VIII. But, it will be said, Ambrose, Origen, and Jerome believed that God dispenses his grace among men, according to his foreknowledge of the good use which every individual will make of it. Augustine also was once of the same sentiment; but when he had made a greater proficiency in scriptural knowledge, he not only retracted, but powerfully confuted it. And after his retractation, rebuking the Pelagians for persisting in this error, he says, “Who but must wonder that this most ingenious sense should escape the apostle? For after proposing what was calculated to excite astonishment respecting those children yet unborn, he started to himself, by way of objection, the following question: What, then, is there unrighteousness with God? It was the place for him to answer, that God foresaw the merits of each of them; yet he says nothing of this, but resorts to the decrees and mercy of God.” And in another place, after having discarded all merits antecedent to election, he says, “Here undoubtedly falls to the ground the vain reasoning of those who defend the foreknowledge of God in opposition to his grace, and affirm that we were elected before the foundation of the world, because God foreknew that we would be good, not that he himself would make us good. This is not the language of him who says, ‘Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.’[483] For if he elected us because he foreknew our future good, he must also have foreknown our choice of him;” and more to the like purpose. This testimony should have weight with those who readily acquiesce in the authority of the fathers. Though Augustine will not allow himself to be disunited from the rest, but shows by clear testimonies the falsehood of that discordance, with the odium of which he was loaded by the Pelagians, he makes the following quotations from Ambrose’s book on predestination: “Whom Christ has mercy on, him he calls. Those who were indevout he could, if he would, have made devout. But God calls whom he pleases, and makes whom he will religious.” If I were inclined to compile a whole volume from Augustine, I could easily show my readers, that I need no words but his; but I am unwilling to burden them with prolixity. But come, let us suppose them to be silent; let us attend to the subject itself. A difficult question was raised—Whether it was a just procedure in God to favour with his grace certain particular persons. This Paul could have decided by a single word, if he had pleaded the consideration of works. Why, then, does he not do this, but rather continue his discourse involved in the same difficulty? Why, but from necessity? for the Holy Spirit, who spoke by his mouth, never laboured under the malady of forgetfulness. Without any evasion or circumlocution, therefore, he answers, that God favours his elect because he will, and has mercy because he will. For this oracle, “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy,”[484] is equivalent to a declaration, that God is excited to mercy by no other motive than his own will to be merciful. The observation of Augustine therefore remains true, “that the grace of God does not find men fit to be elected, but makes them so.”
IX. We shall not dwell upon the sophistry of Thomas Aquinas, “that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination in regard to the act of him who predestinates; but that with regard to us, it may in some sense be so called, according to the particular consideration of predestination; as when God is said to predestinate glory for man according to merits, because he decreed to give him grace by which glory is merited.” For since the Lord allows us to contemplate nothing in election but his mere goodness, the desire of any one to see any thing more is a preposterous disposition. But if we were inclined to a contention of subtilty, we should be at no loss to refute this petty sophism of Aquinas. He contends that glory is in a certain sense predestinated for the elect according to their merits, because God predestinates to them the grace by which glory is merited. What if I, on the contrary, reply, that predestination to grace is subordinate to election to life, and attendant upon it? that grace is predestinated to those to whom the possession of glory has been already assigned; because it pleases the Lord to conduct his children from election to justification? For hence it will follow, that predestination to glory is rather the cause of predestination to grace, than the contrary. But let us dismiss these controversies; they are unnecessary with those who think they have wisdom enough in the word of God. For it was truly remarked by an ancient ecclesiastical writer, That they who ascribe God’s election to merits, are wiser than they ought to be.
X. It is objected by some, that God will be inconsistent with himself, if he invites all men universally to come to him, and receives only a few elect. Thus, according to them, the universality of the promises destroys the discrimination of special grace; and this is the language of some moderate men, not so much for the sake of suppressing the truth, as to exclude thorny questions, and restrain the curiosity of many. The end is laudable, but the means cannot be approved; for disingenuous evasion can never be excused; but with those who use insult and invective, it is a foul cavil or a shameful error. How the Scripture reconciles these two facts, that by external preaching all are called to repentance and faith, and yet that the spirit of repentance and faith is not given to all, I have elsewhere stated, and shall soon have occasion partly to repeat. What they assume, I deny, as being false in two respects. For he who threatens drought to one city while it rains upon another, and who denounces to another place a famine of doctrine,[485] lays himself under no positive obligation to call all men alike. And he who, forbidding Paul to preach the word in Asia, and suffering him not to go into Bithynia, calls him into Macedonia,[486] demonstrates his right to distribute this treasure to whom he pleases. In Isaiah, he still more fully declares his destination of the promises of salvation exclusively for the elect; for of them only, and not indiscriminately of all mankind, he declares that they shall be his disciples.[487] Whence it appears, that when the doctrine of salvation is offered to all for their effectual benefit, it is a corrupt prostitution of that which is declared to be reserved particularly for the children of the church. At present let this suffice, that though the voice of the gospel addresses all men generally, yet the gift of faith is bestowed on few. Isaiah assigns the cause, that “the arm of the Lord” is not “revealed” to all.[488] If he had said, that the gospel is wickedly and perversely despised, because many obstinately refuse to hear it, perhaps there would be some colour for this notion of the universal call. The design of the prophet is not to extenuate the guilt of men, when he states that the source of blindness is God’s not deigning to reveal his arm to them; he only suggests that their ears are in vain assailed with external doctrine, because faith is a peculiar gift. I would wish to be informed by these teachers, whether men become children of God by mere preaching, or by faith. Surely, when John declares that all who believe in God’s only begotten Son, are themselves made the children of God,[489] this is not said of all the hearers of the word in a confused mass, but a particular rank is assigned to believers, “which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.”