What we have said about this question is enough for our purpose. Now we would take up the second problem.

Problem Second: Prophetic Mission:—There are two points which are to be discussed in this problem. First, the proof of the coming of the prophets; and secondly an explanation of the fact that the man claiming to be a prophet is really so and does not lie. Many people are desirous of proving the existence of the prophets by analogy—and such are the Mutakallimun. They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends, and is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a being in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people. Hence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world. They have thought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by absurd and far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use. They say that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the observed world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a king and says, “O ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you” and produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge him to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the credentials are the miracles which they perform. For certain reasons this method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people, but when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle. Our acknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is not true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the royal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects that whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man, which are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger. When this is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance of miracles is the special sign of the prophets? This can be proved neither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more impossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they are the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they were found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other. So in this case a proof of anyone’s prophecy is based upon two premises. First, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and secondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet.

Now as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed miracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have admitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither be made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are beyond our conception. The second premise can only be true when we admit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only performed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission. We would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe the existence of the prophets and the miracles. For instance if it has become clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly knows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man can object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved? Even after we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it may seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the premise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other. One cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by reason, because of its possibility. For the possibility to which they refer is in fact really ignorance, and is not found in the nature of things. For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain or not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that is, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as in the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility of a thing by its nature. The necessary (wajib) is quite contrary to it; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found. In this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its nature cannot be changed or transformed. So when one party admits the existence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic mission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says that it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in its case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because we have known the prophets. We say that a knowledge of the messengers from man, leads us to a belief in the existence of messengers from God, as the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion of there being a messenger from Zaid also. This requires a similarity in the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the difficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the future, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our knowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has come into existence. For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the fact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives, that is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing in this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent any messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from our doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do not know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any messenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose anybody to be his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him. We can admit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So when we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles, then how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for this faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved. At the same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience and habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be seen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to have been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a convincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is not, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one whose claim is wrong.

By these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the whole purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put possibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in reality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every one who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except when the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of messengers. It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous things, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive proof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do such things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie. But it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit that the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be performed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a a prophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person, because there is no connection between them and reason, except that we admit that the miracles are one of the works of the prophets, just as curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is certainly a physician. This is one of the fallacies of the argument. Moreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by putting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place of certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims to be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a person, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets, as the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed by the magicians and saints. The condition which they attach with them is that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time claims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to the false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be understood either by hearing or reason. That is, it is said that one whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as we have already said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then they can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this purpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence cannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who think miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly are not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies. Hence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that they cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only imagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who deny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints.

