succeed,” wrote Garibaldi to Victor Emmanuel, “I shall be proud to adorn your Majesty’s crown with a new and perhaps more brilliant jewel, but always on the condition that your Majesty will resist your advisers should they wish to cede this province to the stranger, as they have ceded my native city, Nice.” The bitter allusion to Cavour’s policy, which had converted Garibaldi into a Frenchman against his will, is a sufficient answer to those who have alleged that Cavour was acting at this time in concert with Garibaldi. The most that can be said is that he knew privately that a revolutionary attack on the Sicilian monarchy was contemplated, and finding it to his account to preoccupy Francis II., then threatening interference in the revolted Roman States, he did not consider it necessary to prevent Garibaldi’s departure from Genoa.[65] But all the European Governments believed that Cavour was secretly in league with Garibaldi, and they pretended to see in the revolution of the Sicilies an attempt at piratical self-aggrandisement by Sardinia. Sardinian ambition must be curbed, said the diplomatists; and so Cavour soon found himself surrounded by embarrassments. Russia hinted at armed intervention for the protection of the Neapolitan Bourbons. France, in a paroxysm of virtue, deprecated any extension of Sardinian territory. England implored Sardinia to take no hand in, and lend no countenance to, the revolution in the Sicilies, lest France should demand more compensations in Genoa and the Island of Sardinia itself. When Lord John Russell pressed this view on the Cabinet of Turin he was probably ignorant of the fact that Cavour, when he signed the compact ceding Savoy to France, said, bitterly, “Et maintenant vous voilà nos complices!” (“Now you are an accomplice”). France had, in fact, been paid in full for her neutrality; and though Cavour issued a platonic protest against the conquest of the Sicilies in May, it was obvious that Victor Emmanuel would never risk his Crown by actively impeding in any part of Italy the movement for national independence.

The Court of Naples at this crisis seemed paralysed with panic. In August Garibaldi advanced virtually unopposed, and captured the capital, the King, with 50,000 troops, retreating to Capua and Gaëta.[66]

Italy, said Mr. Disraeli, in one of the debates in Parliament, “was in a state far beyond the management of, and settlement of Courts and Cabinets,” and whilst diplomatists were debating how she could be kept in bondage, she had freed half of her territory by one daring but decisive stroke. Flushed with his easy victory, Garibaldi now declared he would hold South Italy till the whole peninsula was free—till Austria was expelled from the north-east, and the eagles of France were chased from the pinnacles of the capital. This declaration forced the hands of France and Sardinia. Cavour and Napoleon agreed that intervention in the Papal States and in Naples could not be postponed.[67] Victor Emmanuel, therefore, summoned the Pope to dismiss the foreign levies he had organised for the purpose of forcing his revolted subjects to return to their allegiance. His Holiness refused, and then Cialdini and Fanti overran Umbria and the Marches, crushed the Papal army, and forced Lamoriciere to surrender the fortress of Ancona. Carefully avoiding a collision with Austria and with the French army of occupation in Rome—a condition attached to the neutrality of Napoleon III.—the Piedmontese troops marched on to complete the conquest of the Sicilies, where the King still held out at Gaëta and Capua. When this had been effected the kingdoms, by a popular vote, decided on annexation to Sardinia, and Europe acquiesced in the interests of law, order, and monarchical institutions. Garibaldi, on handing over the Sicilies to Victor Emmanuel, retired to Caprera, refusing all reward or recompense for his splendid services to his country, and appealing to Italy to be ready to renew the struggle for freedom in Venetia next year. But the prevailing feeling was that a final settlement of the Italian Question had not yet been arrived at, and would never be arrived at whilst Austria held Venetia and the French occupied Rome. Knowing well that the hold of Austria on Venetia was weakened by disaffection in Hungary, the Emperor of Austria promulgated a general constitution for the Empire, with separate charters for the various provinces. The scheme, however, broke down, because it failed to satisfy the popular demand for the restoration of the rights of Hungary as they existed in 1848.