[490] But they say, there is a mutual agreement between faith and the word. This is the case wherever there is any faith; but it is no new thing for the seed to fall among thorns or in stony places; not only because most men are evidently in actual rebellion against God, but because they are not all endued with eyes and ears. Where, then, will be the consistency of God’s calling to himself such as he knows will never come? Let Augustine answer for me: “Do you wish to dispute with me? Rather unite with me in admiration, and exclaim, O the depth! Let us both agree in fear, lest we perish in error.” Besides, if election is, as Paul represents it, the parent of faith, I retort that argument upon them, that faith cannot be general, because election is special. For from the connection of causes and effects, it is easily inferred, when Paul says, “God hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings, according as he hath chosen us before the foundation of the world;” that therefore these treasures are not common to all, because God has chosen only such as he pleased. This is the reason why, in another place, he commends “the faith of God’s elect;”[491] that none may be supposed to acquire faith by any exertion of their own, but that God may retain the glory of freely illuminating the objects of his previous election. For Bernard justly observes, “Friends hear each one for himself when he addresses them, ‘Fear not, little flock, for to you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven.’ Who are these? Certainly those whom he has foreknown and predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son. The great and secret counsel has been revealed. The Lord knows who are his, but what was known to God is manifested to men. Nor does he favour any others with the participation of so great a mystery, but those particular individuals whom he foreknew, and predestinated to be his own.” A little after he concludes, “The mercy of God is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him; from everlasting in predestination, to everlasting in beatification; the one knowing no beginning; the other, no end.” But what necessity is there for citing the testimony of Bernard, since we hear from the Master’s own mouth, that “no man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God,”[492] which implies, that all who are not regenerated by God, are stupefied with the splendour of his countenance. Faith, indeed, is properly connected with election, provided it occupies the second place. This order is clearly expressed in these words of Christ: “This is the Father’s will, that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which believeth on the Son, may have everlasting life.”[493] If he willed the salvation of all, he would give them all into the custody of his Son, and unite them all to his body by the sacred bond of faith. Now, it is evident, that faith is the peculiar pledge of his paternal love, reserved for his adopted children. Therefore Christ says in another place, “The sheep follow the shepherd, for they know his voice; and a stranger will they not follow, for they know not the voice of strangers.”[494] Whence arises this difference, but because their ears are divinely penetrated? For no man makes himself a sheep, but is created such by heavenly grace. Hence also the Lord proves the perpetual certainty and security of our salvation, because it is kept by the invincible power of God.[495] Therefore he concludes that unbelievers are not his sheep, because they are not of the number of those whom God by Isaiah promised to him for his future disciples.[496] Moreover, the testimonies I have cited, being expressive of perseverance, are so many declarations of the invariable perpetuity of election.
XI. Now, with respect to the reprobate, whom the apostle introduces in the same place; as Jacob, without any merit yet acquired by good works, is made an object of grace, so Esau, while yet unpolluted by any crime, is accounted an object of hatred.[497] If we turn our attention to works, we insult the apostle, as though he saw not that which is clear to us. Now, that he saw none, is evident, because he expressly asserts the one to have been elected and the other rejected while they had not done any good or evil; in order to prove the foundation of Divine predestination not to be in works.[498] Secondly, when he raises the objection whether God is unjust, he never urges, what would have been the most absolute and obvious defence of his justice, that God rewarded Esau according to his wickedness; but contents himself with a different solution, that the reprobate are raised up for this purpose, that the glory of God may be displayed by their means. Lastly, he subjoins a concluding observation, that “God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.”[499] You see how he attributes both to the mere will of God. If, therefore, we can assign no reason why he grants mercy to his people but because such is his pleasure, neither shall we find any other cause but his will for the reprobation of others. For when God is said to harden or show mercy to whom he pleases, men are taught by this declaration to seek no cause beside his will.
When the human mind hears these things, its petulance breaks all restraint, and it discovers as serious and violent agitation as if alarmed by the sound of a martial trumpet. Many, indeed, as if they wished to avert odium from God, admit election in such a way as to deny that any one is reprobated. But this is puerile and absurd, because election itself could not exist without being opposed to reprobation. God is said to separate those whom he adopts to salvation. To say that others obtain by chance, or acquire by their own efforts, that which election alone confers on a few, will be worse than absurd. Whom God passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and from no other cause than his determination to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children. And the petulance of men is intolerable, if it refuses to be restrained by the word of God, which treats of his incomprehensible counsel, adored by angels themselves. But now we have heard that hardening proceeds from the Divine power and will, as much as mercy. Unlike the persons I have mentioned, Paul never strives to excuse God by false allegations; he only declares that it is unlawful for a thing formed to quarrel with its maker.[500] Now, how will those, who admit not that any are reprobated by God, evade this declaration of Christ: “Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up?”[501] Upon all whom our heavenly Father has not deigned to plant as sacred trees in his garden, they hear destruction plainly denounced. If they deny this to be a sign of reprobation, there is nothing so clear as to be capable of proof to such persons. But if they cease not their clamour, let the sobriety of faith be satisfied with this admonition of Paul, that there is no cause for quarrelling with God, if, on the one hand, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, he endures, “with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction;” and on the other, makes “known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, whom he had afore prepared unto glory.”[502] Let the reader observe that, to preclude every pretext for murmurs and censures, Paul ascribes supreme dominion to the wrath and power of God; because it is unreasonable for those deep judgments, which absorb all our faculties, to be called in question by us. It is a frivolous reply of our adversaries, that God does not wholly reject the objects of his long-suffering, but remains in suspense towards them, awaiting the possibility of their repentance; as though Paul attributed patience to God, in expectation of the conversion of those whom he asserts to be fitted to destruction. For Augustine, in expounding this passage, where power is connected with patience, justly observes, that God’s power is not permissive, but influential. They observe, also, that it is not said without meaning, that the vessels of wrath are fitted to destruction, but that God prepared the vessels of mercy; since by this mode of expression, he ascribes and challenges to God the praise of salvation, and throws the blame of perdition upon those who by their choice procure it to themselves. But though I concede to them, that Paul softens the asperity of the former clause by the difference of phraseology, yet it is not at all consistent to transfer the preparation for destruction to any other than the secret counsel of God; which is also asserted just before in the context, that “God raised up Pharaoh, and whom he will he hardeneth.” Whence it follows, that the cause of hardening is the secret counsel of God. This, however, I maintain, which is observed by Augustine that when God turns wolves into sheep, he renovates them by more powerful grace to conquer their obduracy; and therefore the obstinate are not converted, because God exerts not that mightier grace, of which he is not destitute, if he chose to display it.