It is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him, that he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy, and that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the performance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing one element into another. Whatever miracles did appear from him were only performed in the natural course of things, without on his part any intention of contention or competition. The following words of the Quran will make this clear; “And they say: We will by no means believe in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth for us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and vines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst thereof in abundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as thou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch for thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to heaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until thou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we may read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as an apostle?”[104] Then again, “Nothing hindered us from sending thee with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with imposture.”[105] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in him, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, “Say, verily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto it, although the one of them assigned the other.”[106] Then further he says, “will they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore ten chapters like unto it forged by yourself.”[107] This being the case the miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which he advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic mission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but how does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his prophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of prophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of any prophet. Besides the people have differed in taking the Quran to be a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a miracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may have become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only word, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by its superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing anything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent. This being the case it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details only, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some people say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority. They do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should be quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be such a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would reply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not as they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy, is based, we believe, upon two principles, which are found in the Book itself. The first being that the existence of the class of men called prophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down laws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education. Their existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated action, as the existence of all things which we have not seen—the lives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and other men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words, (and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been revealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good actions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them give up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions. This is the business of divine apostles. The second principle is, that everyone who does this work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This principle is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it is known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one who can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of the prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and one who does so is a prophet. The Book mentions the first principle in the following:—“Verily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and We have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and Solomon; and we have given thee the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto David; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee, and God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,”[108] and again: “Say, I am not alone among the apostles.”[109] The second principle is that Mohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is, has given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be known from the Quran, where God mentions it. He says, “O men, now is an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down unto you manifest light.”[110] By manifest light is meant the Quran. Again He says, “O men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord; believe, therefore, it will be better for you,”[111] and again, “But those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who believe in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;”[112] and again “God is the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He sent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness thereof; but God is a sufficient witness.”[113] If it be said, how can the first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men who give the Law to the people by divine revelation; and so also, how to know the second principle, that is, that which the Quran contains, about beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that the first principle can be known by the information which these men give about the existence of things, which were not found before, but come into existence after they have informed the people about them, and in a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and teaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and actions, which can be taught by human agency. This is so because if the miracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot be laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation, then it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of laws, as the dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily prove the prophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the former, if they fall very near to it. But standing alone they cannot prove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance of the prophets, if the other kind of miracles, which are its conclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle must be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs while others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. So now it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and how can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearance; as is the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked: How can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a miracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is the business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in many ways:—First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and deeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation; secondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can be achieved by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is known that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic speaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is the case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the Arabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one. If it be asked how can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge and precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they deserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also can be known in many ways. First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be acquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and misery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as charity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness and produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the knowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the soul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not. If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery; and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does not give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a knowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the common people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this, or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education, learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting learning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and giving information about the conditions of the Day of Judgment. When all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about it, “Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like it.” This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit, who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, “Thou couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the divine origin thereof.”[114] Hence God has repeatedly told the people this quality of His prophet. “It is He who hath raised up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,”[115] and, “Those who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet.”[116] This matter can also be known by another method—that of comparison of this Law with the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an unlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it is clear that the Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you could know the past books—the Old and New Testaments. But that is not possible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day of Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would require many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has been called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be on him, has said, “Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped following me,” and the Prophet was right, on account of the universal nature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the human race. So God has said, “say, O men, Verily I am the messenger of God unto you all.”[117] The Prophet has said, “I have been sent both to the white and the black nations.”

The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some foods which agree with all, or most of the people. Such is the case with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation, which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said informing us of his superiority over other prophets, “There is no prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment.” All that we have said must have made it clear to you that the proof of the prophecy of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,—they not being acts which make a prophet.

Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it would be outward satisfaction alone. The first is far better. The only reason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God distinguished him with his revelations.

On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist, and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted with regard to the common people. For the doubts and objections which we have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the sake of truth.

Problem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. This is one of the most intricate problems of religion. For if you look into the traditional arguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such also being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the arguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions. There are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature, teach that all the things are predestined, and that man is compelled to do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in his acts and not compelled in performing them. The following verses tell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined, “Everything have We created bound by a fixed degree;”[118] again, “With Him everything is regulated according to a determined measure.”[119] Further, He says, “No accident happeneth in the earth, nor in your persons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with God.”[120] There may be quoted many other verses on this subject. Now, as to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will, and that things are only possible and not necessary, the following may be quoted: “Or He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), because of that which their crew have merited; though He pardoneth many things.”[121] And again, “Whatever misfortune befalleth you is sent you by God, for that which your hands have deserved.”[122] Further, He says, “But they who commit evil, equal thereunto.”[123] Again, He says, “It shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil which it gaineth.”[124] and, “And as to Thamud, We directed them, but they loved blindness better than the true directions.”[125] Sometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran. For instance, He says, “After a misfortune hath befallen you (you had already attained two equal advantages), do you say, whence cometh this? Answer, This is from yourselves.”[126] In the next verse, He says, “And what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies met, was certainly by permission of the Lord.”[127] Of this kind also is the verse, “Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God; and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself;”[128] while the preceding verse says, “All is from God.”[129]

Such is also the case with the Traditions. The Prophet says, “Every child is born in the true religion; his parents afterwards turn him into a Jew or a Christian.” On another occasion he said, “The following people have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are fit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for it.” The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one’s own environments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other Tradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and man is compelled to follow them.

This condition of things has led Muslims to be divided into two groups. The one believed that man’s wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement, and that according to these he will be either punished or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean between these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God. But this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and the power of doing it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this problem.

