[110] Timæus, c. 16.

[111] Phædrus, c. 166.

[112] γενεαλογῇ.

[113] Alcinous, c. 25.

[114] Phædrus, cc. 51, 52.

[115] For this see the Timæus, c. 17.

[116] This sentence is corrupt throughout, and there are at least three readings which can be given to it. I have taken that which makes the smallest alteration in Cruice’s text.

[117] Phædo, c. 43.

[118] I do not think this can be found in any writings of Plato that have come down to us. Hippolytus probably took it from Aristotle, to whom he also attributes it; but I cannot find it in this writer either. A passage in Arist., Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, c. 6, is the nearest to it.

[119] So Alcinous, c. 29. The other statements in this sentence seem to be Aristotle’s rather than Plato’s. Cf. Diog. Laert., V, vit. Arist., c. 13, where he describes the good things of the soul, the body and of external things respectively.

[120] Alcinous, cc. 28, 29.

[121] Ibid., c. 27.

[122] Ibid., c. 29.

[123] Ibid., c. 26. The passage about the choice [of virtue] is in the Republic, X, 617 C. Hippolytus had evidently not read the original, which says that according as a man does or does not choose virtue, so he will have more or less of it.

[124] Alcinous, c. 30.

[125] This passage is not in the Republic, but in the Clitopho, as to Plato’s authorship of which there are doubts. Cruice quotes the Greek text from Roeper in a note on p. 38 of his text.

[126] Alcinous, c. 30.

[127] Ibid., c. 29.

[128] “Substance” (οὐσία) and “accident” (συμβεβηκός) are defined by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, Bk. IV, cc. 8, 9 respectively. The definitions in no way bear the interpretation that Hippolytus here puts on them. In the Categories, which, whether by Aristotle or not, are not referred to by him in any of his extant works, it is said (c. 4) that “of things in complex enunciated, each signifies either Substance or Quantity, or Quality or Relation, or Where or When, or Position, or Possession, or Action, or Passion.” It is from this that Hippolytus probably took the statement in our text. The illustrations are in part found in Metaphysica, c. 4.

[129] The famous “Quintessence.” So Aetius, De Plac. Phil., Bk. I, c. 1, § 38. But see Diog. Laert. in next note.

[130] This is practically verbatim from Diog. Laert., V, vit. Arist., c. 13.

[131] Hippolytus gives as is usual with him a more detailed account of Aristotle’s doctrines on these points later. (See Book VII, II, pp. 62 ff. infra.) He there admits that he cannot say exactly what was Aristotle’s doctrine about the soul. He also refers to books of Aristotle on Providence and the like which, teste Cruice, no longer exist. Cf. Macmahon’s note on same page (p. 272 of Clark’s edition).

[132] ἐπὶ τὸ συλλογιστικώτερον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ηὔξησαν. Syllogisticæ artis expolitione philosophiam locupletarunt.

[133] Prof. Arnold in his lucid book on Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911, p. 219, n. 4) quotes this as a genuine Stoic doctrine. But Diog. Laert., VII, vit. Zeno, c. 68, represents Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Posidonius as agreeing that principles and elements differ from one another in being respectively indestructible and destroyed, and because elements are bodies while principles have none. For the Stoic idea of God, see op. cit., c. 70. So Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Bk. I, cc. 8, 18, makes Zeno say that the cosmos is God, but in the Academics, II, 41 that Aether is the Supreme God, with which doctrine, he says, nearly all Stoics agree. Perhaps Hippolytus is here quoting Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, VI, 71, who says that the Stoics dare to make the God of all things “a corporeal spirit.” For the Stoic doctrine of Providence, see Diog. Laert., vit. Zeno, c. 70.

[134] ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης οἷον τῆς εἱμαρμένης. Τὸ αὐτεξούσιον is the recognized expression for free will. Note the difference between ἀνάγκη, “compulsion,” and εἱμαρμένη, “destiny.” For the Stoic doctrine of Fate, see Diog. Laert., vit. cit., c. 74.

[135] Diog. Laert., ubi cit., c. 84.

[136] From ψῦξις, “cooling”—a bad pun.

[137] It is extremely doubtful whether the metempsychosis ever formed part of Stoic doctrine.

[138] Zeno and Cleanthes both accepted the ecpyrosis. See Diog. Laert., ubi cit., c. 70. The same author says that Panætius said that the cosmos was imperishable.

[139] σῶμα διὰ σώματος μὲν χωρεῖν, corpusque per corpus migrare, Cr. Macmahon inserts a “not” in the sentence, but without authority. The Stoic resurrection assumed that in the new world created out of the ashes of the old, individuals would take the same place as in this last. See Arnold, op. cit., p. 193 for authorities.