II. These things will amply suffice for persons of piety and modesty, who remember that they are men. But as these virulent adversaries are not content with one species of opposition, we will reply to them all as occasion shall require. Foolish mortals enter into many contentions with God, as though they could arraign him to plead to their accusations. In the first place they inquire, by what right the Lord is angry with his creatures who had not provoked him by any previous offence; for that to devote to destruction whom he pleases, is more like the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge; that men have reason, therefore, to expostulate with God, if they are predestinated to eternal death without any demerit of their own, merely by his sovereign will. If such thoughts ever enter the minds of pious men, they will be sufficiently enabled to break their violence by this one consideration, how exceedingly presumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the Divine will; which is in fact, and is justly entitled to be, the cause of every thing that exists. For if it has any cause, then there must be something antecedent, on which it depends; which it is impious to suppose. For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, Because he would. But if you go further, and ask why he so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found. Let human temerity, therefore, desist from seeking that which is not, lest it should fail of finding that which is. This will be a sufficient restraint to any one disposed to reason with reverence concerning the secrets of his God. Against the audaciousness of the impious, who are not afraid openly to rail against God, the Lord will sufficiently defend himself by his own justice, without any vindication by us, when, depriving their consciences of every subterfuge, he shall convict them and bind them with a sense of their guilt. Yet we espouse not the notion of the Romish theologians concerning the absolute and arbitrary power of God, which, on account of its profaneness, deserves our detestation. We represent not God as lawless, who is a law to himself; because, as Plato says, laws are necessary to men, who are the subjects of evil desires; but the will of God is not only pure from every fault, but the highest standard of perfection, even the law of all laws. But we deny that he is liable to be called to any account; we deny also that we are proper judges, to decide on this cause according to our own apprehension. Wherefore, if we attempt to go beyond what is lawful, let us be deterred by the Psalmist, who tells us, that God will be clear when he is judged by mortal man.[503]
III. Thus God is able to check his enemies by silence. But that we may not suffer them to deride his holy name with impunity, he supplies us from his word with arms against them. Therefore, if any one attack us with such an inquiry as this, why God has from the beginning predestinated some men to death, who, not yet being brought into existence, could not yet deserve the sentence of death,—we will reply by asking them, in return, what they suppose God owes to man, if he chooses to judge of him from his own nature. As we are all corrupted by sin, we must necessarily be odious to God, and that not from tyrannical cruelty, but in the most equitable estimation of justice. If all whom the Lord predestinates to death are in their natural condition liable to the sentence of death, what injustice do they complain of receiving from him? Let all the sons of Adam come forward; let them all contend and dispute with their Creator, because by his eternal providence they were previously to their birth adjudged to endless misery. What murmur will they be able to raise against this vindication, when God, on the other hand, shall call them to a review of themselves. If they have all been taken from a corrupt mass, it is no wonder that they are subject to condemnation. Let them not, therefore, accuse God of injustice, if his eternal decree has destined them to death, to which they feel themselves, whatever be their desire or aversion, spontaneously led forward by their own nature. Hence appears the perverseness of their disposition to murmur, because they intentionally suppress the cause of condemnation, which they are constrained to acknowledge in themselves, hoping to excuse themselves by charging it upon God. But though I ever so often admit God to be the author of it, which is perfectly correct, yet this does not abolish the guilt impressed upon their consciences, and from time to time recurring to their view.
IV. They further object, Were they not, by the decree of God, antecedently predestinated to that corruption which is now stated as the cause of condemnation? When they perish in their corruption, therefore, they only suffer the punishment of that misery into which, in consequence of his predestination, Adam fell, and precipitated his posterity with him. Is he not unjust, therefore, in treating his creatures with such cruel mockery? I confess, indeed, that all the descendants of Adam fell by the Divine will into that miserable condition in which they are now involved; and this is what I asserted from the beginning, that we must always return at last to the sovereign determination of God’s will, the cause of which is hidden in himself. But it follows not, therefore, that God is liable to this reproach. For we will answer them thus in the language of Paul: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?”[504] They will deny this to be in reality any vindication of God’s justice, and call it a subterfuge, such as is commonly resorted to by persons destitute of a sufficient defence. For what appears to be the meaning of this, but that God possesses power, that cannot be resisted, of doing any thing whatsoever according to his pleasure? But it is very different. For what stronger reason can be alleged, than when we are directed to consider who God is? How could any injustice be committed by him who is the Judge of the world? If it is the peculiar property of the nature of God to do justice, then he naturally loves righteousness and hates iniquity. The apostle, therefore, has not resorted to sophistry, as if he were in danger of confutation, but has shown that the reason of the Divine justice is too high to be measured by a human standard, or comprehended by the littleness of the human mind. The apostle, indeed, acknowledges that there is a depth in the Divine judgments sufficient to absorb the minds of all mankind, if they attempt to penetrate it. But he also teaches how criminal it is to reduce the works of God to such a law, that on failing to discover the reason of them, we presume to censure them. It is a well known observation of Solomon, though few rightly understand it, that “the great God, that formed all things, both rewardeth the fool, and rewardeth transgressors.”[505] For he is proclaiming the greatness of God, whose will it is to punish fools and transgressors, although he favours them not with his Spirit. And men betray astonishing madness in desiring to comprehend immensity within the limits of their reason. The angels who stood in their integrity, Paul calls “elect;”[506] if their constancy rested on the Divine pleasure, the defection of the others argues their being forsaken—a fact for which no other cause can be assigned than the reprobation hidden in the secret counsel of God.
V. Now, to any follower of Manes or Celestius, a calumniator of Divine Providence, I reply with Paul, that no account ought to be given of it, for its greatness far surpasses our understanding. What wonder or absurdity is there in this? Would he have the Divine power so limited, as to be unable to execute more than his little capacity can comprehend? I say, with Augustine, that the Lord created those who, he certainly foreknew, would fall into destruction, and that this was actually so because he willed it; but of his will it belongs not to us to demand the reason, which we are incapable of comprehending; nor is it reasonable that the Divine will should be made the subject of controversy with us, which, whenever it is discussed, is only another name for the highest rule of justice. Why, then, is any question started concerning injustice, where justice is evidently conspicuous? Nor let us be ashamed to follow the example of Paul, and stop the mouths of unreasonable and wicked men in this manner, repeating the same answer as often as they shall dare to repeat their complaints. Who are you, miserable mortals, preferring an accusation against God, because he accommodates not the greatness of his works to your ignorance? as though they were necessarily wrong, because they are concealed from carnal view. Of the immensity of God’s judgments you have the clearest evidences. You know they are called “a great deep.” Now, examine your contracted intellects, whether they can comprehend God’s secret decrees. What advantage or satisfaction do you gain from plunging yourselves, by your mad researches, into an abyss that reason itself pronounces will be fatal to you? Why are you not at least restrained by some fear of what is contained in the history of Job and the books of the prophets, concerning the inconceivable wisdom and terrible power of God? If your mind is disturbed, embrace without reluctance the advice of Augustine: “You, a man, expect an answer from me, who am also a man. Let us, therefore, both hear him, who says, O man, who art thou? Faithful ignorance is better than presumptuous knowledge. Seek merits; you will find nothing but punishment. O the depth! Peter denies; the thief believes; O the depth! Do you seek a reason? I will tremble at the depth. Do you reason? I will wonder. Do you dispute? I will believe. I see the depth, I reach not the bottom. Paul rested, because he found admiration. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable; and are you come to scrutinize them? He says, his ways are past finding out; and are you come to investigate them?” We shall do no good by proceeding any further; it will not satisfy their petulance; and the Lord needs no other defence than what he has employed by his Spirit, speaking by the mouth of Paul; and we forget to speak well when we cease to speak with God.