As we have said there is another cause of difference of opinion about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority. So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslims are agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and freedom. Again, if man is compelled to do certain deeds, then on him has been imposed a task which he cannot bear; and when he is made to bear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task, such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his Nizamiyyah, that man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He has established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one cannot bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the Mutazilites, on account of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding Asharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil, and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring goodness. In this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as agriculture etc., would become useless. So also would become useless all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine etc. such a condition is quite contrary to all that is intelligible to man.

Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evident that God has created in us power by which we can perform deeds which are contradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed by the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being so the deeds attributed to us are done by our intention, and by the fitness of the causes which are called the Predestination of God, which He has furnished for us from outside. They neither complete the works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause of our intending them—one of the two things. For intention is produced in us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us. For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention, and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing which it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves. To this the following words of God, refer “Each of them hath angels, mutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him; they watch him by the command of God.”[130] As these outside causes take this course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them, and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on the whole, but by their fitness, so it is necessary that actions too should also be within well-defined limits, that is, they be found in a given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us; and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes, are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantity only. This relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes, but also between them and the causes which God has created in our body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner and outer causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also the “Preserved Tablet.”[131] God’s knowledge of these causes, and that which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one can have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said, “Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden besides God.”[132] A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing, before it comes into being. And as the arrangement and order of causes bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be a knowledge of the existence or non-existence of a thing at a certain time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes. This is what is meant by the “keys of the secret,” in the following words of God, “with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth them besides Himself.”[133]

All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by those verses and Traditions which are apparently contradictory. When their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The existent things from our volition are completed by two things: our intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a good answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion, but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called creators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that a man who makes any of the causes to be co-existent with God is like a man who makes the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He means that writing is a word which may be applied to both, but in reality they have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no difference between them. Such is also the case with the word Creator, when applied to God and the Causes. We say that in this illustration there are doubts. It should have been clearly shown, whether the scribe was the Creator of the essence (Jawhar) of pen, a preserver of it, as long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences (Jawahir) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no creator but God—a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that which surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it is on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements that our existence and that of all other things depends. So even if we imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them, all the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number, or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating them that could not exist even for a single moment after birth. But we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not even for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the “Sagacious, the Knowing.”[134] God has called our attention to this fact in His book, “And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service; and the sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His Command;”[135] again, “Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with perpetual night, until the day of Resurrection;”[136] and again, “Of His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance, by your industry; in the other;”[137] and, “And He obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth to serve you.”[138] Further He says, “He likewise compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your service,”[139] There may be quoted many other verses on the subject. Had there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to be grateful to Him.

The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real creator of the child, and the life in it. Such is also the case with agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences. To this refer the words of God. “O men, a parable is propounded unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily the idols which ye invoke, besides God, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned.”[140] This is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said, “I give life and kill.”[141] When Abraham saw that he could understand it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, “Verily, God bringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west.”

On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not apply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God has said, “God created you, and that which ye know.” It should be known that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the knowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must always be understood by a reference to the seen.

So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for every action there is an actor. It being so, the agreement of the Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, if we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the visible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His command and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds, and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling and the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling of hand and voluntary movement, which they would call acquired. So there is no difference between them, except in their names, which never effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.

Fourth Problem:—Divine Justice and Injustice. The Asharites have expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and religion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions, so when a man’s action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad. So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied injustice to himself. He says “God hath borne witness that there is no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom profess the same, who executeth righteousness;”[142] and “Thy God is not unjust towards His servants;”[143] and again, “Verily God will not deal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their own souls.”[144] It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many a verse of the Quran, “That He leads as well as misleads the people?” He says, “God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom He pleaseth;”[145] and, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction.”[146] We would say that these verses cannot be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently contradict them—the verses in which God denies injustice to himself. For instance, He says, “He liketh not ingratitude (Kufr) in His servant.”[147] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. That God has not misled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you from the following verses: “Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy face towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath created man kindly disposed;”[148] and, “when thy Lord drew forth their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam.”[149] A Tradition of the Prophet says, “Every child is born according to the divine constitution.”