Early in the summer a remarkable incident in European politics happened that profoundly agitated the Queen. The French press had suggested that, provided France was compensated by an extension of frontier on the Rhine, Prussia might, with her consent, play in Germany the rôle assumed by Sardinia in Italy. When Lord John Russell publicly abandoned the French alliance, the Queen suggested the substitution for it of an arrangement between England, Prussia, and Austria, to the effect “that each should make known to the other two any overture or proposition, direct, or indirect, which either of the three may receive from France tending to any change of the existing state of territorial possessions in Europe, and that no answer should be given to such overture or proposal until the Government to which it may have been made shall have had an answer from the other two to the communication so made.” [68]

This arrangement subsisted when the French Emperor suggested to the Prince Regent of Prussia that they should meet in friendly conference together at Baden on the 16th of June. The Prince Regent of Prussia met the French Emperor, not alone, but in company with the Kings of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover; the Grand Dukes of Baden, Saxe-Weimar, and Hesse Darmstadt; and the Dukes of Nassau and Saxe-Coburg Gotha, and the Prince of Hohenzollern. This, says the biographer of Prince Bismarck, was a “demonstration for the integrity of German soil,”[69] and it compelled the French Emperor to suddenly change his plan, which had been to suggest that Prussia should seize Savoy and Hanover, and let France rectify her frontier on the Rhine. This design could not be avowed at such a meeting, so Napoleon contented himself with assuring the Prince Regent of Prussia that he had no intention of dissevering any territory from Germany—and giving for the first time his reasons for violating the pledges of Milan and annexing Nice and Savoy. The Prince accepted Napoleon’s assurances, saying that he could immediately restore confidence to Germany by communicating them to the German sovereigns then in Baden. He also transmitted to the Prince Consort a private account of the interview, which quite relieved the anxiety which the conference had caused the Queen.[70]

Following closely on this conference came a letter from the French Emperor to Persigny for Palmerston’s perusal, in which he strove hard to reconstruct his English alliance, but to which no other reply was given than that England gave France credit for good intentions, and would remain her friend so long as she did not disturb the peace of Europe.[71] Garibaldi’s invasion of the Sicilies had alarmed Austria. French conspirators, it was said, were already busy in Hungary and Russian Poland, and Venetia might be attacked at any moment. In these circumstances the attitude of Prussia was a matter of supreme concern to Austria. The unrest of Poland rendered it inconvenient for Russia to help Austria. Could she hope to induce Prussia to assist her in coercing her mutinous subjects? The meeting of the Emperor of Austria and the Prince Regent of Prussia at Töplitz was watched with intense interest by the Queen, who knew how fatal it would be for Germany if Prussia suffered herself to be entangled in the non-German affairs of Austria. The Austrian Emperor, however, did not ask for Prussian aid in the event of Venetia being attacked by France or Italy, unless, as he hoped, Prussia “after negotiations,” saw in such an attack a common danger. The real danger to Prussia was that Austria, after getting a promise of assistance, might provoke France to attack Italy; but as a matter of fact, the Prince Regent kept clear of all engagements with Austria at this interview, about which so much mystery was raised at the time. According to the private account of it given by the Prince of Prussia to the Prince Consort, it only led to an exchange of ideas, and to certain vague promises on the part of the Emperor Francis Joseph, that he would grant reforms to his provinces.[72] After the fall of the Neapolitan dynasty had been brought about, the French Emperor let it be known that whilst he approved of the creation of a strong Italian kingdom, he would not defend Italy if she attacked Austria. It was, indeed, the knowledge of this fact which enabled Cavour to hold the Italian Revolution in hand, for even Garibaldi was not so reckless as to rush into war against Austria without allies. Still, the Austrians put little faith in Napoleon’s assurances, and on the 25th of October a meeting between the rulers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia was held at Warsaw to discuss the situation.