VI. Impiety produces also a second objection, which directly tends, not so much to the crimination of God, as to the vindication of the sinner; though the sinner whom God condemns cannot be justified without the disgrace of the Judge. For this is their profane complaint, Why should God impute as a fault to man those things which were rendered necessary by his predestination? What should they do? Should they resist his decrees? This would be vain, for it would be impossible. Therefore they are not justly punished for those things of which God’s predestination is the principal cause. Here I shall refrain from the defence commonly resorted to by ecclesiastical writers, that the foreknowledge of God prevents not man from being considered as a sinner, since God foresees man’s evils, not his own. For then the cavil would not stop here; it would rather be urged, that still God might, if he would, have provided against the evils he foresaw, and that not having done this, he created man expressly to this end, that he might so conduct himself in the world; but if, by the Divine Providence, man was created in such a state as afterwards to do whatever he actually does, he ought not to be charged with guilt for things which he cannot avoid, and to which the will of God constrains him. Let us see, then, how this difficulty should be solved. In the first place, the declaration of Solomon ought to be universally admitted, that “the Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.”[507] Observe; all things being at God’s disposal, and the decision of salvation or death belonging to him, he orders all things by his counsel and decree in such a manner, that some men are born devoted from the womb to certain death, that his name may be glorified in their destruction. If any one pleads, that no necessity was imposed on them by the providence of God, but rather that they were created by him in such a state in consequence of his foresight of their future depravity,—it will amount to nothing. The old writers used, indeed, to adopt this solution, though not without some degree of hesitation. But the schoolmen satisfy themselves with it, as though it admitted of no opposition. I will readily grant, indeed, that mere foreknowledge lays no necessity on the creatures, though this is not universally admitted; for there are some who maintain it to be the actual cause of what comes to pass. But Valla, a man otherwise not much versed in theology, appears to me to have discovered superior acuteness and judiciousness, by showing that this controversy is unnecessary, because both life and death are acts of God’s will, rather than of his foreknowledge. If God simply foresaw the fates of men, and did not also dispose and fix them by his determination, there would be room to agitate the question, whether his providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But since he foresees future events only in consequence of his decree, that they shall happen, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree.
VII. They say it is nowhere declared in express terms, that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as though the same God, whom the Scripture represents as doing whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures without any determinate end. They maintain, that he was possessed of free choice, that he might be the author of his own fate, but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God’s omnipotence, by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing besides? But whether they wish it or dread it, predestination exhibits itself in Adam’s posterity. For the loss of salvation by the whole race through the guilt of one parent, was an event that did not happen by nature. What prevents their acknowledging concerning one man, what they reluctantly grant concerning the whole species? Why should they lose their labour in sophistical evasions? The Scripture proclaims, that all men were, in the person of their father, sentenced to eternal death. This, not being attributable to nature, it is evident must have proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God. The perplexity and hesitation discovered at trifles by these pious defenders of the justice of God, and their facility in overcoming great difficulties, are truly absurd. I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. Their tongues, so loquacious on every other point, must here be struck dumb. It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his own decree. If any one here attacks God’s foreknowledge, he rashly and inconsiderately stumbles. For what ground of accusation is there against the heavenly Judge for not being ignorant of futurity? If there is any just or plausible complaint, it lies against predestination. Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his own will. For as it belongs to his wisdom to foreknow every thing future, so it belongs to his power to rule and govern all things by his hand. And this question also, as well as others, is judiciously discussed by Augustine. “We most wholesomely confess, what we most rightly believe, that the God and Lord of all things, who created every thing very good, and foreknew that evil would arise out of good, and knew that it was more suitable to his almighty goodness to bring good out of evil than not to suffer evil to exist, ordained the life of angels and men in such a manner as to exhibit in it, first, what free-will was capable of doing, and afterwards, what could be effected by the blessings of his grace, and the sentence of his justice.”
VIII. Here they recur to the distinction between will and permission, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruction by the mere permission, and without any appointment, of God; as though God had not determined what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, to confess plainly with Augustine, “that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that what he has willed will necessarily come to pass; as those things are really about to happen which he has foreseen.” Now, if either Pelagians, or Manichæans, or Anabaptists, or Epicureans, (for we are concerned with these four sects on this argument,) in excuse for themselves and the impious, plead the necessity with which they are bound by God’s predestination,—they allege nothing applicable to the case. For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of Divine justice,—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame,—since it is certain they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate, it is equally certain, that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. Besides, their perdition depends on the Divine predestination in such a manner, that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason of this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus, only because he foresaw it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name. Whenever you hear the glory of God mentioned, think of his justice. For what deserves praise must be just. Man falls, therefore, according to the appointment of Divine Providence; but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had a little before pronounced “every thing that he had made” to be “very good.” Whence, then, comes the depravity of man to revolt from his God? Lest it should be thought to come from creation, God had approved and commended what had proceeded from himself. By his own wickedness, therefore, he corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, and by his fall he drew all his posterity with him into destruction. Wherefore let us rather contemplate the evident cause of condemnation, which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of mankind, than search after a hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the predestination of God. And we should feel no reluctance to submit our understanding to the infinite wisdom of God, so far as to acquiesce in its many mysteries. To be ignorant of things which it is neither possible nor lawful to know, is to be learned: an eagerness to know them, is a species of madness.