These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, “Verily God will cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth” refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes. The meaning of the verse, “If we had pleased, we have given unto every soul its direction,” is that He thought of not creating people ready to err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have done so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which speak of misleading the people. For instance, “He will thereby mislead many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby except the transgressors”[150]; and, “We have appointed the vision which we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran,”[151] and the verses about the number of angels of hell. “Thus doth God cause to err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth.”[152] It means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few, to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or there had been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones, is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little evil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man. “When God said to the angels, I am going to place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know not.”[153] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction of the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be attributed to Him, in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes of direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictory verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations, which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Creator of both. As misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary that it should be attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. But this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good—on account of their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not have existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its existence is better than non-existence, that is,—good. Now the verse of the Quran “No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do; but an account shall be demanded of them,” means that He does nothing because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need doing a thing. If it be so, God needs that thing for His own existence, because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being—and God is free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be evident, that He is not just in the same way as man is just. But it is not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same way as man is, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.

It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the common people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal verses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is impossible (Mustahil) and they think that God has power over it, and then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is weak. As the existence of things free from evil was possible according to the masses, God has said, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell with genii and men, altogether.”[154] This verse means one thing to the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to mean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought we could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with the fifth question.

Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:—The Day of Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ about its condition, but about the visible things by which they should explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are some religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon principles, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category. God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the created things. He says in the Quran, “We have created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion of the unbelievers.”[155] Again, He says, describing and praising the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of this existence, “Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee therefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire.”[156] The ultimate purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran. He says, “Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye should not be brought again before us,”[157] and, “Doth man think, that he shall be left at full liberty, without control?”[158] and further on He says, “I have not created genii and men for any other end, but that they should serve me.”[159] That is the genius out of all creation which could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance of knowing God, “What reason have I that I should not worship him who hath created me? for unto him shall ye return.”[160] Now it being clear that man has been created for a certain work, it is evident that the work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none other; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary that the real purpose of man’s creation be those deeds which are found in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational powers. As there are two portions of the rational powers,—practical and theoretical—it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded of him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people, both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught them the theoretical knowledge of things, which all the people should know, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of goodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts which would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is especially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with other religions, it is found that it is absolutely the best religion. Hence it was the last of divine dispensations.

Now divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the soul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have established the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after death. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from desires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity, for they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and their regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before their separation from the body, for this purification is not possible without it. It is to this that following verse refers:—A soul would say, “Alas, for that I have been negligent in my duties towards God: Verily I have been one of the scorners.”[161] All the religions agree about this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery. This being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything which may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its description in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean to say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of the good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not given any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and bad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions there would be only spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the examples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world, after deducting the trouble borne in acquiring them, and in the same way, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery here, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the people of these religions received from God revelations which those did not receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that illustrations from things visible are best understood by the common people and that they are best led so or checked from an action through them. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their respective bodies, and the best possible ease—in paradise. The bad souls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst possible misery, which they call hell-fire.

This is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions of the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain arguments as to the possibilities of the conditions of that world, which can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot apprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is common to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence of the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into being. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the existence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, “And He propoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation.”[162] In these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the beginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of those is refuted who differentiate between the real and return of the same thing. He says, “He giveth you fire out of a green tree.”[163] The doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the return will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact that God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create the like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of the little from the great. For example, God says, “Is not He who has created the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like unto them! yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator.”[164] These verses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same time refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the verses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all of them are of the kind we have mentioned.

So, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there is a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in illustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to the common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is the most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at the same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the advantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary purpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting to the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they would have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical illustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most exciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal only to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are always very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been divided into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the Day of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like our present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they think that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and termination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The other party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is again subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence with our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as physical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would be useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is physical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will be different from our present body. This is only transient, that will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that even Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he said, “There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names.” It seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another, i. e.; one and the same matter is found in many people and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for their matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then our aforesaid view cannot be true.

The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would say that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, “God taketh unto himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which die not He also taketh in their sleep.”[165] In this verse sleep and death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.