The rumour which immediately flew round was that the Holy Alliance was to be revived, that the three Powers were to combine for the revision of the Treaty of 1856, and, having isolated England, to coerce all struggling nationalities, and defend Austria in Venetia and Hungary. This rumour was quite unfounded. The Powers did agree, however, that if Austria, attacked in Venetia, proved victorious and re-conquered Lombardy, she could not be asked beforehand to give back Lombardy to Italy, though the fate of that province might properly be determined by a Peace Congress. The Prince Regent of Prussia insisted that England must be kept informed of all their transactions in such a Congress. But at this meeting there was a decided tendency to isolate England because of Lord John Russell’s despatch of the 27th of October, and the Russian Czar pressed forward Prince Gortschakoff’s idea, which was that by conciliating France, a quadruple alliance might be formed against the progress of revolution, which Lord John Russell was supposed to have stimulated. The objection of the Prince Regent of Prussia—who, like the Austrian Emperor, thought that France ought to give new guarantees against raising revolutionary disturbances in Europe—to act save in concert with England, was, however, fatal to Prince Gortschakoff’s schemes. Prussia, in fact, held obstinately to the opinion that the friendship of England was of vital importance to the defence of Germany against French encroachments. These facts are worth noting, for they explain the just indignation of the Queen against a series of attacks on Prussia which at this inopportune moment began to appear in the Times. They preyed on the mind of the Prince Consort to such an extent that the Queen asserts his health gave way, which but served to add to her sorrows and anxieties.

Yet it is but just to say that the Times was not entirely to blame. The conduct of the Prussian Government in a matter of painful dispute between the administrations of the two countries was far from satisfactory. In September a certain Captain Macdonald quarrelled with the railway authorities at Bonn about a seat in a railway carriage. He was violently dragged from his place and cast into prison with arbitrary brutality. The Public Prosecutor, in dealing with his case, had publicly accused English residents and travellers in Germany of being notorious for “rudeness, impudence, and boorish arrogance;” and as the Queen and her husband were, a few days after that speech was delivered, themselves tourists in Germany, the Public Prosecutor’s insolence was felt to be peculiarly obnoxious. The Queen herself, in an entry in her Journal made during her German tour, says, “Saw Lord John on the subject of a vexatious circumstance which took place about three weeks ago—namely, a dispute on the railway at Bonn, and the ejection and imprisonment (unfairly, it seems) of a Captain Macdonald, and the subsequent offensive behaviour of the authorities. It has led to ill blood and much correspondence; but Lord John is very reasonable about it, and not inclined to do anything rash. These foreign Governments are very arbitrary and violent, and people are apt to give offence and to pay no regard to the laws of the country.”[73] Baron Schlenitz, says the Prince Consort in a letter to Stockmar, “took it [the dispute] very lightly;” whereas, on the other hand, Lord Palmerston demanded that the judge who sentenced Captain Macdonald to imprisonment should be dismissed, and reparation made to the Captain, otherwise diplomatic relations would be broken off with Prussia. But the Prussian Government kept this irritating business open for several

months; in fact, they did not settle the affair till May, 1861, and thus the English Press could not be altogether blamed if its criticisms of Prussian diplomacy were somewhat caustic.

Springing from the unrest of Europe we find in 1860 a great popular movement in England in favour of national defence. This found expression in two forms—in Palmerston’s Fortification Scheme and the rapid increase of the Volunteer Force. Both schemes were watched by the Queen with the closest attention, and both were furthered by her to the utmost of her power, though one of them very nearly shattered the Ministry. In an article on the History of 1852-60, Mr. Gladstone comments on the silent conflict that went on during 1860 between the policy that found expression in the Commercial Treaty with France, and that which was typified by the Fortification Scheme of Lord Palmerston.[74] The annexation of Nice and Savoy alarmed the country, and convinced even Lord Palmerston that the French Emperor had a fixed idea that it was his mission to rectify the frontier assigned to France in 1815. This might lead him to cast a hungry eye on Belgium, where already French intriguers were busy. As Mr. Tennyson sang, in the poem the publication of which in the Times of the previous year evoked the Volunteer Force, the word went round:—