IX. Some one perhaps will say, that I have not yet adduced a sufficient answer to that sacrilegious excuse. I confess it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety; yet I think I have said what should suffice to remove not only all just ground, but every plausible pretext, for objection. The reprobate wish to be thought excusable in sinning, because they cannot avoid a necessity of sinning; especially since this necessity is laid upon them by the ordination of God. But we deny this to be a just excuse; because the ordination of God, by which they complain that they are destined to destruction, is guided by equity, unknown indeed to us, but indubitably certain. Whence we conclude, that they sustain no misery that is not inflicted upon them by the most righteous judgment of God. In the next place, we maintain that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, direct their views to the secret recesses of the Divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature, which is its real source. The testimony God gives to his creation prevents their imputing it to him. For though, by the eternal providence of God, man was created to that misery to which he is subject, yet the ground of it he has derived from himself, not from God; since he is thus ruined solely in consequence of his having degenerated from the pure creation of God to vicious and impure depravity.
X. The doctrine of God’s predestination is calumniated by its adversaries, as involving a third absurdity. For when we attribute it solely to the determination of the Divine will, that those whom God admits to be heirs of his kingdom are exempted from the universal destruction, from this they infer, that he is a respecter of persons, which the Scripture uniformly denies; that, therefore, either the Scripture is inconsistent with itself, or in the election of God regard is had to merits. In the first place, the Scripture denies that God is a respecter of persons, in a different sense from that in which they understand it; for by the word person, it signifies not a man, but those things in a man, which, being conspicuous to the eyes, usually conciliate favour, honour, and dignity, or attract hatred, contempt, and disgrace. Such are riches, wealth, power, nobility, magistracy, country, elegance of form, on the one hand; and on the other hand, poverty, necessity, ignoble birth, slovenliness, contempt, and the like. Thus Peter and Paul declare that God is not a respecter of persons, because he makes no difference between the Jew and Greek, to reject one and receive the other, merely on account of his nation.[508] So James uses the same language when he means to assert, that God in his judgment pays no regard to riches.[509] And Paul, in another place, declares, that in judging, God has no respect to liberty or bondage.[510] There will, therefore, be no contradiction in our affirming, that according to the good pleasure of his will, God chooses whom he will as his children, irrespective of all merit, while he rejects and reprobates others. Yet, for the sake of further satisfaction, the matter may be explained in the following manner: They ask how it happens, that of two persons distinguished from each other by no merit, God, in his election, leaves one and takes another. I, on the other hand, ask them, whether they suppose him that is taken to possess any thing that can attract the favour of God. If they confess that he has not, as indeed they must, it will follow, that God looks not at man, but derives his motive to favour him from his own goodness. God’s election of one man, therefore, while he rejects another, proceeds not from any respect of man, but solely from his own mercy; which may freely display and exert itself wherever and whenever it pleases. For we have elsewhere seen also that, from the beginning, not many noble, or wise, or honourable were called,[511] that God might humble the pride of flesh; so far is his favour from being confined to persons.
XI. Wherefore some people falsely and wickedly charge God with a violation of equal justice, because, in his predestination, he observes not the same uniform course of proceeding towards all. If he finds all guilty, they say, let him punish all alike; if innocent, let him withhold the rigour of justice from all. But they deal with him just as if either mercy were forbidden him, or, when he chooses to show mercy, he were constrained wholly to renounce justice. What is it that they require? If all are guilty, that they shall all suffer the same punishment. We confess the guilt to be common, but we say, that some are relieved by Divine mercy. They say, Let it relieve all. But we reply, Justice requires that he should likewise show himself to be a just judge in the infliction of punishment. When they object to this, what is it but attempting to deprive God of the opportunity to manifest his mercy, or to grant it to him, at least, on the condition that he wholly abandon his justice? Wherefore there is the greatest propriety in these observations of Augustine: “The whole mass of mankind having fallen into condemnation in the first man, the vessels that are formed from it to honour, are not vessels of personal righteousness, but of Divine mercy; and the formation of others to dishonour, is to be attributed, not to iniquity, but to the Divine decree,” &c. While God rewards those whom he rejects with deserved punishment, and to those whom he calls, freely gives undeserved grace, he is liable to no accusation, but may be compared to a creditor, who has power to release one, and enforce his demands on another. The Lord, therefore, may give grace to whom he will, because he is merciful, and yet not give it to all, because he is a just judge; may manifest his free grace, by giving to some what they never deserve, while, by not giving to all, he declares the demerit of all. For when Paul says, that “God hath concluded all under sin, that he might have mercy upon all,”[512] it must, at the same time, be added, that he is debtor to none; for no man “hath first given to him,” to entitle him to demand a recompense.[513]
XII. Another argument often urged to overthrow predestination is, that its establishment would destroy all solicitude and exertion for rectitude of conduct. For who can hear, they say, that either life or death is appointed for him by God’s eternal and immutable decree, without immediately concluding that it is of no importance how he conducts himself; since no action of his can in any respect either impede or promote the predestination of God? Thus all will abandon themselves to despair, and run into every excess to which their licentious propensities may lead them. And truly this objection is not altogether destitute of truth; for there are many impure persons who bespatter the doctrine of predestination with these vile blasphemies, and with this pretext elude all admonitions and reproofs: God knows what he has determined to do with us: if he has decreed our salvation, he will bring us to it in his own time; if he has destined us to death, it will be in vain for us to strive against it. But the Scripture, while it inculcates superior awe and reverence of mind in the consideration of so great a mystery, instructs the godly in a very different conclusion, and fully refutes the wicked and unreasonable inferences of these persons. For the design of what it contains respecting predestination is, not that, being excited to presumption, we may attempt, with nefarious temerity, to scrutinize the inaccessible secrets of God, but rather that, being humbled and dejected, we may learn to tremble at his justice and admire his mercy. At this object believers will aim. But the impure cavils of the wicked are justly restrained by Paul. They profess to go on securely in their vices; because if they are of the number of the elect, such conduct will not prevent their being finally brought into life. But Paul declares the end of our election to be, that we may lead a holy and blameless life.[514] If the object of election be holiness of life, it should rather awaken and stimulate us to a cheerful practice of it, than be used as a pretext for slothfulness. But how inconsistent is it to cease from the practice of virtue because election is sufficient to salvation, while the end proposed in election is our diligent performance of virtuous actions! Away, then, with such corrupt and sacrilegious perversions of the whole order of election. They carry their blasphemies much further, by asserting, that any one who is reprobated by God will labour to no purpose if he endeavour to approve himself to him by innocence and integrity of life; but here they are convicted of a most impudent falsehood. For whence could such exertion originate but from election? Whoever are of the number of the reprobate, being vessels made to dishonour, cease not to provoke the Divine wrath against them by continual transgressions, and to confirm by evident proofs the judgment of God already denounced against them; so that their striving with him in vain is what can never happen.