[140] ἀτόμοι, “that cannot be cut.” The rest of this sentence is taken from Diog. Laert., X, vit. Epicur., c. 24, and is quoted there from Epicurus’ treatise on Nature.

[141] With the exception of the Deity’s seat in the intercosmic spaces and the idea that the souls of men consist of blood, all the above opinions of Epicurus are to be found in Diog. Laert., X, vit. Epic.

[142] οὐ μᾶλλον, “not rather.”

[143] See n. on p. 49 supra. The doctrines here given are those of the Sceptics, and are to be found in Diog. Laert., IX, vit. Pyrrho, c. 79 ff. and in Sextus Empiricus, Hyp. Pyrrho, I, 209 ff. Diog. Laert. quotes from Ascanius of Abdera that Pyrrho introduced the dogma of incomprehensibility, and Hippolytus seems to have copied this without noticing that he has said the same thing about Xenophanes.

[144] Diog. Laert., I, Prooem., c. 1, mentions both Gymnosophists and Druids, but if he ever gave any account of their teaching it must be in the part of the book which is lost. Clem. Alex., Stromateis, I, c. 15, describes the two classes of Gymnosophists as Sarmanæ and Brachmans. The Sarmanæ or Samanæi (Shamans?) seem the nearer of the two to the Brachmans of our text.

[145] ἀκροδρύοι, hard-shelled fruit such as acorns or chestnuts.

[146] Roeper suggests the Ganges.

[147] Megasthenes, for whom see Strabo V, 712, differs from Hippolytus in making the abstinence of the Gymnosophists endure for thirty-seven years only.

[148] Nothing has yet been said about any bank.

[149] The whole of this sentence is corrupt. Macmahon following Roeper would read: “This discourse whom they name God they affirm to be incorporeal, but enveloped in a body outside himself, just as if one carried a covering of sheepskin to have it seen; but having stripped off the body in which he is enveloped, he no longer appears visibly to the naked eye.”

[150] ἐγείρας τρόπαιον, lit., “raised a trophy.”

[151] θεολογοῦσι. Eusebius, Præp. Ev., uses the word in this sense. For the Dandamis and Calanus stories, see Arrian, Anabasis, Bk. VII, cc. 2, 3.

[152] This is quite unintelligible as it stands. It probably means that the Brachmans worship the light of which the Sun is the garment, and that they think they are united with it when temporarily freed from the body. Is he confusing them on the one hand with the Yogis, whose burial trick is referred to later in connection with Simon Magus, and on the other with some Zoroastrian or fire-worshipping sect of Central Asia?

[153] ὃς ... ἐκεῖ χωρήσας αἴτιος τούτοις ταύτης τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐγένετο. Does the ἐκεῖ mean Galatia, whose inhabitants were Celts by origin? Hippolytus has probably copied the sentence without understanding it.

[154] Hesiod is treated by Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. II, c. 15, as one who philosophizes, which perhaps accounts for the introduction of his name here.

[155] διδαχθῆναι, ut se edocerent, Cr. So Macmahon. The context, however, plainly requires that it is Hesiod and not the Muse who is to be taught. The rendering of poetry into prose is seldom satisfactory, so I have ventured to give here the version of Elton, which is as close to the original as it is poetic in form.

[156] ὡς στέφανον δάσσαντο.

[157] Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη. One would prefer to keep the word “Aether,” which is hardly “sunshine.”

[158] ἶσον ἑαυτῇ.

[159] τὰ μυστικὰ. The expression generally used for Mysteries such as those of Eleusis. Either he employs it here to include the tricks of the magicians described in Book IV, or he did not mean to describe these last when the sentence was written, but to go instead straight from the astrologers to the heresies. The last alternative seems the more probable.

[160] ἀδρανῆ, infirmas, Cr.

[161] The main question which arises on this First Book of our text is, What were the sources from which Hippolytus drew the opinions he here summarizes? Diels, who has taken much pains over the matter, thinks that his chief source was the epitome that Sotion of Alexandria made from Heraclides. As we have seen, however, Diogenes Laertius is responsible for a fair number of Hippolytus’ statements, especially concerning the opinions of those to whom he gives little space. Certain phrases seem taken directly from Theophrastus or from whatever author it was that Simplicius used in his commentaries on Aristotle, and the likeness between Alcinous’ summary of Plato’s doctrines and those of our author is too close to be accidental. It therefore seems most probable that Hippolytus did not confine himself to any one source, but borrowed from several. This would, after all, be the natural course for a lecturer as distinguished from a writer to adopt, and goes some way therefore towards confirming the theory as to the origin of the book stated in the Introduction.