XIII. This doctrine is maliciously and impudently calumniated by others, as subversive of all exhortations to piety of life. This formerly brought great odium upon Augustine, which he removed by his Treatise on Correction and Grace, addressed to Valentine, the perusal of which will easily satisfy all pious and teachable persons. Yet I will touch on a few things, which I hope will convince such as are honest and not contentious. How openly and loudly gratuitous election was preached by Paul, we have already seen; was he therefore cold in admonitions and exhortations? Let these good zealots compare his vehemence with theirs; theirs will be found ice itself in comparison with his incredible fervour. And certainly every scruple is removed by this principle, that “God hath not called us to uncleanness but that every one should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour;”[515] and again, that “we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them.”[516] Indeed, a slight acquaintance with Paul will enable any one to understand, without tedious arguments, how easily he reconciles things which they pretend to be repugnant to each other. Christ commands men to believe in him. Yet his limitation is neither false nor contrary to his command, when he says, “No man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father.”[517] Let preaching therefore have its course to bring men to faith, and by a continual progress to promote their perseverance. Nor let the knowledge of predestination be prevented, that the obedient may not be proud as of any thing of their own, but may glory in the Lord. Christ had some particular meaning in saying, “Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.”[518] Therefore when we exhort and preach, persons endued with ears readily obey; and those who are destitute of them exhibit an accomplishment of the Scripture, that hearing they hear not.[519] “But why (says Augustine) should some have ears, and others not? ‘Who hath known the mind of the Lord?’[520] Must that which is evident be denied, because that which is concealed cannot be comprehended?” These observations I have faithfully borrowed from Augustine; but as his words will perhaps have more authority than mine, I will proceed to an exact quotation of them. “If, on hearing this, some persons become torpid and slothful, and exchanging labour for lawless desire, pursue the various objects of concupiscence, must what is declared concerning the foreknowledge of God be therefore accounted false? If God foreknew that they would be good, will they not be so, in whatever wickedness they now live? and if he foreknew that they would be wicked, will they not be so, in whatever goodness they now appear? Are these, then, sufficient causes why the truths which are declared concerning the foreknowledge of God should be either denied or passed over in silence? especially when the consequence of silence respecting these would be the adoption of other errors. The reason of concealing the truth (he says) is one thing, and the necessity of declaring it is another. It would be tedious to inquire after all the reasons for passing the truth over in silence; but this is one of them; lest those who understand it not should become worse, while we wish to make those who understand it better informed; who, indeed, are not made wiser by our declaring any such thing, nor are they rendered worse. But since the truth is of such a nature, that when we speak of it, he becomes worse who cannot understand it, and when we are silent about it, he who can understand it becomes worse,—what do we think ought to be done? Should not the truth rather be spoken, that he who is capable may understand it, than buried in silence; the consequence of which would be, not only that neither would know it, but even the more intelligent of the two would become worse, who, if he heard and understood it, would also teach it to many others? And we are unwilling to say what we are authorized to say by the testimony of Scripture. For we are afraid, indeed, lest by speaking we may offend him who cannot understand, but are not afraid lest in consequence of our silence, he who is capable of understanding the truth may be deceived by falsehood.” And condensing this sentiment afterwards into a smaller compass, he places it in a still stronger light. “Wherefore, if the apostles and the succeeding teachers of the Church both piously treated of God’s eternal election, and held believers under the discipline of a pious life, what reason have these our opponents, when silenced by the invincible force of truth, to suppose themselves right in maintaining that what is spoken of predestination, although it be true, ought not to be preached to the people? But it must by all means be preached, that he who has ears to hear may hear. But who has them, unless he receives them from him who has promised to bestow them? Certainly he who receives not may reject, provided he who receives, takes and drinks, drinks and lives. For as piety must be preached that God may be rightly worshipped, so also must predestination, that he who has ears to hear of the grace of God, may glory in God, and not in himself.”
XIV. And yet, being peculiarly desirous of edification, that holy man regulates his mode of teaching the truth, so that offence may as far as possible be prudently avoided. For he suggests that whatever is asserted with truth may also be delivered in a suitable manner. If any one address the people in such a way as this, If you believe not, it is because you are by a Divine decree already destined to destruction,—he not only cherishes slothfulness, but even encourages wickedness. If any one extend the declaration to the future, that they who hear will never believe because they are reprobated,—this would be rather imprecation than instruction. Such persons, therefore, as foolish teachers, or inauspicious, ominous prophets, Augustine charges to depart from the Church. In another place, indeed, he justly maintains, “that a man then profits by correction, when he, who causes whom he pleases to profit even without correction, compassionates and assists. But why some in one way, and some in another? Far be it from us to ascribe the choice to the clay instead of the potter.” Again afterwards: “When men are either introduced or restored into the way of righteousness by correction, who works salvation in their hearts, but he who gives the increase, whoever plants and waters? he whose determination to save is not resisted by any free-will of man. It is beyond all doubt, therefore, that the will of God, who has done whatever he has pleased in heaven and in earth, and who has done even things that are yet future, cannot possibly be resisted by the will of man, so as to prevent the execution of his purposes: since he controls the wills of men according to his pleasure.” Again: “When he designs to bring men to himself, does he bind them by corporeal bonds? He acts inwardly; he inwardly seizes their hearts; he inwardly moves their hearts, and draws them by their wills, which he has wrought in them.” But he immediately subjoins, what must by no means be omitted; “that because we know not who belongs, or does not belong, to the number of the predestinated, it becomes us affectionately to desire the salvation of all. The consequence will be, that whomsoever we meet we shall endeavour to make him a partaker of peace. But our peace shall rest upon the sons of peace. On our part, therefore, salutary and severe reproof, like a medicine, must be administered to all, that they may neither perish themselves nor destroy others; but it will be the province of God to render it useful to them whom he had foreknown and predestinated.”
But, in order to a further elucidation of the subject, it is necessary to treat of the calling of the elect, and of the blinding and hardening of the impious. On the former I have already made a few observations, with a view to refute the error of those who suppose the generality of the promises to put all mankind on an equality. But the discriminating election of God, which is otherwise concealed within himself, he manifests only by his calling, which may therefore with propriety be termed the testification or evidence of it. “For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified,” in order to their eventual glorification.[521] Though by choosing his people, the Lord has adopted them as his children, yet we see that they enter not on the possession of so great a blessing till they are called; on the other hand, as soon as they are called, they immediately enjoy some communication of his election. On this account Paul calls the Spirit received by them, both “the Spirit of adoption, and the seal and earnest of the future inheritance;”[522] because, by his testimony, he confirms and seals to their hearts the certainty of their future adoption. For though the preaching of the gospel is a stream from the source of election, yet, being common also to the reprobate, it would of itself be no solid proof of it. For God effectually teaches his elect, to bring them to faith, as we have already cited from the words of Christ: “He which is of God, he,” and he alone, “hath seen the Father.”[523] Again: “I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me.”[524] For he says in another place, “No man can come to me, except the Father draw him.”[525] This passage is judiciously explained by Augustine in the following words: “If, according to the declaration of truth, every one that has learned comes, whosoever comes not, certainly has not learned. It does not necessarily follow that he who can come actually comes, unless he has both willed and done it; but every one that has learned of the Father, not only can come, but also actually comes; where there is an immediate union of the advantage of possibility, the inclination of the will, and the consequent action.” In another place he is still clearer: “Every one that hath heard and learned of the Father, cometh unto me. Is not this saying, There is no one that hears and learns of the Father, and comes not unto me? For if every one that has heard and learned of the Father comes, certainly every one that comes not has neither heard nor learned of the Father; for if he had heard and learned, he would come. Very remote from carnal observation is this school, in which men hear and learn of the Father to come to the Son.” Just after he says, “This grace, which is secretly communicated to the hearts of men, is received by no hard heart; for the first object of its communication is, that hardness of heart may be taken away. When the Father is heard within therefore, he takes away the heart of stone, and gives a heart of flesh. For thus he forms children of promise and vessels of mercy whom he has prepared for glory. Why, then, does he not teach all, that they may come to Christ, but because all whom he teaches, he teaches in mercy? but whom he teaches not, he teaches not in judgment; for he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.” Those whom God has chosen, therefore, he designates as his children, and determines himself to be their Father. By calling, he introduces them into his family, and unites them to himself, that they may be one. By connecting calling with election, the Scripture evidently suggests that nothing is requisite to it but the free mercy of God. For if we inquire whom he calls, and for what reason, the answer is, those whom he had elected. But when we come to election, we see nothing but mercy on every side. And so that observation of Paul is very applicable here—“It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy;” but not as it is commonly understood by those who make a distribution between the grace of God, and the will and exertion of man. For they say, that human desires and endeavours have no efficacy of themselves, unless they are rendered successful by the grace of God; but maintain that, with the assistance of his blessing, these things have also their share in procuring salvation. To refute their cavil, I prefer Augustine’s words to my own. “If the apostle only meant that it is not of him that wills, or of him that runs, without the assistance of the merciful Lord, we may retort the converse proposition, that it is not of mercy alone without the assistance of willing and running.” If this be manifestly impious, we may be certain that the apostle ascribes every thing to the Lord’s mercy, and leaves nothing to our wills or exertions. This was the opinion of that holy man. Nor is the least regard due to their paltry sophism, that Paul would not have expressed himself so, if we had no exertion or will. For he considered not what was in man; but seeing some persons attribute salvation partly to human industry, he simply condemned their error in the former part of the sentence, and in the latter, vindicated the claim of Divine mercy to the whole accomplishment of salvation. And what do the prophets, but perpetually proclaim the gratuitous calling of God?
II. This point is further demonstrated by the very nature and dispensation of calling, which consists not in the mere preaching of the word, but in the accompanying illumination of the Spirit. To whom God offers his word, we are informed in the prophet: “I am sought of them that asked not for me: I am found of them that sought me not: I said, Behold me, behold me, unto a nation that was not called by my name.”[526] And lest the Jews should suppose that this clemency extended only to the Gentiles, he recalls to their remembrance the situation from which he took their father Abraham, when he deigned to draw him to himself; that was from the midst of idolatry, in which he and all his family were sunk.[527] When he first shines upon the undeserving with the light of his word, he thereby exhibits a most brilliant specimen of his free goodness. Here, then, the infinite goodness of God is displayed, but not to the salvation of all; for heavier judgment awaits the reprobate, because they reject the testimony of Divine love. And God also, to manifest his glory, withdraws from them the efficacious influence of his Spirit. This internal call, therefore, is a pledge of salvation, which cannot possibly deceive. To this purpose is that passage of John—“Hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us.”[528] And lest the flesh should glory in having answered at least to his call, and accepted his free offers, he affirms that men have no ears to hear, or eyes to see, but such as he has formed; and that he acts in this, not according to individual gratitude, but according to his own election. Of this fact Luke gives us an eminent example, where Jews and Gentiles in common heard the preaching of Paul and Barnabas. Though they were all instructed on that occasion with the same discourse, it is narrated that “as many as were ordained to eternal life, believed.”[529] With what face, then, can we deny the freeness of calling, in which election reigns alone, even to the last?
III. Here two errors are to be avoided. For some suppose man to be a coöperator with God, so that the validity of election depends on his consent; thus, according to them, the will of man is superior to the counsel of God. As though the Scripture taught, that we are only given an ability to believe, and not faith itself. Others, not thus enervating the grace of the Holy Spirit, yet induced by I know not what mode of reasoning, suspend election on that which is subsequent to it; as though it were doubtful and ineffectual till it is confirmed by faith. That this is its confirmation to us is very clear; that it is the manifestation of God’s secret counsel before concealed, we have already seen; but all that we are to understand by this, is that what was before unknown is verified, and as it were ratified with a seal. But it is contrary to the truth to assert, that election has no efficacy till after we have embraced the gospel, and that this circumstance gives it all its energy. The certainty of it, indeed, we are to seek here; for if we attempt to penetrate to the eternal decree of God, we shall be ingulfed in the profound abyss. But when God has discovered it to us, we must ascend to loftier heights, that the cause may not be lost in the effect. For what can be more absurd and inconsistent, when the Scripture teaches that we are illuminated according as God has chosen us, than that our eyes should be so dazzled with the blaze of this light as to refuse to contemplate election? At the same time I admit that, in order to attain an assurance of our salvation, we ought to begin with the word, and that with it our confidence ought to be satisfied, so as to call upon God as our Father. For some persons, to obtain certainty respecting the counsel of God, “which is nigh unto us, in our mouth and in our heart,”[530] preposterously wish to soar above the clouds. Such temerity, therefore, should be restrained by the sobriety of faith, that we may be satisfied with the testimony of God in his external word respecting his secret grace; only the channel, which conveys to us such a copious stream to satisfy our thirst, must not deprive the fountain-head of the honour which belongs to it.
IV. As it is erroneous, therefore, to suspend the efficacy of election upon the faith of the gospel, by which we discover our interest in election, so we shall observe the best order, if, in seeking an assurance of our election, we confine our attention to those subsequent signs which are certain attestations of it. Satan never attacks believers with a more grievous or dangerous temptation, than when he disquiets them with doubts of their election, and stimulates to an improper desire of seeking it in a wrong way. I call it seeking in a wrong way, when miserable man endeavours to force his way into the secret recesses of Divine wisdom, and to penetrate even to the highest eternity, that he may discover what is determined concerning him at the tribunal of God. Then he precipitates himself to be absorbed in the profound of an unfathomable gulf; then he entangles himself in numberless and inextricable snares; then he sinks himself in an abyss of total darkness. For it is right that the folly of the human mind should be thus punished with horrible destruction, when it attempts by its own ability to rise to the summit of Divine wisdom. This temptation is the more fatal, because there is no other to which men in general have a stronger propensity. For there is scarcely a person to be found, whose mind is not sometimes struck with this thought—Whence can you obtain salvation but from the election of God? And what revelation have you received of election? If this has once impressed a man, it either perpetually excruciates the unhappy being with dreadful torments, or altogether stupefies him with astonishment. Indeed, I should desire no stronger argument to prove how extremely erroneous the conceptions of such persons are respecting predestination, than experience itself; since no error can affect the mind, more pestilent than such as disturbs the conscience, and destroys its peace and tranquillity towards God. Therefore, if we dread shipwreck, let us anxiously beware of this rock, on which none ever strike without being destroyed. But though the discussion of predestination may be compared to a dangerous ocean, yet, in traversing over it, the navigation is safe and serene, and I will also add pleasant, unless any one freely wishes to expose himself to danger. For as those who, in order to gain an assurance of their election, examine into the eternal counsel of God without the word, plunge themselves into a fatal abyss, so they who investigate it in a regular and orderly manner, as it is contained in the word, derive from such inquiry the benefit of peculiar consolation. Let this, then, be our way of inquiry; to begin and end with the calling of God. Though this prevents not believers from perceiving, that the blessings they daily receive from the hand of God descend from that secret adoption; as Isaiah introduces them, saying, “Thou hast done wonderful things; thy counsels of old are faithfulness and truth;”[531] for by adoption, as by a token, God chooses to confirm to us all that we are permitted to know of his counsel. Lest this should be thought a weak testimony, let us consider how much clearness and certainty it affords us. Bernard has some pertinent observations on this subject. After speaking of the reprobate, he says, “The counsel of God stands, the sentence of peace stands, respecting them who fear him, concealing their faults and rewarding their virtues; so that to them, not only good things, but evil ones also, coöperate for good. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s elect? It is sufficient for me, for all righteousness, to possess his favour alone, against whom alone I have sinned. All that he has decreed not to impute to me, is just as if it had never been.” And a little after: “O place of true rest, which I might not improperly call a bed-chamber, in which God is viewed, not as disturbed with anger, or filled with care, but where his will is proved to be good, and acceptable, and perfect. This view is not terrifying, but soothing; it excites no restless curiosity, but allays it; it fatigues not the senses, but tranquillizes them. Here true rest is enjoyed. A tranquil God tranquillizes all things; and to behold rest, is to enjoy repose.”
V. In the first place, if we seek the fatherly clemency and propitious heart of God, our eyes must be directed to Christ, in whom alone the Father is well pleased.[532] If we seek salvation, life, and the immortality of the heavenly kingdom, recourse must be had to no other; for he alone is the Fountain of life, the Anchor of salvation, and the Heir of the kingdom of heaven. Now, what is the end of election, but that, being adopted as children by our heavenly Father, we may by his favour obtain salvation and immortality? Consider and investigate it as much as you please, you will not find its ultimate scope extend beyond this. The persons, therefore, whom God has adopted as his children, he is said to have chosen, not in themselves, but in Christ; because it was impossible for him to love them, except in him; or to honour them with the inheritance of his kingdom, unless previously made partakers of him. But if we are chosen in him, we shall find no assurance of our election in ourselves; nor even in God the Father, considered alone, abstractedly from the Son. Christ, therefore, is the mirror, in which it behoves us to contemplate our election; and here we may do it with safety. For as the Father has determined to unite to the body of his Son all who are the objects of his eternal choice, that he may have, as his children, all that he recognizes among his members, we have a testimony sufficiently clear and strong, that if we have communion with Christ, we are written in the book of life. And he gave us this certain communion with himself, when he testified by the preaching of the gospel, that he was given to us by the Father, to be ours with all his benefits. We are said to put him on, and to grow up into him, that we may live because he lives. This doctrine is often repeated. “God spared not his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish.”[533] “He that believeth on him, is passed from death unto life.”[534] In which sense he calls himself “The bread of life, he that eateth which, shall live for ever.”[535] He, I say, is our witness, that all who receive him by faith shall be considered as the children of his heavenly Father. If we desire any thing more than being numbered among the sons and heirs of God, we must rise above Christ. If this is our highest limit, what folly do we betray in seeking out of him, that which we have already obtained in him, and which can never be found any where else! Besides, as he is the Father’s eternal Wisdom, immutable Truth, and determined Counsel, we have no reason to fear the least variation in the declarations of his word from that will of the Father, which is the object of our inquiry; indeed, he faithfully reveals it to us, as it has been from the beginning, and will ever continue to be. This doctrine ought to have a practical influence on our prayers. For though faith in election animates us to call upon God, yet it would be preposterous to obtrude it upon him when we pray, or to stipulate this condition—O Lord, if I am elected, hear me; since it is his pleasure that we should be satisfied with his promises, and make no further inquiries whether he will be propitious to our prayers. This prudence will extricate us from many snares, if we know how to make a right use of what has been rightly written; but we must not inconsiderately apply to various purposes, what ought to be restricted to the object particularly designed.